

# OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: INTERVIEW OF: GARY BRENBORG AND INDIRA KOCHERY

Docket No.

LOCATION: Waynesboro, Georgia

DATE: March 27, 1990

PAGES: 1-13

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

1612 K St. N.W., Suite 300

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 293-3950

9202190615 920116  
PDR ADDOCK 05000424  
S PDR

ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF

GARY C BRENNENBORG  
(Print Identity of Interviewee)

Page      Line      Correction and Reason for Correction

*No corrections*

Page \_\_\_\_ Date 3-30-90 Signature G.C. Brennan

ADDENDUM TO INTERVIEW OF

Indira KUCHER

(Print Identity of Interviewee)

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction and Reason for Correction</u>
3	7	hold instead of "ahold" grammatical
283	25	"Government" instead of "period" after "
4	20	"what" instead of when "
9	3	add "power" by the space



PROCEEDINGS

1  
2 MR. LAZARUS: On the record. It's March 27, 1990,  
3 545 p.m. We're at Vogtle Plant in an interview with Gary  
4 Brenenberg and Indira Kochery regarding their role in the  
5 loss of power incident on March 20th.

6 Whereupon,

7 GARY BRENEBORG

8 INDIRA KOCHERY

9 appeared as witnesses herein, and were examined and  
10 testified as follows:

11 EXAMINATION

12 BY MR. LAZARUS:

13 Q Would you state your name for the record please,  
14 Gary?

15 A (Witness Brenenberg) My name is Gary Brenenberg.  
16 My position during the emergency was that of a TSC  
17 supervisor, HP supervisor. Prior to the emergency actually  
18 being declared, I was in the service building in my office  
19 and we had a loss of power in the service building.

20 Shortly after we had the loss of power, I got up and  
21 went to the HP control point. The reason I wanted to go  
22 there, I wanted to make -- find out if they still had power  
23 in the plant. I didn't know what they had over there and I  
24 was concerned that somebody could sti'l be using the  
25 breathing air. I was concerned that breathing air might

1 have been lost.

2 I got over to the control point and I saw that all  
3 the power was out over there. I got ahold of the foreman  
4 that I knew was in containment, Tony Bush. I also knew  
5 there was only one job going on at that time using the  
6 breathing air which was a seal table. I was able to get  
7 ahold of Tony and I told him to get the people out of the  
8 breathing air because I wasn't sure exactly how it was going  
9 to affect the breathing air by the power being out. All I  
10 knew was there was power out at the plant.

11 After that, I left the control point once I made it  
12 clear to Tony that we needed to get everybody out of  
13 breathing air. I went over to where the breathing air  
14 compressor is located, which is just outside the equipment  
15 hatch. I got over there, the compressor was still working  
16 properly. Tony had told me when I talked to him on the  
17 phone he still had breathing air down there, but I still  
18 told him to get the people out because I didn't know what  
19 was going to happen to the power. The compressor was  
20 working properly.

21 Shortly thereafter I saw some people running up and  
22 down the roadway and I hadn't heard anything over the page,  
23 you can't hear very much over the page at the equipment  
24 hatch. I went up to some guy who was coming towards me and  
25 I asked him why is everybody running. At that time I found



1           One of the first things I did when I got there they  
2 were in the process of setting up the TSC. That involves  
3 putting all the procedures out, notebooks, what-not. I  
4 opened up the procedure book to the HP checklist.

5           Shortly thereafter I looked at the ERF computer and  
6 noted that I had no MET tower data. Shortly after that,  
7 James Carswell who is the HP foreman -- is an HP foreman,  
8 along with an HP technician, came to the TSC which is where  
9 they're supposed to go during an emergency and I let James  
10 know that we had no MET tower information. What I asked  
11 James to do is two things, see if he could get some people  
12 over to the MET tower but before doing that I just asked him  
13 to step outside real quick and take a look at the cooling  
14 tower to see which way the wind was blowing.

15           At the same time the technician was in the process  
16 of having the building checks in the TSC. After that I went  
17 through my checklist and also went back to the board and saw  
18 that I didn't have any information on rad monitors on the  
19 ERF computer either.

20           Probably ten or fifteen minutes after that, I was in  
21 the process of setting up -- I've got another computer over  
22 there I can look at. I went over and I was able to  
23 determine that -- I was able to see the low range area  
24 monitors inside the Unit 1 containment. I was also able to  
25 tell that the problem was that they didn't have power for



1 the RHR because they had already started logging things on  
2 the status board.

3 I'm not sure where I should go from here.

4 Q Everything was normal now, pretty well staffed up?

5 A (Witness Erenenborg) Right.

6 Q You would not have had anything to do operations  
7 wise in the plant at that point, you would have been  
8 preparing for I guess dose assessment and those sorts of  
9 things off-site?

10 A (Witness Brenenborg) Right. One of the things we  
11 did was get the computer fired up. We've got a little  
12 computer back there that can run our off-site dose  
13 assessment. If the TSC is the only thing that's activated  
14 at that time, we can run off-site dose assessment from the  
15 TSC. And we were in the process of getting it plugged in  
16 and operational too.

17 Q Okay. Indira, why don't you tell us where you were.

18 A (Witness Kochery) The first indication we had was  
19 the loss of power in the service building. I was in a  
20 meeting with the Westinghouse outage people trying to trend  
21 some work. Maybe ten minutes later, I heard the  
22 announcement that Unit 2 tripped. Approximately ten minutes  
23 later I said I'd better go find out what's going on and I  
24 did the same thing that Gary did, walked over to the HP  
25 control point and at that time we were looking at all of the

1 access control which provides the on-line HP computer  
2 information as far as dose control, et cetera. That was  
3 working and our PERMS computer was working and all the HP  
4 instrumentation seemed to be working. We didn't have any  
5 problem.

6 Maybe a few minutes later I heard the announcement  
7 saying evacuate Unit 1 containment, so saw -- I was still  
8 in the HP control point and I sent people down to make sure  
9 that everybody heard because in containment you really can't  
10 hear the page well. It comes but it's garbled so we  
11 dispatched some people with flashlights, et cetera.

12 Then I knew the equipment hatch was open so I said  
13 I'd better go check that out and I was in the process of  
14 walking down -- I exited the HP control point and I was in  
15 between the turbine building and the aux building and I  
16 heard a site area has been declared, it was about 10:00.  
17 And I said oh my gosh, the equipment hatch is open. At that  
18 time, I saw two people going down, running down to tell the  
19 people to close the equipment hatch.

20 A (Witness Brenenberg) I'd like to add one thing  
21 there. I was down there at the breathing air compressor and  
22 they were in the process of getting it closed at that time.  
23 They had the crane in place lifting out the rail and what-  
24 not that they needed to move prior to closing the doors.  
25 But they were in the process of trying to get that equipment

1 in.

2 A (Witness Kochery) The first thing we wanted to do  
3 was to close that because this is the worst condition we  
4 could ever be in. So after that I ran, I ran all the way to  
5 my desk to get my car keys. My normal position is EOF and  
6 I'm the dose assessment manager in the EOF. So I ran and I  
7 reached the EOF and I was there almost like 13 minutes after  
8 it was declared. We started setting the area up and the ERF  
9 did not give us the MET data, and I said we don't have time  
10 to go to the MET tower so I called Bush Field Airport and  
11 found out the wind direction and speed. We figured out what  
12 the zones were and decided where our teams have to go.  
13 After that I called OSC, told them to send me two teams so  
14 we can do some data to check readings. The teams came, we  
15 got some readings and everything was fine.

16 I also in the meantime called TSC to see if they  
17 have any indications for the rad data. Gary -- like he said  
18 -- we tried the PERMS terminal and got the information that  
19 I was looking for and I said gee, that's just fine, I'd  
20 better verify this. I called the HP control point, they  
21 have the same terminal and they both gave me the same data.  
22 So I felt pretty comfortable that containment was stable.

23 In the meantime I think it was towards the end of  
24 the incident, we got our ERF terminals to display radiation  
25 information because the set up we had, due to the loss of

1 power, we had lost the component that provides the  
2 information to the mini-computer. The com console had lost  
3 -- due to loss of power, they both were disabled and we had  
4 to wait until they were energized to get that set up. The  
5 chemistry technician went to set a com console in the  
6 control room first and then he goes to the level A in the  
7 control building to set up the mini-computer. It has to go  
8 through some iteration of software before it's ready. Prior  
9 to the incident of course both com console and the mini-  
10 computers were working.

11 That's about it. We were on hot standby, we were  
12 never truly activated because it was downgraded to alert.  
13 Most of the activity was happening inside containment trying  
14 to get people out, putting manways on -- it was after the  
15 incident we did get everybody's dose for completing the  
16 census. We didn't see any readings other than the previous  
17 day's rad information. From a radiation standpoint we did  
18 not have any problem.

19 Q So looking at the plant, people in containment, all  
20 those people were covered by normal health physics rules and  
21 practices.

22 A (Witness Kochery) That is correct. There was never  
23 a necessity to have extension dose or to have an emergency  
24 exposure because of saving plant equipment or saving lives,  
25 none of that.

1 MR. TRAGER: You mentioned that some of your people  
2 went down with a flashlights. That's routine or was the  
3 lighting affected?

4 WITNESS KOCHERY: Well we don't know, you know, when  
5 we are sending people out and we see there is no power we  
6 send flashlights.

7 MR. TRAGER: Had there been a total loss of AC, I  
8 gather things would have been substantially different.

9 WITNESS BRENEBORG: I heard the announcement that  
10 Indira talked about too and when I heard that they were  
11 evacuating containment, I assumed it was because they had no  
12 lights in there, they were trying to get everybody out.

13 WITNESS KOCHERY: And in fact it was because we had  
14 some delay in getting the RHR and we were afraid -- if you  
15 don't have it, you don't know how long it's going to take.

16 MR. TRAGER: Would a total loss of power affect the  
17 way you do things with computers?

18 WITNESS KOCHERY: As far as -- no, because we still  
19 have a safety related display panel in the control room that  
20 can provide us with rad data. Am I answering your question?

21 WITNESS BRENEBORG: I think what he's asking is if  
22 we lost that too.

23 WITNESS KOCHERY: That should not because that's  
24 from a different source of power, I think it's battery. So  
25 as far as I know, by design, we would always have that, but

1 it is in the control room and not at the TSC. The way we  
2 are set up the TSC is right next to the control room, a  
3 corridor away, so we can always talk to them.

4 MR. TRAGER: I was just wondering how it would have  
5 affected your activities because in the rest of the facility  
6 it would have affected lighting and use of the crane and I  
7 guess it would have had an effect.

8 WITNESS BRENEBORG: It would have had an effect on  
9 our ability to see things. All of our instrumentation is  
10 battery operated except for some air samplers and we do have  
11 battery operated air samplers.

12 WITNESS KOCHERY: Right and that's what we were  
13 using. We did take a bunch of air samples outside the  
14 equipment hatch and inside. We had an open release permit  
15 and we calculated based on the conditions.

16 WITNESS BRENEBORG: The air samples that were taken  
17 in containment showed basically no activity.

18 MR. LAZARUS: Is there anything else you'd like to  
19 add? It sounds like things went pretty smoothly as far as  
20 you were concerned.

21 WITNESS BRENEBORG: I know I felt a whole lot  
22 better as soon as I saw they had power back to the RHR.

23 WITNESS KOCHERY: We have participated in many  
24 drills but a real incident --

25 MR. LAZARUS: Makes the adrenalin flow.

1 WITNESS KOCHERY: Oh, yeah.

2 MR. TRAGER: Think about if the same thing happened  
3 and the lights were out, it's a different level of  
4 excitement.

5 WITNESS KOCHERY: It is. Even after it was over  
6 from a power standpoint, I did go through my checklist,  
7 that's a normal thing we do.

8 MR. LAZARUS: So all your procedures you think were  
9 adequate and nothing really interfered with setting up?

10 WITNESS KOCHERY: Yes, from the EOF I would say the  
11 big thing was not everybody heard the page announcement.  
12 There was a whole bunch of equipment running that raised the  
13 noise level.

14 WITNESS BRENENBORG: They had a cherry picker  
15 operating out there and there's a breathing air compressor.

16 WITNESS KOCHERY: Really high noise level, so we  
17 dispatched people to give them the information. But as far  
18 as the plant staff exiting the protected area, there was not  
19 a mass exodus of people really. People still used the  
20 access control and walked through the portal monitors.

21 MR. LAZARUS: Okay, thank you very much.

22 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded at  
23 6:05 p.m.)

P  
E  
N  
N  
S  
Y  
L  
V  
A  
N  
I  
A  
C  
O  
D  
E  
S  
F  
O  
R  
M  
E  
D



C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:


Name: Interview of GARY BRENEBORG AND INDIRA KOCHERY

Docket Number:

Place: Vogtle Nuclear Generating Plant, Waynesboro, GA

Date: March 27, 1990

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original  
transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear  
Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and,  
thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under my  
direction, and that the transcript is a true and accurate  
record of the foregoing proceedings.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
PEGGY J. WARREN  
Official Reporter

Ann Riley & Associates

P  
E  
N  
N  
S  
Y  
L  
V  
A  
N  
I  
A  
R  
E  
G  
U  
L  
A  
T  
O  
R  
Y  
C  
O  
M  
M  
I  
S  
S  
I  
O  
N  
R  
E  
P  
O  
R  
T  
I  
N  
G  
F  
O  
R  
M  
E  
D

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22