

NOTICE OF VIOLATION
AND
PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES

Philadelphia Electric Company
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Units 2 and 3

Docket Nos. 50 277; 50-278
License Nos. DPR-44; DPR-56
EA 84-39

During a routine NRC inspection on January 13 - February 29, 1984, the NRC reviewed the circumstances associated with violations of technical specification limiting conditions for operation which were identified by the licensee and reported to the NRC. These violations involved two examples of excessive reactor vessel heatup rates, reactor pressurization at a temperature at which pressurization is prohibited, and startup and operation of the reactor with an inoperable control rod in that the rod exhibited a slow scram response time.

The occurrence of excessive heatup rates at each unit, plus an inadvertent reactor pressurization, demonstrate a lack of attention to detail and inadequate supervisory performance and control of plant activities. The excessive heatup rates occurred in the one instance because trainees did not properly utilize recorded data and supervision did not recognize this failure. In the other instance, an operator was withdrawing control rods too quickly. The unplanned pressurization of the reactor occurred because valves were not properly positioned, and the improper positions were not recognized during valve checks. The failure to recognize a slow control rod scram time in November 1983 followed by startup and operation of the reactor until January 1984 with this rod fully withdrawn, is of serious concern because several individuals reviewed the scram response times after the November shutdown, but the slow response time of the one rod was not recognized. As a result, adequate shutdown margin was not assured. Although the individual safety significance of these events was minimal, collectively, these events involved both facilities, various shifts and some experienced operators, and they demonstrate (1) inadequate attention to detail during the performance of plant operations; (2) inadequate control and supervision of routine plant operations and tests; (3) inadequate procedures; and (4) failure to adhere to procedures.

To emphasize the importance of providing (1) adequate attention to detail during the performance of plant activities, (2) adequate procedures, and (3) adequate supervision of plant activities to ensure procedures are followed and parameters are maintained within Technical Specification limits, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes civil penalties in the cumulative amount of \$30,000. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295 and 10 CFR 2.205, the particular violations and the associated civil penalties are set forth below.

I. VIOLATIONS ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY

- A. Technical Specification 3.6.A.1 requires that the average rate of change of reactor coolant temperature not exceed 100°F in any one-hour period during normal heatup or cooldown.

Contrary to the above,

1. During the heatup of Unit 3 on January 24, 1984 between 9:15 a.m. and 10:15 a.m. and between 9:30 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., the average rate of change (average over an hour) of the reactor coolant temperature, as indicated on the B recirculation loop temperature recorder, exceeded 100°F per hour. The actual temperature changes over the respective one hour periods were 102°F and 111°F.
2. During heatup of the Unit 2 reactor, on January 31, 1984, between 4:20 a.m. and 5:20 a.m., the reactor coolant temperature, as indicated by the A and B Recirculation Loop temperature traces, increased 110°F.

- B. Technical Specification 3.6.A.2, Thermal and Pressurization Limits, and Figure 3.6.2, prohibit reactor vessel pressurization above atmospheric pressure at vessel temperatures below 120°F.

Contrary to the above, for approximately five minutes at about 5:30 p.m. on January 25, 1984, the Unit 3 reactor vessel was pressurized above atmospheric pressure to about 10 psig, and at the time, the reactor vessel temperature was below 120°F (about 110°F).

- C. Technical Specification 3.3.C.3 specifies that the maximum scram time for 90 percent insertion of any operable control rod shall not exceed 7.0 seconds. Technical Specification 3.3.A.2.C specifies that control rods with scram times greater than those specified in Technical Specification 3.3.C.3 shall be considered inoperable.

Contrary to the above, on November 17, 1983, control rod 34-27 had a scram time of greater than 12 seconds, as indicated on a strip chart recorder, but this condition was not recognized at that time and the control rod was not considered inoperable until a subsequent reactor scram on January 14, 1984.

These violations have been categorized in the aggregate as a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - \$30,000 distributed equally among the violations).

II. VIOLATION NOT ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY

Technical Specification 6.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.33 (November 1972) require implementation of written procedures for troubleshooting, for control of maintenance, and for surveillance tests.

Contrary to the above, written procedures, as required above, were not adequately implemented as evidenced by the following examples:

- a. Administrative Procedure A-26, Revision 23, dated June 24, 1983, Procedure for Corrective Maintenance, requires immediate investigation of plant problems and initiation of a Maintenance Request Form (MRF) for problems that cannot be corrected within eight hours.

However, problems with testing and operating the RWM and RSCS during a plant shutdown on November 17, 1983, were not sufficiently investigated to correct the problem within eight hours, and no MRF was initiated.

- b. Administrative Procedure A-47, Revision 2, dated April 14, 1980, Procedure for the Generation of Surveillance Tests, requires that surveillance test procedure steps which document completion of Technical Specification related surveillance requirements to be indicated with an asterisk. The test results section shall be signed only if all asterisked steps are completed satisfactorily.

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.B.3a states that the group notch mode of RSCS shall be demonstrated to be operable by attempting to move a control rod more than one notch in the first program group after reaching 50 percent rod density on a reactor startup.

However, ST10.6, Revision 10, dated July 18, 1980, Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) Function Test, was written and implemented without making the technical specification requirement an asterisked step. As a result, completed tests do not contain documentation of the completed technical specification surveillance requirement, and they were signed off as satisfactory.

- c. Surveillance Test Procedure ST10.5, Revision 11, dated July 18, 1980, RWM Operability Check, requires, in an asterisked step, selection and listing of at least three rods to verify operability of the RWM rod select error function.

However, on May 28, 1983, ST10.5 was completed and signed off as satisfactory when only one rod was listed as having been used to verify the operability of the rod select error function.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Notice of Violation


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Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Philadelphia Electric Company is hereby required to submit to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, 631 Park Avenue, King of Prussia, PA 19406, within 30 days of the date of this Notice, a written statement or explanation, including for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation; (2) the reasons for the violation, if admitted; (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Considerations may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.

Within the same time as provided for the response required under 10 CFR 2.201, Philadelphia Electric Company may pay the civil penalties in the amount of \$30,000 or may protest imposition of the civil penalties, in whole or in part, by a written answer. Should Philadelphia Electric Company fail to answer within the time specified, the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, will issue an order imposing the civil penalties proposed above. Should Philadelphia Electric Company elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, such answer may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice in whole or in part; (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances; (3) show error in this Notice; or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the five factors contained in Section IV(B) of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. Philadelphia Electric Company's attention is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedures for imposing civil penalties.

Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due, which has been subsequently determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Date at Bethesda, Maryland
this 18th day of June 1984