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jumpers and/or mechanically providing an exhaust air path. Long-term correction will be made as part of the necessary 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, modification.

NRC Form 366A

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER
Browns Ferry - Units 1 and 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 5	9 81 4 - 0 12 12 - 0 10 0 1 2 0 5 0 12

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Unit 1 was operating at 96 percent power, unit 2 was operating at 59 percent power, and unit 3 was in a refueling outage. Units 1 and 2 were the only units affected by this event.

On May 12, 1984 during 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, evaluations, it was determined that during a design basis accident necessary cooling equipment for electrical board rooms for units 1 and 2 could be lost under certain events. Because of a design error, the normal exhaust fans (FAN) for units 1 and 2 electrical board rooms A, B, C, and D are automatically and permanently load shed from their power supply upon receipt of an accident signal (LOCA) and concurrent loss of offsite power.

A single failure of a reactor motor operated valve board (ECBD) (1A or 2A) causes the loss of both the normal exhaust fan and the emergency air-conditioners (ACU) for the rooms (1A board effects electrical board rooms A and B; 2A board effects electrical board rooms C and D). This is contrary to Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.12.5. (Note: Room cooling is deperient upon either the exhaust fan or the emergency air-conditioner.)

The Plant Operating Instruction - 57, and Emergency Operating Instruction - 36 were revised May 12, 1984 to include appropriate action to be taken upon loss of the cooling units listed above. The instruction options include jumpering the 480V load shed logic contacts on the exhaust fan within the first hour of losing ventilation, placing the normal supply fan power source on the appropriate electrical board and/or providing an exhaust path in the exhaust fan ductwork (DUCT) for short-term measures.

Analysis shows that essential equipment in the rooms would function for at least one hour under this situation. After this time, it is most likely that electrical boards/loads would begin to trip, alarming in the control room. Appropriate operator response would be to investigate and restart ventilation systems. The actual time to troubleshoot and get systems restarted would vary, and loads would be lost which cannot be predicted precisely.

Long-term corrective action will be to review the ventilation circuits for the shutdown board rooms for compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, requirements. This evaluation will continue and additional modifications are expected in response to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, requirements.

Responsible Section - ED

Previous Similar Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

June 8, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFR0-50-259/84022

The enclosed report provides details concerning a design oversight on load shed logic. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(11).

Very truly yours.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

G. T. Jones

Power Plant Superintendent Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

JE22