UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos.: 50-348/95-14 and 50-364/95-14

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Facility Name: Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: July 17 through August 20, 1995

Inspectors: VIA Phone 9/6/95
T. M. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

VIA Phone 9/6/95
M. A. Scott, Resident Inspector Date Signed

Approved by: 9/6/95
Harold O. Christensen, Chief Date Signed
Reactor Projects, Branch 1B
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine resident inspection was conducted onsite in the functional areas of operations, maintenance and surveillance, engineering and technical support, and general plant support. Backshift inspections were conducted on July 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, and, August 1, 3, 10, 1995.

Results:

Operations

Operations personnel and management continued to perform well in maintaining steady-state operations of Units 1 and 2. The Unit 2 downpower to improve steam generator chemistry was accomplished without incident. Operators remained alert for changes in plant conditions and were well-versed on plant status and ongoing activities. An unresolved item was identified regarding high containment air temperature during the peak summer heat. New fuel assembly receipt inspection and transfer for the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outage went smoothly.

Maintenance/Surveillance

Maintenance and surveillance personnel consistently performed assigned activities in accordance with work orders and applicable procedures. Personnel continued to demonstrate familiarity with administrative procedures and radiological controls, and exhibited good working skills. Responsible surveillance personnel coordinated well with control room operators during testing that affected critical plant equipment.

Engineering/Technical Support

Overall engineering support of the plant was good and met the needs of both units. Strong engineering and technical support was evident on the testing and evaluation of service water system flow performance. Considerable effort has been expended to effectively expand and improve the site's root cause trending program. Initiation of the Engineering Project Council was a positive licensee initiative to facilitate coordination and resolution of important engineering issues and licensing projects.

Plant Support

Health physics personnel provided good support of Unit 1 and 2 steady-state operations. Security personnel were consistently alert and implemented the site's security plan in an appropriate manner. Personnel entry into protected areas was well-controlled. Chemistry continued to provide excellent support of plant efforts to control secondary side sodium and improve electro-hydraulic control fluid quality. Fire protection features were well maintained and compensatory measures properly implemented.

REPORT DETAILS

1. PERSONS CONTACTED

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Employees:

W. Bayne, Chemistry/Environmental Superintendent
*C. Buck, Technical Manager
*R. Coleman, Maintenance Manager
*P. Crone, Operations Manager
*L. Enfinger, Administration Manager
H. Garland, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
*R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant
*C. Hillman, Security Manager
*J. Hornbuckle, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Auditor
R. Johnson, Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent
J. Kale, Maintenance Engineering Support Group Supervisor
M. Mitchell, Health Physics Superintendent
R. Monk, Engineering Support Supervisor - Equipment Evaluation
*C. Nesbitt, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
J. Odom, Superintendent Unit 1 Operations
*J. Powell, Superintendent Unit 2 Operations
*L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
*J. Thomas, Engineering Support Manager
*W. Warren, Engineering Support Supervisor - Performance Review
*G. Waymire, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Site Supervisor
P. Webb, Technical Training Supervisor
L. Williams, Training/Emergency Preparedness Manager
*B. Yance, Plant Modifications and Design Manager

NRC Personnel:

*P. Hopkins, Resident Inspector
*T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Scott, Resident Inspector

*Attended the exit interview

Other licensee employees that were contacted included, operations, HP, chemistry, engineering, security, maintenance, planning, and administration personnel.

Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2. PLANT STATUS AND ACTIVITIES

a. Unit 1 and 2 Status:

Unit 1 began and ended the reporting period at full power operation.

Unit 2 began and ended the reporting period operating at full power. However, on August 11, the licensee reduced power to 15 percent to blowdown excessive sodium from the SGs and conduct a boron saturation soak. Full power operation resumed on August 14.

Other NRC Inspections/Meetings:

On August 2, Mr. S. Young of NRR and Mr. D. Nebuda of the Army Corp of Engineers visited the site. They discussed security issues related to the new vehicle bomb rule with the licensee.

During the week of August 14, Mr. W. Loo and B. Parker, Region II DRS Inspectors, were onsite to inspect the radiation protection program and closeout previous open items (IR 95-15).

3. OPERATIONS

a. Plant Operations (71707)

1) Routine Plant and Facility Tours

Tours of FNP facilities were performed to verify that operating license and regulatory requirements were being met. In general, inspectors looked for indications of plant degradation, improper tagouts, incorrect operation, and improper system alignment. Tours were performed on both day shift and backshifts to ensure conduct of plant Operations and Security remained at acceptable levels.

The inspectors reviewed various logs, reports, and tagouts and compared them with actual plant conditions. The inspectors also monitored CR demeanor and staffing; shift turnovers; and operator alertness of current and changing plant conditions, and performance during routine and transient operations. Annunciator status and alarms were also verified and discussed with operators.

Limited walkdowns of accessible portions of the following safety-related systems and areas were also performed:

a. Unit 1 & 2 New Fuel Storage
b. Unit 2 Cable Spreading Rooms
c. Unit 1 & 2 Hot Shutdown Panels
d. Unit 1 Service/Instrument Air Compressors
e. EDGs 1-2A, 1B, 2B, 1C and 2C
f. Unit 1 & 2 SFPs and heat exchangers
g. Unit 1 & 2 Turbine Building (MS lines and SGFP)
h. Unit 1 & 2 SWIS
i. Unit 1 Pipe Penetration Rooms
j. Unit 1 & 2 RHR pumps and heat exchangers
k. Unit 1 CS pump rooms
l. Unit 1 & 2 CR HVAC and emergency ventilation systems

m. Unit 2 PRF fans
n. Unit 2 CCW pumps and heat exchangers

Breaker/switch positions and valve line-ups for safety-related systems were verified, both locally and in the CR, for consistency with operability requirements. MCB annunciators for both units were frequently observed to be in a blackboard condition. Only a few MCB deficiencies were noted and those were being tracked to resolution on an individual basis. During the inspectors' tours of the plant, a number of very minor deficiencies were identified and reported to the SS. In general, equipment material conditions and housekeeping on both units was good. Recent efforts to improve cleanliness, lighting, and physical appearances by extensive painting were evident - especially in the CCW pump and heat exchanger area. The inspectors also noticed that auxiliary building ventilation was having difficulty in maintaining a balanced atmosphere turnover, as evidenced by a number of stagnant areas with elevated temperatures. These elevated temperatures were attributed to abnormally high ambient temperature and did not adversely effect equipment operation.

2) Plant Tagged Orders

During the inspection period, the following tagouts/clearances were reviewed, "walked down" and verified to be properly implemented:

- #95-2314-2; Unit 2 D Steam Dump Valve
- #95-2374-1; 1C Instrument Air Compressor
- #95-2582-1; 1C Steam Dump
- #95-2295-2; 2A CCW Pump
- #95-2298-2; Unit 2 Containment Purge and Mini-purge

One minor finding was identified regarding the clearance boundary established for conducting a LLRT of the Unit 2 containment purge and mini-purge CIV's. This clearance relied primarily upon the boundary established by TO #95-2298-2, but also relied upon TO #94-2910-2 to tag the MCB switch for containment purge supply/exhaust fans. Although the clearance boundary was adequate, TO #94-2910-2 was not properly referenced as part of the work clearance. The inspector discussed this minor problem with Operations supervision and management.

3) Technical Specification LCO Compliance

Selected TS LCO status sheets were reviewed on a regular basis in order to confirm that mandatory and voluntary entries into TS action statements were recognized, tracked, and maintained in compliance. No problems were identified.

4) Unit 2 Scheduled Power Reduction for SG Chemistry

On August 11 at 10:02 p.m., the licensee reduced power on Unit 2 from 100 to 15 percent power in order to reduce SG sodium concentrations by maximizing blowdown. After extensive secondary side flushing (see IR 95-11) following U2RF10, sodium levels have continued to remain in the 1 to 2 ppb range, which is about a factor of 5 higher than normal. During the power reduction, the licensee also conducted a boron saturation soak of the SG secondary side. The ramp down to 15 percent and return to power went very smoothly. The unit was returned to full power at 9:30 a.m. on August 14. An inspector observed plant conditions prior to and after the power change, and reviewed trend chart data recorded during the ramp down and ramp up. Nothing abnormal was noticed. The inspector also reviewed data taken on the SGFP pump skids during the return to power, which indicated normal vibration levels and no unusual occurrences.

5) New Fuel Receipt Inspection In Preparation for Refueling (60705)

The inspectors observed the receipt inspection and transfer of new fuel assemblies for the upcoming U1RF13. The new fuel assemblies were unloaded from the shipping containers, inspected, transferred to the new fuel storage racks, and then (at a later date) transferred to the Unit 1 SFP. Procedural prerequisites and equipment checkouts were reviewed and verified by the inspectors. All phases of this evolution were observed by the inspectors for a selected number of assemblies. A licensed SRO was assigned to provide constant direction for the conduct of all new fuel receipt, inspection and transfer activities, with continuous coverage by a HP technician. New fuel receipt and inspections were supported by a fuel vendor representative. Security guards postings were timely and efficient. Overall, these activities were carefully controlled and conducted without mishap. Unit operators, including the previously mentioned support staff, performed in a smooth and deliberate manner IAW FNP-0-FHP-3.0, "Receipt and Storage of New Fuel." Only one minor paperwork related finding was identified regarding the incomplete dating and initialing of the FATF for certain assemblies. This finding was discussed with the assigned SRO and Operations management.

c. Effectiveness of Licensee Control in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems (40500)

The inspectors routinely reviewed open FNPIRs processed IAW FNP-0-AP-30, "Preparation and Processing of Instant Reports, Plant Event Reports and Licensee Event Reports." These reviews were performed

to determine licensee's effectiveness in: 1) identifying/describing problems; 2) elevating problems to the proper level of management; 3) root-cause determination and/or analysis; 4) assessing operability/reportability; 5) developing appropriate corrective actions and 6) evaluating cause/corrective action scope for generic implications. In particular, the following FNPIRs, whose final resolution has been approved by Operations manager, were reviewed in detail:

- FNPIR #1-95-152; B accumulator discharge valve found open
- FNPIR #1-95-132; Pressurizer LT459 failed low
- FNPIR #1-95-131; CIV HV3377 failed to close
- FNPIR #1-95-096; Plant computer failure
- FNPIR #1-95-040; SW supply to CR HVAC pipe rupture
- FNPIR #2-95-116; Inoperable 2B charging pump room cooler
- FNPIR #2-95-086; Tagged closed MOV8131B found open

In general, each of the aforementioned FNPIRs were complete, thorough, conformed with AP-30, and identified comprehensive corrective actions - with one exception. Corrective actions for FNPIR 1-95-040 did not adequately address the implications of MIC being the most probable root cause. An inspector met with ES management and engineering personnel to discuss the FNP MIC mitigation program and to reflect on the recent SWS pipe failure. The licensee has since decided to modify their FNPIR corrective actions in order to further evaluate what was learned from this specific MIC induced failure.

1) SGFP Reliability

The licensee continued to followup on licensee investigations into the root causes of recent and past Unit 2 SGFP failures (see IR 95-11 and 13). An inspector attended several presentations made by the root cause task team, and witnessed licensee activities to improve the EHC system and address procedural issues.

2) Root Cause Trending

On July 27, the inspectors met with ES personnel to discuss the status and progress of licensee initiatives to expand and improve its root cause trending program. Considerable licensee effort and attention has been applied to this program over the past few months, particularly in the area of tracking and trending personnel-related errors in light of recent problems. The main controlling procedures FNP-0-ACP-9.0, "Root Cause Program," and ACP-9.1, "Root Cause Investigation," have now been augmented by a new procedure FNP-0-SYP-10, "FNP Event Trending," that provides more detailed guidance on trending root cause data. The ES technical staff conducted an exhaustive study of the past two years of FNPIR data (July 1, 1993 - present) using the

new trending procedure. Root cause contributors for equipment and personnel failures during this period were collected, broken down, correlated into numerous categories (e.g., cause code, functional area, organization, safety significance, etc.), and graphed over time using trend charts. The inspectors reviewed the final products sent to each of the principal FNP managers to evaluate and take appropriate actions. The inspectors noted that minor changes to this new program may be required as the ES staff receives feedback from the managers on ways to make the root cause information more useful and easier to assimilate.

3) Containment Air Temperature

During the later half of July and the month of August, the weather was extremely hot and humid with less than average rainfall. As a routine matter, the inspectors have monitored the effects of high ambient temperatures on plant conditions. In particular, the inspectors monitored for increased containment air temperatures during the weeks of peak summer heat; which according to TS 3.6.1.5, primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120 degrees F. This limit ensures that overall containment air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature assumed in the accident analyses for LOCA and MSLB that are described in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.

Plant operators monitor and calculate the primary containment average air temperature each shift, for both Unit 1 and 2, IAW STP-1.0, "Operations Daily and Shift Surveillance Requirements." The instructions of STP-1.0 are consistent with applicable TS SR 4.6.1.5.1 & 2 which require averaging at least four of the following temperature elements (with at least two elements being from the containment air cooler intakes):

Temperature Element	Location
TE 3187E, F, G & H (155′ elev.)	Containment Air Cooler Intake
TE 3188H & I (105′ elev.)	Containment Lower Compartment
TE 3188J (85′ elev.)	Reactor Cavity

Typical high readings (in degrees F) for these temperature elements during the hottest days, with containment dome fans operating on fast speed, have been the following:

Unit 1	Unit 2
TE 3187E - 119	TE 3187E - 126
TE 3187F - 131	TE 3187F - 130
TE 3187G - 127	TE 3187G - 125
TE 3187H - 130	TE 3187H - 124
TE 3188H - 106	TE 3188H - 109
TE 3188I - 120	TE 3188I - 119
TE 3188J - 101	TE 3188J - 99

The licensee's STP-1.0 methodology for calculating average containment air temperature instructs operators to "use only four temperatures; the highest two cooler intake temperatures and the lowest two remaining sensors." This methodology has resulted in calculated Unit 1 and 2 average containment air temperatures as high as 116 to 117 degrees F. However, after reviewing the licensee's methodology and results, independently monitoring containment temperatures and trends, examining plant drawings of temperature element locations in containment, reviewing calibration records, interviewing responsible onsite and corporate licensee management, and discussions with NRR technical staff the inspector has concluded the following:

- SNC currently meets applicable TS requirements;
- STP-1.0 methodology is not realistic, and non-conservatively understates actual bulk containment air temperature;
- TE 3188J, and possibly TE 3188H, are unduly influenced by localized conditions (i.e., close proximity to the outflow from containment air cooler ventilation ducts) that are not representative of bulk air temperature;
- SNC was unable to provide any technical basis for its unique method of implementing TS SR 4.6.1.5.1;
- Temperature element and indicator channel inaccuracies have not been considered in licensee calculations (the vendor's acceptance limit for TE 3187E, F, G, and H is plus/minus four degrees; I&C indication tolerance is plus/minus two degrees);
- No margin exists between the FNP acceptance criteria, the TS limit and actual safety analysis assumptions;
- Unit 1 and 2 bulk containment air temperature (using a straightforward, volumetric-based averaging scheme) may actually exceed the 120 degree F limit by a few degrees and represent a condition outside the bounds of the plant safety analysis; and

- Preliminary analysis by SNC indicated that an initial bulk air temperature of 125 degrees F would have minimal impact on containment temperature and pressure following a LOCA or MSLB.

In response to the inspector's concerns, SNC developed and began implementing an action plan that should address the issues described above. FNP management continued to maintain that their methodology for calculating average containment air temperature complied with TS. The inspectors concluded that there does not appear to be a significant safety concern at present. Until such time as the results from the SNC action plan are available, the inspector's issues will be identified as URI 50-348, 364/95-14-01, High Containment Air Temperature.

Operations personnel and management continued to perform well in maintaining steady-state operations of Units 1 and 2. The Unit 2 downpower to improve steam generator chemistry was accomplished without incident. Operators remained alert for changes in plant conditions and were well-versed on plant status and ongoing activities. A URI was identified regarding high containment air temperature during the peak summer heat. New fuel receipt inspection and transfer for the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outage went very smoothly.

Within the areas inspected, one URI was identified.

4. MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE

a. Maintenance Observations (62703)

Inspectors observed and reviewed portions of various licensee corrective and preventative maintenance activities, to determine conformance with procedures, work instructions and regulatory requirements. Work orders were also evaluated to determine status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that proper priority was assigned to safety-related equipment. The following maintenance activities were observed.

1) WO 530526; 2G Steam Dump Valve

The 2G dump valve was discovered to be leaking steam during the recent secondary system performance test completed in July 1995. The valve was leaking by about one MWe worth of steam. The ES group wrote a deficiency report on the valve at the time of the test.

Using the above WO, I&C personnel were to troubleshoot the valve and make any necessary adjustments if possible, or recommend mechanical repair. The inspector observed I&C setup test gear provided by the vendor and perform

preliminary testing. Initially the licensee concluded that the valve was leaking through an internal pilot valve. Testing indicated that the actuator on the main valve functioned well. The licensee contacted the test gear vendor and electronically sent the test data to the vendor for corroboration on a recommended repair. With vendor concurrence, the licensee attempted to shorten the main valve stroke length to improve valve seating. This adjustment had little effect and the valve will be repaired at the next refueling outage or next window of opportunity (main steam system shut down for some length of time). The observed work was performed properly, and the valve was left in an operable condition.

2) WO 510697; 2A CCW Pump Motor Sight Glass Oil Leakage

MM mechanics replaced the sight glass on the 2A CCW pump motor end bearing. All work observed by the inspector was satisfactory (see paragraph 4.b.2 below).

3) WO 533299; Unit 2 BOP Cabinet Loss of Power Annunciator

The inspector observed portions of the work performed to investigate and repair an apparent loss of power to the BOP cabinet. The "K" cabinet NA-3 alarm indicated a loss of power for no known reason. With the alarm locked in, no further "K" cabinet annunciator failures could alarm. The I&C technician checked "K" cabinet cards that could cause a general series NA-3 alarm and found two cards that could have been the problem. The cards were replaced and the loss of power alarm cleared. All observed work was IAW with WO instructions.

4) WO 533800; 1C Instrument Air Compressor Work

The inspector observed portions of PM activities performed on the 1C A/C. All work was accomplished in an acceptable manner. During this work, the licensee also took the opportunity to examine the 1C A/C in preparation for implementing DCP 4773 during U1RF13. The DCP will allow the 1C A/C to restart automatically after a LOSP. This plant change will reduce required operator actions after a LOSP. The inspector observed a vendor check of the new 1C A/C computer control prior to the actual modification.

5) WO 63699; Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit 1A

An inspector observed limited portions of MM activities to replace charcoal filters in the A train emergency filtration for the CR. An appropriate clearance was established and release of work was properly approved. Mechanics were aware of administrative requirements and performing their task IAW

work instructions. The inspector expressed a concern to Maintenance management that FNP-0-SOP-0.4, " Fire Protection Program Administration Procedure," did not clearly specify fire watch requirements for charcoal trays that were left unattended in the CR penthouse. However, subsequent discussions with the plant Fire Marshall resolved the inspector's concern regarding control of transient combustibles. The licensee has since revised SOP-0.4 to clarify fire watch requirements.

b. Surveillance Observation (61726)

Inspectors witnessed surveillance activities performed on safety-related systems/components in order to verify that activities were performed IAW licensee procedures, FNP TSs and NRC regulatory requirements. Portions of the following surveillances were observed:

1) 1-STP-24.1; Service Water Pump 1A, 1B, and 1C Inservice Test

The A train SWS inservice test observed by the inspector began last inspection period (IR 95-13), but did not finish until this period. The Unit 1 test results for pump combinations 1A & 1B, 1A & 1C, and 1B & 1C were 17,774, 17,615, and 17,214 gpm (respectively). The minimum allowed Unit 1 SW flow was 17,496 gpm. Following this test, pumping combinations 1A & 1B and 1A & 1C were identified to be in the alert range for low flow. The 1B & 1C pumping combination was identified to be in the required action range of the ASME Code. Consequently, this pump combination was declared inoperable and the 1C SW pump was caution tagged to avoid using it with the 1B pump.

Based on a engineering evaluation by SCS issued on July 25, 1995, all Unit 1 A train SWS pump flows were found to be acceptable. SCS performed a detailed re-analysis of required SW flow using more accurately modeled heat loads. The minimum SW water required design flow for Unit 1 pumps was reduced from 17,496 to 16,230 gpm. This design basis change was documented in ENG 15 93-0358 dated July 25, 1995 (supported by engineering calculation SM-ES-89-1499-001, Rev. 2). This evaluation not only cleared the 1B & 1C pump combination from the required action range, but also removed the remaining two train A pump combinations from the alert range. For the first time this year, Unit 1 SW pumps were considered to be operating in a normal range without encroaching on the IST program allowed margin for pump performance degradation. The inspectors reviewed the SCS documents and found them acceptable. Although no longer in the alert range, the Unit 1 A train pumps still exhibited roughly 2,000 to 3,000 gpm lower flow than the B train pumps (Unit 2 SW pumps have different motors and pumps). The

licensee was continuing to explore the flow differences between the two Unit 1 trains.

2) 2-STP-23.1; CCW Pump 2A Quarterly Inservice Test

With an inspector present, this test was successfully completed. The pump operated as required and the test was performed IAW STP-23.1. The sight glass replaced earlier (paragraph 4.a.2) did not leak and the repair was functionally accepted by Operations.

3) 2-STP-20.2; Penetration Room Filtration System Train A(B) Monthly Operability Test

The inspector observed portions of STP-20.2 performed on the B train of the Unit 2 PRF system. The 2B PRF exhaust fan had been worked prior to the test. During the initial test performance, the inspector observed that a lock ring outboard of the exhaust fan motor side pillow block bearing was not rotating at the same speed as the shaft and some unusual noises were coming from this relatively small rotating assembly. The licensee subsequently discovered that the lock ring set screws were not completely tight and the distance between the two shaft bearings required adjustment. These repairs were made and the 10 hour performance test was successfully re-run.

The licensee was continuing to monitor the 2B exhaust fan due to another low level noise coming from the rotating assembly. Site engineering was working to resolve this issue. The vibration levels during operation were satisfactory but slightly elevated. The inspector reviewed the vibration data and discussed the possible problems with the MESG engineering staff.

4) 0-STP-123.0; Control Room Emergency Ventilation Performance Test

An inspector observed the smoke and freon penetration performance testing of the A train CR emergency filtration unit. The inspector also reviewed performance test results of the A train CR recirculation and pressurization units. Results from all three tests met established acceptance criteria. Test equipment was verified to be in calibration and connected IAW STP-123.0. The test itself was also conducted IAW STP-123.0. Actual testing was performed by an experienced contractor under the oversight of an ES engineer. Although the ES engineer was new to this test, the contractor was very familiar with the FNP CREVS and extremely knowledgeable. Only one minor finding was identified regarding the failure to complete the STP-123.0 data sheets and procedure signoffs in a timely manner after

they were accomplished during the test. This was discussed with plant management.

Maintenance and surveillance personnel consistently performed assigned activities in accordance with work orders and applicable procedures. Personnel continued to demonstrate familiarity with administrative procedures and radiological controls and exhibited good working skills. Responsible surveillance personnel coordinated well with control room operators during testing that affected critical plant equipment.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

5. ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

Onsite Engineering (37551)

Inspectors periodically inspected onsite engineering/technical support activities (e.g., design control, configuration management, system performance monitoring, plant modification, etc.). Effectiveness of on-site engineering and technical group support of licensee efforts to identify, resolve and prevent incidents or problems were also inspected. The ES group has continued to play a very proactive role in monitoring plant performance parameters and volunteering recommendations. One such example this inspection period was the discovery that the A loop Tavg reading had increased slightly above the expected operating range due to RCS temperature streaming. The ES group worked closely with the Operations staff in resolving immediate concerns. The ES group recommended and was pursuing the implementation of specific adjustments to the RCS temperature averaging circuitry similar to those made previously on Unit 1.

Engineering Projects Council

An inspector attended the second meeting of the EPC on July 26, 1995 at FNP. The inspector also reviewed the EPC charter and minutes from the previous meeting on May 26. The EPC was chartered by the Farley Project Vice President on April 19, 1995 to provide greater overview of important FNP engineering issues and licensing projects. This SNC initiative established an advisory council to facilitate communications between Corporate and FNP to ensure evolving issues and projects are handled effectively and fully support the Farley project. Membership to the EPC includes the Corporate NEL and Engineering managers, FNP Operations and ES managers, SCS Project Engineering Manager, and the Bechtel Project Engineering manager. Meetings of the EPC are to occur on a monthly basis. During the July 26 meeting a number of high priority projects were discussed at length (e.g., Power uprate, Improved TS, On-line maintenance, RHR pump design requirements, Ten year ISI program upgrade, Instrumentation setpoint program, DEHC/EHC Problems, etc.). Although not all items on the EPC agenda were discussed in great detail, each was

touched upon and lead FNP/Corporate contacts were assigned. Overall the meeting appeared to be productive.

Overall engineering support of the plant was good and met the needs of both units. Strong engineering and technical support was evident on the testing and evaluation of service water system flow performance. Considerable effort was expended to effectively expand and improve the site's root cause trending program. Initiation of the Engineering Project Council is a positive licensee initiative to facilitate coordination and resolution of important engineering issues and licensing projects.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

6. PLANT SUPPORT (71750)

a. Routine Inspection of Fire Protection Activities

During normal tours, inspectors routinely examined aspects of the plant FP Program, (e.g., transient fire loads, flammable materials storage, fire brigade readiness, ignition source/risk reduction efforts & FP features). No problems were identified.

b. Chemistry

Chemistry generally supported the plant with good overall effort. They increased the sampling rate and turn around time of analysis for EHC fluid samples. This effort should produce better control over such an important process fluid. The inspectors continued to evaluate the licensee's monitoring program of this system.

d. Routine Security Inspection Activities

During routine inspection activities, inspectors verified that security program plans were being properly implemented. This was evidenced by: proper display of picture badges; appropriate key carding of vital area doors; adequate stationing/tours of security personnel; proper searching of packages/personnel at the Primary Access Point; and adequacy of compensatory measures during disablement of vital area barriers. Licensee activities observed during the inspection period appeared to be adequate to ensure proper plant physical protection. Guards were alert and particularly attentive to open doors. Posted positions were well manned with frequent relief.

c. Routine Health Physics Inspection Activities

Inspectors routinely examined postings and surveys of radiological areas and labelling of radioactive materials in the RCA. Work activities of plant personnel in the RCA were observed to verify their adherence to established administrative guidelines for radiation protection and ALARA work practices. Effluent and

environmental radiation monitors were monitored on a routine basis for any significant changes in radiological conditions or indications of uncontrolled releases. No significant findings were identified. HP technicians continued to maintain good control over the RCA and provide positive support of Unit 1 and 2 steady-state operations.

HP personnel provided good support of Unit 1 and 2 steady-state operations. Security personnel were consistently alert and implemented the site's security plan in an appropriate manner. Personnel entry into protected areas was well-controlled. Chemistry continued to provide excellent support of plant efforts to control secondary side sodium and improve electro-hydraulic control fluid quality. Fire protection features were well maintained and compensatory measures properly implemented.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

8. EXIT INTERVIEW

On August 21, 1995, the inspectors met with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1. During this meeting the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as detailed in this report. SNC management at FNP acknowledged these findings and did not identify as proprietary any material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors nor did they express any dissenting comments.

ITEM NUMBER	DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE
URI 50-348, 364/95-14-01 (Open)	High Containment Air Temperature

8. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A/C	-	Air Compressor
ACP	-	Administrative Control Procedure
ALARA	-	As Low As Reasonably Achievable
AP	-	Administrative Procedure
CCW	-	Component Cooling Water
CIV	-	Containment Isolation Valve
CR	-	Control Room
CREVS	-	Control Room Emergency Ventilation System
CS	-	Containment Spray
DCP	-	Design Change Package
DEHC	-	Digital Electro Hydraulic Control
DRS	-	Division of Reactor Safety
EDG	-	Emergency Diesel Generator
EHC	-	Electro-Hydraulic Control
EPC	-	Engineering Projects Council
ES	-	Engineering Support

F	-	Fahrenheit
FATF	-	Fuel Assembly Transfer Form
FHP	-	Fuel Handling Procedure
FNP	-	Farley Nuclear Plant
FNPIR	-	Farley Nuclear Plant Incident Report
FP	-	Fire Protection
FSAR	-	Final Safety Analysis Report
gpm	-	Gallons Per Minute
HP	-	Health Physics
HV	-	Hydraulic Valve
HVAC	-	Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IAW	-	In Accordance With
IR	-	Inspection Report
IST	-	Inservice Test
I&C	-	Instrumentation and Control
LCO	-	Limiting Condition for Operation
LLRT	-	Local Leak Rate Test
LOCA	-	Loss of Coolant Accident
LOSP	-	Loss of Offsite Power
LT	-	Level Transmitter
MCB	-	Main Control Board
MESG	-	Maintenance and Engineering Support Group
MIC	-	Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion
MM	-	Mechanical Maintenance
MOV	-	Motor-Operated Valve
MS	-	Main Steam
MSLB	-	Main Steam Line Break
MWe	-	MegaWatt Electric
NEL	-	Nuclear Engineering and Licensing
NRC	-	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	-	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
PM	-	Preventative Maintenance
ppb	-	Parts Per Billion
PRF	-	Penetration Room Filtration
RCA	-	Radiologically Controlled Area
RCS	-	Reactor Coolant System
RHR	-	Residual Heat Removal
SCS	-	Southern Company Services
SFP	-	Spent Fuel Pool
SG	-	Steam Generator
SGFP	-	Steam Generator Feed Pump
SNC	-	Southern Nuclear Company
SOP	-	System Operating Procedure
SR	-	Surveillance Requirement
SRO	-	Senior Reactor Operator
SS	-	Shift Supervisor
STP	-	Surveillance Test Procedure
SW	-	Service Water
SWS	-	Service Water System
SWIS	-	Service Water Intake Structure
Tavg	-	Average RCS Temperature
TE	-	Temperature Element