

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I

Report Nos.: 50-317/92-03  
50-318/92-03

Docket Nos.: 50-317  
50-318

License Nos.: DPR-53  
DPR-60

Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland

Inspection Conducted: January 14-17, 1992

Inspector: *R. J. Albert* 1-31-92  
R. J. Albert, Physical Security Inspr. date

Approved by: *R. R. Keimig* 1-31-92  
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section date  
Facilities Radiological Safety and  
Safeguards Branch  
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Areas Inspected: Licensee action on previously identified Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) open items; Management Support and Program Plans; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel and Packages; Emergency Power Supply; Alarm Stations and Communications; and Security Training and Qualification.

Results: The licensee was in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas inspected. The licensee's actions to correct one violation and three unresolved items previously identified in the FFD program were reviewed, found to be satisfactory and closed.

## DETAILS

### 1.0 Key Personnel Contacted

#### Licensee

- \*J. Alvey, Assistant General Supervisor, Nuclear Security
- \*N. Bleakly, Security Supervisor
- \*M. Burrell, Supervisor-Security Screening
- \*M. Cox, Security Program Specialist
- \*J. Frost, Security Supervisor
- \*L. Gibbs, General Supervisor, Calvert Cliffs Security Operations
- \*S. Guarnieri, Medical Review Officer
- \*J. Holleman, Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) Program Administrator
- \*J. Kennedy, Supervisor-Security Training and Support
- K. Lombardi, Random Coordinator
- \*H. Long, Senior Security Officer
- \*T. Mackert, FFD Analyzer
- \*F. Martenis, FFD Program Manager
- \*J. McHale, Engineer-QAU
- \*S. Rizzo, FFD Clerk
- \*J. Ross, Jr., Security Program Specialist
- \*J. Volkoff, Compliance Engineer
- M. Ward, Security Screening Specialist

#### U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- \*S. Fiveash, Physical Security Assistant
- \*A. Howe, Resident Inspector
- \*P. Wilson, Senior Resident Inspector

\*indicates those present at the exit interview

The inspector also interviewed other personnel and members of the licensee and contract security forces during this inspection.

### 2.0 Follow-up of Previously Identified Items in the FFD Program

#### 2.1 (Closed) VIO 50-317/90-30-01 and 50-318/90-30-01

The licensee had not established procedures for or documentation of supervisory training for contractor personnel who had Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) Program behavioral observation responsibilities. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed this aspect of the program and determined that the licensee had revised its FFD procedures to require supervisory training for contractors. Additionally, the licensee provided the inspector with documentation to

substantiate that the training had been accomplished. The corrective action was satisfactory. This item is closed.

2.2 (Closed) UNR 50-317/90-30-02 and 50-318/90-30-02

The licensee had established, as part of its FFD policy, temporarily suspending unescorted plant access to individuals with preliminary positive drug test results, i.e., positive results not yet reviewed by the MRO. In August 1991, the NRC amended its FFD rule to permit licensees the option of taking such action on preliminary positive results for marijuana and cocaine provided that certain accuracy and reliability could be met by on-site certified screening laboratories. As a result, the licensee revised its policy to suspend unescorted access temporarily in cases of preliminary positive results for cocaine and marijuana. However, since the licensee does not conduct on-site screening, it was not eligible to exercise this option. During this inspection, this misinterpretation was clarified by the inspector and the licensee corrected its FFD policy to reflect the requirements of the NRC rule accurately. The licensee's corrective action was satisfactory. This item is closed.

2.3 (Closed) UNR 50-317/90-30-03 and 50-318/90-30-03

The licensee could not demonstrate effective tracking of FFD training for supervisors. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee corrective actions and supporting documentation. The inspector verified that supervisors were being trained in a timely manner and the training was being tracked. The corrective actions were satisfactory. This item is closed.

2.4 (Closed) UNR 50-317/90-30-04 and 50-318/90-30-04

The licensee was consistently conducting random FFD testing at the beginning of shifts, which presented a predictable gap in testing. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and supporting documentation. The inspector verified that the licensee conducted testing at different times during shifts and that testing was also being conducted on backshifts, weekends and holidays. The corrective actions were satisfactory. This item is closed.

3.0 Management Support and Security Program Plans

3.1 Management Support

Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be adequate by the inspector. This determination was based

upon the inspector's review of various aspects of the licensee's program during this inspection, as documented in this report.

### 3.2 Security Program Plans

The inspector verified that changes to the licensee's Security, Contingency, and Guard Training and Qualification plans, as implemented, did not decrease the effectiveness of the respective plans, and had been submitted in accordance with NRC requirements.

## 4.0 Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids

### 4.1 Protected Area Barriers

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the protected area (PA) barrier on January 14, 1992, and determined by observation that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

### 4.2 Isolation Zones

The inspector verified that the isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the protected area barrier. No deficiencies were noted.

### 4.3 Assessment Aids

The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids and determined that they were installed and operated as committed to in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

### 4.4 Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting

The inspector conducted a lighting survey of the PA and isolation zones on January 16, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that lighting in the PA and isolation zones was adequate. No deficiencies were noted.

### 4.5 Vital Area Barriers

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of selected vital area (VA) barriers on January 16, 1992, and determined by observation that the barriers were installed and maintained as described in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

## 5.0 Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel and Packages

### 5.1 Personnel Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA's and VA's. This determination was based on the following:

- 5.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel are properly identified and authorization is checked prior to issuance of access badges and key cards.
- 5.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee has a program to confirm the trustworthiness and reliability of employees and contractor personnel.
- 5.1.3 The inspector verified that the licensee took immediate measures to prevent unescorted access to PAs and VAs when employees and contractor personnel were terminated or transferred for cause. The measures included changing keys, locks, combinations or related access control devices to which the individual had access.
- 5.1.4 The inspector verified that the licensee took precautions to ensure that an unauthorized name cannot be added to the access authorization program.
- 5.1.5 The inspector verified that the licensee has a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the Plan. The inspector observed personnel access processing during shift changes, visitor access processing, and interviewed members of the security force and licensee's security staff regarding personnel access procedures.
- 5.1.6 The inspector determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs display their access badges as required.
- 5.1.7 The inspectors verified that the licensee has escort procedures for visitors in the PA and VAs.
- 5.1.8 The inspectors verified that the licensee has a mechanism for expediting access to vital equipment during emergencies and that the mechanism is adequate for its purpose.

5.1.9 The inspectors verified that unescorted access to VAs is limited to authorized individuals. The access list is revalidated at least once every 31 days as committed to in the Plan.

No deficiencies were noted.

## 5.2 Package and Material Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and materials that are brought into the PA at the main access control portal. The inspector reviewed the package and material control procedures and found that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector also observed package and material processing and interviewed SO's and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures. No deficiencies were noted.

## 6.0 Emergency Power Supply

The inspector verified that there are several systems (batteries, dedicated diesel generator within a VA, and plant on-site AC power) that provide backup power to the security systems. No deficiencies were noted.

## 7.0 Alarm Stations and Communications

The inspector observed the operations of the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and determined that they were maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspector and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspector verified that the CAS and SAS do not contain any operational activities that would interfere with assessment and response functions. No deficiencies were noted.

## 8.0 Security Training and Qualification

The inspector observed the licensee conduct contingency drills within the PA and VAs for crucial task certification. The drills were realistic and representative of the design basis threat. The security force demonstrated good tactical control and maneuvers. The inspector also observed tactical live fire and simulated tactical response through a firearms training systems (F.A.T.S.) simulator, recently purchased by the licensee. The simulator appeared to be an excellent training aid, especially in reinforcing the shoot/don't shoot process and in assessing a security officer's response to life-threatening situations. No deficiencies were noted.

## 9.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on January 17, 1992. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented.