NAC For (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)							U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85							
FACILIT	V NAME	(1)									DOCKET NUMBER	(2)	PAGE (3)		
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3										0 15 10 10	10131012	1 OF 0 13			
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NAC Form 366 (9-83)

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NRC Form 366A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION						
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER	(6)	PAGE (3)		
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3		YEAR	SEQUENTIA				
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EVENT DESCRIPTION

EXT IIf more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3664's/ (17)

On May 9, 1984, Crystal River Unit 3 was in steady state operation at 94% reactor power and generating 817 MWe. During the performance of a surveillance it was discovered that a check valve, RWV-38, (BI, V) on the discharge of a Nuclear Services Seawater Pump, RWP-2A, (BI, P) had failed open. RWP-2A and RWP-2B discharge to a common header. To prevent bypass flow thru this check valve the normal duty pump, RWP-1, (BI, P) was secured and RWP-2A was started.

An engineering evaluation was performed to determine the effects this failure would have on the Nuclear Services Seawater System. This analysis revealed that a failure of RWP-2A would result in sufficient bypass flow that the redundant pump, RWP-2B, would be incapable of providing the required design flow (11,000 gpm with the failure as opposed to the required 14,100 gpm). A dedicated operator was stationed at the manual discharge valve, RWV-24, (BI, P) for RWP-2A. This operator was directed to shut the valve in the event RWP-2A was shut down. RWV-38 was removed and replaced. Inspection of the failed valve revealed the disc seat ring had separated from the body due to corrosion and blocked the valve in the open position.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

TIME	DATE	EVENT
1930	May 9, 1984	RWV-38 was found stuck open bypassing flow from RWP- 1. RWP-2A was started and RWP-1 was secured. Plant personnel failed to recognize that RW pumps were no longer independent.
1930	May 12, 1984	Time limit expired for operation without two independent RW pumps per Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.7.4.1.
NA	May 15, 1984	Nuclear Engineering was requested to perform calculations to determine the independent operability of RWP-2B with RWV-38 failed open.
1530	May 17, 1984	Engineering calculations were completed showing RWP-2B would not provide adequate flow if RWP-2A failed. A dedicated operator was stationed at RWV-24 (RWP-2A discharge valve). Entered the action statement of T.S. 3.7.4.1.
0635	May 18, 1984	RWP-2A secured and tagged out for the replacement of RWV-38.
2250	May 18, 1984	RWV-38 replaced and tested. Exited the action statement of T.S. 3.7.4.1.

19-831 LICENSEE EV	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/85								lion	
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	Т	R NUMBER 16	1			PAGE (3)			
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SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

TEXT (If more space is requir.), use additional NAC Form 3664's) (17)

The failure of RWV-38 resulted in the loss of independence of the Nuclear Services Sea Water System Pumps as required by T.S. 3.7.4.1. Plant personnel failed to realize this loss of redundancy until engineering calculations were performed eight days later. Operation in this mode is contrary to T.S. 3.7.4.1. Crystal River Unit 3 operated in this condition for a period of 219 hours and 20 minutes. A review of components cooled by Nuclear Services Seawater System revealed the plant would have had ample indication and time to respond even to a total loss of the Nuclear Services Seawater System. Operations personnel could have either isolated the bypass flow path or utilized redundant systems to provide cooling to vital systems.


CORRECTIVE ACTION

Engineering calculations determined that RW pumps were not independent with RWV-38 failed open. The independence of the RW pumps was re-established by stationing an operator whose sole function was to shut RWV-24, if RWP-2A was shut down.

A review of other safety systems with respect to pump discharge check valves in which a single failure could result in loss of independence will be conducted. The results of this review will be discussed with Operations personnel to avoid future occurrences of this type. Engineering is investigating methods to minimize the corrosion rate of these valves.

SIMILAR LERS

A review of previous LERs did not reveal any events where plant personnel failed to recognize a requirement to enter a TS action statement.





June 11, 1984 3F0684-07

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Licensee Event Report No. 84-011-00

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 84-011-00 which is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Hatek

G. R. Westafer Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management

RHT/feb

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator, Region II Office of Inspection & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323

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