

46-1A

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency: U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: INTERVIEW OF EDWARD DANNEMILLER AND DOUG JUYCK

Docket No.

LOCATION: Waynesboro, Georgia

DATE: March 28, 1990

PAGES: 1-24

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
 1612 K & N.W., Suite 300
 Washington, D.C. 20006
 (202) 293-3950

9202190581 920116
 PDR ADDCK 05000424
 S PDR

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

INTERVIEW OF:

EDWARD M. DANNEMILLER, II
DOUG HUYCK

Main Conference Room
Administration Building
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Waynesboro, Georgia

Wednesday, March 28, 1990

The interview commenced at 9:40 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

WILLIAM LAZARUS

On behalf of INPO:

PAUL DIETZ

On behalf of CP&L:

MIKE JONES

P
E
N
D
A
D
C
O
B
A
Y
C
N
N
E
N
J
O
D
O
O
F
O
R
M
E
D

PROCEEDINGS

1
2 MR. LAZARUS: This is March 28, 1990 at 9:40 a.m.
3 and we are interviewing Mr. Ed Dannemiller and -- is it Ted
4 or Ed? I'm sorry.

5 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: My nickname is Ted. I am
6 Edward M. Dannemiller, II.

7 MR. LAZARUS: Okay. And Doug Huyck from the
8 Security Department who detailed some of the incidents
9 surrounding the loss of power event on March 20th and their
10 involvement in that.

11 Would you each state your name and title for the
12 record, please?

13 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: My name is Edward McCleve
14 Dannemiller, II. I am the Nuclear Security Manager at
15 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

16 WITNESS HUYCK: My name is Douglas Glenn Huyck and
17 I am the Security Operations Supervisor at Vogtle Nuclear
18 Generating Plant.

19 BY MR. LAZARUS:

20 Q Ed, you were saying that you were not here during
21 the event on Tuesday?

22 A (Witness Dannemiller) That is correct. I was in
23 Birmingham on Tuesday but I was aware of the incident and
24 stayed abreast of it from the Birmingham office most of the
25 day.

1 Q Okay. What was your knowledge and involvement in
2 the Birmingham office of that? What was transpiring?

3 A (Witness Dannemiller) I'm in the process of
4 relocating. I've just been assigned as the Nuclear Security
5 Manager and I'm currently assigned in the Birmingham office.
6 When I went to the office on Tuesday, I learned of the
7 event just as part of my normal go and see what was
8 happening. I then called the shift and talked with the
9 shift and the EOF just to understand the nature of the site-
10 area emergency and also to check up on any security issues
11 that might have been challenged as a result of loss of
12 normal and off-site power sources.

13 I was aware that the security emergency diesel
14 generator had in fact auto started and carried all of those
15 loads satisfactorily and I was aware that we had properly
16 activated our security coordinator posts and emergency
17 notification network posts as required by the procedure.

18 For the rest of the day, I generally stayed in
19 touch with the Emergency Operations Facility just to see how
20 that was progressing, from the Birmingham office.

21 Late in the afternoon on Tuesday, I was aware that
22 the emergency had been downgraded and then terminated and I
23 then left Birmingham early on Wednesday morning to come back
24 here to Augusta.

25 Q Doug, since you were on site at the time, why don't

1 you describe your involvement and your knowledge of the
2 sequence of events?

3 A (Witness Huyck) Basically that day, I was filling
4 in for Ted. I was the Acting Security Manager that day.
5 Early that morning, I was over in my office in the Field
6 Support Building when we heard the plant page that the
7 reactor had tripped. I immediately turned my radio on to
8 monitor the security frequency to find out exactly what was
9 going on and to insure that we're doing everything as
10 required to assist the control room in that trip.

11 At that time, the transmission came across the
12 radio that there was a downed line north of the Turbine
13 Building. You know, somebody had backed into a concrete
14 pillar and there was a downed power line north of the
15 Turbine Building inside the PA.

16 So, I immediately raised several concerns. I just
17 pictured in my mind, you know, possible, you know, disaster
18 out there in that area. So, I picked up my radio and
19 contacted the duty captain, told the duty captain to meet me
20 at that location, which I went en route at that time.

21 When we got out there, yes, there was a downed
22 line. There was a truck in the immediate area with a plant
23 employee driving it and a security officer escorting the
24 vehicle. I immediately got with the duty captain and
25 informed the captain -- to ensure that we cordoned the area

1 off, to go ahead and take control of the scene of the
2 accident. We began roping the area off at that time. We
3 instructed the security officer in the area of the vehicle
4 to lock the vehicle down because it was a non-designated
5 vehicle and we were required to lock them down. I
6 instructed him to lock it down and at time, him and the
7 driver got out of the immediate area.

8 More or less after that, I went ahead and notified
9 my immediate supervision that day, Alan Mosbaugh, to ensure
10 that he was aware of what had happened. We also -- I was
11 informed by the shift captain that we did have a minor
12 computer problem. When the reactor tripped, it caused our
13 primary computer to go down; thus, bringing our backup up.
14 No security degradation -- no severe security degradation,
15 everything was properly compensated for.

16 I was informed that our security diesel was
17 running, that we were on backup power. At that time, I came
18 over to the PESB with the shift captain to insure that we
19 were in regulatory compliance at that point. And again, I
20 notified my supervision and the shift captain contacted the
21 control room.

22 At that point, we felt like we had a handle on it.
23 So I went ahead and went on out to the field and was
24 conducting some post walk-downs -- some security post walk-
25 downs. At that time, I heard a plant page about the plant

1 emergency -- the site area emergency. I head the plant
2 page, it was kind of garbled, so I requested Central via the
3 radio -- Central is our alarm station, via the radio, to
4 relay that back to me so I understood what it was. They
5 did. So I immediately went en route to the PESB.

6 At that time the captain informed me what had
7 happened. He told me that he was notified via the plant
8 page what condition we were in. He immediately was
9 implementing our security emergency procedure, 91704, and I
10 just -- at that point -- and throughout the emergency. I
11 coordinated with the captain and with my upper supervision
12 to ensure that we were implementing everything correctly. I
13 did not go to any of the EP coordinator posts. I ensured
14 that we had a coordinator at the TSC. We activated our EOF.
15 We were on standby at the EOF. I more or less just oversaw
16 the plant emergency that day. I also talked to Ted in
17 Birmingham that day. That is my direct involvement in the
18 incident.

19 Q Were you aware of the problems regarding -- I guess
20 there was some confusion over evacuation of the plant and
21 the accountability problems that have been pursued.

22 A (WITNESS DANNEMILLER) This is Ted Dannemiller
23 again. I'm aware of this particular issue and I would like
24 to speak to it some. Part of the issue was that inadequate
25 instructions were given on the plant page when the site area

1 emergency was declared.

2 The procedure allows some discretion to the person
3 making the announcement and the procedure form used to
4 generate that announcement prior to its being made was lined
5 through that portion which said this is a site area
6 emergency, all personnel should proceed to their assembly
7 areas and take instructions from plant management at their
8 assembly area locations. A portion regarding proceeding
9 from the plant site, if they were nonessential, and going to
10 their assembly area had been lined through by the shift
11 supervision. So the announcement that came over the plant
12 page was that a site area alert -- a site area emergency had
13 been declared. Some people proceeded to the assembly areas,
14 one of which is the Vogtle Recreation Center and the other
15 which is Plant Wilson. There was some confusion as to wind
16 direction and which assembly area they were to go to.

17 Some people left the protected area of the plant
18 and assembled in the parking lot of the Administration
19 Building on the northeast side of the plant. A number of
20 people remained in the plant at the request of Outage or
21 Operations' supervision or in the belief -- from having
22 heard the announcement that they were not required to leave
23 the protected area. The accountability problems are related
24 to those specific issues.

25 A number of people left in a short period of time

1 which caused our computer to slow down as we began to
2 process people through the system. When the electronics
3 slowed down, the Security organization began to accept the
4 badges in bulk allowing the people to exit the PA and then
5 we, individually, as the computer came back up to speed,
6 badged out from our security equipment and badged each
7 person out of the protected area. Because of that and also
8 because of the high number of people who remained inside the
9 protected area -- that number has been estimated to be as
10 high as 197 who were unaccounted for, I believe, there was
11 an accountability problem.

12 The procedural factor that bears on this is that
13 when the accountability check is begun in the alarm station,
14 the computer automatically accounts for personnel who have
15 badged into one of the emergency operation facilities,
16 either the control room, the Technical Support Center or the
17 Operations Support Center. It ignores people who are still
18 in the plant and who have properly entered other places in
19 the plant. So the unaccountability is in the context of we
20 had people who were not on the emergency response
21 organization who remained on plant.

22 By manually cross checking with Outage management,
23 Operations management and people in the Emergency Operation
24 facilities, we were able to reduce that number
25 significantly. I'm not aware of the exact number but I

1 believe by the time the event was terminated, we were unable
2 to account for 47 people. That is a number that I have
3 heard, but that number is still kind of in flex.

4 Q Were there more -- my understanding is there were
5 more than one announcement, you know, surrounding the site
6 area emergency and the question of evacuation, assembly area
7 and accountability. Did the initial message -- the site
8 area emergency, say anything about evacuation of
9 nonessential personnel?

10 A (Witness Huyck) This is Doug Huyck. In regards to
11 that question, basically the initial announcement that I
12 heard when I was out in the protected area did not -- there
13 was no mention about evacuation.

14 Q It was just an announcement of the site area
15 emergency?

16 A (Witness Huyck) That's correct.

17 Q Okay. There were subsequent messages then that did
18 discuss or give details about evacuation of nonessential
19 personnel or early dismissal of nonessential personnel or
20 whatever the terminology was?

21 A (Witness Huyck) This is Doug Huyck again. My only
22 involvement in regards to that was when I was in the
23 Captain's office -- I don't know the exact time, Captain
24 Johnson received a phone call from the OSOS and I heard him
25 talking to him over the phone. He hung up and he said the

1 OSOS more or less wants everybody to come back to work, to
2 come back in the PA. That's the only other word that I
3 heard. I did not hear any other plant pages.

4 Q You were not aware that there was communication
5 between the Security force and the Technical Support Center
6 about making a subsequent announcement --

7 A (Witness Huyck) No.

8 Q -- for evacuation of --

9 A (Witness Huyck) No, sir, I wasn't.

10 Q Isn't it correct that -- what are the assembly
11 areas currently for site evacuation?

12 A (Witness Huyck) Okay, we have two assembly areas.
13 We have Plant Wilson and we have the Training Center, two
14 assembly areas. I'm sorry, you have Plant Wilson and the
15 rec area. I'm sorry. Depending on wind direction, the
16 Emergency Director has the authority to activate one or the
17 other.

18 Q Plant Wilson and...

19 A (Witness Huyck) And the rec center, the recreation
20 area.

21 (Witness Dannemiller) That's based on wind
22 direction.

23 Q I have -- at least one person has told me that
24 there was a recent change and now there's only one assembly
25 area and that's the Admin parking lot. Is that your

1 understanding?

2 A (Witness Dannemiller) I just took my GET training
3 and it's my understanding there remains two assembly areas,
4 the Recreation Center and the Plant Wilson Visitors Center.
5 We can't accommodate a thousand people in the Administration
6 Building parking lot.

7 MR. DIETZ: Doug, where -- you were stationed where
8 during the event?

9 WITNESS HUYCK: During the plant emergency, I was
10 stationed in the Capta: 's office -- the majority of the
11 time. I was in and out of the Captain's office just
12 ensuring, you know, everything was going on as required.

13 MR. DIETZ: The Tech Support Center would have been
14 in communication with which area of Security?

15 WITNESS HUYCK: A coordinator in Tech Support
16 Center would have been in contact with the duty captain via
17 the telephone.

18 MR. DIETZ: And where is the duty captain?

19 WITNESS HUYCK: He's in the PESB, the Captain's
20 office.

21 MR. DIETZ: Okay.

22 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: PESB is the plant entry
23 security building.

24 MR. DIETZ: Okay. I'm just trying to get the
25 picture.

P
E
N
N
A
D
C
O
R
R
A
Y
O
N
N
E
N
J
D
D
D
F
E
D
R
M
F
E
D

1 WITNESS HUYCK: Yeah.

2 MR. DIETZ: If Security was to make an
3 announcement, where would that have been made from? From
4 that same building?

5 WITNESS HUYCK: The announcement would either come
6 from the Captain's office or come from the secondary alarm
7 station at the PESB.

8 MR. DIETZ: Okay.

9 WITNESS HUYCK: It would be either one of the two
10 places.

11 MR. DIETZ: And that's where you and the Captain
12 were?

13 WITNESS HUYCK: That's correct.

14 MR. DIETZ: And there were no announcements made -

15 - WITNESS HUYCK: As far as my involvement, when I
16 was in there with the Captain -- of course, I was out a few
17 times, I did not hear and I was not aware that we made an
18 announcement -- that he made an announcement.

19 MR. DIETZ: Are there logs kept of the
20 announcements?

21 WITNESS HUYCK: Yes, we have a chronology of the
22 incident.

23 BY MR. LAZARUS:

24 Q So if he made an announcement he probably would
25 have logged it?

1 A (WITNESS HUYCK) Yes, sir, it would be in our event
2 chronology.

3 Q Okay. Can I get a copy of the section of the log
4 for that day?

5 A (Witness Dannemiller) Yes, sir.

6 Q What's the title of that log?

7 A (Witness Dannemiller) Well, it's --

8 Q Don't worry. I'll request it through the Admin
9 people here and they'll get back to you to get a copy of it.

10 A (Witness Huyck) It's our security report and we're
11 required in the report to have a time-event chronology of
12 the incident. I do not know the report number but I'll be
13 glad to get it for you.

14 Q I'll just ask for the security time-event
15 chronology for March 20th and that should do it.

16 A (Witness Huyck) I think that'll do it.

17 MR. DIETZ: Doug, in terms of -- or either one of
18 you -- yes, go ahead.

19 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: If you ask for the Security
20 Event Report, that is the terminology that the officer or
21 the requestee will understand more clearly. The event
22 chronology would be contained in a Security Event Report.

23 MR. LAZARUS: Event Report?

24 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: That's correct.

25 MR. LAZARUS: Just ask him for the date March 20th

P
E
N
S
I
O
N
A
D
C
O
B
A
Y
O
N
N
E
N
J
O
O
O
O
F
O
R
M
E
D

1 and he will give me what I want?

2 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: Yes.

3 MR. LAZARUS: Okay, thank you.

4 MR. DIETZ: When you allow vehicles on site, what
5 areas of the plant do the vehicles inside the security area
6 have access to and what areas do they not have access to?

7 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: We have two kinds of vehicle
8 authorizations. They are a designated vehicle or a non-
9 designated vehicle. A designated vehicle would be one that
10 would remain permanently inside the protected area or some
11 duration of time -- permanent is figurative, and might be
12 used to transport contaminated trash from, let's say the
13 power block over to the rad waste solidification building or
14 to transport materials from the warehouse over to the power
15 block, bulk chemicals and that sort of thing. Those
16 vehicles are not escorted because they have been physically
17 searched and because of the safeguards we have on other
18 materials coming into the site including security officer
19 inspections at the warehouse and everything that comes
20 through the gate and on personnel passing through the plant
21 entry security building, they are not routinely researched
22 and when they are loaded, we have adequate safeguards to
23 insure that they don't have contraband or unauthorized
24 materials on them. They are restricted primarily to the
25 roadbeds by operator common sense. If the roadbed is paved,

P
E
N
D
A
D
C
O
B
A
Y
D
O
N
S
E
N
J
D
T
E
D
D
F
O
R
M
F
E
D

1 then they would not be authorized into unpaved areas
2 normally.

3 Non-designated vehicles, such as the one involved
4 on the site area emergency, are inspected at the time of
5 entry into the protected area. They are escorted at all
6 times by a security officer who ensures that the vehicle
7 does not do anything inconsistent with its task while inside
8 the protected area. In cases where the vehicle -- like the
9 one used, the POL truck, I call it, is required to go into
10 an area like the switch yard where there are not roads, the
11 security officer has no responsibility for the safe
12 operation of the vehicle but he would ensure, for instance,
13 that the operator didn't intentionally drive that vehicle
14 through a reserve auxilliary transformer or something else -
15 - a power pole.

16 The officer is required to ensure that the vehicle
17 is either continuously escorted or if the operator is
18 required to leave the vehicle, then the officer would escort
19 the operator after having ensured that the vehicle was
20 properly locked down and secured in a proper parking
21 location or one consistent with its task.

22 MR. DIETZ: Are there any restrictions the truck -
23 - you know, when you're driving a vehicle, do you have to
1 keep it ten feet away from fences? I'm looking more for
23 what are the bounds under which a truck can basically be

1 operated.

2 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: The isolation zone is
3 described in general employee training and no one is
4 authorized to drive the vehicle or to walk into the
5 isolation zone without first notifying Security and having
6 appropriate authorization to go in there on official duty.
7 There are no other protective features or procedural
8 features to prevent a vehicle from scuffing a building
9 except that the layout of the roads prevents that to the
10 greatest extent.

11 MR. DIETZ: As long as he stays on the road?

12 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: That's right. If he stays on
13 the road, then he would not unintentionally or normally hit
14 any of the safety related or non-safety related structures
15 that we have out here.

16 MR. DIETZ: Okay.

17 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: The switchyard doesn't have
18 any roads and the individual would go to wherever they
19 happen to need to be in the switchyard in terms of the
20 specifics of the instance.

21 MR. DIETZ: And prior to this event there were no
22 restrictions on vehicles being in the switchyard?

23 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: There are still no
24 restrictions on vehicles being in the switchyard except that
25 they have to be there on official duty. Because it was a

P
E
N
D
I
N
G
C
O
B
A
Y
O
N
N
E
N
I
D
O
T
T
O
P
P
E
R
F
O
R
M
F
E
E
D

1 non-designated vehicle, a supervisor -- a plant supervisor
2 or a department head is required to approve the vehicle
3 coming on site and then state the purpose for the vehicle
4 coming on site. As long as the purpose is consistent with
5 the vehicle and its load, then that vehicle is authorized on
6 site and would use the best route available to do that.

7 MR. DIETZ: Who authorized the vehicle on this day,
8 or when was it authorized?

9 WITNESS DANMILLER: It was authorized that day by
10 Charles L. Coursey, a maintenance superintendent, who
11 signed a form and a procedure -- the security procedure, I
12 believe is -- I don't know the numbers.

13 MR. DIETZ: Has this vehicle been entering the site
14 on a regular routine?

15 WITNESS DANMILLER: That's correct. This vehicle
16 or a vehicle identical to it routinely performs those
17 functions, especially during outages when we have
18 additional equipment which requires petroleum, oils or
19 lubricant services; that's what this vehicle was doing.

20 MR. DIETZ: Are there any restrictions on where --
21 other things like welders being in the switchyard that you
22 know of?

23 WITNESS DANMILLER: I'm not aware of specific
24 restrictions. We in our management planning -- in our
25 outage planning, excuse me, discuss the locations of things

P
E
N
N
S
Y
L
V
A
N
I
A
R
E
C
O
R
D
S
D
I
V
I
S
I
O
N
S
F
O
R
M
I
D

1 like trailers, outage equipment, the compressors to be used
2 for the integrated leak rate test and proper placement of
3 fire extinguishers for those devices. For instance, as a
4 part of our planning process in the outage, which is
5 obviously a bit more complex than day-to-day operations.
6 You have a lot of abnormal conditions inside the protected
7 area and those conditions might require different vehicular
8 paths. There are no restraints on placement of those
9 vehicles; however, we have administrative procedures which
10 constrain or prevent the introduction of hazardous or
11 controlled substances -- controlled not in the DEA sense,
12 into the protected area without approval of the Chemistry
13 Department and the appropriate level of site supervision.

14 MR. DIETZ: Is that a -- is the switchyard a
15 protected area?

16 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: The switchyard is in the
17 protected area.

18 MR. DIETZ: The low voltage switchyard?

19 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: The low voltage switchyard is
20 in the protected area.

21 MR. DIETZ: Who would we talk to find out how the
22 welder got out into that area? What it was there for and
23 what considerations were done in putting it there?

24 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: The person to whom you need
25 to speak is probably Mike Lackey who is the Acting Outage

1 Department Manager. He may not know directly the purpose
2 but he has responsibility for outage activity coordination
3 and he would know to whom you might ask about the specific
4 purpose of that specific welder in the witchyard.

5 MR. DIETZ: And the guard going along, he was
6 really to maintain the vehicle was secure?

7 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: The officer is required to
8 ensure that the vehicle while inside the PA does not do any
9 unauthorized activity.

10 MR. DIETZ: Damage?

11 WITNESS HUYCK: Mainly for a radiological --

12 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: From a radiological sabotage
13 standpoint, he's not the driver and he's not responsible for
14 the safe operation of the vehicle.

15 WITNESS HUYCK: He has to have physical control
16 over the vehicle.

17 MR. DIETZ: Hitting the pole like that is -- does
18 that fall into sabotage?

19 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: No, I don't think it does.
20 The plant is analyzed to deal with the loss of off-site
21 power, so that is not. Does the officer have some common
22 sense responsibility? Again, at what point in time is he
23 going to have to make a decision and try and take control of
24 the vehicle from the driver is a nuance that I think
25 neither of us here can make any judgement on.

P
E
N
S
I
O
N
S
C
O
N
F
I
D
E
N
T
I
A
L

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. LAZARUS: Was he riding in the vehicle?

WITNESS DANNEMILLER: He was riding in the vehicle. He is not allowed to be outside of the vehicle. As a matter of fact, in the last 24 hours, we have issued a policy that says that any vehicle larger than a pickup truck inside the protected area will have a flagman with it if it is anticipated that vehicle will be required to back up. That is really what we should have had in the first place, a ground guide for that vehicle whenever it was maneuvering in restrictive areas or backing up where the driver doesn't have full visibility around him. The security officer might have mitigated this but it would have been very difficult because he can't be on the ground and have the driver inside not under his physical control.

BY MR. LAZARUS:

Q I have a couple of questions that go back to EP about the interface between the Security force and the Emergency Response forces during an emergency. Based on your experience during this event and exercises, do you think there was adequate communication between your security force and the emergency director?

A (Witness Dannemiller) I would believe that, yes, there is; however, Doug might have a different perception. The security coordinators are in the areas where the emergency director is resolving the accident and should be

P
E
N
N
S
Y
L
V
A
N
I
A
C
O
U
N
T
Y
C
O
U
R
T
R
E
C
O
R
D
S

1 aware of and acting consistent with whatever the emergency
2 director may be doing. The Security Department does not
3 specifically have the responsibility to make the page
4 announcement if the ED doesn't make the proper announcement.
5 As a for instance, they are in the EOF and the TSC. So I
6 believe the communications were adequate between the two
7 departments. We were present in all of the places the
8 decisions were made.

9 Q How about the training of Security forces? If
10 there was a radiological release during this time, what
11 provisions exist in your plan and the emergency plan to
12 protect the security guards who may be exposed to a
13 radiological release from the plant and still maintain
14 security?

15 A (Witness Dannemiller) I believe that the EP
16 recognizes that security officers are a part of the
17 emergency response organization and have a responsibility to
18 continue to prevent an act of radiological sabotage even if
19 a radiological release occurs. Until such time the manager
20 declares a general emergency and evacuates the site and we
21 suspend safeguards, we would continue to occupy our posts.

22 Adequate protection is available in the form of
23 protective clothing and radiological monitoring instruments.
24 I believe then that the security manager -- well, the
25 security coordinators, if it occurred on a back shift, would

1 have to take appropriate compensatory measures consistent
2 with the radiological conditions to continue to maintain
3 proper security here at the plant.

4 Q Does the guard force receive respirator training
5 and qualifications?

6 A (Witness Dannemiller) Some of the officers are
7 respirator qualified.

8 Q That's really for containment type duties rather
9 than emergency planning?

10 A (Witness Dannemiller) That's right. Although, it
11 is not -- I have not enacted it; we intend for all the
12 officers to be respirator qualified because any officer
13 might be called upon to make an entry into a confined space
14 requiring the use of a respirator.

15 A (Witness Huyck) The only one position that
16 Security Force holds in the EP is the ENN communicator and
17 the ENN communicator is required to be SCBA qualified. As
18 far as EP requirements, that is the only security position
19 that we're required to be respirator certified.

20 Q I have just one last question. Does the emergency
21 plan clearly cover the situation where a plume would be
22 blowing directly at a security guard post; are there any
23 special habitability things in the design of that?

24 A (Witness Dannemiller) No.

25 Q So you may have to evacuate that?

1 A (Witness Dannemiller) We may have to evacuate it
2 or -- again, depending on conditions, lock a camera or some
3 other function to compensate for an officer being there.
4 There are not normally guard posts in a fixed location where
5 the plume might be a consideration. As it happened, we had
6 fixed posts or semi-fixed posts that might have had to be
7 considered in terms of the downwind plume. I believe that -
8 - again, having Security present in the EOF where the
9 analysis of the plume and any setdown that might occur would
10 provide me information or the security coordinator
11 information that would then be used to revise whatever
12 compensator measures that were necessary to maintain proper
13 security orientation.

14 MR. LAZARUS: Thanks very much. You've been very
15 helpful.

16 WITNESS DANNEMILLER: Thank you.

17 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded at 10:08
18 a.m.)
19

C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name: Interview of EDWARD M. DANMILLER AND DOUG HUYCK

Docket Number:

Place: Vogtle Nuclear Generating Plant, Waynesboro, GA

Date: March 28, 1990

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original
transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and,
thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under my
direction, and that the transcript is a true and accurate
record of the foregoing proceedings.

William L. Warren

WILLIAM L. WARREN
Official Reporter

Ann Riley & Associates

P
E
N
S
I
L
A
D
C
O
S
A
Y
O
N
N
E
N
J
S
T
R
I
C
T
F
O
R
M
F
E
D

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22