


Nuclear Plant Vogtle
Post Office Box 1800
Waynesboro, Georgia 30389
Telephone 404 714 8114
404 554 9961

2-89

EP ②

Nuclear Plant Vogtle



DATE: March 20, 1990
RE: Site Area Emergency/Alert
Emergency Follow-Up Report
Log: NOTS-00334
FROM: G. Bockhold, Jr.
TO: Distribution List

The attached is a written follow-up report for the Site Area Emergency/Alert Emergency which occurred at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant on March 20, 1990.

If you have any questions, please contact R. M. Odom at 404-826-3201.

J Bockhold

TEW:dmh

Attachment

Distribution Attached

9202200407 920116
PDR ADDCK 05000424
S PDR

8 - HOUR FOLLOW-UP REPORT FOR LOSS OF
A.C. POWER CAUSING SITE AREA EMERGENCY

The following is a summary of occurrences and actions taken for the VEGP Site Area Emergency which occurred on March 20, 1990.

At 0820 CST, Unit 2 was at 100% power and Unit 1 was in its second refueling outage (Mode-6). A construction vehicle backed into a support pole damaging an incoming voltage line, resulting in a loss of offsite power.

The Unit 2 Generator tripped sensing a ground fault resulting in a Unit 2 Reactor trip. Unit 2 Diesel Generator (DG) started and essential electrical power was maintained.

At 0840 CST, a Site Area Emergency was declared due to loss of A.C. power for Unit 1 for greater than 15 minutes. Unit 1B DG was out of service for planned maintenance and the Unit 1A DG failed to automatically pick up the electrical buses with loss of offsite power. Non-essential personnel were assembled and accounted for in accordance with emergency operating procedures.

At 0856 CST, the Unit 1 DG started and loaded successfully, restoring power to the unit.

At 0915 CST, the Site Area Emergency was downgraded to an Alert Emergency.

At 1247 CST, the Alert Emergency was terminated when offsite power was restored to onsite electrical buses.

Neither unit sustained any damage. No one was injured, and there was no radioactive release as a result of this event. Further information will be provided at a later date.

DISTRIBUTION:

Paul R. Lunsford
Director, Emergency Preparedness Division
State of South Carolina
1429 Senate Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Bobby R. Mauney
Aiken County Emergency Services
828 Richland Avenue, West
Aiken, South Carolina 29801

J. Hair
Barnwell County Disaster Preparedness Agency
Barnwell County EOC
Calhoun Street
Barnwell, South Carolina 29812

Harold W. Awbrey
Director Allendale County Disaster Preparedness Agency
P. O. Box 507
Allendale, South Carolina 29810

Billy J. Clack
Executive Director-Georgia Emergency Management
P. O. Box 18055
Atlanta, Georgia 30316-0055

James Earl Porterfield
Burke County Emergency Management Agency
P. O. Box 62
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

Heyward Shealy
Chief, Bureau of Radiological Health
S. C. DHEC
2600 Bull Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

U. S. Department of Energy
Savannah River Operations Office
Office of External Affairs
P. O. Box A
Aiken, South Carolina 29801
ATTENTION: James M. Gaver

C. K. McCoy
42 Inverness Center Parkway
Birmingham, Alabama 35242

xc: Mr. Stewart Ebner ✓
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Vogtle Met Tower Data

3/20/90

2-89

Time, EST	10-meter Tower		ΔT , 10-60 meter °F
	Wind Speed mph	Wind Dir., degrees	
0830	7.0	320	3-22-90 SAM 2.6 -2.8 -1.8
0845	7.0	325	3-22-90 SAM 2.6 -1.6
0900	7.0	340	-1.9
0915	8.0	340	-1.8
0930	8.0	340	-1.9
0945	9.0	340	-2.0
1000	9.0	350	-2.0
1015	9.0	345	-2.6
1030	11.0	350	-2.2
1045	9.0	340	-3.0
1100	8.0	360	-2.1
1115	10.0	360	-2.0
1130	10.0	340	-1.8
1145	7.0	340	-2.0
1200	8.0	350	-2.4
1215	5.0	340	-3.0
1230	8.0	360	-2.7
1245	9.0	340	-2.6
1300	10.0	330	-3.0
1315	8.0	325	-2.7
1330	8.0	300	-2.6
1345	9.0	330	-2.5
1400	10.0	345	-2.5

Lee here @ 2:00 P
Randy @ 1:45 P
Tom @ 2:00 P

Questions

• Dalberg

147 Termination of Emergency

2

no isolation island

• K McCoy

Repairing U#2 about 1/2 way through
U#2 @ 100% power for now

~ 9:30 construction team build into transmission support tower

Feed U#1 transformer

- 1 redundant Transformer out of service
- 1 Diesel out of service

still have Transformer ← this is the one Diesel

- a) Start shutdown
- b) Restart on 2nd tower took 30 minutes on U#1

unit 2 -
Transformer on #1 caused a greater trip than water about down
Normal trip & about down

back to #1 -

water down level on
Heat removal the concern
Temperature 100°F start and 115°F

→ Estimated 2.4 hrs before problem

Notification → auto diesel did not work into long point
Took longer than 15 minutes by back up means
→ GA took 1.5 hrs to notify

Heater (6a) - 15 minutes cushion
Bell County ≈ 50-55 to north
GEMA ≈ 1.5 hrs to notify

Ken Clark - activated again & HQ
6 engine bars + 1 more
→ now determine what happened
no fuel damage
no release of radioactivity

Q - Is this the 1st time Site Emergency?

A - Yes Criteria met for emergency and loss of all onsite & offsite AC power > 15 minutes

Q - Problem with notification

A - Several issues

EWN - auto ring down

2 hrs of time saved per day

Backup system - dial up for each person took longer than they like

Q - Why 55 minutes for Back Count

A -

Q - 30 minutes to restart generators

Notification

A - Confirm reactor safely shut down

↳ go thru events

No speculation

Notify & act

Q - How serious

A - EAL's present in nature

↳ Under SAE

Prepare if a serious event take place

Q - 1 hr delay a serious lapse
- Hard to tell right now

Q - 1 person only notified people
A - Planned for normal means

Q - Person at SRP on stand?
A - No report for help

Q - People must around on site
A - accountability

2 accounts in accounts joint Party let
Emergency meet

Q - Rate need shut down
A - Yes

Q - Reactor?
U # 1 April 9th no effort
U # 2 24 hrs to react probably lowering

Q - % of Power
A - 1100 MW \approx 10 %

Q - What is power coming from
A - Reactor

Q - Power loss to Entire Plant ?

- only U #1
- David not used on #2

Q - Why U #2 try

- protection relay to prevent damage to generator

Q - Unit 1 & 2 reports ?

A - Switchyard common

Q - How long had to power @ 100%

A - 24 hrs to adjust reactor + 1 day to 100% power

Q - Fine some

A - Don't think they violated anything

Q - Time limit for Boiling

A - by 18° in 36 minutes

Day or weeks - from refueling tank

24 hrs plus to fuel tank

Q - Reports to State include residents ?

A - 5 tells

Q - What if residents release

A - that's why we need prompt reports

Q If info out needed could use

A - yes if relevant

step of 60 - it just took longer

Q

CR - Bank Court let

Then after

1: ~~SAE~~ Bank Court - 10:16A call logged in

Q What is closest school to plant

A No school within 10 miles

Q Requirement for Site area

A. Particular concern somewhat handicapped people

Q was that done.

A. By the time they heard it was downgraded

Q SAE ^{9:40} The alert

10:15 downgraded

9:56 - NRC ^{notification}

accident @ 9:20A

9:56A Direct relay in manual

10:04A

Time confusion on Central

1:47 event terminated

25 p End.

6:35 p ~~was~~ tank intake
water chem - #2

Shutdown any foils

O₂ up need to go long cycle clean up.

Don't E I - some a pretty

*EP - (5)

9-87

~~REVISION~~



3/20/90 Repair into SW departure

11:5

From 300 9 mph

5×10^{-2} m/s in tent 2

10^{-4} out still normal

From Jim

- * Met into 9:40 - 1400
- * When + at site + 10:30 eastern Person count
- @ 10:46 person count Fax 68-72°

- EX 10:40 y EPE
- PA affected by blackout, alarms
- Training
 - all people who responded - as they consent
 - Communique, lesson plans & attendance sheets
- Backup E:ANW Electrical Hookup & story
- Accountability
- EVACUATION Time estimates with update
- Control Room (check procedure in CR/TSC)
- ERF what was problem
- NO Info audits
- 2A audit & NEC reports will get

Requested Trajanowski to notify FEMA of interest in office logs
 Communique for state & County & tape

Procedure	Verifed	12/19
91001	7	✓
91002	15	✓
91102	6	8
91401	5	✓
91704	2	/

* 1. Internal Heat Unit 1
2 others

Results

Accountability took from 0925 CDT to never completed

Banking 10/16A

TSC Procedures	verified	41001	Rev 7	} OK
Copy 59		91002	15	
Copy 64		91102	6	
		91401	5	
		91704	8	

3/2/86 Backup ENN

1986 { SC had TWO sep. notations for AS
GA

SRP ^{was to initial} - SC
GA P - GP

———— Both forms and procedure merged into 1

Backup ENN retained as backup

- Backup ENN is found by van 1E some (Security) Direct
- ENN started play as normal 3 period play. ~~to~~ one lock down
 - No battles lock up or games

On 3/22 @ 3:31 pm I was called by A. Boland RII
who was directed by P. Stebbins Div Director to tell me not
to talk to office people. R. Trojainowski would be the contact
through RAC. Determination of important to report would be made
at that time after careful review.

2-2-99

INTRO

2-9/

EP (9)

Herb W. Lichten - RII Reactor Inspector - Test Progn

arrived 8:00A been here about 1 hr
in test abog.

lights dimmed in abog at time

left abog came up here to make off light off phone out

* want to hear any PA or alarm

went back to maint abog.

then to control room arrived \approx 10:00A Eastern time

left Control 10:15

got status from Swartz and Hople

had gotten dimmed back & started

walked past control panel.

in this bldg people being at a rapid pace.

Phone still dead

Team meeting 3:30p
 FRI
 3 RO's
 1 SS
 2 Maint Supv
 3 Maint SAO's
 Comm. room

10:40 PA announcement - visible heat able to go on

went to gate to tell security when in use

10:40 lights back on and called again

then back to control room

* had not know about emergency control to get to CP

had been staying on way to CP between bldgs

2:25

Manager in Control Room - ~~was~~ Busy but started photo, dropped

- no ~~light~~ lights report from bldg

- No power to control panel

TSC - called to control panel

to be paid but never had
any power on site @ time of event

P. Location of ENS

ENW

ERT

UJ CP EP1R2

id 56 Control from manager 24

237 Changing Repair Report Directory record date 2/14/90

3/23

Test of CR location of ENS
 ENN
 ERF

Included CR EPIR's

Control Set 56 " Control Room Manager Set

VEGP Emergency Response Telephone Directory revised date 2/14/90

		CR	3-28/90
91001-C	7	✓	8:50A
91002-C	15	✓	
→ 91102	6	labeled 9/201	✗ wrong Tab
91401	5	✓	correct procedure
91704	8	✓	"Picked Procedure between 91101-C - 91102-C

Control Set 56 Control Room Manager Set

VEGP Emergency Response Telephone Directory revised date 2/14/90

CAPT. T. NASH

BURKE COUNTY

(404) 554-2133 EXT. 54

Eldon / We received a complaint from above that he did not get timely county police notification. Looks like another example of breakdown in offsite notification.

EP (11)

2-93

This person by gender is not by Burke Co. Burke County
was not at 10:16A

2-94

Pauline Jenkins Shift Clerk on left Form

- IN OSOS office
 - Lights out & alarm of Trip
 - Pictures of Ferns (9 1001-C Rev 7 Pg 2)
 - changed it was a NOVE \approx A+5min
 - stand on desk
 - OSOS direct input
 - OS - John Highin ED
 - went to phone 3 min ENN common
 - phone conversation had was to be by Tessa Jones
 - missed ENN dead \approx 6 min
 - again took up ENN
 - 30 years doing cell work died 99 only SC
 - ~~Plant~~ Plant Mgr came in wanted to see form
 - added additional info to form - ~~2~~ form related to 3956
 - continued on cell work
 - after 10:00 went to manual phone to do 10:00 work
 - (10:15 \rightarrow 10:16) saw GEMA, got Banks Cr
 - 1st Max in
 - before Banks Cr on type
 - and 10:00 ...
- | | | | |
|------------|--------|-----|----------|
| 10:30 | 1st No | 404 | 624-7000 |
| phone book | 1st No | 404 | 624-7000 |
- no abnormal phone signs led it in 3-4 hrs
- no call #

- Tried GEMA again after Banks Cr
- Go called in on OS phone \approx 10:25-10:30
- Tried to SS \rightarrow connect had open from that to SS
- ~~ready for~~ 10:40-10:50
- made 3rd Nodpin
- Then TSC had with Jack Davis came into line
- Complete at about 11:00 A

Lat Train April 89

- phone call to be made next night
- BY ENN to include Go
- Part system 2 equipment was able to talk - No 2nd

27. Doing by design

Drill in Feb - 96 Take message only

Get Katerina, Jim, John's test results

↳ Know what's better & good out
of FAX

By adding info a small delay occurred and had to go back to
beginning of previous delay

↳ a lot of request to request for message


↳ let time to use commit phone

2-95

7:20 am - Shift Job

- 0500 office at desk
- came to shift earlier
- Shift 1 hour
- and for shift 3rd shift 4 am
- 7:20 am 2nd to come about mid get on 2nd & 3rd Shift Super plan
- 2nd shift 1st shift 2nd shift 3rd shift 4th shift 5th shift 6th shift 7th shift 8th shift 9th shift 10th shift 11th shift 12th shift
- ~~2nd shift~~ 2nd shift 3rd shift 4th shift 5th shift 6th shift 7th shift 8th shift 9th shift 10th shift 11th shift 12th shift
- 05:00 1st 99' on BUENN
- 1st call - only Barwood get on go
- 2nd call - only Barwood get on go
- 3rd call - only Barwood get on go
- 4th call - only Barwood get on go
- 5th call - only Barwood get on go
- 6th call - only Barwood get on go
- 7th call - only Barwood get on go
- 8th call - only Barwood get on go
- 9th call - only Barwood get on go
- 10th call - only Barwood get on go
- 11th call - only Barwood get on go
- 12th call - only Barwood get on go

1st shift 1st shift 1st shift



1st shift



1st shift

It can't wait until you can make 15 min
out of it. I am at home

Send a lot of love to mother

* Just
- 64
NAME
7 km 147

3/23

Jimmy Cook Ops Dept.

I'm Jim Schwalger's office 2nd Floor Same Bldg. Lights out
went to get food that Jim Control Room

2:07 Went to control room

Saw truck

Truck had left for you, James

+ 2:10

Back to CR

Back to Security yard

Back to CR

Checked Unit 2

Go to TSC - TSC Mgr and attend

*None done since before - ~~now~~ never flooded in any of cells

Then went to Edwig Keller

2 People still coming in

Status board

Went to get Jim Ops Dept. in TSC

2:15 - 2:20

→ still not done had not done any work

1
went to TSC

got everyone a status

2-5 back to CK

Then back to TSC

- sound good plan

Did not know when you should work

3-12/82 - would have to offer

Now level not high

17 - too low

* Forms are in a Control Document ~~Form~~ Fall in Packet
3rd form in SAE

→ Xerox did not work - Broken

Organizing group 3-4 people down, actual inter-connection

→ Communication

Friend gave notes on phone

What is the problem - not that many people have a file

— Would not be a PROBLEM

(samples)

Spoke to a selected group of employees in ~~Indiana~~ ^{Spain} Bldg

- Could see PA on site
- Followed Director to his site
- Had to see PA near admin bldg
- He got him looking at
- He got him looking at ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~fact~~ ^{fact} with
- He got out about a lot of information given to them
- Felt left out

Done / 1/10/84

Chris T. Hart
 SAE - Page Hannon
 Has on Mon

- * MIT info 8:40 - 1400
- * W... 10:30 call - Present
- o 10:46 present - Fin 28.72°
- Ex 10 ...
- ... 71001 7 ✓
- Training 91002 15 ✓
- all people who responded - 91102 6 ✓
- Communicate lesson plans 91401 5 ✓
- Backup ENW Electrical 91704 7 ✓
- Accountability
- Evacuation Time est. #1, Indoor Heat Unit 1
- Control Room (check provide) ✓
- ERF what was problem
- No gaps and's
- 2A codes 2 NRC report will get

Revised Program will be diff FEMA interested in efforts for
 summary for state & federal & state

Backup ENN

2-98

1986 { SC had TWO sep. notification forms
GA

ERP ^{was to include} - SC
GA - GP

———— Both forms and procedure merged into 1

Backup ENN retained as backup

- Backup ENN is formed by von IE some (Security Dept)
- ENN electrical plug as normal 3 pronged plug. ~~is~~ one locking device
 - No battery back up or printer

Edward Kozaneky Shift Superintendent
Grand SRD

Result in plot 5/21/7 CR

17060-5 under F4

Answered Kupus Florida Co ALC 60 or from Central Road

3/23

(samples)

Spoke to a selected group of employees in ~~Admin~~ Bldg.

- Could hear PA on site
- Followed Division to test site
- Hard to hear PA near admin Bldg
- No problem hearing out
- No game of floor but in ~~area~~ a det. foot walk
- 3 hrs out still not a lot of information passed on to them
- Felt left out

Doug Haight

Chris Akert
 SAE - Page Annou-
 Here on Mon

H.2 Corporate and News Center Facilities

Descriptions of the corporate facilities used during emergencies and the Emergency News Center are described in appendix 7 and appendix 8, respectively.

H.3 Activation and Staffing of Emergency Facilities

During the initial stages of an emergency situation, emergency activities at VEGP are directed from the control room. For a Notification of Unusual Event, no other facilities need be activated. | 1

Upon declaration of an Alert or higher level classification, the TSC will be activated and will be fully operational within about an hour of the initial notification. Overall direction and control will be exercised from the TSC for an Alert situation. For Site Area and General Emergency categories, the TSC will be the command center if the emergency director chooses, at least until the EOF is activated. | 5
46 MIN

Activation of the OSC will be initiated at an Alert or higher level classification. Support personnel will be directed to report to that facility as appropriate for the specific situation. The OSC will be operational within about an hour of initial notification. | 5
46 MIN

The EOF will be brought to a standby status for an Alert and will be activated for a Site Area or General Emergency classification. This facility will be operational within about an hour of the initial notification. VEGP security personnel will establish access control to the EOF, since it is outside the plant security area. The emergency director may establish himself either at the TSC or EOF at his option. | 5
55 MIN

H.4 Plant Monitoring and Data Handling Systems

1. GEOPHYSICAL PHENOMENA MONITORS

a. Meteorological

A meteorological monitoring program is in place at VEGP. Instruments are mounted on a 60-m tower located to the south-southwest of the power block. Parameters measured and transmitted to the control room include:

- Windspeed (10 m and 60 m).
- Wind direction (10 m and 60 m).

REV 0 11/30/84
 REV 1 5/85
 REV 2 11/85
 REV 5 2/86

- Standard deviation of horizontal wind direction (10 m).
- Vertical temperature difference (10 m and 60 m).
- Ambient temperature (10 m).
- Dewpoint temperature (10 m).
- Precipitation (base).

An equipment building which houses the recording, calibration, and amplification equipment is located near the base of the tower. The system is powered by an uninterruptible power supply consisting of wet cell batteries, charger, and inverter for high availability.

The important parameters for characterizing the transport of airborne radioactivity are windspeed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability (derived from the standard deviation of the horizontal wind direction or vertical temperature difference). These meteorological parameters are used in a calculational methodology to assess the offsite radiological consequences of accidental releases of airborne radioactivity. The methodology is described in section I, Accident Assessment.

b. Hydrologic

The normal source of plant cooling water is the Savannah River, which provides makeup to the cooling towers. The probable maximum flood level has been determined to be about 140 ft mean sea level (MSL). However, since the access elevations to safety-related structures are at 220 ft MSL, high river level is not relevant to plant safety. The ultimate heat sink for VEGP is the nuclear service cooling water towers. Two 100-percent towers are provided for each unit, and the system will provide sufficient shutdown cooling for approximately 30 days with no makeup. Because of these design features, hydrologic monitors will not be required for initiation of emergency actions; therefore, there will be no emergency levels based on hydrologic monitors.

REV 0 11/30/84
REV 1 5/85
REV 2 11/85
REV 5 2/86

John Hopham Shift Supervisor Unit 1

- Know power out
- Know trend on
- Know Dist TRIP
- D-CAM on again
- Tripped 2nd time low jacket water pressure
-

*EP (18)
Need to talk to
him in greater detail
about EP only.

2-100

3/24 9:50A

Capt. William Johnson

2-101

- SAS at PA desk in
- Security Guard of TRUCK prior to this
- PA in SAS inop → ^{can't} repaired several times
- Tons for Sets Area
- Check to be sure it was sent (Wed. in that day)
- Alarm Station Operator in CASS said it was sent
- Sent EXN memo to Control room
- Actions TSC & OSC not made for accountability
- Reported to Desk in office to check procedure Manual Set 2
91704-C Br. 8
- Double Lt. Stewart to ~~prepare~~ prepare papers for accountability
how long did he need to wait
- Wait until non essential people had exited till computer room
→ Not yet notified

- 10:25 John Hopkins called to get truck things
- 11:20 called by ED to prepare accountability
- at conference with John Hopkins he told incident account
of Unit 1 station
- I will see to early dismissal of evacuation
- → He said no early dismissal or no Evacuation of Unit 1 Control
- → He said he to see some do early dismissal of Unit 1
Pg. 9 of 16 - Step 10
- → duplicate to ECF to do see get
- → sent people to EVC @ Warehouse (no one should be there they
all went to Visitor Center)
- → access was limited at gate
- → Officer at gate was told to go to relocation center for decon
HP would be there - people leaving told him that early
was told by other supervisor to do so
- → Account - I see we would leave
- ③ People stayed in capsules - " people taking advantage of decon
food EVC people outside
of test area

* Technician never notified accountability

1st report 1977 not accounts for in Part A.M.
2nd 110
3rd 49
7 hrs T. Minister

= see below

- Notified by COS early about what was in classified
- Stress in Badge Train what people should do, especially craft people
- Method of accountability failed 2 or 3 times would not work - this has been part of criticism in part. Drills do not test real problems.
~~Not~~ People not in ~~force~~ TSC, CF, SAS, CAS, OSC or Security Post are not accounts for

• Few traffic problems at light - Confusion $\frac{1}{2}$ hour relocation center

- [People don't know what to do.
Too many chiefs!]

Security Force

• No basis - a good job

→ Requires force not requires qualified $\frac{1}{2}$ sent to 1977

• 2 people say: Qualified E.M. ~~Group~~ Commission 5 to 6 / night

"Real disappointment on how plant performed" "Have been told that it would not work"

→ Miscommunication caused some people to leave rather to stay.

* Concern that no individual not able to assist in least back;

• Concern some small factors etc.

• Safety should have etc.

3/24/90 4:30p

FROM - CAPT. W.L. JOHNSON, JR. - G.P.C. SECURITY
TO - ELOAN TESTA - USNRC.

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ON SITE (INSIDE P.A.)
AT 2200 HRS./ 19 MARCH 90 ^{TIME PERIOD} (1700-2200 HRS) — APPX. - (646)
(NIGHT BEFORE EVENT ON 20 MARCH 90 - SITE AREA EMERGENCY)

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ON SITE (INSIDE P.A.)
AT 1001 HRS./ 20 MARCH 90 ^{TIME PERIOD} (0500-1000 HRS.) — APPX. - (1188)
(DAY THE EVENT OCCURED - SITE AREA EMERGENCY)

Computer Printouts are available.

3/24

Lt William Stewart - Security

- Checking camp posts inside ^{1st sub. camp} PESS - ED when David went out in SAS
- Found unexpected OK
- 50 minutes required for loss of post
- Physique went out to check on security person in truck (all people too)
- sent 1 column ~~out~~ when NET lacked SAE
- came back to SAS immediately
- In SAS 3 Bdegs returned (~~also~~ only had 4 ^{3rd line} later than usual 5)
 - ↳ one + W. Stewart doing account

Dad accountable by procedure cost. well here

10 min. rain site account after SAE

account 30 min (in process)

↳ 177 accounts for

↳ CR, OSA, TSC all gas left

↳ 133 accounts for

↳ Lt. Quinn in CR

↳ Jimmy Cook - told him to do PA again

↳ Clark

↳ Cook

↳ Oiler in Service Bldg still there

Stewart made 2nd account

ED first - ~~off~~ Stewart to say "For accountability purposes 'all non-essential personnel report to base commander Patrick Fort' by Jimmy Cook"

after 2nd PA - now they blew accounts

- now about 47 people

4th account

- now a total of 5 reports now did get accounts

PA in alarm station - Conflict in Procedure - ED 9204

ED now directed him to do train

Drill - not realistic

↳ extra shift provide all the extra people.

↳ ~~but~~ if ambulances had to come in then had to find people.

3/24

Drill only selected people have
Coferin report.

=

APA Fred take not paid for
0 150

* Drill only 2 page long
real amount 12 page long

= Last one of 5 was 6 page long.

Not required. Qualified

1988 212 UE
 6 Alt
 0 SAE

1989 197 UE
 12 Alt
 0 SAE

FROM Bib TROT.
 3/24/90
 @ 12:11 P

9:41 SRP

10:13 - TSC to Gen

10:59 - TSC to Gen & to alert

11:41 - ENW → CR was let them that "SAE"
 no link

2-104

EP (22)

B. ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION

Initial staffing of the onsite emergency organization will be provided from personnel normally employed at the site. For reference throughout this section, the organizational chart for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) staff is presented in figure B-1. If the need arises, this staff will be augmented substantially by the addition of other Georgia Power Company (GPC) personnel and by personnel from other organizations. This section includes a description of the emergency duties of the normal shift complement, a discussion of the manner in which emergency assignments are to be made, a listing of additional support personnel on whom GPC can rely, and a description of the relationships between onsite and offsite response activities.

B.1 Normal Plant Organization

The organizational structure shown on figure B-1 represents the pool of personnel available on site during normal working hours. Approximately 700 people will be stationed at the site during the standard workday when construction and startup activities have been completed.

The normal operating crew for each unit includes one shift supervisor, one plant operator, one assistant plant operator, and two plant equipment operators. An operations supervisor is also on shift during operation (as defined in the Technical Specifications). Personnel from the Chemistry and Health Physics, Maintenance, and Security Departments are also on site continuously.

B.2 Emergency Organization

The emergency director has the responsibility to classify an event in accordance with the emergency classification system (described in section D). Classification of an event into one of the four emergency categories (Notification of Unusual Event (NUE), Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency) activates the VEGP emergency organization. The extent to which the emergency organization is activated depends on the severity of the situation. Table B-1 provides a summary of personnel available on shift and those who would be available within 60 min of notification.

For an NUE, the emergency director assigns responsibility for making the appropriate notifications and directing the proper response; but no further activation of the emergency organization is required.

If the event is classified as an Alert, the technical support center (TSC), operations support center (OSC), and General Office Operations Center (GOOC) will be activated.

For this classification, the emergency organization is structured as shown on figure B-2. The corporate emergency organization will also be activated. The organization for corporate response is shown on figure B-4, and further information about the corporate resources and operations is presented in the GPC Corporate Emergency Plan (appendix 7). Corporate personnel who report to the plant site will be integrated into the VEGP emergency organization. In addition, the emergency operations facility (EOF) will be brought to a standby status.

For a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, the emergency organization and EOF will be fully activated. The organization will be as shown in figure B-3.

Relationships among the VEGP emergency organization and other elements of emergency response are shown on figure A-1.

B.2.1 Emergency Organization Responsibilities

Following an Alert or higher emergency declaration, the positions shown on figures B-2 and B-3 will be filled by GPC personnel as discussed below.

1. EMERGENCY DIRECTOR

The individuals designated as emergency director are the general manager-nuclear plant; plant manager; vice president-nuclear (Vogtle); manager, operations; plant support manager; onshift operations supervisor; and shift supervisor. The qualifications of the listed individuals include the emergency response training specified in table 0-2 of this plan and the qualifications for their normal positions as managers or supervisors of nuclear operations as shown in table B-2. Tables 13.1.1-1 and 13.1.3-1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report identify their qualifications to assume their normal plant positions.

The emergency director has the authority, management ability, and knowledge to assume the overall responsibility for directing VEGP staff in an emergency situation. Initially this position will be filled by the onshift operations supervisor or the shift supervisor if the onshift operations supervisor is not

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immediately available. The responsibility for emergency direction will be transferred to the general manager-nuclear plant, or an alternate after receiving an appropriate briefing and becoming familiar with the current status of events.

Turnover with the accompanying briefing will include, but is not limited to, the following:

1. Review of logs and status boards.
2. Discussion with the incumbent including emergency classification, summary of events, offsite notifications, plant status, equipment status, outstanding orders, any noted deficiencies and completed checklist items.
3. Discussion with staff, as needed.

Following relief, announcement will be made to staff of the transfer of responsibility. (See Procedure 91102 for specifics.) The primary and alternates for the position of emergency director are shown on table B-2.

The emergency director manages the following activities for the duration of the emergency:

- Notification and communication: directs the notification of VEGP and GPC personnel and notifies and maintains open communications with offsite authorities regarding all aspects of emergency response.
- Emergency response facilities: oversees the activation and staffing and requests additional assistance, as needed.
- Emergency operations: has authority over those actions taken to mitigate the emergency condition or reduce the threat to the safety of plant personnel or the public, including the recommendation of protective actions to offsite authorities.
- Emergency services: provides overall direction for management of procurement of site-needed materials, equipment, and supplies; documentation; accountability; and security functions.

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- Emergency operations planning: provides overall direction for the management of planning for procedure, equipment, and system development to support emergency operations.
- Discretionary authority: can modify emergency implementing procedures in accordance with plant Technical Specifications; may tailor the emergency organization to fit the specific staffing needs on a case-by-case basis.

The emergency director may not delegate the following responsibilities:

- The decision to notify offsite emergency response agencies.
- The decision to recommend protective actions to offsite authorities.
- Declaration of emergency classifications.
- Authorization for plant personnel to exceed 10 CFR 20 radiation exposure limits.
- The decision to downgrade the emergency classification or terminate the emergency.
- Request for Federal assistance.
- The decision to order evacuation of non-essential personnel from the site at an Alert classification level.

The emergency director may operate from the control room, TSC, or EOF at his discretion. He may act as the TSC manager during the early phases of emergency response until the EOF is activated.

2. TSC STAFF

a. TSC Manager

The TSC manager performs the following activities:

- Coordination of inputs and recommendations from technical and corrective action advisors.
- Direction of onsite emergency personnel involved in restoration of the plant to a safe condition.

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- Technical assistance and operations guidance to control room personnel.
- Direction of TSC staff in analysis of problems, design and planning for temporary modifications, and development of temporary emergency operating procedures.
- Recommendation of protective actions to the emergency director based on plant conditions.
- Providing recommendations on emergency classifications to the emergency director.

b. TSC Support Coordinator

The TSC support coordinator directs the clerical and logistic activities in the TSC. He ensures that support staff, including clerks, status board keepers, and communicators, are available in sufficient numbers and that office supplies, drawings, and other documents are available to TSC and OSC personnel. He is responsible for timely completion of offsite notification. He ensures that transportation and communication needs are satisfied. He arranges for additional offsite support personnel and equipment working in conjunction with the EOF support coordinator. (Primary and alternates are identified on table B-2).

c. Engineering Supervisor

The engineering supervisor directs a staff of engineers with expertise in reactor engineering, thermal and hydraulic analysis, instrumentation and control, and mechanical and electrical systems. He directs the analysis of plant problems and provides recommendations for plant modifications to mitigate the effects of the accident.

d. Maintenance Supervisor

The maintenance supervisor manages the planning and coordination of repair, damage control, and plant modification activities. He works closely with the engineering supervisor in planning for plant modifications and repairs.

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e. Operations Supervisor

The operations supervisor analyzes problems associated with systems operations and provides recommendations for procedures for mitigating the emergency situation.

f. Health Physics Supervisor

The health physics supervisor is responsible for onsite and in-plant radiological controls. He provides guidance to the maintenance supervisor related to radiological considerations associated with plant modification and repair and provides direction to the OSC manager related to the health physics controls for emergency teams. He performs offsite dose assessment prior to EOF activation and keeps the dose assessment manager in the EOF informed of the radiological status of the plant.

g. Chemistry Supervisor

The chemistry supervisor is responsible for directing and evaluating in-plant chemistry and analyses, directing and evaluating post-accident sampling system (PASS) sampling, and directing core damage assessment.

h. TSC Security Coordinator

The TSC security coordinator coordinates the security functions including accountability and access control.

3. OSC STAFF

a. OSC Manager

The OSC manager receives direction from the TSC personnel to dispatch emergency teams (e.g., firefighting, search and rescue, first aid, repair, etc.) to prescribed areas of the plant or site. The OSC manager directs composition of the teams to ensure that appropriately qualified personnel are assigned. In particular, he will ensure that proper health physics coverage is provided. The OSC manager will provide specific instructions to the team leaders and will maintain communications with the teams that remain assigned to the OSC, to monitor the status of their activities.

b. OSC Personnel

Selected emergency response personnel will report to the OSC as directed. Depending on the nature of the emergency, personnel from the Maintenance, Operations, Chemistry and Health Physics Departments will be directed to report to the OSC. The following emergency teams will be formed as necessary:

- Backup fire brigade.
- Search and rescue.
- First aid.
- Damage assessment.
- Damage control.
- Repair and modification.
- In-plant radiological monitoring.
- Field monitoring.

Each team will be headed by a designated team leader, who will maintain communication with the OSC.

4. EOF STAFF

The emergency director will normally manage the VEGP emergency organization from the EOF. In addition to serving as the overall command center, the EOF is the location where offsite response activities are coordinated and initial reentry and recovery actions are planned.

a. EOF Manager

The EOF manager manages the following activities:

- Overall direction and control of offsite GPC response.
- Communication of radiological information to State and local emergency response agencies.
- After consultation with the emergency director, provides support for initial activities associated with planning for site reentry or recovery operations.

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b. EOF Security Coordinator

The EOF security coordinator has the following responsibilities:

- Access control for the EOF.
- Processing of personnel who require authorization to enter the site.
- Requesting assistance through the emergency director for civil law enforcement authorities, if required.

c. EOF Support Coordinator

The EOF support coordinator performs the following functions:

- Ensures timely completion of offsite notifications in coordination with the TSC support coordinator.
- Ensures the availability of an adequate number of administrative personnel for F¹ and TSC operations.
- Develops a duty roster for extended emergency operations, if necessary.
- Obtains and distributes office supplies, office equipment, drawings, and documents, as necessary.
- Provides temporary quarters, food, and water as necessary for emergency workers.
- At the request of the EOF manager or emergency director, makes contact with private organizations to provide support services.
- Expedites procurement of necessary materials or equipment.
- Arranges for offsite support personnel and equipment.

d. Dose Assessment Manager

The dose assessment manager is responsible for the evaluation of offsite radiological conditions; his specific responsibilities include:

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- Performance of offsite dose calculations in accordance with plant procedures.
- Direction of GPC environmental and field monitoring teams.
- Comparison of calculated offsite dose rates with measured values.
- Comparison of calculations and measurements with state and federal groups performing radiological assessment.
- Projection of radiological consequences offsite, based on anticipated or predicted plant conditions.
- Recommending protective actions to the EOF manager, based on actual or projected offsite radiological consequences.

5. OTHER CORPORATE PERSONNEL

The Corporate Emergency Plan (appendix 7) describes the actions to be taken by GPC's Nuclear Operations Department in the event of an emergency. The executive vice-president, nuclear operations, may supplement the VEGP emergency organization with additional resources and personnel from Hatch Nuclear Plant, which is within about 2 h driving time.

B.2.2 Emergency Organization Assignments

Table B-2 identifies by title the individuals who will fill the key emergency positions. No individual listed in table B-2 is identified as the primary candidate for more than one emergency position. There is some duplication, since some primary candidates are identified as alternates for other emergency positions or are identified as alternates for more than one position. A sufficient number of people are identified to ensure that all emergency positions on table B-2 will be filled.

B.2.3 Other Support Services

1. CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Arrangements have been made to obtain support services from Bechtel Power Corporation and Westinghouse, if required. These organizations will initially be

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contacted by the EOF support coordinator to arrange for the required assistance. | 5

2. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

Agreements are in place with Radiation Management Corporation, Burke County Hospital, Hazana Hospital, and Burke County Ambulance Service (see appendix 2) to provide assistance for injured personnel, including cases involving radioactive contamination. This assistance will be requested whenever necessary in accordance with plant procedures.

3. AGENCY SUPPORT

Assistance may be requested from Burke County, the State of Georgia, or Federal agencies. Section A of this Plan describes the assistance that may be requested. Any requests for aid will be made by the emergency director.

B.2.4 Interfaces Among Response Groups

Section A, figure A-1, illustrates the integrated organization for response to an emergency at VEGP.

TABLE B-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)

MINIMUM STAFFING FOR POWER OPERATION

Major Functional Area	Major Tasks	Position title or Expertise	In Shift	Augmentation in 60 min
Plant operations and assessment of operational aspects		Operations supervisor (SRO)	1	-
		Shift supervisor (SRO)	1	-
		Plant operator (RO)	4	-
		Assistant plant operator (RO)	1	-
		Plant equipment operator	2	-
Emergency direction and control (emergency director)	Overall management of emergency organization	Shift supervisor; onshift operations supervisor	1	-
Notification/communication	Notification of GPC, State, local, and federal personnel	Shift clerk or other trained personnel	2	2
Radiological accident assessment and support of operational accident assessment	EOE direction Offsite dose assessment	Manager or superintendent	-	1
		Health physics foreman	1	-
	Offsite surveys onsite (out of plant)	Chemistry technicians and other trained personnel	5	6
Plant system engineering, repair and corrective actions	Chemistry/radiochemistry	Chem technicians or equivalent	1	1
	Technical support (including core/thermal hydraulics)	Shift technical advisor or engineer	1	-
		Electrical	-	1
		Mechanical	-	1
	Repair and corrective actions	Mechanical maintenance	1	1
		Radwaste operator	-	1
		Electrical maintenance	1	1
Instrumentation and control technician		1	-	
Protective actions (in plant)	Radiation protection: - Access control - HP coverage for repair, corrective actions, search and rescue, first aid, and firefighting - Personnel monitoring - Dosimetry - Decontamination - In-plant Survey	Rad technicians or other trained personnel	2	2

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TABLE B-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)

MINIMUM STAFFING FOR POWER OPERATION

Major functional Area	Major tasks	Position title or Expertise	On Shift	Augmentation in 60 min
Firefighting	-	-	Fire brigade per Technical Specifications	Local support
Rescue operations and first aid	-	-	2 ^(a)	Local support
Site access control and personnel accountability	Security, firefighting communications, personnel accountability	Security personnel	Per Security Plan	
		Totals	26 ^(a)	15

- Refer to technical specifications for two-unit operation.
- May be provided by shift personnel assigned other functions.
- Required unless operations supervisor or the individual with a senior operator license meets the qualification for the STA as required by the NRC.
- Does not include positions footnoted with a (b) or (c).

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TABLE B-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2)

EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENTS


Emergency Position	Primary	Alternate(s)
Emergency director	General manager-nuclear plant or vice-president-nuclear	Plant manager; manager, operations; operations superintendent; plant support manager; onshift operations supervisor; shift supervisor
EOF manager	Outage and planning manager	Plant training and emergency preparedness manager; health physics superintendent; work planning, and controls superintendent;
EOF support coordinator	Manager, general support	Superintendent of administration; administration supervisors
Dose assessment manager	Health physics superintendent	Health physics supervisors; health physicist
Public information manager	Director corporate communication	Emergency Communications Supervisor; Speech and information services supervisor
Dose analyst	Health physicist	Radiological engineer; health physics supervisor; health physics foreman
EOF security coordinator	Nuclear security manager	Nuclear security supervisor(s); nuclear security shift supervisor
TSC manager	Plant manager	General manager-nuclear plant; plant support manager; manager, operations; operations superintendents
TSC support coordinator	Document control supervisor	Administration supervisors
Engineering supervisor	Engineering support superintendent	Engineering supervisors
Maintenance supervisor	Maintenance superintendent	Maintenance supervisors
Operations supervisor	Manager, operations	Deputy manager of operations; operations superintendents; operations supervisors
Health physics supervisor	Health physics supervisor	Laboratory supervisors; health physics foreman
Chemistry supervisor	Chemistry superintendent	Chemistry supervisor; chemistry foreman.
Engineers	Designated plant engineers	
TSC security coordinator	Nuclear security supervisor	Other nuclear security supervisor(s); nuclear security shift supervisor
Chemist	Plant chemist	Chemistry supervisor; chemistry foreman
OSC manager	Maintenance manager	Maintenance supervisors and superintendents
Dosimetry team leader	Dosimetry specialist	Dosimetry clerks
Communicators/recorders	Designated plant engineers	

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 REV 2 11/85 REV 10 2/88
 REV 5 2/86 REV 11 1/89
 REV 6 7/86

TABLE B-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)


Emergency Position	Primary	Alternate(s)
Clerks	Designated clerks	
In-plant radiation monitoring team	Selected emergency response personnel	
Post accident sampling team	Selected emergency response personnel	
Damage control/assessment/repair team	Selected emergency response personnel	
Search and rescue team	Selected emergency response personnel	
Backup fire brigade	Selected emergency response personnel	
First aid team	Selected emergency response personnel	
Field monitoring team	Selected emergency response personnel	
Shift supervisor Plant operators Assistant plant operators Plant equipment operators	Normal operating shift personnel	
Dosimetry team	Dosimetry specialist	Dosimetry clerks

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 REV 10 10/87
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
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- REV 9 1/87
- REV 10 2/88
- REV 11 1/89



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
SITE AREA OR GENERAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2



FIGURE B-3

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Orange Cove

Found Empty

3/21/90

@ 1:20P

SITE AREA EMERGENCY - TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROCEDURE NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER OF COPIES
1001-C	Data Sheet 1 - Classification Determination	1
1001-C	Site Area Emergency/General Emergency Checklist	1
1002-C	Emergency Notification Message For State and Local Response Agencies	1
11002-C	Checklist 1 - Emergency Director Notification Checklist	1
11002-C	Checklist 3 - NRC Notification Checklist	1
11002-C	Checklist 4 - Georgia Power Company Notification Checklist	1
11102-C	Emergency Director Checklist	1
11305-C	Table 1 - Guidelines for Recommended Protective Actions For Gaseous Plume Exposure	1

GENERAL EMERGENCY - TABLE OF CONTENTS

Red cover

PROCEDURE NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER OF COPIES
91001-C	Data Sheet 1 - Classification Determination	1
91001-C	Site Area Emergency/General Emergency Checklist	1
91002-C	Emergency Notification Message For State and Local Response Agencies	1
91002-C	Checklist 1 - Emergency Director Notification Checklist	1
91002-C	Checklist 3 - NRC Notification Checklist	1
91002-C	Checklist 4 - Georgia Power Company Notification Checklist	1
91102-C	Emergency Director Checklist	1
91305-C	Table 1 - Guidelines For Recommended Protective Actions For Gaseous Plume Exposure	1


Received 3/27/90 © 215P
FROM J. Roberts

S. Carolina Backup FNN

1986 Two primary FNN at VEGP, one for Georgia & one for S. Carolina. S. Carolina part responsibility of Savannah River Site (SRS) SRS late in getting their part installed so VEGP installed present BU FNN to S. Carolina as interim pri ENN in S. Carolina only.

2 Sept 86 SRS installed pri ENN in S. Carolina since there were so many drops on S. Carolina FNN, VEGP decided to return BU ENN in S. Carolina

System Configuration at this time



Commercial Phone

BU ENN

Tie together for SRS Emergency
Split for VEGP Emergency

April 1989 - Tie together permanently
one notification for for Georgia + S. Carolina

2/24/90 1:00p

Backup ENN

Power 1 to system and 5 wires
4 plugged in


INLP-29

CIR#8

*Wall mounted

Storage unit - Communication unit & loaded
TSC work area

Used as a Fire Brigade Training room



TSC

Unit 1

SC ENN
GA ENN p-36 C12

under desk on podium in CR on 2 1 ads

Unit 2

Backup ENN (SC)

Powered by ~~network~~ by cabinet in TSC area

3/24 Mt Kido 145 p

~~2-80~~ EP (25) 2-107

Tower Instrument Panel A-2001-P5-MCP

From 10:14	Barley Temp	73°
11:11	Temp	72°
12:11	Temp	70°
13:11	LT	70°
14:11		69°
Barley 15:11		68°
Temp		64 of 100 reads

Left Side

WS meter @ 60m	12 m x 4
Dial	2700

10m @ WS	5 m x 4
10m @ WS	5 m x 4

WT Tot 4416

date 3/19/96

fd

... ..

WT 2414

on plan 4105

3502 ← ... for Tower

Printed from Plant Water

120/240V Out PNL

A-1807-Q3-VH6

General housekeeping poor, with excessive dirt & oil matts in comm. cabinets.

Manual Valve always too dirty to read correctly.

ON ...
B ...

2-108

- 0900 : D.R. VINEYARD SS outage Support
- 0930 : P.A. HUMPHREY BOP Quarter
- 1000 : L.P. VANNIER B
- 1030 : R.B. SNIDER Unit Shift Supr
- 1100 : K.A. JOHNS Extra CEO (CR/TA)
- 1130 : J.W. ACREE. TA } Shift Supr (outage support)
- 1300 : R.K. POPE } PEQ's EDG
- 1330 : D. DELOACH } PEQ's EDG
- 1400 : S. WHITMAN } PEQ's EDG
- 1430 : J.P. CASH Opers Superintendent/TSC
- 1500 : W.L. BORMEISTER " " "
- 1730 : J.T. HEFK Senior SEO (Shift Superintendent)

EP
 TSC?
 (? time)

* Had to talk to Ship Kalina - 11:00 A on Sun
 FF Gascon - 5:00 p on Sat

2-100

TELEPHONE CALL FROM WAYNE ROUNDTREE
MARCH 22, 1990

Inventory of Fuel Truck

Gas - 94 gallons
Diesel - 264 gallons
Waste oil - Empty
Water - 40 gallons
Antifreeze - 15 gallons
#68 Hydraulic fluid - 100 gallons
Transmission fluid - 80 gallons
Grease (lube) 18 gallons
Motor oil - 65 gallons
Gear oil (85W 140) - 65 gallons
#32 Hydraulic oil - 25 gallons

KR Hines 3/22/90

Memo—Long Form

ITEMS ON FUEL TRUCK
For: G. West

2-110

DATE
5/30/90

FROM
TO
TO
TO
TO

- NOTE AND FILE
- NOTE AND RETURN TO ME
- RETURN WITH MORE DETAILS
- NOTE AND SEE ME ABOUT THIS
- PLEASE ANSWER
- FOR YOUR APPROVAL
- PREPARE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE
- TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION
- PER YOUR REQUEST
- SIGNATURE
- FOR YOUR INFORMATION
- INVESTIGATE AND REPORT

COMMENTS

Fueling Truck - Maximum Capacities

85W140 - Comd Oil - 187 gal.

15W40 - Motor Oil - 187 gal.

#32 - Hydraulic Oil - 78 gal.

Grease - 55 gal. or 400 lb.

Transmission Fluid - 187 gal.

#68 H-DRAULIC Oil - 187 gal.

Antifreeze - 75 gal.

Water - 75 gal.

Gasoline - 300 gal.

Diesel Fuel - 300 gal.

Waste Oil - 122 gal.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Procedure Review Request Form (PRRF)

(1) No. 00656-C Rev. 0 Title Traffic + Parking Control
() New () Revision/Deletion () Biennial () Change Required
() No Change Required

Reason for deletion/revision Interoff. Concep., dtd Sep. 17, 1985, transfer
responsibility for this procedure to Plant Admin. Dept. (Proc # 70030-C

Originator John Lewis (Signature) 12/12/85 (Date)

(2) All applicable licensing commitments included or resolved
Quality Review performed by: [Signature] 2-3-86 (Date)
(No IDENTIFIABLE COMMITMENTS APPLY)

(3) PRB review required (Table 2 or Safety Evaluation) (X) Y () N
Safety Evaluation performed by: [Signature] 2-4-86 (Date)

(4) Responsible Department Head Approval [Signature] 2/25/86 (Date)

(5) PRB Meeting No. PRB-86-13 Date 3/7/86
Recommend: (X) Approval () Approval w/comment () Rejection
This procedure ~~does~~/does not contain an unreviewed safety
question.
PRB Chairman [Signature] 3-10-86 (Date)

(6) PRB comments resolved and procedure changes do not impact
Commitment Tracking or Safety Evaluation reviews:
Responsible Department Head Approval N/A (Signature) (Date)

(7) Disposition () Approved () Rejected
Reason for rejection _____

Approving Manager [Signature] (Signature) 3/11/86 (Date)

SAFETY EVALUATION

SECTION 1.0

1.1 Description of proposed change, test, or experiment:

PROCEDURE NO. 00056-C
DELETE PROCEDURE 00056-C, PARKING AND TRAFFIC CONTROL,

FROM THE PLANT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MANUAL AND REISSUE AS

PROCEDURE 70030-C IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE PROCEDURE MANUAL.

1.2 Reason for proposed change, test, or experiment:

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROCEDURE IS ASSIGNED TO THE PLANT

ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT. (REFERENCES BILL BURMEISTER, INTEROFFICE

CORRESPONDENCE, SUPERINTENDENT INTERFERENCE MEETING, SEPT. 17, 1985.)

1.3 Does the proposed change involve a change to Technical Specifications? Yes ___ No X

Explanation: BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE DRAFT TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS, THERE ARE NO TECH. SPECS. APPLICABLE TO THIS
PROCEDURE.

1.4 Does the proposed change involve a change in the facility as described or implied in the FSAR? Yes ___ No X

Explanation: THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN
OR IMPLIED IN THE FSAR RESULTING FROM THE CHANGES IN THE
PROCEDURE.

1.5 Does the proposed change involve a change in procedures described or implied in the FSAR? Yes ___ No X

Explanation: BASED UPON A REVIEW OF CHAPTERS 13.0 AND 14.0
OF THE FSAR, THIS PROCEDURE CHANGE DOES NOT INVOLVE A
CHANGE TO THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED OR IMPLIED IN THE FSAR.

1.6 Does the proposed change involve a test or experiment not described or implied in the FSAR? Yes ___ No X

Explanation: THIS PROCEDURE DOES NOT PERFORM ANY
TESTS OR EXPERIMENTS.

SECTION 2.0

PROCEDURE NO: 00056-C

- 2.1 Does the proposed change, test, or experiment increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident described in the FSAR? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/A

- 2.2 Does the proposed change, test, or experiment increase the probability or consequences of the malfunction of any equipment or component assumed to function in accidents analyzed in the FSAR? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/A

- 2.3 Does the proposed change, test, or equipment create the possibility of an accident or equipment/component malfunction not described and analyzed in the FSAR? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/A

- 2.4 Does the proposed change, test, or experiment decrease the margin of safety defined by the bases for the Technical Specification? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/A

- 2.5 Does the proposed change, test, or experiment involve an unreviewed safety question? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/AEvaluator Bert - York Date 2/14/86Supervisor [Signature] Date 2/14/86Department Superintendent R.M. Olson J.S.F.D. Date 2/25/86

DATE: November 29, 1984

RE: Plant Vogtle - Units 1 & 2
Plant Review Board
File: X7BD01 System: 3612
Log: GSU-1449
Security Code: NC
Keyword: Plant Review Board

FROM: J. F. D'Amico - PRB Chairman

TO: G. Bockhold, Jr.

The PRB has reviewed the following procedures at PRB-84-36 on November 28, 1984, and unanimously recommends approval:

- | | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| 00656-C, Rev. 0 | Traffic and Parking Control | } returned to WPK
by GB 12/2/84 JFD |
| 18031-1, Rev. 0 | Loss of Class IE Electrical Systems | |
| 18008-1, Rev. 0 | Secondary Coolant Leakage | |

The above procedures do not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

Upon approval, these procedures should be returned to me for further processing.

J. E. Swartzwelder
FOR J.F.D.

cc
CLC:1de

Attachment

xc: PRB members, w/o attachment
VRMS

PROCEDURE REVIEW REQUEST FORM (PRRF)

(1) Procedure No. 00656-C Rev. No. 0

Procedure Title Traffic and Parking Control

- New Procedure
- Procedure Revision

Reason for revision: N/A

- Biennial Review: Change Required
- No Change Required

Procedure Deletion

Reason for deletion: N/A

Originator: John L. Curtis 1/10/15/84
(Signature) (Date)

(2) All applicable licensing commitments included or resolved.

Quality Review performed by: J.M. Knoll 1/11-20-84
Technical (Signature) (Date)

(3) PRB review required either by Table 2 or USQD (attach form):

- YES
- NO

USQD review performed by: J.M. Knoll 1/11-20-84
(Signature) (Date)

FIGURE 1

(4) Supervisor Approval:

[Signature] / 11/20/84
(Signature) (Date)

(5) Department Head Approval:

[Signature] / 11/20/84
(Signature) (Date)

(6) PRB Meeting No. PRB 84-36 Date 11/28/84

- Approval Recommended
- Approval Recommended with comments
- Rejection Recommended

PRB Chairman:

[Signature] / 11/28/84
(Signature) (Date)
FOR J.F.D.

(7) PRB comments resolved and procedure changes do not impact Commitment Tracking or USQD reviews:

Responsible Department Head Approval: N/A / 1
(Signature) (Date)

(8) Approving Manager's Disposition

- Approved
- Rejected

Reason for rejection: _____

Approving Manager:

[Signature] / 11/22/84
(Signature) (Date)

(9) Commitment Tracking data base has been updated. (For revised or deleted procedures which impact Licensing Commitments)

N/A / 1
(Signature) (Date)

FIGURE 1

COMMITMENT TRACKING DATA BASE UPDATE (CTDBU) FORM

Procedure No. 00656-C

Revision No. 0

PROCEDURE TITLE Traffic and Parking Control

Does this procedure contain any licensing commitments: () Yes (X) No

Have any commitments included in previous revisions of this procedure been deleted in the present revision: () Yes () No (X) N/A

If yes, list the commitment and LDCR control number, if applicable, below:

Have any commitments included in previous revisions of this procedure been placed in another procedure or implementing document: () Yes () No (X) N/A

If yes, list the commitment and new resolution document below:

Is this procedure being deleted: () Yes (X) No

If yes, list all commitments previously included and their new resolution document:

All commitments are included or resolved: AS applicable

FSTAR Section 1.9.17.2

J.M. Knoll
11-16-00
Reviewer Date
J.M. Knoll
SAMPLE

SECTION 1.0

SAFETY EVALUATION

1.1 Description of proposed change, test, or experiment:

New Administrative Procedure 00056-C, "Traffic and Parking Control"

1.2 Reason for proposed change, test, or experiment:

To describe the requirements established to control the operation and parking of vehicles inside the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant controlled area by employees, visitors, and contractors.

1.3 Does the proposed change involve a change to Technical Specifications?

Yes ___ No

Explanation: Technical Specifications are not directly involved with this administrative procedure scope.

1.4 Does the proposed change involve a change in the facility as described or implied in the FSAR?

Yes ___ No

Explanation: This is an administrative procedure that establishes controls for traffic and parking inside the "owner controlled area" and outside the "protected area."

1.5 Does the proposed change involve a change in procedures described or implied in the FSAR?

Yes ___ No

Explanation: This procedure does not involve a change in procedures described/implied in FSAR, since administrative controls are established for traffic/parking.

1.6 Does the proposed change involve a test or experiment not described or implied in the FSAR?

Yes ___ No

Explanation: This procedure establishes administrative controls and does not involve test or experiments described or implied in the FSAR.

FIGURE 1

SECTION 2.0

2.1 Does the proposed change, test, or experiment increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident described in the FSAR? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/A

2.2 Does the proposed change, test, or experiment increase the probability or consequences of the malfunction of any equipment or component assumed to function in accidents analyzed in the FSAR? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/A

2.3 Does the proposed change, test, or equipment create the possibility of an accident or equipment/component malfunction not described and analyzed in the FSAR? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/A

2.4 Does the proposed change, test, or experiment decrease the margin of safety defined by the bases for the Technical Specification? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/A

2.5 Does the proposed change, test, or experiment involve an unreviewed safety question? Yes ___ No ___

Explanation/Justification: N/A

Evaluator J.M. Knoll (J.M. Knoll)

Date 11-20-84

Supervisor [Signature]

Date 11/20/84

Department Superintendent [Signature]

Date 11/20/84

FIGURE 1

APPROVAL
J. Beckhold
DATE
12/2/84

Georgia Power
POWER GENERATION DEPARTMENT
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
UNIT COMMON



PROCEDURE NO.
00656-C
REVISION NO.
0
PAGE NO.
1 of 3

FOR INFORMATION ONLY **VOID**

TRAFFIC AND PARKING CONTROL

1.0 PURPOSE

This procedure describes the requirements established to control the operation and parking of vehicles inside the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) controlled area by employees, visitors and contractors. Entry and operation of vehicles inside the protected area are addressed by Procedure 00653-C, "Access Control".

2.0 DEFINITIONS

2.1 PROTECTED AREA

The area at VEGP encompassed by physical barriers and in which access is controlled.

2.2 PHYSICAL BARRIER

Any of a number of physical obstructions described by 10CFR73.2 constructed to deter unauthorized access, delay intrusion and aid in access control.

2.3 VEGP - CONTROLLED AREA

The area exterior and contiguous to the protected area marked in a manner to provide reasonable assurance that persons entering the area are aware that the property is GPC owned.

3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1 SUPERINTENDENT, NUCLEAR SECURITY

3.1.1 Ensure the establishment and maintenance of an employee vehicle registration system.

- 3.1.2 Ensure the establishment of employee, visitor, and contractor parking areas within the VEGP-controlled area.
- 3.1.3 Ensure security force enforcement of vehicle parking and operation rules and requirements.
- 3.1.4 Ensure that a copy of vehicle violation citations issued by the VEGP security force is transmitted to the supervisor of the individual involved.

3.2 SUPERVISORS

Take actions deemed appropriate regarding supervised employees and contractors involved in traffic and parking violations.

3.3 VEGP EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS

- 3.3.1 Ensure the registration of vehicles as directed by the Superintendent, Nuclear Security.
- 3.3.2 Park vehicles only in designated parking areas in the VEGP-controlled area.
- 3.3.3 Operate vehicles in a safe manner observing posted speed limits and traffic control patterns, and security force directions.

4.0 EMPLOYEE VEHICLE CONTROL

- 4.1 VEGP employees shall contact the Superintendent, Nuclear Security to register vehicles and obtain an identification sticker or decal as required by the established vehicle registration system.
- 4.2 Identifying decals or stickers shall be issued and applied by members of the security force.
- 4.3 VEGP employees should notify the Superintendent, Nuclear Security of previously registered vehicles that will no longer be operated in VEGP-controlled areas.
- 4.4 Identifying decals or stickers should be removed from vehicles upon determination that operation in VEGP-controlled areas is no longer required.
- 4.5 Employees shall park only in designated employee parking areas.
- 4.6 Employee vehicles shall not be operated inside the protected areas without prior approval of the Superintendent, Nuclear Security.

CONTINUED

- 4.7 Access of all vehicles to protected areas shall be in accordance with Procedure 00633-C, "Access Control."
- 5.0 CONTRACTOR VEHICLE CONTROL
- 5.1 Contractors employed at VEGP shall adhere to established traffic control patterns and speed limits.
- 5.2 Contractor vehicle registration shall be as directed by the Superintendent, Nuclear Security and should be based on circumstances such as length of contract, nature of work to be performed and the total number of contractor vehicles involved.
- 5.3 Contractors shall park only in areas designated by the Superintendent, Nuclear Security or members of the security force.
- 5.4 Access of contractor vehicles to protected areas shall be in accordance with Procedure 00653-C, "Access Control."
- 6.0 VISITOR VEHICLE CONTROL
- 6.1 VEGP visitors shall operate vehicles in accordance with established traffic control patterns and speed limits.
- 6.2 Visitors shall park vehicles only in areas designated for visitor parking or as directed by members of the security force.
- 6.3 Visitor vehicles shall not be allowed inside the protected areas.
- 7.0 REFERENCES
- 7.1 Title 10CFR73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials"
- 7.2 FSAR Section 1.9.17
- 7.3 U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.17, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Industrial Sabotage"
- 7.4 ANSI/ANS-3.3-1982, "Security for Nuclear Power Plants"

END OF PROCEDURE TEXT