

CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Project
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, N.C. 28461-0429

FILE: B09-13510C

10CFR50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-325
LICENSE NO. DRP-71
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-92-002

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is submitted in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,


J. W. Spencer, General Manager
Brunswick Nuclear Project

TMJ/

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter
Mr. N. B. Le
BSEP NRC Resident Office

210020

9202240266 920217
PDR ADOCK 05000325
S PDR

Handwritten initials/signature

EXPIRES: 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Unit 1DOCKET NUMBER (2)
05000325

PAGE (3)

1

TITLE (4) Automatic ESF Actuation of the Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System Due to Simultaneous Fire Alarms in Two Zones of the Control Room.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NO.	REV. NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
01	17	92	92	-	002	-	00	02	17	92	BSEP Unit 2 05000324
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		085		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)			
				20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)			
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract and Text)			
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)				
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)				
				20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Theresa M. Jones, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(919) 457-2039

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X

NO

DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 17, 1992, Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% and 85% power, respectively. At 0215 simultaneous fire alarms in two zones of the control room resulted in an automatic initiation of the Control Building Emergency Air Filtration (CBEAF) system. The alarms were caused by cooking in the control room kitchen and a person smoking in the Secondary Alarm Station for Security. The kitchen and the alarm station are respectively located in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 electronic equipment room fire detection zones. At 0219, after verification that an actual fire did not exist, the alarms were reset and the Control Building Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning and CBEAF systems were restored to normal line up. An investigation revealed that prior to the actuation, one of the involved fire detection zones had been placed in a condition requiring a limiting condition for operation (LCO), but the responsible group had not been notified to initiate the LCO. However, the fire protection annunciators are in the main control room and the affected fire detection zone is located in a frequently traveled area. Additionally, the area is in close proximity to and environmentally communicates with the control room proper. It is therefore reasonable that a fire would have readily been detected within the same time frame as that provided by a fire watch. An investigation will be conducted into the failure to notify the responsible personnel of the condition. This event will be reviewed with shift operations personnel. This event had minimal safety significance; the systems functioned as designed. Similar events were reported in LERs 1-85-012 and 1-86-007.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1	05000325	YEAR	SEQ NO.	REV NO.	2	
		92	002	00		

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

TITLE: Automatic ESF Actuation of the Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System Due to Simultaneous Fire Alarms in Two Zones of the Control Room.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

On January 17, 1992, Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100 and 85% power, respectively. The common Control Building Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (CBHVAC) system was operating in normal line up; the Control Building Emergency Air Filtration (CBEAF) system was in standby.

EVENT NARRATIVE

At 0215, the CBHVAC system supply dampers positioned to the emergency supply and the 2B CBEAF system initiated automatically. The initiation resulted from simultaneous fire alarms in two fire detection zones of the control room, as designed. The alarms were caused by cooking in the control room kitchen and a person smoking in the Secondary Alarm Station for Security. The kitchen and the alarm station are respectively located in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 electronic equipment room fire detection zones. At 0219, after verification that an actual fire did not exist, the alarms were reset and the CBHVAC and CBEAF systems were restored to normal line up.

The fire alarm in the control room kitchen was activated earlier in the shift when cooking began. Interviews indicate that the time was between 2100 and 2230 on January 16, 1992. At that time the alarm reset. The alarm was activated a second time between 0100 and 0215 on January 17, again due to cooking. The second alarm did not reset and the control building local fire alarm panel was placed in "silence" until the cooking was completed. The time the panel was actually placed in "silence" was not logged. Placing the panel in "silence" prevents the remaining detectors in the affected fire detection zone from initiating an alarm and requires that a limiting condition for operation (LCO) be initiated.

LCOs associated with fire protection are the responsibility of the Radioactive Waste/Fire Protection (RW/FP) staff of Operations. Site personnel are responsible for informing the RW/FP personnel of problems associated with fire protection equipment. Although fire protection personnel were not notified that the panel had been placed in "silence" and no LCO was initiated, the fire protection annunciators are in the main control room and the affected fire detection zone is located in a frequently traveled area. Additionally, the area is in close proximity to and environmentally communicates with the control room proper. It is therefore reasonable that a fire would have readily been detected within the same time frame as that provided by a fire watch.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The initiation resulted from simultaneous fire alarms in two fire detection zones of the control room.

The reason the placing of the fire detection panel in "silence" was not logged and the reason RW/FP was not notified to initiate an LCO has not been determined. An investigation will be conducted.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 1	05000325	YEAR	SEQ NO.	REV NO.	3
		92	002	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

After verification that an actual fire did not exist, the alarms were reset and the CBHVAC and CBEAF systems were restored to normal line up. Fire protection personnel subsequently cleaned the detectors to help prevent spurious alarms.

Until further notice, smoking has been banned at the Secondary Alarm Station by order of the Plant General Manager.

An investigation will be conducted into the failure to log the placing of the fire detection panel in "silence" and failure to inform RW/FP of the condition.

This event will be reviewed with shift Operations personnel. The requirement to log plant status and events in chronological order and to inform RW/FP personnel of problems associated with fire protection equipment will be stressed.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event had minimal safety significance; the systems functioned as designed. The fire protection zone which was disabled by placing the local control panel in "silence" is located in a frequently traveled area. Additionally, the area is in close proximity to and environmentally communicates with the control room proper. It is therefore reasonable that a fire would have been detected in the same time frame as that provided by a fire watch.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

Similar events were reported in LERs 1-85-012 and 1-86-007.

EIIS COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION

<u>System/Component</u>	<u>EIIS Code</u>
CBEAF	VI