



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS FIELD OFFICE, REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011

DATE: September 8, 1983

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

TITLE: WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
ALLEGED INTIMIDATION OF DANIEL INTERNATIONAL
MECHANICAL QC INSPECTORS

CASE NUMBER: 4-82-016

CONTROL OFFICE: OIFO: Region IV STATUS: CLOSED

PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION: December 1, 1982 - February 18, 1983

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Summary

During October of 1982, four QC inspectors previously employed by Daniel International (DI) at Wolf Creek made an allegation to the NRC Resident Reactor Inspector at the Zimmer nuclear construction site in Moscow, Ohio. The inspectors alleged that QC inspectors at Wolf Creek were not given adequate freedom to report nonconforming conditions. An investigation was initiated regarding the allegation, and six former DI QC inspectors were interviewed, including the original four inspectors who made the allegation. The six former DI inspectors provided testimony that DI QC management personnel had instituted a policy of management review of nonconformance reports (NCRs) before allowing inspectors to formally issue NCRs. The former DI inspectors testified that numerous nonconforming conditions were not reported because DI QC managers voided NCRs, thereby, restricting the inspector's reporting of violations. The former DI inspectors further stated that DI QC inspectors were threatened with termination if they failed to adhere to this policy.

During February of 1983, six DI QC inspectors, one DI QA inspector, and three DI QC lead inspectors were interviewed at Wolf Creek. These inspectors reported numerous instances of DI QC managers directing inspectors to conduct their inspections to instructions contained in three-part memorandums which conflicted with procedures. These DI inspectors related numerous instances where NCRs and DRs (Deficiency Reports) were "voided" or "closed in process," which they felt restricted their freedom and allowed nonconforming safety conditions to go uncorrected. Four of the DI QC inspectors provided the NRC with copies of NCRs and DRs they identified as "voided," NCRs "closed in process," and three-part memorandums. These inspectors stated that the above documents were examples of nonconforming condition and/or constituted violations of procedure. Two of these inspectors indicated they kept these documents to "cover themselves" should questions be raised as to the validity of their inspections.

These DI QC inspectors reported that many of their concerns about freedom to inspect and report nonconforming conditions had been alleviated since 1982 by DI management's response to their complaints. Further, none of DI QC inspectors

interviewed indicated they felt threatened with termination from the instructions received by supervisors concerning the policy of NCR review. The inspectors stated that four DI QC supervisors primarily responsible for the restriction of their inspection freedom had either been transferred to another site, taken out of the chain of command, or terminated.

The DI Project Quality Inspection Manager, the DI Senior Quality Supervisor, and two DI QC supervisors were interviewed, and they explained that the review policy for NCRs at Wolf Creek was implemented to avoid invalid NCRs. They emphasized this policy was not an attempt to curtail the reporting of nonconforming conditions. They further testified that three-part memorandums were used to clarify or interpret procedures, and were not intended to circumvent approved procedures. They explained that many of the NCRs voided by DI QC supervisors were not legitimate violations. The above supervisors explained the QC inspectors were told that if they continued to write invalid NCRs, retraining would be initiated, and inspectors failing to re-qualify would be terminated. The DI Project Quality Inspection Manager stated that this policy was not intended as a threat, but was meant to emphasize the need for a professional inspection effort by all QC inspectors.