

DAN GLICKMAN
FOURTH DISTRICT—KANSAS

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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

April 6, 1984

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Commissioner Victor Bilinsky
Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts
Commissioner James K. Asselstine
Commissioner Frederick Bernthal
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Commissioners:

I am writing to request information pertaining to the licensing of the Wolf Creek nuclear reactor in Burlington, Kansas.

I have learned from your April 4, 1984, "Weekly Information Report--Week Ending March 30, 1984" memorandum from T.A. Rehm to the Commissioners that the Bechtel Power Corporation has notified the NRC that certain cables at the Wolf Creek plant are apparently defective. The internal memorandum states that the apparent design deficiency affects approximately 50 valves at both Wolf Creek and the Callaway reactor in Fulton, Missouri, as the two plants are of similar design.

So that I may consider the seriousness of this situation, I would appreciate your response to the following:

1. What is the design, safety and quality assurance significance of the potentially defective cables?
2. Had this apparent design deficiency not been detected prior to licensing, what adverse consequences could have resulted?
3. The April 4, 1984, memorandum states that valves in the following systems "are affected" by the apparent design deficiency: S/G blowdown, essential service water and containment monitor isolation systems. Please explain the safety significance of these systems and identify what adverse consequences could have resulted from one or more valve failures.
4. Why was this apparent design deficiency not previously detected by either the licensee or the NRC?
5. What action will the NRC take to remedy this apparent problem?

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PDR COMMS NRCC
CORRESPONDENCE PDR


Commissioners
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
April 6, 1984
Page 2

I would also like to be provided with all documents including, but not limited to, internal staff memoranda, analyses, reports and correspondence with the Bechtel Power Corporation or the licensee.

On a related matter, recent news reports have stated that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is conducting an investigation of allegations made by former workers at the Wolf Creek project about quality-control and documentation problems. An article appearing in the April 5, 1984, edition of the Wall Street Journal quotes agency officials as confirming that an investigation is underway. I would like to be kept fully and currently informed of the Commission's activities in this case and expect to receive a copy of the findings of this investigative effort as soon as it is complete.

Thank you, in advance, for your attention to these requests.

With best regards,



Dan Glickman
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

DG:sm

cc: Congressman Harold Volkmer
Michael Lennen, Chairman, Kansas
Corporation Commission
Congressman Morris Udall, Chairman
Committee on the Interior

SNUPPS

Standardized Nuclear Unit
Power Plant System


5 Choke Cherry Road
Rockville, Maryland 20850
(301) 869-8010

May 10, 1984

SLNRC 84-079 FILE: 0491.10.2
SUBJ: Supplemental Significant Deficiency
Report (SDR 84-02): Field Run Cables
for Solenoid Valves

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Mr. John T. Collins
Regional Administrator, Region IV
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 1000, Parkway Central Plaza
Arlington, Texas 76012



Docket Nos. STN 50-482 and STN 50-483

Reference: SLNRC 84-065, dtd. 4/13/84: Final Significant Deficiency
Report (SDR 84-02)

Gentlemen:

The reference letter provided a description of a generic deficiency relating to improperly rated field run cabling used to connect Valcor supplied solenoid valves in Class 1E and non-1E applications. As indicated in the reference, design changes have been implemented to replace the field run cabling with high temperature cabling qualified for the environment experienced in these solenoid valves. Field rework to affect the prescribed changes is currently underway at each SNUPPS job-site and will be completed within the time frame initially specified.

The reference letter report also indicated that other equipment would be examined for excessive heat rise at field termination locations and that a determination would be made whether deficiencies exist similar to those observed with the Valcor valve connections. The scope of the followup investigation included items of potential high heat rise such as diesel generator auxiliary equipment, hydrogen recombiners, selected pump motors, packaged air conditioning units, solenoid valves (other than Valcor) and certain electrically operated components and equipment furnished by the NSSS supplier. As a result of this investigation, similar deficiencies were identified for the following equipment:

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- 1) Target Rock Solenoids: A total of 20 Target Rock solenoids furnished under the NSSS scope of supply for use generically in safety-related systems have deficiencies similar to those described in the reference letter. Actions are presently underway to rework these units, replacing existing field cabling with qualified, high temperature wiring/connectors. All rework will be completed at each jobsite prior to the time that these valves are required for their operational modes.
- 2) ASCO Solenoids: Two (2) ASCO solenoid valves on each of 12 condenser dump valves (nonsafety-related) have been identified as having under-rated cabling connections (105°C max vs. 90°C available). The existing installation was reviewed for service at the higher; i.e. 105°C (Max), temperature and the conclusion reached that, as a minimum, continued service would be permissible at each SNUPPS plant up to the first refueling outage. Cables for the solenoids will be replaced on a schedule commensurate with each plant's maintenance and operational requirements.

In addition, one (1) ASCO solenoid valve on each of two (2) nonsafety-related Control Room HVAC heating/cooling water control valves will also require rework at each SNUPPS plant. Cables for these units will likewise be replaced on a schedule commensurate with each plant's maintenance and operational requirements.

This supplemental report closes out all items relating to the generic deficiency initially reported on behalf of the SNUPPS Utilities and should be considered the final report on this subject. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned.

Very truly yours,


S. J. Seiken
QA Manager

SJS/dck/5a5

cc: D. F. Schnell	UE
G. L. Koester	KGE
D. T. McPhee	KCPL
W. S. Schum	NRC/WC
J. H. Neisler	NRC/CAL
B. H. Little	NRC/CAL
R. C. DeYoung	NRC/IE: HQ
J. E. Konklin	NRC/IE: III
Record	

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Docket File* STN 50-482/50-483

NRC PDR*

EDO Control No. 14323

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J. Holonich

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V. Stello

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J. Roe

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T. Speis

R. Mattson

R. Vollmer

H. Thompson

B. Snyder

SECY (1)

K. Bowman, P-428 #14323

OCA**

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
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Thank you, in advance, for your attention to these requests.

With best regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dan Glickman", with a stylized, flowing script.

Dan Glickman
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

DG:sm

cc: Congressman Harold Volkmer
Michael Lennen, Chairman, Kansas
Corporation Commission
Congressman Morris Udall, Chairman
Committee on the Interior