

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 1		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)  
Primary Containment Isolation System Initiation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES											
0	5	18	8	4	8	4	0	2	3	0	0	6	1	4	8	4		DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0		

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 6 4	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)						
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)						
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)							
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME David L. Smith	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 2 0 5 7 2 9 - 0 8 6 5
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
			0 8	0 1	8 4

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (18)

During replacement of failed relay 16AK20, an adjacent internal panel wire which supplies power to numerous primary containment isolation (PCIS) valves came loose giving intermittent PCIS signals, including isolation of the drywell sumps and continuous air monitor. The wire had been incorrectly terminated on the GE CR 120A type relay (3 wires on one terminal during a modification that was completed in August, 1981) causing it to come loose. The wire was re-terminated and the event ended in two hours. PCIS panels in units 1, 2, and 3 auxiliary instrument rooms were checked for similar wiring problems.

Panel 9-42 in unit 3 was found to have two similar problems where 3 wires were terminated on a single terminal. A design change will be necessary to correct the wiring. No other problems were found in units 1, 2, 3 PCIS panels. Unit 3 is currently in a refueling outage and corrections are expected by the end of the outage. These are considered to be isolated events and no further corrective action is required.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Browns Ferry - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			0 2 3	0 0	0 2	OF

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During normal operation, unit 1 was operating at 63 percent, Unit 2 at 59 percent, and unit 3 was in a refueling outage. Unit 1 was the only unit affected.

Concurrent with maintenance work on relay 16AK20 (RLY) replacement, the licensed unit operator received numerous primary containment isolations on May 18, 1984, at 1700 hours. These were group 2 and 6 isolation valves. Electricians working on the relay identified a loose wire near adjacent relay 16AK57. The wire supplies power to numerous primary isolation valves (JM), and was the cause of the problem. The intermittent isolations resulted as the plant electricians bumped the wire during replacement of the adjacent relay. By the time relay replacement was finished the loose wire had become completely disconnected from its terminal. The wire was located and the termination point (relay 16AK57) of the wire was found to be incorrect. Although this point performed the same electrical function, it placed three wires on a two wire terminal. The wire was properly reterminated (relay 16AK61B (AD)) per approved drawings and the event terminated within two hours.

With the wire loose, the affected primary containment isolation valves all went closed, as designed. The wiring error was of no serious consequence since the circuit still performed the correct electrical function when the wire was connected. Therefore, it did not create any new safety problems. The person responsible for the wiring error is no longer working for TVA.

Other wiring in the unit 1, 2, and 3 PCIS panels was checked for similar wiring errors. Two terminals in unit 3 panel 9-42 were found with 3 wires connected. A design change will be necessary to correct these terminations. The change is expected to be completed during the current refueling outage. No other problems were found in units 1, 2, or 3 PCIS panels. The cause of the unit 3 problems is under investigation and will be addressed in a following report by 8/1/84.

Previous Similar Events : None

Responsible Plant Section : F.S.

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant  
P. O. Box 2000  
Decatur, Alabama 35602

June 14, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET  
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE  
REPORT BFRO-50-259/84023

The enclosed report provides details concerning Primary Containment  
Isolation System Initiation. This report is submitted in accordance  
with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



G. T. Jones  
Power Plant Superintendent  
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, GA 30303

INPO Records Center  
Suite 1500  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway  
Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN  
NUC PR ARMS, 1520 CST2-C  
J. Hutton, Chief, Reactor Engineering Branch (w/10CFR21)  
E. A. Belvin, 109 MPB-M  
C. W. Crawford, 670 CST2-C  
C. H. Crowell, E12A4 C-K  
H. N. Culver, 249A HBB-K  
J. P. Darling, 1750 CST2-C (w/10CFR21)  
A. Brusck, 126 LSB-K  
R. J. Johnson, POTC (Attn: N. S. Catron)  
R. L. Lumpkin, 401 UBB-C  
D. E. McCloud, 1530 CST2-C  
L. M. Mills, 400 CST2-C  
J. A. Raulston, W10C126 C-K  
F. A. Szczepanski, 220 401B-C  
D. L. Williams, W10B84 C-K

T. L. Chinn, BFN  
J. A. Coffey, BFN  
S. R. Maehr, BFN  
E. G. Thornton, BFN  
T. D. Cosby, BFN (COG SEC)  
W. C. Thomison, BFN

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