

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-247/84-11

Docket No. 50-247

License No. DPR-26 Priority -- Category C

Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place
New York, New York 10003

Facility Name: Indian Point - 2

Inspection At: Buchanan, New York

Inspection Conducted: May 7-10, 1984

Inspectors: E. Woltner
E. Woltner, Team Leader

5/30/84
date

P. Brown, PNL
P. Clemons, RI
T. Kenny, RI
R. Jaquish, PNL
P. Koltay, RI
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Approved by: H.W. Crocker
H.W. Crocker, Chief, Emergency
Preparedness Section, DETP

5/31/84
date

Inspection Summary: Inspection on May 7-10, 1984 (Report No. 50-247/84-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency small scale exercise performed on May 9, 1984. The inspection involved 139 inspector-hours by a team of seven NRC and NRC contractor personnel.

Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's response actions for this exercise scenario were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on May 10, 1984:

D. McCloskey, Manager, Emergency Planning
G. Hugo, SRO
J. Brown, Consultant
N. Hartmann, QA Auditor
F. Gross, Training Instructor
S. Southern, Consultant
G. Liebler, Senior Radiation Protection Specialist
T. Cotter, Consultant
M. DiGenova, Senior Radiation Protection Specialist
M. Skotzko, Consultant
C. Hughes, OCC Supervisor
M. Blatt, Director, Regulatory Affairs
B. Raskovic, Engineer, Regulatory Affairs
B. Lindgren, Manager, Nuclear Information

2. Emergency Exercise

The Indian Point Station Unit No. 2 small scale exercise was conducted on May 9, 1984 from 8:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m.

a. Pre-Exercise Activities

Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to review the scope and content of the exercise scenario.

In addition, NRC Team observers attended a licensee briefing for licensee controllers and observers on May 8, 1984. The licensee specified the emergency response activities that would be simulated and also that controllers would intercede in activities to prevent disturbing normal plant operations.

The exercise scenario included the following events:

- A tremor is recorded in Unit 3 with the horizontal and vertical indication large enough to declare an Alert
- Personnel assembly/accountability
- One Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) is ejected from the reactor core resulting in a small loss-of-coolant accident
- Reactor and turbine both trip

- Two pressure relief valves outside containment fail to close
- Offsite electrical power disturbance causes loss of all offsite power
- Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps fail to start
- Steam generators boil dry
- Indications of fuel damage
- Instrumentation indicates high radiation levels in the plant ventilation system
- Radiogas monitors indicate significant releases are occurring

The above events caused the activation of the licensee's emergency facilities.

b. Exercise Observation

During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of emergency response facilities; and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

- (1) Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events;
- (2) Direction and coordination of the emergency response;
- (3) Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information;
- (4) Assembly and accountability of personnel;
- (5) Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and consideration of protective actions;
- (6) Provisions for in-plant radiation protection;
- (7) Performance of offsite, onsite, and in-plant radiological surveys;
- (8) Maintenance of site security and access control;
- (9) Performance of technical support;
- (10) Performance of repair and corrective action;
- (11) Communications/information flow, and record keeping; and
- (12) Provisions for information flow to the public.

The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of the emergency response facilities; and actions and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following areas where the licensee's activities were thoroughly planned and efficiently implemented:

- Emergency response personnel were knowledgeable in their assignments and the emergency procedures. Individuals were conscientious and in general, demonstrated that they were competent in performing their assigned function.
- Personnel briefings were conducted in a timely manner by the individual in command of each emergency facility.
- The observed activities performed by the emergency response organization were indicative of an active training and emergency preparedness program.
- Accountability of assembled personnel was completed in less than 30 minutes and access controls were adequate.
- Status boards in the emergency facilities had adequate content and in general, were maintained with current information.
- The corrective measures implemented by the Emergency Director were based on consideration of plant systems and conditions that were or might be affected by scenario conditions.

The NRC team findings in areas for licensee improvements were as follows (the licensee also identified several of these areas in their critique of the exercise):

- Information on the projected dose rate was not relayed to the off-site monitoring teams to alert them of what levels to expect.
- EOF did not demonstrate ALARA considerations in a timely manner to the off-site monitoring teams.
- There was an extended time period for in plant team to obtain badges/dosimeters and for the chem technicians to prepare equipment required to collect samples.
- The Dose Assessment HP and ORAD in the EOF were kept busy filling out forms when the release rate was rapidly escalating.
- Adequate support staff should be provided for the Emergency Director to maintain log entries, message copying and distribution.

c. Exercise Critique

The NRC team attended the licensee's post exercise critique on May 10, 1984, during which key licensee controllers discussed their observations of the exercise. The licensee participants highlighted areas for improvement which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate action taken.

3. Exit Meeting and NRC Critique

Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC Team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise and discussed the areas described in Section 2.b.

The licensee was informed that no violations were observed; and although there were areas identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measure for the health and safety of the public.

Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified improvement areas.