### U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

### REGION I

Conference Report No. 50-387/84-11

Docket No. 50-387

License No. NPF-14

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Licensee:

2 North Ninth Street

Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

Facility Name: Susquehanna Steam Electric Company, Unit 1

Meeting At: USNRC, Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

Meeting Conducted: March 20, 1984

Prepared By: Sene Kelly E.M. Kelly, Project Engineer

May 23, 1984

Approved By: E.C. McCabe, Chief, Project Section 1C

5/25/84

### Meeting Summary:

Enforcement conference at NRC Region I on March 20, 1984, to discuss the findings of Special Inspection Report 50-387/84-11. This report described system lineup problems which resulted in the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system being inoperable, in violation of the Technical Specifications. HPCI inoperability was caused by operator failure to make the system operable before exceeding 150 psig primary pressure, and was corrected in about two hours. RCIC inoperability was caused by RCIC Room overtemperature, the result of mispositioned valves, and was corrected in under two hours.

The meeting was attended by NRC and PP&L management, and lasted approximately 15 hours.

### DETAILS

#### 1. Participants

### Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PP&L)

B. D. Kenyon, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

H. W. Keiser, Superintendent of Plant

W. Barberich, Manager, Nuclear Licensing

H. Palmer, Supervisor of Operations

D. Wood, Compliance Engineer

### Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

T. E. Murley, Regional Administrator

R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs

J. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel

D. Holody, Enforcement Specialist

E. Blackwood, Deputy Director, Enforcement

E. Greenman, Chief, Project Branch 1, DPRP R. Bellamy, Chief, Radiological Protection Branch, DETP

E. McCabe, Chief, Project Section 1C

L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Test Programs Section

R. Jacobs, Senior Resident Inspector, Susquehanna

L. Plisco, Resident Inspector

R. Perch, Licensing Project Manager, NRR

E. Kelly, Project Engineer, DPRP

P. Farron, IE

#### 2. Introduction

The enforcement conference was held at the request of NRC Region I to discuss the specifics of Special Inspection Report Number 50-387/84-11, conducted during February 21-24, 1984 and issued on March 8, 1984. involving the inoperability of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems on February 22, 1984. HPCI was inoperable for a period of two hours, in violation of Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition 3.5.1.c which requires an operable system whenever the plant is in Startup Condition 2 with reactor steam dome pressure in excess of 150 psig, because operators apparently failed to realize this TS requirement and had not therefore readied HPCI for operation as the plant approached (and exceeded) 150 psig on February 22. 1984. A power supply (Topaz inverter) for HPIC instrumentation was de-energized during this time, and would've also prevented proper HPCI turbine operation. Although not required by TS, the RCIC system was also disabled during this time, as a result of an improperly implemented valve lineup check which allowed for mispositioned steam line drain valves and subsequently caused RCIC room high temperature.

### 3. Presentation

PP&L was asked to recount the details surrounding the HPCI and RCIC event of February 22, 1984, as well as their analysis of other recent events which involved inadequacies in controlling system lineups and operator response to alarms. The attached presentation describes the HPCI/RCIC event, along with a number of spills of radioactive fluids, including their cause and significance. Major corrective actions were outlined including an extensive checkoff list verification performed immediately after the HPCI/RCIC event.

### 4. Concluding Statements

The licensee concluded that, while none of these events individually were of any major immediate safety significance, the PP&L performance goal would still be to improve operations and achieve "zero defects". No trends were identified, in PP&L's analysis of the events discussed, which were indicative of a decline in the quality of plant operations. Valve status control was concluded to be satisfactory. The HPCI/RCIC event was viewed by PP&L as a training problem, involving a better understanding of certain TS requirements. The spills (eight discussed) were attributed to 5 cases of equipment malfunction and 3 cases involving personnel error. Timely and agressive operator response and action was concluded by the licensee in their review of these spills. NRC Region I management acknowledged the license's open discussion, and indicated that they would be informed of appropriate enforcement action at some later date.


PP&L PRESENTATION

REGION I ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

MARCH 20, 1984

HPCI AND RCIC INOPERABILITY

EVENT DATE 02/21/84
REACTOR POWER~1%



WARM-UP PERIOD


## EVENTS

O HPCI - TOPAZ INVERTER OFF


- POWER SUPPLY TO HPCI INSTRUMENTS


O RCIC - STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVES OPEN

- RCIC ROOM HIGH TEMPERATURE



HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION





# COL VERIFICATIONS

- 44 SAFETY/CRITICAL SYSTEM COL'S VERIFIED BY 2/23/84
- 128 COL'S VERIFIED BY 2/27/84

 425 IN-CONTAINMENT SAFETY/NON-SAFETY DEVICES VERIFIED

144 - SAFETY

281 - NON-SAFETY

- 5100+ DEVICES VERIFIED
- COL VERIFICATION CONTINUES

# CONCLUSIONS FROM VERIFICATIONS


- VALVE DISCREPANCIES LIMITED TO HPCI/RCIC
- RANDOM CASES OF INCORRECT DEVICE LOCATION
- ISOLATED CASES OF DEVICES NOT LISTED
- SOME TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS


# MAJOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- ISSUE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS RE, COL IMPLEMENTATION
- REVISE SHIFT TURNOVER PRACTICES DURING HEATUP
- CONDUCT REVIEW TO DETERMINE T.S. SPECIAL CONDITIONS
- CONDUCT TRAINING ON SPECIAL CONDITIONS
- COMPLETE REVIEW OF STARTUP INVESTIGATIONS
- COMPLETE REVIEW OF OPERATIONS IMPROVEMENT AREAS
- IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS FROM ABOVE REVIEWS
- REVIEW / REVISE STARTUP PROCEDURE
- REVISE VESSEL HYDRO PROCEDURE

# SPILL EVENTS DISCUSSED WITH REGION I


- EQUIPMENT OPERATION / DESIGN PROBLEMS
- VALVE LINE UP PROBLEMS






TOO MUCH FLOW AND CLOSED VALVE

4. HIGH-LEVEL ALARM FAILED.






FUEL POOL CLEAN UP SYSTEM

**EVENT DATE 12-09-83** 

- 1.) SV FAILS OPEN ON LOSS OF POWER
- 2.) SV FAILS AS IS ON LOSS OF AIR
- 3.) LEAK ON SIMILAR VALVE PRESSURIZED HEADER
- 4.) AO VALVE DRIFTED OPEN


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EVENT DATE: 10/13/83

- 1) DURING NORMAL OPERATION OVERPRESSURIZATION OCCURRED.
- 2) FLOW GLASS ON TURBIDITY METER BURST.
- 3) AUTO PUMP TRIP ON HIGH PRESSURE WILL BE IN-STALLED.


# OFFGAS RECOMBINER HYDROGEN ANALYZER



# **EVENT DATE 03/12/83**


- 1. OPERATOR OPENED HRONG VALVE
- 2. VALVE NOT LABELED
- 3. OPEN VALVE ALLOHED FLOW FROM UNIT I TO UNIT II

# RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM



# **EVENT DATE: 1/17/83**

- 1) OPERATOR INCORRECTLY LEFT "A" SUCTION VALVE CLOSED.
- 2) "B" PUMP RUNNING.
- 3) "A" CHECK VALVE LEAK.
- 4) SRV OPENED.



# GENERAL

- STRONG MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT
- EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
- COMPETENT PERSONNEL
- SYSTEM STATUS MAINTAINED
- DEVICES CONTROLLED