

# OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: INTERVIEW OF: WILLIAM BURMEISTER

Docket No.

LOCATION: WAYNESBORO, GEORGIA

DATE: TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 1990

PAGES 1-32

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ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF

(Print Identity of Interviewee)

Page	Line	Correction and Reason for Correction
6	4	Official records have the exact time. I believe I stated 9:56
6	14	Should say approximately 10:10
15	9-12	change lines to read "I'm the Vogtle representative for the Westinghouse owners group. They have a guideline that's coming out, I think, in a couple of weeks dealing with loss of RHR while operating at mid loop conditions." (change for better accuracy)
15	19-20	Change "Point information" to "Vortexing" I don't remember what I said but "Point information" makes no sense.
18	16	change "unable" to "unavailable"
18	19	change "Unit 1" to "Unit 2"
18	25	add "weather" before data for clarification
22	9	} → "recall" should have been "regual" which is short for "regualification training"
22	14	
26	15+16	delete "I think like an hour and a half later, an hour later" replace with "soon afterwards" (accuracy)
27	20	Start new sentence with "And maybe..." (clarity)

ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF

(Print Identity of Interviewee)

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction and Reason for Correction</u>
30	1	change "force paths" to "forced flow paths" (for clarity)
31	5+6	move "for a minute" from line 6 to line 5 after the word "started" (for clarity)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

INTERVIEW OF:

WILLIAM BURMEISTER

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Main Conference Room  
Administration Building  
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant  
Waynesboro, Georgia

Tuesday, March 27, 1990

The interview commenced at 9:08 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

WILLIAM LAZARUS  
AL CHAFFEE  
WARREN LYON  
GENE TRAGER

On behalf of INPO:

PAUL DIETZ

On behalf of CP&L:

MIKE JONES

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PROCEEDINGS

1  
2 MR. LAZARUS: Today's date is March 27, 9:06 a.m.  
3 I'm William Lazarus, conducting an interview of Mr.  
4 Burmeister.

5 Whereupon,

6 WILLIAM BURMEISTER

7 appeared as a witness herein and was examined and testified  
8 as follows:

9 EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. LAZARUS:

11 Q Mr. Burmeister, will you tell us your name for the  
12 record and what your duties are at the station?

13 A Okay, my name is Bill Burmeister and my title is  
14 Unit Superintendent. And what I have done is I have  
15 basically written down a list of sequence of events as I  
16 recall, to the best of my knowledge, and I'll pretty much  
17 just read from it because it's the most accurate that way I  
18 believe.

19 Q That's fine.

20 A If you don't have any problem with that.

21 Q I don't have any problem with that. What was your  
22 function on Tuesday during the loss of vital power incident?

23 A My function is -- what activity did I perform?

24 Q Yes.

25 A I assisted the OS in completing the notification

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1 forms for the site area emergency.

2 Q Were you normally on shift at the time or you just  
3 went up to assist?

4 A No, I was not on shift, I came to the control room  
5 to assist the OS -- not OS, we call them Shift  
6 Superintendents now -- as he needed, to support conditions  
7 in the plant.

8 Q Okay. So would you just go in your own words since  
9 you prepared a chronology as best you can remember it, and  
10 tell us how you got there and what you did when you arrived  
11 in the control room.

12 A Okay, the time of the trip was 9:20 and I was in my  
13 office at the time. I heard a loud bang and subsequent  
14 announcement of the Unit 2 reactor trip over the page  
15 system. Loss of service building power also occurred at  
16 this time and this is where my office is located. I noticed  
17 this because all the lights went out.

18 I was beeped to call the control room and I  
19 attempted to call the control room but could not because the  
20 phone system was down. I then proceeded to the control room  
21 and on the way I observed a lot of people headed for the low  
22 voltage switch yard; therefore, I also headed for the low  
23 voltage switch yard to see what I could find on my way to  
24 the control room.

25 I observed a down transmission line feeding the

1 1-A RAT and asked what had happened. Others present said  
2 that a lube oil truck, still there, had backed into a  
3 transmission line support pole and knocked the line down. I  
4 asked if anyone was injured and the response I got was the  
5 driver could not be located, therefore I presume that he had  
6 abandoned the truck and the area, for whatever reason.

7 At this time, I incorrectly assumed the damage was  
8 to the feeder supply in the B RAT, which I knew to be out of  
9 service, and therefore I presumed that the incident had no  
10 impact on Unit 1 and that the resulting electrical  
11 disturbance had resulted in some kind of generator trip on  
12 Unit 2.

13 At approximately 9:30 to 9:32, I entered the  
14 control room area and observed that one RAT had been lost on  
15 Unit 2 because I entered the Unit 2 control area first. I  
16 then proceeded to the Unit 1 control area and observe a loss  
17 of on-site and off-site AC power. I did notice that power  
18 was available to the non-1-E busses which is available  
19 through a UAT backfeed arrangement that we have during  
20 refueling outages.

21 In conjunction with the shift superintendent, I  
22 assigned an individual who worked for me to make sure that  
23 the containment was closed up. He had also reported -- or  
24 was in the control room at the time. By closed up, I  
25 specifically stated the personnel lock closed and the

1 equipment hatch secured.

2 Q The shift superintendent was Mr. Hopkins?

3 A Right. I then volunteered to fill out the  
4 emergency plan notification forms, noting that no one had  
5 started that at this time. This is approximately I'd say at  
6 9:32.

7 At 9:40, I determined the plan classification level  
8 to be a site area emergency and received concurrence from  
9 the Operations Manager and Shift Superintendent. I then  
10 completed the notification forms and submitted them to the  
11 Shift Superintendent, who is the Emergency Director, John  
12 Hopkins.

13 Q The Operations Manager was whom?

14 A Jim Swartzwelder.

15 I then gave the notification form to the shift  
16 clerk for notification of off-site agencies. After doing  
17 this, I tried to pay a little bit more attention to what was  
18 going on in the plant and requested another individual who  
19 had not been doing much -- he was standing there available --  
20 -- to be given something to do. I requested that he monitor  
21 the core exit thermocouples and obtain some weather data  
22 from the ERF. I don't remember the exact temperature of the  
23 thermocouples. I think the logs have that information, but  
24 I could see that there was a pretty good heat-up rate going  
25 on in the reactor core.



1           The weather data I was informed was unavailable  
2 from the ERF and I didn't know -- I don't know the reason  
3 for that.

4           At 9:50, I observed the restoration of on-site  
5 emergency power, a diesel generator. The shift operators  
6 present had emergency started the diesel and it stayed  
7 running and they loaded the bus and it continued to run  
8 until we restored one of the RATs to service.

9           At 10:03, I began filling out the follow-up  
10 notification form to downgrade to an alert and this was  
11 based on the diesel generator being in service now and  
12 appeared to be stable. Technically I guess the  
13 classification could have been lowered to an unusual event  
14 but the reason we stayed with an alert classification was we  
15 wanted to maintain the TSC active just in case the unit --  
16 things turned worse, you know, we had experienced another  
17 problem.

18           10:10 -- these are all Eastern times -- by the way  
19 -- I checked the progress of the notifications to off-site  
20 agencies. The shift clerk reported that all had been  
21 contacted except GEMA and Burke County and I told her to  
22 continue trying to get them.

23           At 10:15, the General Manager relieved the Shift  
24 Superintendent as Emergency Director, and some time after  
25 that I reported to the TSC to assist the operations --

1 individuals in the TSC, and I was there until approximately  
2 noon.

3 Q You said approximately 9:32 you began filling out  
4 the first notification forms?

5 A Yes -- well a little bit after that, probably  
6 somewhere 9:35 -- sometime before 9:40 because it was  
7 completed at 9:40, the forms were completed at 9:40.

8 Q You provided that to the shift clerks to make the  
9 notifications?

10 A After -- yes, after the Shift Superintendent had  
11 authorized it.

12 Q The first feedback then that you had any indication  
13 of a communication problem was you said at 10:10 when you  
14 got back and they said they had notified everybody except  
15 for GEMA -- G-E-M-A -- and Burke County?

16 A At 10:10 was the first time I was aware of a  
17 problem with communication -- well getting ahold of off-site  
18 individuals. I did know earlier on that the bridge phone, I  
19 think there was a problem with the bridge phone and  
20 therefore the shift clerk had to contact each off-site  
21 agency individually.

22 Q Okay, so they did give you some feedback that they  
23 were having some difficulty or difficulties and were having  
24 to do it by backup methods?

25 A Right. I guess in retrospect if I were involved

1 again, I would have the shift clerk -- before the forms are  
2 filled out, I would have the shift clerk get in touch with  
3 everybody, get them on the line and waiting for the message  
4 to come, because that took a significant period of time and  
5 we could have saved some time there.

6 Q That's a good idea. Were you involved at all with  
7 the emergency notification system notification to the NRC?

8 A I was not directly involved, I was indirectly  
9 involved in that an individual by the name of Jeff Gasser  
10 conducted the notification and remained on the phone with  
11 the NRC throughout the event, and I overheard his  
12 conversation and for quite some time I monitored it and I  
13 thought he was doing a very good job and I was comfortable  
14 with what he was doing, so I did not interfere or get  
15 involved any more than just to listen.

16 Q Were there any indications of communication  
17 difficulty on that line?

18 A They did switch lines from the Unit 2 control to  
19 Unit 1 control and I didn't ask why, but I think the  
20 communications with the NRC started somewhere around 10:00  
21 Eastern, and they were pretty much continuous from that  
22 point on until the emergency was terminated, as far as I  
23 know.

24 MR. LAZARUS: This is Mr. Chaffee joining us. Bill  
25 Burmeister.

1 MR. CHAFFEE: Hi, Bill.

2 THE WITNESS: Hi.

3 MR. LAZARUS: Mr. Chaffee is the team leader.

4 BY MR. LAZARUS:

5 Q Were you aware of any unusual questions or  
6 existence of any inappropriate questions coming over the NRC  
7 hot line?

8 A I did ask Jeff that particular question. I was  
9 concerned that there might be some kind of distraction with  
10 the number of people that were apparently involved. He said  
11 there were several NRC people on the line and they were  
12 asking all kinds of questions and he said generally they  
13 were good questions and he was able to answer them to their  
14 satisfaction, I guess -- that was the impression I got. So  
15 I was not aware of any problems -- to answer your question.

16 Q Did you have any difficulty using the emergency  
17 action level procedures to classify the event?

18 A No. The strategy I used is I looked at the highest  
19 possible incident that we had. There could have been other  
20 categories for classifying the event. Loss of off-site  
21 power and on-site power for more than 15 minutes is a site  
22 area emergency and I looked at general emergency items and  
23 there was nothing to indicate that we had a general  
24 emergency. I also looked at other site area emergency  
25 classification items and there was nothing else there. I

1 didn't look at other lower classification items because I  
2 was more interested in the highest classification and  
3 calling it correctly and completing the notification forms.

4 Q Is your classification system specifically  
5 structured to lead you from the highest to the lowest?

6 A Well --

7 Q Or is that just part of your training?

8 A It -- you look at -- the strategy we use, there's a  
9 classification form that looks at three barrier statuses  
10 and then it looks at the "other" category, and this happened  
11 to be an "other" category. The "other" category -- I looked  
12 at the barriers and did not see anything that fit real well  
13 as far as challenging or breaching barriers; the fuel, the  
14 vessel, the containment. And then I looked at the "other"  
15 category and it was the electrical systems that was the  
16 highest level classification and marked it a site area  
17 emergency.

18 After finishing that, I could have signed the form,  
19 but I went back and looked at the pulled out page for any  
20 other activities that might have been higher level  
21 classification -- I kind of did it on my own I guess -- and  
22 didn't find anything that was a higher classification or  
23 warranted a higher classification. Therefore, I stuck with  
24 the site area emergency classification.

25 Q There were some announcements made to plant

1 personnel regarding the site area emergency. Did you get  
2 involved in the formulation of those announcements or making  
3 those announcements?

4 A I did not make any of the announcements. I heard  
5 the announcement and if you asked me at the time who the  
6 individuals were that made the announcements, I couldn't  
7 have told you, but I have since talked to those individuals  
8 and I know who made the announcements. But to answer your  
9 question, I was not directly -- I did not directly make any  
10 of the announcements.

11 Q Were you aware that some of the announcements were  
12 later made by Security or Evacuation Unaccountability?

13 A Yes, I was told that.

14 MR. DIETZ: Bill, during the outage, what is your  
15 level of staffing for operations support on the day shift  
16 and on the night shift? I understand you're running 12-hour  
17 shifts so there's two shifts a day.

18 THE WITNESS: The additional people on the day  
19 shift are supervisory in nature and probably amount to like  
20 three or four extra people.

21 MR. DIETZ: Uh-huh. How about in terms of  
22 operations crew support, are there a lot more operators  
23 available on the day shift?

24 THE WITNESS: There are a lot more plant equipment  
25 operators -- not a lot more, there are a few more plant

1 equipment operators available on the day shift than there  
2 are on the night shift. How many I don't know.

3 MR. DIETZ: You're running about two and a half  
4 times the normal shift during the day and two times a normal  
5 shift at night?

6 THE WITNESS: Right.

7 MR. DIETZ: And that's just for the outage?

8 THE WITNESS: Right.

9 MR. DIETZ: To support all the work that's going  
10 on?

11 THE WITNESS: Right.

12 BY MR. LAZARUS:

13 Q Is there anything in the EPRA that you can share  
14 with us -- anything that we forgot to ask about that you'd  
15 like to tell us about?

16 A Last time I was interviewed I was asked for  
17 recommendations and I guess I had a chance to think about it  
18 a little bit more since then because I wasn't expecting to  
19 have to answer that question -- but I would suggest that the  
20 non-essential personnel that were asked to leave the site  
21 protected area, be kept a little better informed as to what  
22 is going on because in some cases they are the people that  
23 go home and they end up talking to other people in the  
24 community and if they're not very well informed, there's a  
25 tendency for incorrect information to be communicated and

1 that sometimes works very much against the organization.

2 Q I agree with that.

3 A The other item I mentioned about getting the shift  
4 clerk on the line as soon as possible with the off-site  
5 agencies and having her wait and having those people wait  
6 until the notification forms are completed, rather than the  
7 other way around would have saved some time and expedited  
8 communications.

9 We're going to probably have a new policy on  
10 allowing trucks and cranes in the switch yard area.

11 (Laughter.)

12 A I think that's something that needs to be  
13 considered a lot more carefully, possibly a watch outside  
14 the truck directing the movement of the truck should also be  
15 considered.

16 One other area that might be looked at is a  
17 requirement for on-site and off-site power sources during  
18 mad-loop operations. Currently you have two on-site and two  
19 off-site normally available at full power. In Mode 5 and 6,  
20 you're allowed to drop down to one off-site and one on-site.  
21 There may be consideration for increasing the requirements  
22 in that area.

23 Q One question to go back for a minute -- was there a  
24 clear announcement made when Mr. Bockhold relieved Mr.  
25 Hopkins as Emergency Director, so you were aware of that?

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1           A     I was aware of it. I don't know if a page  
2 announcement -- I don't think a page announcement was made,  
3 but I was aware of it.

4           Q     In the control room?

5           A     I think he announced it to the people in the  
6 control room, is the way it worked.

7           MR. CHAFFEE: Could I ask -- you are a -- what is  
8 your position?

9           THE WITNESS: Shift Superintendent -- I'm sorry,  
10 Unit Superintendent.

11          MR. CHAFFEE: So you were an extra on shift?

12          THE WITNESS: I was not on shift. I am a day shift  
13 person, to support the operations management. The way the  
14 organization is set up, the Shift Superintendent reports to  
15 the Operations Manager. The Operations Manager has two day  
16 shift superintendents but we're titled Unit  
17 Superintendents, that assist him in carrying out the  
18 activities that need to be done.

19          MR. CHAFFEE: What are the responsibilities you  
20 have?

21          THE WITNESS: Primary responsibility is refueling  
22 outage support right now, and more planning and maintenance  
23 activities and clearance assignment for Unit 2 while it's  
24 operating.

25          MR. CHAFFEE: Have you had any involvement in any

1 work that's been going on in the area of developing  
2 procedures for the Operations Department -- do you get  
3 involved in that?

4 THE WITNESS: To some extent. I approve system  
5 operating procedures and the alignment procedures.

6 MR. CHAFFEE: Do you know if any work has been  
7 going on in the area of developing procedures to handle  
8 events in the operations area?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes. I'm the owners' group  
10 representative for Westinghouse and they have a guideline  
11 that's coming out I think in a couple of weeks on operation  
12 of RHRF mid-loop.

13 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, is that right?

14 THE WITNESS: Yes.

15 MR. CHAFFEE: Do you know if any of those  
16 procedures would focus on bringing together loss of vital  
17 bus power and loss of shutdown cooling?

18 THE WITNESS: It does deal with loss of shutdown  
19 cooling but from a different perspective. Point  
20 information, air entrainment and other things like that. It  
21 did not focus on loss of electrical power for a sustained  
22 period of time.

23 MR. CHAFFEE: We don't have time to get into this,  
24 but we may ask you to talk in that area a little bit more.

25 THE WITNESS: Okay.

1 MR. JONES: I'd like to ask a question here. In  
2 your job as Unit Superintendent coordinating maintenance  
3 activities, are you aware of when equipment is taken out of  
4 service and when it's ready to go back in service?

5 THE WITNESS: Yes.

6 MR. JONES: With regard to the RAT that was out of  
7 service, do you know whether -- apparently it was very close  
8 to being put back in service. Do you know how long it had  
9 been -- could it have been put back in service earlier?

10 THE WITNESS: It could have been expedited  
11 possibly, but I had just received word that it was ready,  
12 either earlier that day or late the previous day. Actually  
13 the word I received was that it was going to be ready to  
14 turn over very soon. So I didn't have a time for which  
15 maintenance was expected to be finished but I knew it was  
16 soon.

17 MR. JONES: What would be the name of the  
18 maintenance contact?

19 THE WITNESS: Actually it was brought up in our  
20 7:30 status meetings, refueling outage status meetings, and  
21 I can't remember the individual that brought it up.

22 MR. CHAFFEE: But it was brought up in the context  
23 that it was ready for clearance to be removed or --

24 THE WITNESS: The context was that the work was  
25 almost completed and it was ready, you know -- close to

1 being ready to be restored to service.

2 MR. CHAFFEE: We're trying to figure out whether or  
3 not, you know, it could have been done sooner or --

4 THE WITNESS: Any delay?

5 MR. JONES: Yeah, that's what we're trying to  
6 figure out.

7 THE WITNESS: Maybe a few hours, but not days.

8 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

9 MR. JONES: Do you know if that is typically -- or  
10 maybe you could give me the name of the maintenance person  
11 we could talk to -- is that typically a 24-hour a day job or  
12 they just put that on the -- the transformer on the day  
13 shift?

14 THE WITNESS: I don't know -- I don't know how that  
15 was being worked. But the work finished up ahead of  
16 schedule I know. It went fairly well, but I don't know if  
17 they were just working day shift or around the clock.

18 MR. JONES: What about on the diesel generator,  
19 same type of question. Is that a 24-hour a day job?

20 THE WITNESS: I believe the diesel generator was  
21 working 24 hours a day.

22 MR. JONES: And the primary work, steam generator  
23 work, was that -- if you don't know the answer, maybe you  
24 can just tell me who we might talk to.

25 THE WITNESS: By steam generator work, you mean the

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1 --

2 MR. JONES: Right, all the work that was being done  
3 on the primary system.

4 THE WITNESS: The primary system was pretty much  
5 critical path. The activities keeping us at mid-loop were  
6 critical path activities and therefore they were being  
7 worked around the clock.

8 MR. LAZARUS: Are you finished, Mike?

9 MR. JONES: Yes.

10 BY MR. LAZARUS:

11 Q I did have one other question. You talked about  
12 trying to get weather data -- maybe we answered it already -  
13 - weather data was unavailable and you didn't know the  
14 reason at the time. You haven't learned anything subsequent  
15 to that?

16 A It was unable on our ERF, emergency response  
17 facility computer, which is in the control room on the Unit  
18 1 side. I didn't think at the time, but we could have tried  
19 the Unit 1 computer to see if that was available. It was  
20 not an immediate concern, it was more of a follow-up concern  
21 because I know we didn't have a release at the time and it  
22 was something I thought we had a few minutes to get  
23 information on. So when I filled out the notification  
24 sheet, I put "data not available" instead of listing the  
25 data.

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1           If I thought it were an immediate concern, I would  
2 have called Chemistry or HP and had them give us that  
3 information, or we could have called the local Weather  
4 Bureau.

5           Q     Do you know what action was taken to get that  
6 information from the MET Tower?

7           A     No -- oh, other than calling it up on the screen  
8 display on the ERF computer?

9           Q     Yes.

10          A     And the individual, Dave Vineyard, who checked on  
11 it for me, said it was registering "bad data". That's all I  
12 know.

13          MR. CHAFFEE: Do you know to what extent the people  
14 here have attempted to try to schedule the activities  
15 during this outage such that they minimize the potential  
16 threat of having this type of event occurring? Things like  
17 making sure that you didn't go to mid-loop early on in the  
18 outage when you had a lot of decay heat or making sure you  
19 didn't have things occurring simultaneously that would make  
20 you vulnerable. Do you know to what state of development  
21 the people that are involved in scheduling these things were  
22 at or do you know who we should talk to to try and figure  
23 that out?

24          THE WITNESS: Well --

25          MR. CHAFFEE: Do you understand what I'm asking?

1 THE WITNESS: -- I think you're scheduled to talk  
2 to most of the people. There were quite a few people  
3 involved, but primarily --

4 MR. CHAFFEE: Is there a central person who does  
5 that or a group or --

6 THE WITNESS: Well, it was the Outage and Planning  
7 group in conjunction with Operations, and I'll take  
8 responsibility for that. Our primary consideration was  
9 complying with the Tech Specs, which requires one on-site  
10 and one off-site power source.

11 MR. CHAFFEE: Have you been involved in a process  
12 of -- what I'm trying to figure out is where you guys are in  
13 dealing with I guess it was a generic letter 8817 -- are you  
14 familiar with that?

15 THE WITNESS: Yes.

16 MR. CHAFFEE: And I know on that, people were  
17 trying to figure out ways of dealing with, you know, loss of  
18 shutdown cooling and that sort of thing. I'm trying to sort  
19 of get a picture, maybe an overview, of what you guys have  
20 done or who we talk to who is sort of the guru in this area  
21 that understands the big picture, how you guys are  
22 developing along that line.

23 THE WITNESS: Okay, a lot of our guidance is in  
24 procedures now, has been put in procedures during the last  
25 year and it's been refined and improved upon as new

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1 information becomes available.

2 MR. CHAFFEE: Is there some sort of document that  
3 sort of -- white paper that says okay, well here's the plan  
4 and here's the procedures that are going to go into it and  
5 sort of overviews the work in this area?

6 THE WITNESS: I think you can get our response from  
7 a regulatory standpoint from a group of individuals under  
8 Rick Odom. And as far as the procedures that reflect that  
9 guidance, the Unit Operating Procedure 12007 and 12000 have  
10 that information in it.

11 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

12 THE WITNESS: In fact, 12006, 12007, 12000 and  
13 12001 have that information in them.

14 MR. CHAFFEE: So if we wanted to talk to somebody  
15 that could maybe come in and show us these documents and  
16 explain how it developed, the person we should go to is who?

17 THE WITNESS: Jim Swartzwelder or I could do it.

18 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

19 THE WITNESS: There are a number of people that  
20 could do it.

21 MR. CHAFFEE: We're looking for who that person is  
22 and we'd like to do that, so --

23 MR. LYON: You mentioned a Rick, would you spell  
24 Rick's name?

25 THE WITNESS: Rick Odom, O-d-o-m.

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1 MR. JONES: Is he regulatory compliance?

2 THE WITNESS: Yes.

3 MR. LYON: I'm going to recommend -- I've just got  
4 a couple of real quick questions of clarification and I'm  
5 going to recommend that we ask Bill if he would come back  
6 and visit with us some more at another time because we're  
7 not going to have anywhere the time we need and hold the  
8 schedule -- if that's okay. Are you on today, by the way?

9 THE WITNESS: I'm in recall this week, but I'll be  
10 available after 4:00.

11 MR. CHAFFEE: Maybe we could do it then.

12 MR. LYON: That is perfect timing because there's a  
13 slot open over there.

14 MR. JONES: Covering shutdown events in the recall?

15 THE WITNESS: Yes.

16 MR. CHAFFEE: Can you be ready to discuss that by  
17 4:00 or do you need some time to pull some stuff together?  
18 Would 5:00 be better for you?

19 THE WITNESS: Yeah, it'd be better if you gave me  
20 an hour.

21 MR. CHAFFEE: How about 5:00 then?

22 THE WITNESS: You want me to discuss the procedures  
23 and how we've incorporated the guidance from the generic  
24 letter?

25 MR. CHAFFEE: Yes, that'd be good.

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1 MR. DIETZ: And all of your shutdown emergency type  
2 procedures, LOCAs at shutdown, anything dealing with events  
3 that might occur in the shutdown area. And we'd like to  
4 talk to you a little bit probably about the Westinghouse  
5 effort that's going on there too.

6 THE WITNESS: That's a little hard. I'm going to  
7 be in classroom for six hours, but --

8 MR. DIETZ: Would tomorrow be a better time?

9 THE WITNESS: Tomorrow would be better.

10 MR. CHAFFEE: That's fine. Would you take this --  
11 would you go talk to whoever in your management and explain  
12 to them what our need is and arrange for the people to come  
13 and we'll have a discussion, and what would be a good time  
14 to do that? If it's tomorrow, that's fine, but we want to  
15 understand the big picture of where you guys are progressing  
16 in this area.

17 THE WITNESS: Okay.

18 MR. LYON: Al, are you suggesting a group effort  
19 here like perhaps several people on the record  
20 simultaneously?

21 MR. CHAFFEE: We can do that. I'm asking them to  
22 propose how they think would be the best way to do it. We  
23 could bring in more than one but we'll do it on the record,  
24 you know.

25 MR. DIETZ: If you'll bring copies of the

1 procedures, that would help a lot because it's easy to build  
2 them right into our record.

3 MR. CHAFFEE: Exactly.

4 THE WITNESS: Okay.

5 MR. CHAFFEE: That'll prevent us from going around  
6 all over the place.

7 MR. LYON: Two clarifications, if you would, on  
8 things we covered. One thing that we're trying to carefully  
9 do is obtain what I might call in quotes "original data". I  
10 noticed in going through here, you were very precise on a  
11 number of the times. Is that as a result of your personal  
12 record at the time or have you gone back and looked at the  
13 sequence of events and tried to repeat some of that  
14 information into what you're saying here in order to try to  
15 be more precise to us?

16 THE WITNESS: The times I used were known for other  
17 reasons. For example -- I can go through each of the  
18 times. 9:20 was the time of the trip, so I could use that  
19 one. I didn't look at my watch and say yeah, it is 9:20. I  
20 knew that when I heard the loud bang in the switch yard that  
21 it was 9:20 and I heard the page announcement all occur at  
22 pretty much the same time. The 9:32 -- the reason -- I said  
23 approximately 9:32, although I know that sounds fairly  
24 precise -- at 9:30 we logged that we broke condenser vacuum  
25 on Unit 2 and it was a short time after that that I entered

1 the Unit 2 control room, so I estimated two minutes. That's  
2 why I said 9:32. The 9:40 was the time at which I filled  
3 out the emergency notification forms and that's the time on  
4 the forms, so I put that time down here. The next time,  
5 restoration of an emergency power source at 9:56, that was  
6 logged as the time we restored the diesel generator. The  
7 next time, 10:03, is another time that also appears on the  
8 classification form.

9 MR. LYON: That you put down?

10 THE WITNESS: Right. And I put it down in an  
11 incorrect place, but in any event it happened, -- you know,  
12 what happened occurred at that time, 10:03. AT 10:10,  
13 that's an approximate time that I checked with the shift  
14 clerk. I knew that some time after I filled out the second  
15 follow-up -- the follow-up notification form and before  
16 George became Emergency Director, that I had checked with  
17 the clerk on the notifications and I estimated that time to  
18 be at approximately 10:10. And again, at 10:15, George  
19 became Emergency Director.

20 MR. LYON: So this really is a real good original  
21 time record, from your view point. That's good.

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I wrote down the times and then  
23 I filled in the information on the time frames.

24 MR. LYON: I've only got one more. You indicated I  
25 kind of took you by surprise with asking for

1 recommendations. If you stepped back and sort of looked at  
2 the whole thing, you've given us what I think are some  
3 really excellent suggestions. Would you make a broad  
4 overview comment, if you will, on the whole declaration  
5 process and whether you think it worked well or needs some  
6 really significant improvement kinds of things? Don't let  
7 me throw words at you, but what are your thoughts on that  
8 whole thing?

9 THE WITNESS: On the emergency plan aspect -- I  
10 kind of wanted to make a comment on our response to the  
11 event, which I thought was bordering on excellent, as far as  
12 actions taken by the operators to get busses back. The  
13 diesel generator was powering the bus within I think 35-40  
14 minutes, reliably, and we got one of the RATs back in  
15 service I think like an hour and a half later, an hour  
16 later. And we got the second RAT back later that day. So  
17 we had one on-site and two off-site power sources available.  
18 I think operationally, things went real well, actions went  
19 real well. You could say we're lucky but I could say well  
20 good training helped us to make things happen.

21 MR. LYON: I would agree that skill helps luck a  
22 lot. But I don't think I expressed myself clearly from this  
23 standpoint, how do you think the declaration process worked  
24 and does it need significant improvement?

25 THE WITNESS: In order to meet the time frames that

1 are required by our procedures, 15 minute initial  
2 notification, there has to be a little bit more improvement.  
3 I think that for significant events like a site area and a  
4 general emergency, the Shift Superintendent's focus is going  
5 to be more on the plant than on the notifications because  
6 it's important, you know. There's a real conflict there.  
7 Notifications are important, but so is controlling the plant  
8 and getting the plant in a stable condition. And his  
9 emphasis in the more significant emergencies is going to be  
10 getting the plant in a stable condition. Therefore, your  
11 communications tend to suffer. And I hate to say this in  
12 front of emergency response people -- they'll take a second  
13 priority -- but the reactor operations people say yes, I  
14 agree with you and the emergency response people say no,  
15 emergency planning is just as important as reactor  
16 operations. But that's the way I see it.

17 So our notifications were a little bit slower and  
18 had I come directly to the control room -- I volunteered to  
19 do it right away -- I think we could have done a little bit  
20 better, but I didn't and maybe the Shift Superintendent  
21 could have assigned somebody else before I got there, to get  
22 going on the notifications a little bit sooner. But I think  
23 we should have done a better job in getting the  
24 notifications out and started sooner.

25 There's a general -- kind of a reluctance, I'll

1 admit, on my part to call it a site area emergency right  
2 away. I looked at it and it's pretty black and white if you  
3 look at the procedure and I asked two other individuals, as  
4 I mentioned before, for their concurrence basically. I said  
5 tell me basically that I'm classifying this correctly. And  
6 they agreed, and once I got their agreement, I went ahead  
7 and filled the forms out and gave them to the Shift  
8 Superintendent. And the notifications proceeded from there.

9 MR. CHAFFEE: Is that because you were not sure  
10 that the conditions you had really merited that or you were  
11 sort of shocked by the fact that here we are -- is this  
12 really a site area emergency?

13 THE WITNESS: Probably the latter. Site area  
14 emergencies don't happen very often in the industry and it  
15 has -- receives a high level of attention by a lot of  
16 people, not just regulatory people, but the general public.  
17 And you want to be right when you declare it. That's all, I  
18 just wanted to make sure I was right. We did have non-1-E  
19 power available. However if you look in Tech Specs, it  
20 talks about on-site and off-site power sources and that's  
21 just as it applies to 1-E busses, and we did not comply with  
22 that. We did not have on-site or off-site power supply to  
23 the 1-E busses, and therefore, it was considered a site area  
24 emergency.

25 MR. CHAFFEE: I don't know if this question was

1 asked, but did you -- when you were in the control room, did  
2 you hear or observe anything relative to what was going on  
3 with getting the diesel started or anything relative to  
4 people monitoring the RCS unit?

5 THE WITNESS: Other individuals may have already  
6 asked, but I also independently asked an individual to  
7 monitor core exit thermocouple temperatures.

8 MR. CHAFFEE: Did you get feedback from him?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, the first temperature he gave me  
10 was in the 120's, the low 120's and later on he gave me one  
11 that was 130 and I kind of looked at the amount of time  
12 that had elapsed and figured out a rate that would be  
13 somewhere around 40-50 degrees an hour. I don't know how  
14 accurate that was but in my mind I got a feel for how far  
15 away we were from 200 degrees and when we should -- based on  
16 that, I would have decided to go with alternative means of  
17 cooling the core at some point in time. And I was thinking  
18 like around 150 or 160 degrees, that we should take  
19 alternative action if we had not powered up one of the  
20 busses by then.

21 MR. CHAFFEE: Consisting of what?

22 THE WITNESS: Gravity feed from the RWST was the  
23 first one that came to mind. Now we have non-1-E power  
24 available on the secondary plant, we could have gotten, you  
25 know, a pump and found some injection point to transfer



1 water from the RWST through a force path to the RCS, but  
2 gravity feed -- as long as you don't have pressure in the  
3 reactor vessel, gravity feed will provide -- by our previous  
4 experience -- like 500 to 1000 gallons a minute flow, which  
5 is a very large amount of water.

6 MR. CHAFFEE: Has there been a study done on this  
7 alternate means of providing water as part of the generic  
8 letter thing?

9 THE WITNESS: At this utility -- at this --

10 MR. CHAFFEE: Yes.

11 THE WITNESS: Not to my knowledge. There may have  
12 been, but to my knowledge we had not done that. However,  
13 when the TSC was established, the Engineering manager and  
14 his individuals were looking at alternative means of  
15 cooling the core. We're kind of relying on them to pursue  
16 that course of action in parallel with action we were  
17 taking. And John Aufdenkampe was responsible, he's  
18 Engineering Manager in the TSC. If you're not scheduled to  
19 talk to him, you might want to.

20 MR. LAZARUS: What was the name?

21 THE WITNESS: Aufdenkampe -- you're going to ask me  
22 to spell it -- A-u-f-d-e-n-k-a-m-p-e.

23 MR. CHAFFEE: How about the diesel, did you observe  
24 anything relative to that?

25 THE WITNESS: Well initially I heard that it

1 tripped on I think it was low jacket water pressure and we -  
2 - I'm not sure of the details there because I wasn't  
3 intimately involved, but my understanding was that they were  
4 going to send somebody out to monitor jacket water pressure  
5 while we attempted to start it again and it started and  
6 tripped I think for the same reason for a minute and they  
7 decided to emergency start it because that particular trip  
8 is bypassed and didn't seem to be valid, so we emergency  
9 started it and it worked fine.

10 MR. LAZARUS: I know Jimmy Cash is out there  
11 waiting and you're going to be coming back anyway. So  
12 unless someone else has anything to follow on immediately,  
13 we'll let you go.

14 THE WITNESS: Okay.

15 MR. LAZARUS: Off the record.

16 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded at  
17 9:45 a.m.)

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This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name: interview of WILLIAM BURMEYSTER

Docket Number:

Place: Vogtle Nuclear Generating Plant, Waynesboro, GA

Date: March 27, 1990

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original  
transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear  
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direction, and that the transcript is a true and accurate  
record of the foregoing proceedings.

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WILLIAM L. WARREN  
Official Reporter

Ann Riley & Associates

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