Docket No. 50-413/414 MAY 23 1984

Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
Nuclear Production Department
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Dear Mr. Tucker:

Subject: Request for Additional Information - Catawba Nuclear Station
Security Plan

As part of the NRC staff's review of vital areas identified for Catawba, the staff requires additional information in this area, as specified in the enclosure. The need for this information was discussed with a member of your staff on May 17, 1984.

In order for the additional information to be reviewed in a timely manner, we request that your response be provided no later than June 5, 1984. If you require any clarification of this matter, please contact the project manager, Kahtan Jabbour, at (301) 492-7800.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. 96-511.

Sincerely,

/S/

Elinor G. Adensam, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: w/o enclosure
See next page

DISTRIBUTION w/enclosure

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH

1. Provide a complete list of the vital equipment and vital areas for the McGuire and Oconee Nuclear Stations.

2. Since the Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is not designed to mitigate the effects of design basis or smaller LOCAs, the applicant should demonstrate that a sabotage induced LOCA cannot be achieved regardless of what transpires in areas of the plant not protected as vital. Damage to cabling need not be considered.

3. A loss of feedwater transient concurrent with a loss of offsite power is considered the bounding sabotage initiated transient. For this transient, demonstrate the adequacy of the Standby Shutdown System (SSS) to assure hot shutdown regardless of what transpires in areas of the plant not protected as vital including potential damage to the automatic circuitry associated with the auxiliary feedwater system.

4. By letter dated February 20, 1984, the applicant provided a commitment to incorporate technical specifications to assure operability of the SSS. Provide a summary of these proposed technical specifications.