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JUN 22 1984

JOHN S. KEMPER
VICE PRESIDENT
ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 2
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Docket Nos: 50-352
50-353

Subject: Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2
Opening Pressure of Two-Stage Target
Rock Safety/Relief Valves

References: (1) NUREG-0991 Supplement No. 1
(Limerick Safety Evaluation Report)
(2) Telecon - May 3, 1984 between F. Cherny
(NRC) and J. N. Mollick and J. L.
Phillabaum (PECo)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

Reference (1) identified opening pressure of the two-stage Target Rock safety/relief valves as outstanding issue twenty-eight. The following information is provided for your review as agreed upon in the reference (2) conference call.

As a result of the identification of upward setpoint drift on a number of Target Rock two-stage Main Steam Safety/Relief Valves (Model No. 7567F), the BWR Owners' Group approved establishment of a Committee to investigate the problem with funding made available by participating utilities. General Electric administered the proposed program and furnished substantial technical input. Other technical support organizations were Target Rock Company, Sol Levy Inc., and Wylie Laboratories.

On November 10, 1983, the Committee met with the NRC and presented the results of their investigation and recommended actions to correct the problem. A final report on the subject will be transmitted to the NRC before July 1, 1984.

In summary, the report identifies two problems that cause the upward setpoint drift and offers the following corrective actions to prevent or mitigate the problem:

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1. a) Problem - a corrosive action that creates bonding between the pilot disc and seat.
b) Corrective action - periodically refurbish the pilot disc and seat.
2. a) Problem - insufficient clearance between the pilot stem and the labyrinth seal, thus restricting free stem motion.
b) Corrective action - check to assure that manufacturer recommended clearances exist. Make any necessary clearance corrections.

In addition, General Electric will gather and review all SRV maintenance and test reports for two (2) years to assure that the recommended corrective actions are satisfactorily resolving the high setpoint drift problem.

General Electric has also issued supplement 14 to their SIL 196 to all BWR Owners concerning the problem. Its recommendations are in agreement with the committee findings and recommendations.

Although Unit 1 at Limerick Generating Station is not yet operating, its two-stage Target Rock Main Steam Relief Valves were returned to Target Rock for implementation of all applicable supplements of SIL 196 including supplement 14. They are now back on site with all necessary changes, inspections and confirmations of pressure lift settings.

Consistent with the reference (2) conference call, we believe that this information will permit you to satisfactorily close outstanding issue twenty eight.

Sincerely,

Jw Ballayn
JH
JH Kanja

See Attached Service List

JNM/pd 16/9

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