

Commonwealth Edison Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North Cordova, Illinois 61242 Telephone 309/854-2241

RLB-92-029

January 28, 1992

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-265, DPR-30, Unit Two

Erclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 92-003, Revision 00, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(iv). The licensee shall report any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered safety feature.

Respectfully,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

Wat

R. L. Bax Station Manager

RLB/TB/plm

Enclosure

cc: J. Schrage T. Taylor INPO Records Center NRC Region III

030020

STKGR 274 9202040064 920128 PDR ADDCK 05000265 S PDR

1422.

LICENSEE EVENT REPOR	RT (LER) Form Rev 2
facility Name (1)	Docket Number (2) Page (3)
Quad Cities Unit Two Title (4)	0] 5] 0] 0] 0] 0] 2] 6] 5] 1 0 0
Rx Bldg Vent Isolation and SbGT Start Due to Pulled Fuse During Out	of Service
	te (7) Other Facilities Involved (8)
Month Day Year Year /// Sequential /// Revision Month Day Number /// Number	
	01.51.01.01.01.1
0 1 0 6 9 2 9 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 2 8	8 9 2 0 5 0 0 0 1
OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE	
MODE (9) (Check one or more of the following) (11)	
20.402(b) 20.405(c)	a second s
POWER20,405(a)(1)(i)50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)73.71(c)
LEVEL 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) (10) 0 0 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)0.ier (Specify
$\frac{110}{(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)} = \frac{100.405(a)(1)(111)}{(1000000000000000000000000000000000000$	
20.405(a)(1)(v)50.73(a)(2)(iii	A REAL PROPERTY AND A REAL AND A R
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR T	THIS LER (12)
Name	AREA CODE
Rachel A. Luebbe Ext. 2119	3 0 9 6 2 4 - 2 2 4
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE D	
	SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	Expected Month Day Y
	Submission Date (15)
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO	space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT:

On January 6, 1992 at 1154 nours, Unit Two was in the Shutdown mode for a refueling outage. The Operating Department was taking the Unit 2 Torus to Oxygen Analyzer Solenoid [SOL] (2-8801-D) Out of Service (OOS). During OOS #3938 fuse [FU] F-6 was pulled from the 902-40 panel [PL]. This fuse pull caused the 595-133 relay [RLY] to deenergize which gave an autostart signal to Standby Gas Treatment (SEGT) [VI], isolated the Reactor Building Vents [VA], and a partial Group II isolation was received.

At 1221 hours the SBGT train was secured and the Reactor Building Vents were reset and restarted. At 1314 hours, OOS #3938 was successfully completed without pulling the fuse. On January 6, 1992, Memo 92-1 was issued to operating personnel which put a stop to all fuse pulls in the 901(2)-40 and 901(2)-41 panels until an operator aide addressing inadvertent actuations is made up.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1v).

The Party of the State of the	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER		1. "m Rev 2.0
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	Page (3)
		Year /// Sequential /// Revision /// Number /// Number	
Quad Cities Unit Two	015101010121	6 5 9 2 - 0 0 3 - 0 0	01 2 05 01

chergy industry identification system (CIIS) codes are isentified in the tex

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: Rx Bldg Vent Isolation and SBGT Start Due to Pulled Fuse During Out of Service.

A. CCNDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Pait: Ty	NO	Event Date:	January 6, 1992	Event Time:	1154
Reactor M	lode: 1	Mode Name:	SHUTDOWN	Power Level:	00%

This report was initiated by Deviation Report D-4-2-92-003.

SHUTDOWN (1) - In this position, a reactor scram is initiated, power to the control rod drives is removed, and the reactor protection trip systems have been deenergized for 10 seconds prior to permissive for manual reset.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On January 6, 1992 at 1154 hours, Unit Two was in the Shutdown mode for a refueling outage. The Operating Department was in the process of taking the Unit 2 Torus to Oxygen Analyzer Solenoid [SOL] (2-8801-D) Out of Service (OOS). OOS #3938 called for fuse [FU] F-6 (595-718) to be pulled in the 902-40 panel [PL]. When fuse F-6 was pulled it deenergized the 595-133 relay [RLY] which gave an autostart signal to Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT? [VI], isolated the Reactor Building Vents (Rx Bldg Vents) [VA], and a partial Group II isolation was received. OOS #3938 addressed the partial Group II actuation but not the Rx Bldg Vent Isolation and SBGT autostart.

At 1221 hours the SBGT train was secured off and the Rx Bldg Vents were reset and restarted. At 1314 hours, OOS 3938 was successfully completed without pulling the fuse.

An Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone call was made at 1457 hours in accordance with IOCFR.72(b)(2)(11).

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

The apparent cause of the event was personnel error. Operating personnel failed to identify that pulling fuse F-6 during OOS #3938 would cause an unplanned Engineered Saftey Feature (ESF) actuation. The OOS preparer, a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), failed to thoroughly research the actuations that would result in pulling fuse F-6. The OOS verifier, also an SRO, Gid not identify that an additional actuation would occur which was not listed on OOS #3938.

and the second s	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 1	EXT CONTINUATION	Form Rev 2.0
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	Page (3)
		Year /// Sequential /// Revision	
		/// Number /// Number	
Quad Cities Unit Two	01510101012161	5 9 2 - 0 0 1 3 - 0 1 0	01 3 OF 01

TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The safety consequences of this event were minimal. The Rx Bldg Vents and SBGT functioned as designed. All valves affected by the event failed in the safe direction. Unit 2 was in a refueling outage during the time of the event. The Reactor Building maintained its negative differential pressure with SBGT.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). The licensee shall report any event or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective action was to replace fuse F-6 in the 902-40 panel. The SBGT train was coned off and the Rx Bldg Vents were reset and turned back on at 1221 hours on January 6, 1992. At 1314 hours, OOS #3938 was successfully completed without pulling the fuse. Individuals involved in this event were counseled.

On January 6, 1992, Memo 92-1 was issued from the Assistant Superintendent of Operations which addressed several immediate actions to be taken for this event. First, it was stressed to all individuals who prepare electrical OOS's that all actions that will occur as a result of the OOS be thoroughly researched. It was also emphasized that the individuals who prepare and verify the OOS's are accountable for ensuring they are correct and complete. Second, all fuses in the 901(2)-40 and 901-(2)-41 panels were researched and in operator aid was developed to list all actuations that will occur when the fuses are removed. This temporary operator aid will be replaced by a permanent engraved placard which will reference a procedure listing the consequences of pulling a fuse in the 901(2)-40 and 901(2)-40 and 901(2)-40 and 901(2)-40 and 901(2)-40 and 901(2)-40 and since a procedure listing the consequences of pulling a fuse in the 901(2)-40 and 901(2)-41 panels. Third, until the operator aid is produced and installed, no further fuse removals in the 901(2)-40 and 901(2)-41 panels will be allowed unless a procedure is written to control the activity CNTS #265 200 92 00301). Replacement of blown fuses is an exception of this requirement.

F. PREVIOUS EVENIS:

Deviation Report 4-2-88-038 describes the exact same event as this one except they were taking the 2-1601-56 valve Out of Service. The cause of the event was personnel error and the corrective actions were to counsel the personnel involved in the event.

. •

ACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	Form Rev 2. Page (3)
		Year /// Sequential /// Revision /// Number /// Number	
uad Cities Unit Two	0151010101216	15912 - 01013 - 010	01 4 OF 0

The following is a list of previous events that deal with personnel errors experienced during Out of Services.

- D4-1-91-002 Partial Group II actuation from fuse removal for OOS work. Fuse F-7 pulled from 901-40 and 901-41 panel.
- D4-2-88-038 Fuse pull during Out of Service caused an isolation of the Rx Bldg Vents; Fuse F-6 pulled from the 902-40 panel.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

There is no component failure data because this is a personnel error event.