

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-397/84-12

Docket No. 50-397

License No. CPPR-93

Licensee: Washington Public Power Supply System  
P. O. Box 968  
Richland, Washington 99352

Facility Name: WNP-2

Inspection at: WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington

Inspection conducted: April 30 - May 4, 1984

Inspector: *Dennis J. Willett*  
D. J. Willett, Reactor Inspector

6-12-84  
Date Signed

Approved by: *R. T. Dodds*  
R. T. Dodds, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section 1

4/12/84  
Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection on April 30 - May 4, 1984 (Report No. 50-397/84-12)

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced safety inspections of safety system/  
component calibration and follow-up of previous inspection open items,  
bulletins, circulars, and TMI (NUREG-0737) activities. The inspections  
involved a total of 28 onsite hours by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were  
identified.

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

- \*J. D. Martin, WNP-2 Plant Manager
- \*G. K. Afflerbach, Assistant Plant Manager
- \*G. D. Bouchey, Director, Support Services
- \*J. F. Peters, Plant Administrative Manager
- \*R. C. Mertens, Plant QA Compliance Engineer
- D. H. Walker, Plant Quality Assurance Manager
- S. Dennison, Nuclear Safety Assurance Engineer
- J. Harrmond, I&C Supervisor
- A. P. Gorlich, Maintenance I&C Training

The inspector also talked with other licensee personnel during the inspections. These included plant staff engineers, technicians, administrative assistants, and document control personnel.

\*Denotes personnel present during the exit interview on May 4, 1984.

### 2. TMI (NUREG-0737) Activities

Item II.K.1.23 (Open), "Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation." This item's source, as identified in NUREG-0737, is from IE Bulletin 79-08. This item requires that all uses and types of reactor vessel level indication, for automatic and manual safety systems and other redundant instrumentation which might give the same status, be described and operators be instructed in the use of available and redundant instrumentation.

Appendix B to the FSAR describes the use and types of reactor vessel indication. Emergency Procedure 5.5.1 "RPV Level Control" does not identify any water level instruments (or equipment numbers), sources of redundant level indication, or other indications relating to vessel level. This item will remain open until adequate instructions are given to operators which identifies sources (including redundant, and other plant indications) for vessel level status.

Item II.K.1.22 (Closed), "Proper Functioning of Heat Removal System." This item's source, as identified in NUREG-0737, is from IE Bulletin 79-08. This item requires that the automatic and manual actions necessary for auxiliary heat removal systems, when main feedwater is not operable, be described and that response procedures are timely.

The licensee has described, in Appendix B to the FSAR, the automatic and manual actions necessary for auxiliary heat removal following a loss of feedwater. System operating procedures 2.42, 2.44 and 2.46 for RMR, HPCS and RCIC respectively address appropriate actions for timely heat removal operation.

Item II.F.2 (Open), "Instrumentation for Detecting Inadequate Core Cooling." This requirement, from NUREG-0737 and NUREG-0578 Section

2.1.3.B, requires an unambiguous easy-to-interpret indication of inadequate core cooling. The Supply System's position is that current water level indication is adequate and has presented its position to the NRC through the BWR Owners Group (BWROG). Additionally, this issue has been addressed by letter from G. Sorensen to A. Schwencer, August 9, 1983. This item is open until the Supply System staff can evaluate the BWROG's recommendations.

No violations or deviations were identified.

### 3. Bulletins and Circulars

The inspector reviewed the licensee's status; review and implementation of IE Bulletins and Circulars. Currently, the following eight IE Bulletins are still open: 78-14, 79-14, 79-26, 80-14, 83-01, 83-03, 83-07 and 84-01. The following seven circulars are open: 79-21, 80-14, 80-18, 80-21, 81-09, 81-13 and 81-14.

IEB 83-08 (Closed) - "Electrical Circuit Breakers With An Undervoltage Trip Feature Used in Safety Related Applications." WNP-2 has undervoltage trip relays instead of undervoltage trip features which are mechanically coupled to the trip linkage. Therefore, there are no undervoltage trip features, as described in the bulletin, used in safety related applications.

No violations or deviations were identified.

### 4. Follow-up of Inspection Open Items

Item 79-19-03 (Closed) - "Level Corrected Specific Gravity Readings." The inspector verified that the licensee has revised the station battery procedures to account for level effects when recording specific gravity readings.

No violations or deviations were identified.

### 5. Calibration

The inspector reviewed the program for calibration of components and equipment associated with safety related systems and their functions, to ascertain the licensee's conformance with the requirements of the technical specifications. This review included discussions with supervisors and personnel responsible for program development and implementation. Completed calibrations for instruments in the following systems were reviewed as follows:

- Reactor Pressure (high) - Channel Functional Test (CFT)  
#7.4.3.1.1.52
- Intermediate Power Range Monitor (IRM) B CFT #7.4.3.1.1.24
- Drywell Pressure (high) CFT's for RCIC, LPCI and ADS #7.4.3.3.1.42

These calibrations are defined as CFT's, channel checks, response time tests, and logic system functional checks. The numbering of the calibration/surveillance procedures corresponds to the same technical specification requirement item number, which should assist in minimizing omission of surveillance items.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 4, 1984. The scope and findings of this inspection, were discussed during the exit interview, and are summarized in paragraph 1 through 5 of this report.