ATTACHMENT A

- 1. Remove pages: B 3/4 7-5, B 3/4 9-1,
- 2. Insert pages: B 3/4 7-5, B 3/4 9-1

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PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the control room ventilation system ensures that 1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 19 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR 50.

3/4.7.8 SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM (SLCRS)

The OPERABILITY of the SLCRS provides for the filtering of postulated radioactive effluents resulting from a Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) and from leakage of LOSS of COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) activity from systems outside of the Reactor Containment building, such as Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) equipment, prior to their release to the environment. This system also collects potential leakage of LOCA activity from the Reactor Containment building penetrations into the contiguous areas ventilated by the SLCRS except for the Main Steam Valve Room and Emergency Air Lock. The operation of this system was assumed in calculating the postulated offsite doses in the analysis for > FHA. System operation was also assumed in that portion of the Derign Basis Accident (DBA) LOCA analysis which addressed ESF leakage collowing the LOCA, however, no credit for SLCRS operation was taken in the DBA LOCA analysis for collection and filtration of Reactor Containment building leakage even though an unquantifiable amount of contiguous area penetration leakage would in fact be collected and filtered. Based on the results of the analyses, the SLCRS must be OPERABLE to ensure that ESF leakage following the postulated DBA LOCA and leakage resulting from a FHA will not exceed 10 CFR 100 limits.

3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on sealed source removable contamination ensure that the total body or individual organ irradiation does not exceed allowable limits in the event of ingestion or inhalation of the source material. The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 79.39(c) limits for plutonium. Leakage of sources excluded from the requirements of this specification represent less than one maximum permissible body burden for total body irradiation if the source material is inhaled or ingested.

3/4.7.10 and 3/4.7.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (RHR)

Deleted

BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1

B 3/4 7-5 PROPOSED WORDING

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on minimum boron concentration (2000 ppm) ensure that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The limitation on K_{eff} of no greater than 0.95 which includes a conservative allowance for uncertanties, is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during refueling operations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment penetration closure and operability of the containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment or filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to discharge to the atmosphere within 10 CFR 100 limits. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE. Operations of the containment purge and exhaust system HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1

B 3/4 9-1 Proposed Wording

ATTACHMENT B

Safety Evaluation

Proposed Change Request No. 81 amends the beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Appendix A concerning the Bases of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) and the Containment Purge and Exhaust System to reflect the existing Fuel Handling Accident analysis and the new LOCA offsite dose analysis recently incorporated into the UFSAR.

Description and Purpose of Change

The Bases for the SLCRS have been revised to more explicitly define the conditions and leakage pathways for which operation of the system is assumed in the analysis. The SLCRS Bases will then be consistent with the existing Fuel Handling Accident analysis and the new LOCA offsite dose analysis.

The Bases for the Containment Purge and Exhaust System have been revised to include a requirement to restrict the resultant radioactive discharge to the atmosphere to within 10CFR100 limits following a fuel element rupture during refueling operations when discharging from containment through the SLCRS.

Basis

- 1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR increased? No
 - Reason: The changes are administrative in nature and do not require physical change to the SLCRS or the Containment Purge and Exhaust system. The changes reflect the accident analysis and do not affect the system descriptions of Section 6.6. Therefore, the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of this equipment will not be increased.
- 2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment not previously evaluated in the UFSAR created? No
 - Reason: Changing the Bases to be consistent with the new analysis does not affect the operation of the system. Therefore, since this change is administrative in nature, it will not create the possibility for a new type of accident or malfunction of equipment as described in Section 14.3 of the UFSAR.

Attachment B Safety Evaluation Page 7

- 3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? No.
 - Reason: The Bases have been revised to be consistent with the new analysis of offsite doses resulting from a LOCA. The new analysis is more conservative since no credit is taken for SLCRS collection of containment leakage, and ESF equipment leakage is now considered as a potential source for radioactive release. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for these specifications will be increased since radioactive releases must be controlled to limit offsite doses to within 10CFR100 limits.

4. Based on the above, is an unreviewed safety question involved? No.

Conclusion

The proposed changes are administrative in nature and do not involve physical change to plant safety-related systems, components or structures, will not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety-related equipment, increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed, nor create the possibility of a malfunction different than previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The changes reflect accident analysis described in the UFSAR and do not affect the existing system or its limiting conditions for operation. The OSC and ORC have reviewed the proposed change and determine that the changes are safe and do not involve an unreviewed safety question.