OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

INTERVIEW OF: HARVEY HANDFINGER

Docket No.

LOCATION

WAYNESBORO, GEORGIA

DATE:

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 1990

PAGES 1-11

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

1612 K St. N.W., Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950

INTERVIEW OF:

HARVEY HANDFINGER

Main Conference Room Administration Building Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Waynesboro, Georgia

Tuesday, March 27, 1990

The interview commenced at 4:01 p.m.

APPEAPANCES:

On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

WILLIAM LAZARUS GENE TRAGER

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. LAZARUS: It's March 27, 4:01 p.m., we're interviewing Mr. Harvey Handfinger.

THE WITNESS: Correct.

MR. LAZARUS: Regarding his participation in the loss of power incident on Tuesday, March 20. Whereupon,

HARVEY HANDFINGER

appeared as a witness herein, and was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION

BY MR. LAZARUS:

Q Mr. Handfinger, would you tell us and and position is please?

A My name is Harvey Handfinger, I'm the Maintenance Manager. At the time of the incident, I was the Operations Support Center Manager.

Q Okay. Would you tell us how you were involved in the incident on Tuesday in just a narrative form, where you were, how you responded, what your daties were, what you saw and observed during that time.

Okay. At the time the incident was declared, I responded to the OSC and assumed my position as the OSC Manager. We activated the OSC, contacted the Technical Support Center for direction. In addition, at that time we

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knew there had been people dispatched in other areas, specifically to do some things in containment. We tried to establish who those people were and what they were doing at that point in time. We dispatched our teams consistent with procedures. One of the first things you do is -- is it all right if I use my log a little bit?

MR. LAZARUS: Absolutely.

Okay, once the site area is declared, one of the things we do is get field monitoring teams prepared and we get the HP to go to the HP control point. Parallel with that, we had a request for some people to go to the MET tower to support some MET tower data, so we briefed them. Did you want me to go how we do some of this activity consistent with some of the HP concerns?

MR. LAZARUS: Yes.

We have HP support in the Operational Support Center. We get from them what the radiological conditions are. At the time we dispatch any team, we brief each team before they leave. We brief them as to what the radiological conditions are, what the plant conditions are, whether we're in a site area, whatever kind of event we're in. We give them radio communication, we verify radio communication, we give them on-site and off-site telephone numbers to contact and we require them to call us when they reach the location and we require them to call us every 30

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minutes thereafter. So that's the way we basically brief each team.

We assembled the team to go to the HP control point where people going into the plant -- the first thing they do is go to the HP control point for briefing for health physics requirements inside the plant. In parallel with that, I validate -- I verify with the HP people that people in containment, working on some of the activities in containment, had full HP coverage. The HP supervisor informed me that was correct, that everybody had HP coverage and that those activities were in fact going on.

Q So all of the normal health physics practices were covered with no emergency radiation work?

A That's right. With no dose release at that point in time, the only thing we did was send two off-site field monitoring teams at the request of the Technical Support Center, we dispatched two off-site teams.

Q How many teams did you dispatch to the containment to work there?

A There were already people there, there were people - to the best of my recollection, we had a team working,
getting the steam generator manways on, the pressuri
manways, verifying we had two valves, the cumulator
discharge valve on the D-cumulator and the alternate
charging check valve cover on, which were all points that we

knew were open at that point in time. Those were primarily
the people who were in containment. We got the names of
hose individuals who were performing those activities. We
contacted TSC and gave that information and we also
contacted TSC when they were out of containment.

We also dispatched a number of other teams to check elevators to make sure people weren't stuck on elevators.

We had some air compressors running, we dispatched a team to assure that we shut down all those temporary air compressors. We also dispatched a team to bring up the computer that needed to support some of the activities -- is basically what we did.

Q Do you know what computer that was?

A It was one of our in-plant -- I think it was our MPN1S, just our in-plant computer for work orders and things.

Q So in your words, everything worked pretty smoothly as far as being able to control teams, dispatch them, work with Health Physics?

A Yeah, once we had the OSC established, we had maintained control of getting teams out. Teams were always dispatched as directed by the TSC, we didn't dispatch anybody until we had talked to the TSC and got their concurrence to dispatch the team.

Q At what time was the OSC established or activated?

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A We got our first team I would say 9:20 because we had activated -- it takes about 18 minutes to activate the OSC.

Q So you're talking Central Standard time I assume?

A Yeah, I'm pretty sure that's correct. Ten o'clock

is the site -- this was Eastern and then we corrected it to Central.

Q Or uncorrected it.

A Yes.

MR. TRAGER: That's a source of confusion I guess sometimes?

THE WITNESS: Once you get into it, really it isn't. Operations is totally used to working on Central Standard time. There's no confusion factor for them. There really is a confusion factor only that you're putting a different time down. Once you get it established in your head, you say yeah, I'm going to log everything consistent with Central Standard time.

DY MR. LAZARUS:

The problems are in an emergency interfacing with those local communities around a different time zone.

A Yes. We learn to live with it and it's not a real problem for us.

Q You just have to remember to shift gears and that's a big human factors problem.

Q Is there anything else you can share with us about any problems you had in activating the OSC or any problems in implementing the procedures, things you would do differently?

A Well the only problem we had that we need to correct on the OSC is the number of people. Since we activated when we were on 12-hour shifts -- we typically are on an 8-hour shift. The numbers of people we had because of the 12-hour shift was much larger than we normally would have on an 8-hour shift. The facility we have is not big enough for the numbers of people we had available at the site who were qualified people. We had to distribute them within the shop and maintain control of them within the shop. The OSC really encompasses the whole maintenance shop but the artual OSC facility on the second floor is not big enough for that numbers of people and that's one of the things that we're going to have to work on, either having a subsequent place to designate people within the OSC.

Q That's a common problem with OSCs having a separate assembly area. A lot of people put it next to a cafeteria or something like that where you have a place to store your people until you need them.

A Yeah. We stored them down in the shop. We have a fairly good sized maintenance shop so we were able to store

the predominant number of people in the shop and it wasn't really a problem, we'd just go downstairs if we needed additional people. But just on the initial assembly in that area, it's just too small for that particular application.

Q Did you experience or notice any confusion over the announcements made regarding site area emergency and site evacuation of non-essential personnel?

A Yes, I think there was some confusion in that area where people weren't really sure to leave the plant. That was one of our comments on one of the critique sheets.

- Q People in the OSC?
- A No, people in the OSC --
- Q Knew they were supposed to be in there.

A -- knew where they were supposed to be. We also had some additional contractors. Once we had activated the OSC and had more or less stable conditions, we then dispatched the rest of the contractors to the assembly area outside the plant. It was identified and we assembled people in the admin building parking lot and we sent all the additional contractors to the admin building parking lot.

MR. TRAGER: You mentioned a critique sheet?

THE WITNESS: Yes. We send sheets to the emergency planning group with our comments every time we have a drill or -- hopefully we won't ever have another incident but we

send our critique sheets.

The last thing you do when you basically shut down the OSC is you critique activity, what could have been better, what could have -- what would we have done differently if you had done it -- if you were doing it the next time.

All in all, the OSC in my estimation was not chaotic, it was pretty -- wasn't confusing at all.

MR. LAZARUS: I'm just checking to see if I have a copy of your OSC log. If I don't, I'd like to get a copy.

THE WITNESS: I've got it right here. There's the handwritten, I had it typed so people could actually read it and that's what's on the top.

MR. LAZARUS: That's fine, it will help to try to piece together a sequence of events. Can I keep this copy?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. LAZARUS: Do you have anything else?

MR. TRAGER: No.

MR. LAZARUS: All right, we can go off the record. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded at 4:15 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE

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This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name: Interview of HARVEY HANDFINGER

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Docket Number:

Place: Vogtle Nuclear Generating Plant, Waynesboro, GA

9 Date: March 27, 1990

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under my direction, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

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PEGGY J. WARREN Official Reporter

Ann Riley & Associates