NUREG-0806 Vol. 6, No. 2 May 18, 1984

UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES SUMMARY

AQUA BOOK



NUREG-0606 Vol. 6, No. 2 May 18, 1984

UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES SUMMARY

AQUA BOOK

Manuscript Completed: May 1984 Date Published: May 1984

Compiled by: Judy Butts

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555



FOREWORD

THE "UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES" SUMMARY IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WITH A REPORTED TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 210 OF THE ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1974 AS AMENDED. THIS SUMMARY UTILIZES LABORATORIES AND IS PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH, AND THE MATIONAL

THE DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES COMPLETION OF AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE (USI) INCLUDES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNICAL RESOLUTION. THIS IS IN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE FACT THAT REAL SAFETY BENEFITS OCCUR ONLY AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION HAS TAKEN PLACE. IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THIS IMPLEMENTATION PHASE ARE:

- (1) THE PROVISION OF A PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF A DRAFT NUREG REPORT INCORPORATING THE STAFF'S TECHNICAL RESOLUTION FOLLOWED BY A DISCUSSION AND DISPOSITION OF THE COMMENTS RECEIVED IN A FINAL NUREG REPORT.
- (2) THE PROVISION FOR INCORPORATION OF THE TECHNICAL RESOLUTION INTO THE NRC'S REGULATIONS, STANDARD REVIEW PLAN. REGULATORY GUIDES, OR OTHER NRC OFFICIAL GUIDANCE OR REQUIREMENTS, AS APPROPRIATE.
- (3) THE PROVISION FOR APPLICATION OF THE TECHNICAL RESOLUTION TO INDIVIDUAL OPERATING PLANTS IN THE FORM OF HARDWARE OR DESIGN CHANGES, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE, AND/OR CHANGE TO OPERATING PROCEDURES AND TRAINING, AS APPROPRIATE.

THE SCHEDULES IN THIS BOOK INCLUDE A MILESTONE AT THE END OF EACH ACTION PLAN WHICH REPRESENTS THE INITIATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS BOTH WITH RESPECT TO INCORPORATION OF THE TECHNICAL RESOLUTION IN THE NRC OFFICIAL GUIDANCE OR REQUIREMENTS AND ALSO THE APPLICATION OF CHANGES TO INDIVIDUAL OPERATING PLANTS. THE SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION WILL ACTIVITIES NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE IMPLEMENTATION CANNOT NORMALLY BE RESOLUTION OF A USI SINCE THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE WHICH A TECHNICAL RESOLUTION. THE PROGRESS AND STATUS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHICH A TECHNICAL RESOLUTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED ARE REPORTED SPECIFICALLY IN A SEPARATE TABLE PROVIDED IN THIS SUMMARY. MORE DETAIL ON THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION IN PROGRESS ON A SPECIFIC UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE WHERE THE TECHNICAL RESOLUTION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A SPECIFIC UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE WHERE THE TECHNICAL RESOLUTION REQUIRES CHANGES TO INDIVIDUAL OPERATING PLANTS IS PROVIDED IN NUREGO-0748, "OPERATING REACTORS LICENSING ACTIONS SUMMARY. WHICH IS PUBLISHED MONTHLY.

KARL KNIEL, CHIEF OF THE GENERIC ISSUES BRANCH, DIVISION OF SAFETY TECHNOLOGY/NRR. IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING THE GENERIC TASKS INCLUDED IN THIS SUMMARY.

EXAMPLE PAGE




TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE NO	TASK NO.	TASK MANAGER	DESCRIPTION
1-2		***	ABBREVIATIONS
3-4	***		PROGRAM STATUS
5-9			USI'S FOR WHICH TECHNICAL RESOLUTION IS COMPLETE
10-13	A-1	ALECK SERKIZ	WATER HAMMER
14-15	A-3, A-4, A-5	JACK STROSNIDER	W. CE. AND BEW STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INTEGRITY
16-19	A-17	DALE THATCHER	SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
20-23	A-40	SYED SHAUKAT	SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA-SHORT TERM PROGRAM
24-25	A-43	ALECK SERKIZ	CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP PERFORMANCE
26-27	A-44	ALAN RUBIN	STATION BLACKOUT
28-31	A-45	ANDREW MARCHESE	SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS
32-35	A-46	T. Y. CHANG	SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN OPERATING
36-41	A-47	ANDREW SZUKIEWICZ	SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS
42-45	A-48	TSUNG SU	HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES AND EFFECTS OF HYDROGEN BURNS ON SAFETY EQUIPMENT
46-52	A-49	ROY WOODS	PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK

ABBREVIATIONS

AAB:	ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BRANCH (FORMER NRR BRANCH)	ECC:	EMERGENCY CORE COOLING
	ADMINISTRATION BRANCH, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION STAFF (IE)	EEB	ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING BRANCH DIVISION
AC:	ALTERNATING CURRENT	FERV	OF ENGINEERING (NRR)
ACRS	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS	EFPY: EG&G	EFFECTIVE FULL-POWER YEARS
AD:	ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	E G&G	EDGERTON, GERMESHAUSEN & GRIER
ADB:	ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT BRANCH, DIVISION OF	EPE EPR EQB	EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
MI/U	ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT BRANCH, DIVISION OF	EPR	ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
	REACTOR SAFETY RESEARCH (RES)	EQB -	EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH, DIVISION
AEB:	ACCIDENT EVALUATION BRANCH, DIVISION OF		OF ENGINEERING (NRR)
	SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (NRR)	ETN	CT ENGINEERING (NRK)
AEOD:	OFFICE OF THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF	FSTF	FINANCIAL
	OPERATIONAL DATA	FIN. FSTF:	FULL-SCALE TEST FACILITY
AIF:	ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM	FW:	FEEDWATER
APTS:	OPERATIONAL DATA ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM ACTION PLAN TRACKING SYSTEM ALDEN RESEARCH LABORATORY AUXILIARY SYSTEMS REANCH DIVISION OF	FY:	FISCAL YEAR
ARL	ALDEN RESEARCH LABORATORY	GSB:	GEOSCIENCES BRANCH, DIVISION OF ENGINEERING (NRR)
ASB	ALUXII TABU CUCTUM BANGA CALLERY	GE :	GENERAL ELECTRIC
MOD.		GIB	GENERIC ISSUES BRANCH, DIVISION OF SAFETY
	SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (NRR)		TECHNOLOGY (NRR)
ASME :	AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS	HEER	HIMAN FACTORS (MAK)
ASTM:	AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TESTING MATERIALS	HI E.B.	HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING BRANCH, DIVISION
ATWS:	ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM	HOOT	UP HEALTH, STITING AND WASTE MGMT (RES)
BG&E	BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY	HSST:	MEANT SECTION STEEL TECHNOLOGY
B&W	BABCOCK AND WILCOX COMPANY	ICBR:	INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL BRANCH
BNC:	BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL CONSERVATORY		DIVISION OF FACILITY OPERATIONS (RES)
BNL:		ICSB	INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS BRANCH
BOP	BRIGHT OF BLICKY		DIVISION OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (NRR)
BWR:	BALANCE OF PLANT	IE	OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
	BOILING WATER REACTOR	TEFE-	INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS
CE:	COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INCORPORATED	IE. IEEE INCL IP IREP ISI LANL LER LUNL LOCA LPP LWR MARK I-III	TOANS OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS
CEB:	CHEMICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH, DIVISION OF	TO.	IDAHO NUCLEAR ENGINEERING LABORATORY
	ENGINEERING (NRR)	TOFO	INDIAN POINT
CFR:	CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS	THE P	INTEGRATED RELIABILITY EVALUATION PROGRAM
CP	CONSTRUCTION PERMIT	151	IN-SERVICE INSPECTION
CPB	CORE PERFORMANCE BRANCH, DIVISION OF	LANL	LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
	SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (NRR)	LER:	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
CR	CONTRACTOR CORRESTOR (NRK)	LLNL	LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
CRGR	CONTRACTOR REPORT	LOCA	LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT
	COMMITTEE TO REVIEW GENERIC REQUIREMENTS	L PP	LEAD PLANT PROGRAM
CSB	CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BRANCH, DIVISION OF	LTP:	LONG TERM PROGRAM
2.0	SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (NRR)	1.49	LONG TEMP PROGRAM
DC:	DIRECT CURRENT	MARK T TTT	LIGHT-WATER REACTOR
DE:	DIVISION OF ENGINEERING (NRR)	MARK 1-111:	CONTAINMENT TYPES FOR BOILING WATER REACTORS
DEDROGR:	DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REGIONAL	MEB:	MECHANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH.
State and of	OPERATIONS AND GENERIC REQUIREMENTS		DYATSTON OF ENGINEEKING INKKI
DFO:	DIVISION OF FACILITY OPERATIONS (RES)	MEBR:	MATERIALS ENGINEERING BRANCH.
DHES	DIVISION OF PACIFIF OPERATIONS (RES)		DIVISION OF ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY (RES)
DHRS	DIVISION OF HUMAN FACTORS SAFETY (NRR)	MIT:	MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
	DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS	MSLB.	MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK
DL	DIVISION OF LICENSING (NRR)	MTEB:	MATERIALS ENGINEERING BRANCH, DIVISION
DOE :	U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY		OF ENGINEERING BRANCH, DIVISION
DOR :	DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTORS	NDE :	OF ENGINEERING (NRR)
	(FORMER NRR DIVISION)	NRC	NON-DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION
DRA:	DIVISION OF RISK ANALYSIS (RES)		NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
DSI	DIVISION OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (NRR)	NREP:	NEUTRON RESONANCE ESCAPE PROBABILITY
DOS:	DIVISION OF SYSTEMS SAFETY	NRR	OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
-	(FORMER NRR DIVISION)	NSS:	NUCLEAR STEAM SYSTEM
DST	DIVISION OF SAFETY TECHNOLOGY (NRR)	NUREG:	NUCLEAR REGULATORY REPORT (PREPARED IN-HOUSE)
E	ENGINEERING		The mouse is
EB:			
£0.	ENFORCEMENT BRANCH, ENFORCEMENT AND		
	INVESTIGATIONS STAFF (IE)		

9

ABBREVIATIONS

OL	OPERATING LICENSE
ORAB	OPERATING REACTORS ASSESSMENT BRANCH, DIVISION OF
	LICENSING (NRR)
ORB.	OPERATING PEACTORS BRANCH, DIVISION OF
	LICENSING (NRR)
ORNL:	OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
OSD	OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
030	(FORMER NRC OFFICE)
OTSG	ONCE-THROUGH STEAM GENERATOR
PASNY:	POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
PDA	PRELIMINARY DESIGN APPROVAL
PNL:	BACTETO NOT THE TOTAL APPROVAL
PRA:	PACIFIC NORTHWEST LABORATORY (BATTELLE)
PSB:	PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
L20:	POWER SYSTEMS BRANCH, DIVISION OF
BOIL	SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (NRR)
PSU:	PLANT SYSTEMS UNIT (AEOD)
PTRE	PROCEDURES AND TEST REVIEW BRANCH, DIVISION
	OF HUMAN FACTORS SAFETY (NRR)
PWR:	PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR
RAB:	RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT BRANCH, DIVISION OF
and the same of th	SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (NRR)
RCIC:	REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING
MET.	REFERENCE
RES:	OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH
RFP:	REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL
RHR:	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL
RPV.	REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL
RM	RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
RRAB	RELIABILITY AND RISK ASSESSMENTS BRANCH
	DIVISION OF SAFETY TECHNOLOGY [NRR]
RRRC	REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS REVIEW COMMITTEE
RS	REACTOR SAFETY (FORMER NRR BRANCH)
RSB:	REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH, DIVISION OF
	SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (NRR)
RSSMAP-	REACTOR SAFETY STUDY METHODOLOGY APPLICATION
and the same of th	PROGRAM
RV	REACTOR VESSEL
SAI	SCIENCE APPLICATIONS, INC.
SCC	STRESS-CORROSION CRACKING
SGEB:	CTRICTION AND CONTROLLING
JUCU.	STRUCTURAL AND GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH, DIVISION OF ENGINEERING (NRR)
SEP	SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM
SEPB	STSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM
SEPB.	SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM BRANCH, DIVISION
CED	OF LICENSING (NRR)
SER:	SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
SG	STEAM GENERATOR
SGWH:	STEAM GENERATOR WATER HAMMER
SNL	SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY
SQUG:	SEISMIC QUALIFICATION UTILITIES GROUP
SRP:	STANDARD REVIEW PLAN
SRV:	SAFETY RELIEF VALVE

SSE: SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE
SSPB: STANDARDS SPECIAL PROJECTS BRANCH
DIVISION OF LICENSING (NRR)
STP: SHORT-TERM PROGRAM
TAP: TASK ACTION PLAN
TER: TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT
TH: THERMAL HYDRAULICS
TM: TASK MANAGER
TMI: THREE MILE ISLAND
UCLA: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES
USI: UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE
W: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
WH: WATER HAMMER

PROGRAM STATUS

USI NO.	TITLE .	FEBRUARY 17, 1984 AQUA BOOK SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	CURRENT SCHEDULED	REMARKS
	STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INTEGRITY	MAY 1984	NOT SCHEDULED	THE DRAFT NUREG REPORT HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY THE TECHNICAL BRANCHES, THEIR COMMENTS INCORPORATED, AND TRANSMITTED TO CRGR. A COMMISSION BRIEFING IS PLANNED FOR JUNE 1984.
A-17	SYSTEMS INTER-	MARCH 30, 1986	MARCH 30, 1986	WORK ORIGINALLY PLANNED UNDER TAP A-17 AND TMI ACTION PLAN ITEM II.C.3, SYSTEMS INTERACTION. WERE COMBINED UNDER USI A-17 AND A NEW TASK MANAGER APPOINTED. A REVISED TASK ACTION PLAN HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR. NRR.
A-40	SEISMIC DESIGN	JANUARY 10, 1985	APRIL 1, 1985	THE NRC STAFF INTERNAL REVIEW HAS BEEN COMPLETED A VALUE/IMPACT ANALYSIS HAS BEEN PREPARED BY LLNL AND A CRGR SUBMITTAL PACKAGE WAS PREPARED AND FORWARDED TO THE DIRECTOR OF NRR FOR SIGNATURE
A-43	CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP	SEPTEMBER 30, 1984	SEPTEMBER 30, 1984	ALL TECHNICAL SUPPORT (NUREG/CR) REPORTS HAVE BEEN ISSUED. NUREG-0897 AND NUREG-0869 ALONG WITH SRP SECTION 6 2.2 WERE ISSUED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT IN MAY 1983. THE PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD ENDED IN JULY 1983 AND THE COMMENTS RECEIVED WERE UTILIZED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE REVISED CROR SUBMITTAL WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR MAY 1984.
A-44	STATION BLACKOUT	FEBRUARY 15, 1985	FEBRUARY 15, 1985	THE STAFF'S PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS TO RESOLVE A-44 BASED ON THE TECHNICAL FINDINGS, WERE REVIEWED BY NRR AND RES DIVISIONS. THIS REVIEW RESULTED IN THE RECOMMENDATION TO PROCEED WITH PROPOSED RULEMAKING, IN CONJUNCTION WITH A NEW REGULATORY GUIDE, TO RESOLVE A-44. THE PROPOSED TECHNICAL RESOLUTION WAS FORWARDED TO THE CRGR. THE CRGR RECOMMENDED THAT THE PROPOSED REGULATORY GUIDE AND NUREG-1032 BE ISSUED FOR PUBLIC COMMENTAFIER MODIFICATIONS ARE MADE TO REFLECT CRGR COMMENTAFIER MODIFICATIONS ARE
A-45	SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS	OCTOBER 30 1985	OCTOBER 30, 1985	THE FIRST INTERIM MILESTONE REPORT WAS ISSUED FOR NRC STAFF REVIEW ON DECEMBER 22. 1982. AS A RESULT OF STAFF COMMENTS, A REVISED VERSION OF THIS REPORT WAS ISSUED FOR STAFF AND ACRS REVIEW ON JUNE 21, 1983 THE SECOND INTERIM MILESTONE REPORT WAS ISSUED FOR STAFF REVIEW ON MARCH 29, 1983; THE THIRD IN DRAFT FORM FOR THE STAFF REVIEW ON AUGUST 2, 1983; THE FOURTH IN FINAL FORM (NUREG/CR-3421); THE FIFTH REPORT ON SCREENING CRITERIA FOR LWR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL WAS ISSUED FOR STAFF REVIEW AND IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING A SPECIAL INTERNAL STAFF EVALUATION, THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH REPORTS WERE ISSUED FOR STAFF COMMENT IN JANUARY 1984. THE EIGHTH REPORT ON FEED AND BLEED ANALYSES AND WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS WAS ISSUED FOR STAFF COMMENT IN MAW, CE AND WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS WAS ISSUED FOR STAFF COMMENT IN

PROGRAM STATUS

USI NO.	TITLE	FEBRUARY 17, 1984 AQUA BOOK SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	CURRENT SCHEDULED	REMARKS
A-46.	SEISMIC QUALIFI- CATION OF EQUIP- MENT IN OPERATING PLANTS	DECEMBER 14, 1984	FEBRUARY 15, 1985	WORK ON ALL TASKS IS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TASK 4. AN INTERIM REPORT WHICH SUMMARIZES THE STATUS OF WORK ACCOMPLISHED ON A-48 WAS ISSUED AS NUREG-1018 IN OCTOBER 1983. THE A-46 CROR PACKAGE [INCLUDING DRAFT NUREG-1030] WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE DIRECTOR OF NRR FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL IN MAY 1984.
A-47	SAFETY IMPLICA- TIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS	NOT SCHEDULED	APRIL 1, 1986	INEL SUBMITTED DRAFT REPORTS ON THE GE REVIEW OF OVERFILL AND OVERCOOLING TRANSIENTS AND THE WESTINGHOUSE REVIEW OF OVERFILL AND OVERCOOLING TRANSIENTS FOR STAFF REVIEW IN AUGUST 1983 AND JANUARY 1984, RESPECTIVELY.
				ORNL SUBMITTED DRAFT REPORTS FOR THE E&W REVIEW OF OVERFILL TRANSIENTS AND THE B&W REVIEW OF OVERCOOLING TRANSIENTS IN OCTOBER 1983 AND APRIL 1983, RESPECTIVELY.
A-48	HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES AND HYDROGEN BURNS ON SAFETY EQUIPMENT	JUNE 30, 1985	JUNE 30, 1986	WORK ON THIS USI IS LIMITED TO THE GENERIC RESOLUTION OF HYDROGEN CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION FOR ICE CONDENSER AND BWR MARK III CONTAINMENTS. A COMMISSION PAPER REGARDING HYDROGEN CONTROL FOR MARK III AND ICE CONDENSER CONTAINMENT WAS REVIEWED AND ENDORSED BY THE CRGR ON JUNE 1, 1983. THE COMMISSION PAPER WAS FORWARDED TO THE COMMISSION ON AUGUST 26, 1983, AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED ON DECEMBER 28, 1983.
A-49	PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK	DECEMBER 31. 1985	DECEMBER 31, 1985	THE ORIGINAL TASK ACTION PLAN WAS APPROVED AND ISSUED ON ON MARCH 26, 1982. REVISION 2 OF THE TASK ACTION PLAN CONTAINING MINOR SCHEDULE CHANGES WAS FORWARDED TO THE DIRECTOR OF NRR FOR APPROVAL IN MARCH 1984. NRC STAFF PROPOSED PTS RULE WAS APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION IN JANUARY 1984. THIS NEW PTS RULE WAS PUBLISHED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT ON FEBRUARY 7, 1984.

NO.	TITLE	DATE COMPLETED	REPORTS PUBLISHED	IMPLEMENTATION STATUS	IMPLEMENTATION TASK MANAGER/ TELEPHONE
A-1	WATER HAMMER	MARCH 15, 1984	NUREG-0927, REV. 1 NUREG-0933, REV. 1 SRP SECTIONS 3.9.3, REV. 1 3.9.4, REV. 2 5.4.6, REV. 3 5.4.7, REV. 3 6.3, REV. 2 9.2.1, REV. 3 9.2.2, REV. 2 10.3, REV. 3	THE REVISED SRP SECTIONS WILL BE USED ONLY FOR REVIEW OF "CUSTOM PLANT" CONSTRUCTION PERMIT APPLICATIONS, AND FOR STANDARD PLANT APPLICATIONS OCCKETED AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THESE SRP SECTION REVISIONS, WHICH ARE INTENDED FOR REFERENCING IN CONSTRUCTION PERMIT APPLICATIONS. (FORWARD FIT IMPLEMENTATION ONLY.)	
A-2,	ASYMMETRIC BLOWDOWN LOADS ON REACTOR PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEMS	DEC. 1980	NUREG-0609	ALL PWR PLANT ASSESSMENTS FOR ASYMMETRIC LOADS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND HAVE BEEN EVALUATED BY THE STAFF AND EGAG. THE BASIS FOR THE EVALUATIONS WAS CRITERIA INCLUDED IN NUREG-0609. SER'S FOR ALL BAW OWNERS' GROUP PLANTS HAVE BEEN ISSUED. SER'S FOR THE COMBUSTION ENGINEERING OWNER'S GROUP PLANTS ARE TO BE ISSUED PRIOR TO JULY 1984. SER'S FOR THE PLANT-SPECIFIC SUBMITTALS ARE TO BE ISSUED PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1, 1984. THE WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP 'LEAK BEFORE BREAK' CONCEPY WAS APPROVED. THE SER WAS THE SUBJECT OF GL-84-04 DATED FEBRUARY 1, 1284. TACS FOR THE 18 AFFECTED PLANTS WERE CLOSED. THIS EFFORT WILL CLOSE THE MPA ITEM D-10.	JIM SHEA 492-7231
A-6.	MARK I SHORT TERM PROGRAM	DEC. 1977	NUREG-0408	COMPLETE - ALL PLANT-UNIQUE ANALYSES AND EQUIPMENT MODIFICATIONS AS REQUIRED WERE REVIEWED AND ACCEPTED AND APPRO- PRIATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES WERE MADE	BYRON SIEGEL 492-7534

USI MO.	TITLE	DATE COMPLETED	REPORTS PUBLISHED	IMPLEMENTATION STATUS	IMPLEMENTATION TASK MANAGER/ TELEPHONE
A-7,	MARK I LONG TERM PROGRAM	JULY 1980 AUGUST 1982	NUREG-0661 NUREG-0661 NO. 1	LICENSEES ARE IN THE PROCESS OF OR HAVE INSTALLED MODIFICATIONS TO MEET THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DATE FOR EACH OPERATING PLANT MORE THAN HALF OF THE PLANTS AFFECTED HAVE COMPLETED THESE MODIFICATIONS. THE LICENSEES HAVE PREPARED PLANT-UNIQUE ANALYSES FOR SUBMITTAL TO THE STAFF FOR POST-IMPLEMENTATION AUDIT REVIEW FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA CONTAINED IN APPENDIX A TO NUREGOGO OUR CONTRACTORS, BNL AND THE FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER, ARE REVIEWING THESE SUBMITTALS AND HAVE COMPLETED THE REVIEW FOR TEN PLANTS. SEE MULTIPLANT ACTION ITEM D-01 IN NUREGO-0748.	BYRON SIEGEL 492-7534
A-8.	MARK II CONTAINMENT POOL DYNAMIC LOADS	AUGUST 1981	NUREG-0808	THE REQUIREMENTS RECOMMENDED IN NUREG- 0808 ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED DURING THE OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW FOR EACH PLANT WITH A MARK II CONTAINMENT. THESE REQUIREMENTS HAVE ALSO BEEN INCLUDED AS AN ADDITION TO THE APPROPRIATE SECTION OF THE STANDARD REVIEW PLAN.	BYRON SIEGEL 492-7534
A-9.	ATWS	SEPT. 1980	NUREG 0460, VOL. 4 46FR57521	THE TECHNICAL FINDINGS FOR THIS ISSUE HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED IN NUREG-0460, "ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS." VOL. 4. A PROPOSED RULE BASED ON THIS WORK PLUS ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS WAS PUBLISHED FOR COMMENT. THE COMMENTS RECEIVED WERE ADDRESSED AND A FINAL RULE WAS AFFIRMED BY THE COMMISSION IN NOVEMBER 1983. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN FURTHER DISCUSSION AMONG THE COMMISSIONERS REGARDING THE SPECIFIC QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ATW MITIGATING EQUIPMENT AND THEREFORE THE FINAL RULE HAS NOT YET BEEN PUBLISHED.	DAVID PYATT, RES

USI NO.	TITLE	DATE COMPLETED	REPORTS PUBLISHED	IMPLEMENTATION STATUS	IMPLEMENTATION TASK MANAGER/ TELEPHONE
A-10.	BWR FEEDMATER NOZZLE CRACKING	NOV. 1980	NUREG-0619	RESPONSES FROM LICEMSEES TO AN IMPLEMENTATION LETTER HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND RECOMMENDED TREATMENT OF THESE RESPONSES HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO NRC MANAGEMENT. ADDITIONAL IMFORMATION HAS BEEN REQUESTED OF LICEMSEES. EIGHTEEN PLANTS HAVE RECEIVED LETTERS ACCEPTING THEIR PROPOSED MODIFICATION PLANS. FIVE PLANTS ARE BEING REVIEWED AND NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDER WAY TO OBTAIN LICENSEE COMMITMENTS TO IMPLEMENT ALL NUREG-0819 GUIDANCE. LACROSSE, BIG ROCK POINT, AND DRESDEN I DO NOT HAVE SUSCEPTIBLE PLANT SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS AND ARE CONSIDERED COMPLETE WITH REGARD TO THIS ACTION. HUMBOLDT BAY, BY VIRTUE OF ITS STATUS (SHUTDOWN, NO FORSEEABLE RESTART), IS ALSO CONSIDERED COMPLETE. SEE MULTIPLANT ACTION ITEM B-25 IN NUREG-0748.	ROBERT GILBERT 492-7128
A-11.	REACTOR VESSEL MATERIALS TOUGHNESS	OCTOBER 15, 1982	WUREG-0744, VOLS. I AND II	GENERIC LETTER 82-26 TRANSMITTED THIS NUREG REPORT. NO FURTHER ACTION CONTEMPLAYED.	AL DEAGAZIO 492-8945
A-12,	STEAM GENERATOR & REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SUPPORTS	OCTOBER 11, 1983	NUREG-0577, REVISION 1	SRP SECTION S.3.4 WAS ISSUED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT. COMMENTS WERE RECEIVED AND REVIEWED BY THE STAFF. SRP SECTION S.3.4 WAS REVISED AS APPROPRIATE. AN ISSUANCE PACKAGE WAS PREPARED AND IS BEING REVIEWED BY THE STAFF PRIOR TO SUBMITTAL TO THE EDO AND CRGR FOR FINAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL. SRP SECTION S.3.4 WILL APPLY TO CONSTRUCTION PERMIT AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN APPLICATIONS (PROVIDING THE PRELIMINARY DESIGN INCLUDES THE SUBJECT STRUCTURES) FOR PWRS PROVIDING THE CP OR PDA HAS NOT BEEN GRANTED PRIOR TO THE SRP SECTION S.3.4 FINAL PUBLICATION DATE. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR BACKFIT IMPLEMENTATION.	RICHARD JOHNSON 492-4715

USI NO	TITLE	DATE COMPLETED	REPORTS PUBLISHED	IMPLEMENTATION STATUS	IMPLEMENTATION TASK MANAGER/ TELEPHONE
A-24.	QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT	AUG. 1981	NUREG-0588	EQB HAS THE LEAD IN IMPLEMENTING THE POSITIONS IDENTIFIED IN THE REPORT. SEE MULTIPLANT ACTION ITEM B-60 IN NUREG-0748.	JOSE ' CALVO 492-8563
A-26.	REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE TRANSIENT PROTECTION	SEPT. 1978	NUREG-0224	ALL PLANTS WERE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE AN OVERPRESSURE PREVENTION SYSTEM THAT WOULD BE USED WHENEVER THE PLANT WAS IN A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION. ALL PWRS IMPLEMENTED THEIR SYSTEMS WITH PRELIMINARY APPROVAL FROM THE NRC. AND A COMPLETE REVIEW TOOK PLACE ON A POST-IMPLEMENTATION BASIS. TWO LICENSING ACTIONS REMAIN TO BE COMPLETED. SEE MULTIPLANT ACTION ITEM B-04 IN NUREG-0748.	AL DEAGAZIO 492-8945
A-31.	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS	1978	NO FORMAL REPORT SRP 5.4.7 REVISION	RRRC APPROVED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN JANUARY 31, 1978 BEING IMPLEMENTED ON NTOLS DURING THE REVIEW PROCESS. NO BACKFIT TO OPERATING REACTORS IS PLANNED.	
A-36,	CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS NEAR SPENT FUEL	JULY 1980	NUREG-0612	IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS WERE ISSUED TO ALL LICENSEES BY LETTER DATED DECEMBER 22, 1980 THE LETTER REQUESTED; INTERIM ACTIONS TO BE COMPLETED IN 90 DAYS, A PHASE I ACTION (REPORT, CONFIRMATION AND JUSTIFICATION) IN SIX MONTHS AND PHASE II (SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS) IN NIME MONTHS. ALL LICENSEES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE DECEMBER 22, 1980 GENERIC LETTER AND THEIR RESPONSES ARE BEING EVALUATED. AS OF MAY 18, 1984, 35 PHASE I REVIEWS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND IT IS ANTICIPATED TO COMPLETE A TOTAL OF 64 BY THE END OF FY-84. THE REMAINING 16 PHASE I REVIEWS WILL BE COMPLETED IN FY-85. MPA C-15. HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR PHASE II, AND 19 FACILITIES ARE BEING REVIEWED IN A PILOT PROGRAM.	DON NEIGHBORS 492-4837

NO.	TITLE	DATE COMP	PLETED REPORTS P	UBLISHED	IMPLEMENTATION STATUS	IMPLEMENTATION TASK MANAGER/ TELEPHONE
A-39.	DETERMINATION OF SAFETY RELIEF VALVE (SRV) POOL DYNAMIC LOADS AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS FOR BWR CONTAINMENT	MARK I-02 MARK III-0 MARK III-	2-29-80 NUREG-C76 9-30-82 NUREG-078 10-14-82 NUREG-080	3	GENERIC LETTERS TRANSMITTING THESE NUREGS TO BWR APPLICANTS AND LICENSEES HAVE BEEN ISSUED IMPLEMENTATION ON MARK I PLANTS IS PART OF USI A-7. IMPLEMENTATION ON MARK II AND MARK II PLANTS IS BEING PERFORMED DURING THE OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW FOR EACH PLANT	BYRON SIEGEL 492-7534
A-42,	PIPE CRACKS IN BOILING WATER REACTORS	JULY 1980	NUREG-031:	3 REV. 1	IN FEBRUARY 1981. NUREG-0313. REV 1 WAS ISSUED TO ALL HOLDERS OF BWR OPERATING LICENSES OR CONSTRUCTION PERMITS AND TO ALL APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICENSES BY JULY 1 1981, THE APPLICANTS/LICENSES WERE TO PROVIDE THEIR PROGRAM FOR REPLACEMENT OF SERVICE SENSITIVE LINES AND WELDS, THEIR PROGRAM FOR AUGMENTED INSERVICE INSPECTION, THEIR PROGRAM FOR IMPROVIONG THE WATER CHEMISTRY ENVIRONMENT AND INCORPOR- ATION OF ADEQUATE LEAK DETECTION CAPABILITY. ALL LICENSES HAVE RESPONDED AND THEIR REPLIES ARE BEING EVALUATED BY A TECHNICAL SUPPORT CONTRACTOR (INEL). INITIAL TER'S HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. IMPLEMENTATION HAS CURRENTLY RECEIVED ADDITIONAL ATTENTION AND PROMITMENCE BECAUSE OF CONTINUED CRACKING EXPERIENCE. SEE MULTIPLANT ACTION ITEM B-05 IN NUREG-0748	DICK CLARK 492-7162

for review of "custom plant" Construction Permit (CP)

applications and for reviews of Standard Plant applica-

are intended for referencing in CP applications.

tions docksted after issuance of the revision and which

MAY 18, 1984 AS OF WEEK ENDING SCHEDULED COMPLETION TASK REVIEWERS KEY PERSONNEL TASK MANAGER BRANCH NAME 1978 ANNUAL ALECK SERKIZ X34217 12-31-80 REPORT PTRB/DHFS S. MCKAY Ow Subin stester #03-15-84 - Complete CURRENT C. GRAVES RSB/DSI NRR ANALYST JUDY BUTTS X24822 • TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS • POTENTIAL PROBLEMS RES INTERFACE INFORMATION PROBLEM DESCRIPTION Resolution efforts for A-1 are being conducted under FIN No. A6451 at INEL. Both EG&G-Idaho and Quadrex Since 1969 there have been ove: 150 incidents involving water hammers in BWRs and PWRs reported. The water staff are being utilized. hammers for steam hammers) have involved steam generator feedrings and piping, the RHR system, ELC systems, and containment spray, service water, feed-water and steam lines. The incidents have been attributed to such causes as rapid condensation of steam pockets, steem-driven slugs of water, pump startup with partially empty lines, and rapid valve motion. Most of the damage reported has been relatively minor, involving pipe hangers and restraints; however, there have been several incidents which have resulted in piping Task Action Plan. TAP A-1, subdivides resolution of this Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) into the following tasks: STATUS SUMMARY Task 1: Water Hammer Summery Reports USI A-1 has been technically resolved. NUREG 0927, Rev. Task 2. Resolution of Water Hammer Issue . "Evaluation of Water Hammer Occurrence in Nuclear Power Plants," March 1984 and NUREG-0893. Rav. 1. Task 2: Water Hammer Position for Operating Reactors Regulatory Analysis for USI A-1. Water Hammer March 1964 have been issued. The staff's technical find-Task 4: Water Hammer Safety Studies ings (NUREG-0827, Rev. 1) have been used to revise the following Standard Review Plan (SRP) Sections Task 1 and 4 have been completed and the reports are on the network charts which follow. The near-term posi-3.9.3 ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components. Comtion for operating reactors is to permit continued operation since, as noted above, damage attributed to water harmor has been relatively minor. The long-term aspect ponent Supports, and Core Support Structures 3.8.4 Control Rod Drive Systems FIN NO. CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED EXPENDED 5.4.6 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (BWR) of Task 3, is an integral part of the resolution of this Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION **Emergency Core Cooling System** EG&G-Idaho 4120 000 + 39,300 Task 2 represents the resolution aspect of this USI and 9.2.1 Station Service Water System A briefing on the status of, and proposed resolution of, USI A-1 was made to the full ACRS Committee on FY 82 9.2.2 Reactor Auxiliary Cooling Water Systems will result in the final resolution. EG&G-Idaho 4330,000 \$29K3,000 10.3 Main Steem Supply Systems 16.4.7 Condensate and Feedwater Systems 08/31/83. The Committee accepted the scope utilized for FY 83: resolution of A-1 but questioned whether sufficient EG&G-Idaho attention had been given to the complicating effects of These changes reflect current water hammer findings 1277.000 Qtr. 1 1355.000 and will ensure continued use of design features which water hammer occurring in the course of abnormal avents initiated by water hammer. Qtr. 2 1366,000 4290,000 have eliminated or minimized water hammer occur-Qtr. 3 4366,000 4366,000 4282.000 rence. Public comments received have been reflected in these SRP revisions. The revised SRPs would be used

FY B4

A6451

EGRG-Idaho

Otr 1 Qtr. 2

TASK 2.0 WATER HAMMER (A-1) RESOLUTION OF A-1, WATER HAMMER 11-36-82C 12-31-82T4 09-30-82T3 08-01-82T2 02-16-82T1 11-19-81T 04-15-82C 12:31:8571 10-15-817 (10) AT AN 10-15-81C 12-15-81T 03-10-82C 06-01-82T1 02-15-82 T **EVALUATION OF** WATER HAMMER **EVENTS AND** 05-28-82C SYSTEM EFFECT: 06-01-82T1 03-31-82T DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS 03-10-820 05-01-82T1 01-15-82T 09-24-82C Prepare 09-01-82T Draft

WATER HAMMER (A-1) Continued



CONCLUDING USI A-1 REPORTS

NUREG-0927, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Water Hammer Occurrence in Nuclear Power Plants." March 1964.

NUREG-0993. Rev. 1, "Regulatory Analysis for USI A-1, Water Hammer," March 1984.

TASK 1 REPORTS

NUREG-0582, "Water Hammer in Nuclear Power Plants" July 1979

Chapman, R.L., "Water Hammer Studies," EG&G Interim Rpt., CAAP-TR-053 (Rev. 1), July 1980 (Prepared for NRC Use).

NUREG/CR-2059, "Compilation of Actual and Suspected Water Hammer Events in Nuclear Power Plants," May 1982.

TASK 2 REPORT

NUREG/CR-2781, "Evaluation of Water Hammer Events in Light Water Reactor Plants," July 1982.

TASK 4.1 REPORT

Chapman, R.L., et al., "Review and Evaluation of Actual and Potential Water Hammer Events in Nuclear Plants," EG&G Interim Rpt., CAAP-TR-042 (Rev. 1), September 1979 (Prepared for NRC Use)

TASK 4.2 REPORT

Watkins, J.C., Berry, R.A., "A State of the Art Literature Review of Water Hammer," EG&G Interm Interim Rpt., RE-A-70-044, April 1979 (Prepared for NRC Use)

TASK 4.3 REPORT

Sehs, P., et al., "An Evaluation of Condensation - Induced Water Hammer in Prehest Steam Generators, "NUREG/CR-1606. September 1980.

TASK 4.4 REPORTS

Williamson, R.L., "An Analysis Tool for Predicting Lie Transient Hydrodynamics Resulting from the Rapid Filling of Voided Piping Systems," EG&G Interim Rpt. RE-E-79-009, February 1979 (Prepared for NRC Internal Use)

Morton, D.K., "An Analytical Procedure for Performing Structure! Analyses of Nuclear Piping Systems Subjected to Fluid Transients," EG&G Interim Rpt., RE-E-79-013, February (Prepared for NRC Internal Use)

Demmie, P.N., "An Investigation of the Steem Void Collapse Water Hammer Initiating Mechanism," EG&G Interim Rpt., RE-A-78-229, February 1979 (Prep. red for ?IRC Internal Use)

Berry, R.A., "An Analysis Tool for Predicting Transient Hydrodynamics in Nuclear Piping Systems Containing Swing Check Valves," EG&G Rpt. RE.A.78-261 (Rev. 2), September 1979 (Prepared for NRC Internal Use)

TASK 4.5 REPORT

Saffell, B.F., "Supplemental Water Hemmer Analysis and System Review," EG&G preliminary Rpt. EGG-CAAP-5133, July 1980 (Prepared for NRC for Use as a Preliminary or Working Document)

WEST., CE & B&W STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INTEGRITY

(A-3, A-4, A-5) MAY 18 1984 AS OF WEEK ENDING SCHEDULED COMPLETION KEY PERSONNEL TASK REVIEWERS MEB/DE J. RAJAN CEB/DE B. TUROVLIN TASK MANAGER 1978 ANNUAL NAME BRANCH J. STROSNIDER X35903 ADR/RSR Early 1980 REPORT F. ODAR AER/DSI P. none L. J. thronde J. STROSNIDER MERRIPES F AKSTULEWICZ MITERIDE L FRANK May 1964 CURRENT W PASEDAG NRR ANALYST C. PARSZEWSKI CEB/DE HIEV BUTTS Y24822 POTENTIAL PROBLEMS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS • RES INTERFACE INFORMATION . PROBLEM DESCRIPTION The ACRS letter dated October 18, 1983 stated that The following technical assistance contracts are generic in RES has funded, at the request of NRR, a major con-firmatory program at PNL. The activity of this pronature and will be applicable to the three Category "A" Technical Activities (A.3, A.4, and A.6) related to PWS steal the proposals should be recommended industry Pressurized v / reactor steam generator tobe actions and not new requirements integrity can degraded by corrosion induced oxem consists of tests to verify the burst and cyclic wastage cracking reduction in tube diameter (denting) rengths of degraded steem generator tubes and the and vibration induced fatigue cracks. The primary A SANDIA - Provide statustical analysis of steam generator tisk rate data. 4FS is funding a program addressing the factors which concern is the capability of degraded tubes to tube failures in operating reactors in order to establish maintain their integrity during normal operation and the bases for the sampling plan for inservice inspection. determine Income! 600 susceptability to stress corros under accident conditions (LOCA or a main steam cracking in primary water. Metal condition, chemistry, BNL - Provide necessary computer code and perform parametric evaluation of effects of tube failures conine break) with adequate safety margins. temperature stress and anvironment will be considered. current with MSLE Completed Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering steam generator tubes have suffered degradation due to BNL - Provide technical consultation and assistance to wastage and stress corrosion cracking. Both types review information in areas of water chemistory and of degradation have been decreased by conversion STATUS SUMMARY corrosion analysis stress and/or burst strength from phosphate to an all volatile secondary water calculations. Completed. treatment. Degradation due to denting which leads PNL - Provide cost/benefit evaluation of ISI plans The NRC has formed a Task Force under the Division to primary side stress corrosion cracking continues to be a of Licensing to prepare its proposed requirements FAL - Evaluate environmental consequences of multiple tube suarding steem generator tube integrity. These re-Wures concurrent with MSLB Completed rements will include new concerns resulting from B&W's once through steam generators (OTSG's) were the G the tube failure buch as loose ports in the relatively free of trouble prior to the first tube leak secondary system and plant response to SG tube failures) and also corrosion related failure mecha then, all three Ocones units have experienced tube nisms. The recommendations prepared by the staff leak incidents. The leaks at the Oconee units are ender USLA 1 4 5 were primarily concerned with the result of cracks of unknown origins propagate in forrosion mechanisms such as war age and denting. the circumferential direction by flow induced vir ation Consequently, as discussed with the Commission or and have been limited to tubes located adjacen to June 30, 1982, the requirements from the USI program will be incorporated in the overall set of reguirements being developed to address tube failures A second form of degradation characterized as an izosion cavitation phenomena has been observed at Ocones and other The proposed requirements were discussed with the Steam Generator Owners: Group on July 29 1982 FIN NO. CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED EXPENDED

ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION

The current status of this program was discussed with the ACRS Metal Components Subcommittee on January 28, 1963 and September 12, 1963. A meeting with the full ACRS was held on October 12, 1983.


\$75,000 2314 195,000

comments from the group were received September

Science Applications Inc. performed a Value Impact analysis of the recommendations and issued their final draft report on September 21, 1962. This report was sant to all PWR vendors and licensees for comment

The report has been transmitted to CRGR and meetings were held on September 1s. 1983 and October 24, 1983. An ACRS meeting was held on October 13, 1983. The Commission briefing was delayed pending resolution of a differing profession opinion. The briefing is now planned for June 1984.

WEST., CE & B&W STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INTEGRITY (A-3, A-4, & A-5)



FINAL REPORT AND SCHEDULE SUPERCEDED BY TASK REPORT - SEE STATUS SUMMARY

SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (A-17) AS OF WEEK ENDING

KEY PERSONNEL	TASK REVIEWERS	C. MORRIS RRAB/DST	SCHEDULED COMPLETION
TASK MANAGER DALE THATCHER X29640	NAME BRANCH E. CHELLIAH RRAB/DST	F. COFFMAN RRAB/DST	978 ANNUAL Phase 1 09-79
NRR ANALYST JUDY BUTTS X24822	D. LASHER RRAB/DST		CURRENT03.30-86
PROBLEM DE: CRIPTION The design of a nuclear power plant is accomplished by groups of engineers and scientists organized into engineer-	RES INTERFACE INFORMATION The Division of Risk Analysis has been consulted during the development and association of this plan.	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS LUNL - LUNL is performing a systems interaction review of a portion of the Indian Point 3 plant using the	POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
ing disciplines and into scientific disciplines. The reviews performed by the designers include interdisciplinary reviews to assure the functional compatibility of the plant structures, systems, and components. Safety reviews and accident analyses provide further assurance that system functional requirements will be met. These reviews include failure mode analyses. The NRC review and eveluation of safety systems is accomplished in accordance with the Standard Review		Digraph Matrix mythod. A comparison with the Fault Tranifative Mode and Effect Analysis method will be made. BNL - BNL is performing a systems interaction review of a portion of the Indian Point-3 plant using fault Tree combined with a failure Mode and Effect Analysis. A comparison with the Digraph results will be made.	
Plan ISRPI which essigns mirmary and secondary review responsibilities to organizational units arranged by plant systems or by disciplines. Each element of the SRP is assigned to an organizational unit for primary responsibility and, where appropriate, to other units for secondary responsibilities. Thus, the design and analyses by the plant designers, and the subsequent review and evaluation by the NRC staff take into consideration the interdisciplinary areas of		ORNL ORNL is reviewing a number of information sources lincluding LERal to gether information on experienced and hypothesized system intersection events. From this information, an evaluation will be made to establish trends and petterns among the events, and their safety significance will be assessed.	
concern and account for systems interaction to a large extent. Furthermore, many of our regulatory criteria are aimed at controlling the risks from systems inter- actions. Examples include the single failure criterion and separation criteria. Nevertheless, there is some question regarding the inter- action of various plant systems, both as to the supporting roles such systems play and as to the effect one system	ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION A meeting with the combined ACRS Subcommittees on Reliability and Risk Assessment and Extreme Externel Phenomens was held on 03/13/83 to describe the status of the program.		
can have on other systems, particularly with regard to whether actions or consequences could advarsely affect the presumed redundancy and independence of safety systems.	A meeting with the ACRS Subcommittee on Probabilistic Assessment was held on July 6, 1983. Subsequently, the ACRS wrote a letter critical of the staff program.	FIN NO. CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED EXPENDED	STATUS SUMMARY Responsibility for resolution of USI A 17 was transferred to the Generic Issues Branch of the Division of Safety.
The problem to be resolved by this task is to identify where the present design, analysis, and review procedures may not acceptably assecunt for potentially adverse systems interaction and to recommend the regulatory action that should be taken.	A meeting was held on November 19, 1963 with the full committee for the purpose of discussing the revised staff program.	A-0446 LLNL 91.000K 5225K A-3725 BNL 91.000K 5225K # B-0789 ORNL 9 230K 9130K	Tachnology in Sa, tamber 1983 and a full-time Task Manager was essigned. The Took Action Plan has subsequently been revised and has been approved by the Director. NRM. The scope of USI A 17 has been limited to consideration of functionally coupled, spetially coupled and induced-human coupled interactions which could degrade a safety function. Common mode failures and saternal events will not be directly considered in the proposed program.

SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (A-17) Continued O Charles Start 19.30.802.


O Charles Carryon 19.30.802 Start Predictions (17.30.807 Applicant Submitte Start Barriers Reviews

O Charles Carryon 19.30.802 Start Predictions (17.30.807 Applicant Submitte Start Reviews

O Charles Carryon 19.30.802

O Charles Carryon 19.302

O Charles Carryon 10 30 det Discourse in 1973 (8.30 det LUIL Fresi 68 Story (70) Compension SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (A-17) Continued




SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA - SHORT TERM PROGRAM (A-40)

AS OF WEEK ENDING

MAY 10 1004

KEY PERSONNEL	TASK REVIEWERS	G. BAGCHI EQB/DE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION
TASK MANAGER SYED SHAUKAT X24216 Syeck & Shaulia +	NAME BRANCH N. CHOKSHI SGEB/DE	T. CHENG SEPB/DL	1978 ANNUAL PHASE II - 1979 PHASE II - 1981
NRR ANALYST	L REITER GSB/DE		CURRENT
JUDY BUTTS X24822	P. SOBEL GSB/DE		
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION	RES INTERFACE INFORMATION	• TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS	POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
The seismic design process required by current NRC criteria includes the following sequence of events: (a) Defune the magnitude or inteneity of the earthquake which will produce the maximum vibratory ground motion at the site (the sefs shutdown earthquake or SSE). (b) Determine the free-field ground motion at the site that would result if the SSE occurred. (c) Determine the motion of site structures by modifying the free-field motion to account for the interaction of the site structures with the underlying foundation soil. (d) Determine the motion of the plant equipment supported by the site structures. (e) Compare the seismic loads, in appropriate combination with other loads, on structures, systems, and components important to sefety, with the allowable loads.	None.	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), under contract to RES. reviewed all reports by 04-30-75. LLNL resport on recommendat: was for changes to the seismic design criteria was completed on 12-26-79. (NUREG-CR-1161). 3 LLNL has performed the value/impact analysis on proposed requirements developed from the A-40 technical findings.	
While this seismic design tequence includes many conservative factors, certain aspects of the sequence may not be conservative for all plant sites. At present, it is believed that the overall sequence is adequately conservative. The objective of this program is to investigate selected areas of the seismic design sequence to determine their conservatism for all types of sites, to investigate alternate approaches to parts of the design sequence, and to modify the NRC criteria in the Standard Review Plan if changes are found to be justified. In this manner, this program will provide additional assurance that the health and safety of the public is protected, and if possible, reduce costly design conservatisms by improving (1) current seismic design requirements, (2) NRR's capability to quantitatively assess the overall adequacy of seismic design for nuclear plants in general.	ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION None.	FIN NO. CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED EXPENDED	• STATUS SUMMARY
	None.	7 A - 0411 LLNL 0136 X 9136 K	The CRGR package has been completed and for- warded for signature to the Director of NRR. LLNL has completed work on the Value/Impact Analysis and has issued a draft NUREG which has been reviewed by the staff.


SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA - SHORT TERM PROGRAM (A-40)



Task 4 Deleted


SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA - SHORT TERM PROGRAM (A-40)






Phase 2

SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA - SHORT TERM PROGRAM (A-40)




001111111111111111111111111111111111111			,				AS OF WEEK ENDING MAT 10, 130
KEY PERSONNEL	TASK REVIEW	-				SCHEDULED COMPLETION	
TASK MANAGER A SERKIZ X24217	NAME	BRANCH					ORIGINAL April 1982
and bulbing spectory	S. DIAB	RSB/DSI					
	P. NORIAN	GIB/DST					CURRENT
NRR ANALYST JUDY BUTTS X24822	W. BUTLER	CSB/D3I					
* PROBLEM DESCRIPTION Following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in a PWR, water flowing from the break in the primary system would collect on the floor of containment. During the injection mode, water for core cooling and containment spary is drawn from a large supply tank. When the water reached a low level in the tank, pumps are realigned to draw from the containment. This is called the recirculation mode wherein water is drawn from the containment floor or sump and pumped to the primary system or containment spray headers. This program addresses the sefety issue of adequate sump or suppression pool function in the recirculation mode. It is the objective of this program to develop improved criteria for design, testing, and evaluation which will provide better assurance that emergency sumps will function to satisfy system requirements. The principal concerns are somewhat interrelated but are best discussed separately. One deals with the various kinds of insulation used on piping and components inside of containment. The concern being that bree, initiated debris from the insulation could cause blockage of the samp or otherwise adversely affect the operation of the pumps, spray nozzles, and valves of the sefety systems. The second deals with the hydraulic performance of the sump as related to the hydraulic performance to safety systems supplied therefrom. Preoperational tests have been performed on a number of plants to demonstrate operability in the recirculation mode. Adverse flow conditions have been encountered requiring design and procedural modifications to eliminate them. These conditions, are entrainment, cavitation, and vortex formation, are aggrevated by blockage. If not avoided crisospressed, they could result in pump failice during the long term cooling phase following a LOCA. The concerns relative to debris, blockage, and hydraulic performance also apply to boiling water reactors during recirculation from the suppression pools, and will also be addiressed.	ACRS INTERF The ACRS full Committee me garding gwiff reclated and the Committee cautione application of the leak by the	CE INFORMATION g managed by the Generic Issues ACE INFORMATION les was briefed on the resolu- the comments received on embers relied questions re- tion pump bearings and seels in- it the effect thereof. In addition, in generalized before breek concept to other horough analysis and review.	FIN No. formanc Assistant funded t manage bined affo	A1237. "Conte- in and File N to for Resoluty RES and N d by the GIB orts are expecte CONTRACT Sandia Sandia Sandia Sandia Sandia Cu Sandia	tr 2 \$440,000 tr 3 \$467,000 tr 4 \$606,000	y Sump Per- al are being is work is these com- ty 84.	SCHEdule: review by CRGR could lead to further technical evaluations and schedule delays. STATUS SUMMARY NUREG 0007. "Containment Emergency Sump Performance" and NUREG 0009. "USI A 43 Regulatory Analysis" have been revised to reflect comments received during the 1-For Comment." period and have received staff review. The current schedule calls for submitting the A 43 resolu-


CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP Therein has been summerced in NUREC-0897, Resolution of USI PERFORMANCE (A-43)



KEY PERSONNEL	TASK REVIEWERS	D. LANGFORD RSB/DSI	ORIGINAL JUNE 1982 CURRENT 02-15-86
TASK MANAGER ALAN RUBIN X28383 PAT BARANOWSKY X37832 Clan Rubin NRR ANALYST	NAME BRANCH R. ANAND ASB/DSI L. ENGLE ORB/DL O. CHOPRA PSB/OSI	S. NEWBERRY RRAB/DST	
JUDY BUTTS X24622	O CHOPINA		
Electric power for safety systems at nuclear power plants is supplied by two redundant and independent divisions. Each of these electrical divisions includes an offsite alternating current (A.C.) source, an onisite A.C. source (usually dissel-generators), and a direct current (D.C.) source. Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 defines a total loss of offsite power as an anticipated occurrence, and as such, it is required that an independent emergency onsits power supply be provided at nuclear power plants. The unlikely, but possible loss of A.C. power (that is, the loss of A.C. power from the offsite source and from the onsite source) is referred to as a station blackout. In the event of a station blackout, the capability to cool the reactor core would be dependent on the availability of systems which do not require A.C. power supplies, and on the ability to restore A.C. power in a timely manner. The concern is that the occurrence of a station hlackout may be a relatively high probability event and that the consequences of this event may be inacceptable, for example, severe core damage may result.	RES INTERFACE INFORMATION RES is providing technical assistance for the resolution of A-44. ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION Station Blackout is related to a number of ACRS.	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS ORNL FIN 80744 9740K — Evaluate expected frequency and duration of offsite (preferred) power losses at nuclear power plents. Estimate the reliability and evaluate the dominant factors affecting the reliability of emergency A.C. power supplies. Perform statistical correlation and trend analysis of diesel generator data. NUREG/CR.2989. "Reliability of Emergency AC Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plents." was published in July 1983. SNL FIN A1302 4300K — Evaluate the risks posed by station blackout accidents and assess the effectiveness of safety improvements in reducing those risks. Evaluate risk reduction and costs of various fixes and to provide input for value/impact analysis. NUREG/CR.3226. "Station Blackout Accident Analyses (Part of NRC Task Action Plan A.441." was published in May 1963. FIN NO. CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED EXPENDED."	STATUS SUMMARY The staff's proposed recommendations to resolve A-44
	Station Blackout is related to a number of ACNS concerns regarding the reliability of power systems. This task will be coordinated with the committee as the task progresses. A presentation on staff recommendations to resolve USI A-44 was made to the ACRS Subcommittee on AC/DC Power Systems Reliability on May 10, 1963. A presentation was made to the full ACRS on July 7, 1963.	# 80744 ORNL 5740K FORK A1302 SML 5300K 5282K	The staff's proposed recommendations to resolve A-46 based on the technical findings, were reviewed by NRR and RES divisions. This review resulted in the recommendation to proceed with proposed rulemaking, in conjunction with a new Regulatory Guide, to resolve A-44. The proposed technical resolution has been reviewed by the Director, NRR, and forwarded to CRGR. Meetings were held with CRGR in March and April 1986 to review the proposed resolution. CRGR recommended that the proposed resolution. CRGR recommended and the draft staff NUREG-1032 be issued for public comment after making modifications to reflect CRGR comments.

STATION BLACKOUT (A-44)





Accident Analyses Report and EDG Reliability Report were published in November 1983.
 Dreft Loss of Offsite Power Report is to be issued in July 1984.

** A revised shedule is under development

SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS (A-45)

of the A-65 program.

completed

Further meetings with the full committee and sub-

committee on DHRS will be held as the work on A 46

progresses and certain pre-determined milestones are

4 month schedule slip in the USI A 46 program.

process to United Engineers & Constructors

the owners groups will participate

A subcontract for architect engineer support to perform

feasibility and impact (or cost) assessments of alternative

DHR measures has been awarded in a competitive bid

Establishment of the A-45 Industry Peer Review Group

is nearly complete. All four NSSS vendors and each of

AS OF WEEK ENDING MAY 18, 1984 KEY PERSONNEL TASK REVIEWERS E MCPEEK SCHEDULED COMPLETION D. DHANNI ORB 4/DL TASK MANAGER BRANCH NAME ANDREW MARCHESE X24712 DRABES 10/85 M. CUNNINGHAM **ORIGINAL** P. nova Ja a. marely RSR/DSI R FRAHM BRAB/DST T. MARSH ASR/DSI F ROSA ICSB/DSI P HEARN 10-30-86 CURRENT NRR ANALYST M SRINIVASAN PSB/DSI JUDY BUTTS X24822 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS POTENTIAL PROBLEMS RES INTERFACE INFORMATION PROBLEM DESCRIPTION Close coordination and cooperation will be required on Task A 45 was approved as a USI by the NRC Implemented a technical assistance contract on Potential problem areas identified to date are Obtaining sufficient NRR manpower to work on Task in December 1980. Task A 46 butween NRR and RES. RES assistance will be August 5, 1981 with BNL (FIN-A-3381) for \$100K required from the Divisions of Risk Analysis and Accident Although many improvements to the steam generator auxiliary to make a determination whether it is feasible to Evaluation The Divisior of Risk Analysis will provide Development of appropriate reliability or quantitative feedwater system were required of the reactor manufacturers by separate all currently operating U.S. commercial technical input from their Sandia Laboratory Program on goals for Task A 45 and translation of probabilistic the NRC following the TMI-2 accident, the staff feets that LWR's into groups based on whether they have Alternate Decay Heat ' emoval Concepts, technical evalresults into licensing requirements. providing an alternative means of decay liest removal could Program funding must be approved and obtained. uetions relative to re bility and risk assessment for shut similar DHRS design characteristics to the plants substantially increase the plants' capability to deal with a broad Obtaining necessary operating experience on shutdown dersy heat rer uval systems, and input from Task covered in WASH-1400, RSSMAP, and IREP. spectrum of transients and socidents and potentially could. own cooling systems including the most current A 44. "Sta -- Pir Jut." relative to shutdown cooling therefore, significantly reduce the overall risk to the public ... Jon of Accident Evaluation will provide DHR system design information resulting from Post-Consequently Task A-45 will investigate alternative means of implemented a technical assistance contract on technical input relative to the transient response of exist TMI changes. May 10, 1982 with Sandia (FIN A1309) to provide Uncertainty in the quality of information that will be decay heat removal in PWR plants, including but not limited to ing and improved shutdown decay heat removal systems using existing aguipment where possible. This Unresolved to transient events and small LOCAs. This will also inoverall project management, technical direction available from ongoing reliability and risk assessments on what schedule, and whether information Safety Issue will also investigate the need and possible design and integration for the entire Task A 46 program. clude partorming (in house contractors) detailed requirements for improving reliability of decay heat removal including selection and management of subconcan be extrapolated to all operating plants thermal hydraulics analyses where required to support systems in boiling water reactors (BWRs) existing and improved decay hect removal systems tractors Close coordination and cooperation needed within NRR and between NRR and RES The overall purpose of Task A-45 is to evaluate the adequacy of behavior under transient and accident conditions Number of plants that need to be assessed may be surrent licensing design requirements, in order to ensure that significantly greater than the plants that will have a nuclear power plants do not pose an unacceptable risk due to PRA or reliability study performed because of signififailure to remove shut-down decay heat. The objective will be to cant design variation in the systems used for the develop a comprehensive and consistent set of shutdown coolin decay heat removel function requirements for existing and future LWRs, including the study of ilternative means of shutdown decay heat removal and of STATUS SUMMARY diverse "dedicated" systems for this purpose. # Revision 3 of TAP A-45 was issued in March 1964 for The main objectives of the program are as follows: Division review and comment Determine the safety adequacy of decay heat removal The eighth contractor draft interim milestone report an systems in existing power plants for achieving both hot titled. Los Alamos PWR Decay Heat Removal Studies shutdown and cold shutdown condi-Summary Results and Conclusions has been issued for Evaluate the feesibility of alternative measures for imstaff comment. This report provides feed and bleed proving decay heat removal systems, including diverse analyses and results for specific plant transients in ziternatives dedicated to the decay heat removal 86W, CE and Westinghouse plants function. Assess the value and impact of the most promising after On April 10, 1964, the staff met with the BWR owners ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION FIN NO. CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED EXPENDED native measures. group to discuss their proposed concept for using con-Develop a plan for implementing any new licensing Task Manager briefed the full committee on July tailment venting as an emergency means of decay heat \$ 10,000 \$ 10,000 requirements for decay heat removal systems 9, 1962 on the present plans and content of the removal. Staff concerns were discussed, and a meeting A 3381 BNI \$ 100,000 \$ 100.000 The interrelation and relative timing of each of the program A-45 Task Action Plan (TAP) summary has been issued 43.669.000 43 064 000° A1309 Sandia aub tasks are shown on the schedule network ACRS Subcommittee on Decay Heat Removal Sys-In a memorandum to the Director, NRR, dated April 13. tems (DHRS) met on March 20-21, 1984, and Task * Includes the following funding which has been 1984. DST requested and documented the need for a Manager provided the subcommittee with an update

ted to support subcontracting

ORNI

BRR

LANE

ASAI

\$226,000

9431.000


4 92 000

4107 000


\$100,000

\$ 56,000

SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS (A-45)



SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS (A-45)



SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN OPERATING PLANTS (A-46)

AS OF WEEK ENDING MAY 18, 1984 TASK REVIEWERS KEY PERSONNEL FRANK SKOPEC RAB/DSI SCHEDULED COMPLETION RSR/DSI & KILLIN DESAL TASK MANAGER NAME BRANCH T. Y. CHANG X27456 # HAROLD POLK SGEB/DE 12-15-83 ORIGINAL EQB/DE GSB/DE # ARNOLD LEE # GUSTAAF GIESE-KOCH TE-47 Clys PEI-YING CHEN F GERALD WEIDENHAMER MSER/RES # 02-15-86 CURRENT NRR ANALYST PSB/DSI JUDY BUTTS X24822 RES INTERFACE INFORMATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS " POTENTIAL PROBLEMS PROBLEM DESCRIPTION Task A-46 was approved as a USI by the NRC Tasks 1 and 5 were performed by Brookhaven National Part of a RES contract with Southwest Research Insti December, 1980 ratory and are assentially complete. NUREG/ tute (SWRI) is concerned with developing methodology CR-3367 on Tesk 1 was issued in June 1983. NUREG/ to correlate various seismic qualification tests and is The design criteria and methods for the seismic designated Task 2 for A-46. This work is essentially com-CR-3266 on Task 5 was issued in September 1983. A qualification of mechanical and electrical equipment draft guideline on Task 1 was issued in September 1963. plets. SWRI issued related reports in June and nuclear power plants have undergone significant change during the course of the commercial nuclear November 1963. Task 3 was performed by Idaho National Engineering power program. Consequently, the margins of safety Laboratory. A draft technical report was issued in provided in existing equipment to resist seismically December 1962, and preliminary guidance and accep nduced loads and perform the intended safety tance criteria for the use of in-situ test methods were functions may vary considerably. The seismic issued in April 1963. Additional technical findings and qualification of the equipment in operating plants the updated guidance and acceptance criteria were must, therefore, be reassessed to ensure the ability seued by INEL to the staff in October 1963. to bring the plant to a sate shutdown condition when subject to a seismic event. The objective of this Task 4 has been studied independently by Lawrence Unresolved Safety Issue is to establish an explicit set Livermore National Laboratory and by the Saismic Qualiof guidelines that could be used to judge the fication Utility Group. Reports were issued in November 1992 and September 1992, respectively. adequacy of the seismic qualification of mechanical and electrical equipment at all operating plants in keu of attempting to backfit current design criteria for new plants. This guidance will concern equipment required to safely shutdown the plant, well as equipmer,r whose function is not required for safe shutdown, but whose failure could result in adverse conditions which might impair shutdown functions. Also, explicit guidelines will be established for use in requalifying equipment whose seismic qualification was found to be inadequate. ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION STATUS SUMMARY A breakdown of the tasks is as follows: The status of A-46 was presented to the ACRS Subcom-Identification of Seismic-Sensitive Systems mittee in March 1983. In March and July 1983, respec tively, the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Work on all tasks is essentially completed by the con-tractors with the exception of Task 4. The SQUQ formed Tack 2 Assessment of Adequacy of Existing Seismic also made two separate presentations to the ACRS Sub-FIN NO. CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED EXPENDED committee and Full Committee on their pilot program to an independent Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Qualification Penal (SSRAP) in June 1983 to make recommendations Development and Assessment of In-Situ Test establish the feasibility of using seismic experience data Vank 3 in conventional power plants to demonstrate the adeing Methors to Assist in Qualification of for use of seismic experience data. The NRC staff has been working very closely with the SQUG and the quacy of similar equipment installed in operating nucles Equipment: Selumic Qualification of Equipment Using 9262K (est) A6474 INEL 6276K power plants. The ACRS, in their comments, indicated SSRAP and will continue to do so. This activity is an im Seismic Experience Date that the SQUG apporoach was in line with the ACRS portant element in the resolution of A-46. The A-46 A.1387 RNI 8324K 4330K (ast) Development of Methods to Generate schedule was approved by NRC management on July 18, 7963. SSRAP issued its report in Fabruary 1964. recommendations made in January 1983 and should be Tank 5 Generic Floor Response Spectra encouraged. Howevs.: ACRS believes that more work is

An interim report was issued as NUREG 1018 in October

on USI A 46 by the NRC staff and its contractors.

NRR for review and approvel in May 1984.

The USI A-46 CRGR package (including NUREG-1030)

was issued in March 1984 for NRR and RES staff review

and comments. It will be forwarded to the Director of

1963, which summarizes the status of work accomplished

required to establish the operability of equipment during

and after an sarthquake, and more data will be required

resistance of the equipment investigated. The status of

A 46 was presented to the ACRS Subcommittee again in

March and April 1984, and to the ACRS Full Committee

to support conclusions drawn concerning the seism


in May 1984

Final Report


Task 6

Document Results of USI A 46 and Prepare

SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN OPERATING PLANTS (A-46)




SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN OPERATING PLANTS (A-40)



SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN OPERATING PLANTS (A-46)

Task 6 (Continued)



SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS (A-47)

AS OF WEEK ENDING

KEY PERSONNEL

TASK MANAGER ANDREW SZUKIEWICZ X24713

Auto swing NRR ANALYST

TASK REVIEWERS

NAME BRANCH

D BASDEKAS DFO/RES J. CALVO ICSB/DSI E CHELLIAH BRAR/DST

S. DIAB	RSB/DSI
M. CHIRAMAL	PSU/AEOD
J. T. BEARD	ORAB/DL
W. KENNEDY	PTRB/DHFS

SCHEDULED COMPLETION

ORIGINAL

01-30-86

CURRENT

04-01-86

PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

Task A.47 was approved as a USI by the NRC in December 1980

This issue concerns the potential for accidents or transients being made more severe as a result of control system failures or malfunctions. These failures or malfunctions may occur independently or as a result of the accident or transient under consideration and would be in addition to any control system failure that may have nitiated the event. Although it is generally believed that control system failures are not likely to result in loss of safety functions which could lead to serious events or result in conditions that safety systems are not able to cope with, in depth studies have not been performed to support this belief. The potential for an accident that would affect a particular control system and the effects of the control system failures - will differ from plant to plant. Therefore, it is not likely that it will be possible to develop generic answers to these concerns, but rather plant-specific reviews will be required. The purpose of this Unresolved Safety issue is to define generic criteria that may be used for plant-specific reviews. A specific subtask of this issue will be to study the steam generator overfill transient in PWRs and the reactor overfill manuant in BWRs to determine and define the need for preventive and/or mitigating design measures to accommodate this transient.

RES INTERFACE INFORMATION

Close coordination will be required on Task A 47 bet ween NRR and RES. RES assistance will be required from the Division of Facilities Operations and the Division of hisk Analysis. The Division of Facilities Operations will provide input from their research programs (currently being developed in conjunction with A 47) on control system interactions. The Division of Risk Analysis will provide input on their current ongoing ORNI, program ("Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock"). Other research activities are being evaluated to determine their significance to A-47 and may be identified later.

ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION

The ACRS Subcommittee on Electrical Power Systems

Elements of conceptual Task Action Plan were discussed with

(Dr. Kerr) met on the issue on 1/23/81 to initiate an

approximate six month study at the request of

Status of the activities identified in TAP A 47 was

discussed with the ACRS Subcommittee or

December 21, 1982 and November 16, 1983.

Chairman Ahearne.

ACRS on 05-07-81

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS

During the week of July 20, 1961, meetings were held w 'h INEL. EG&G (Idaho Falls), Battelle Northwest and Lawrence Livermore Labs for the purpose of dis ussing the A 47 objectives and to assess the type of activities that could heat be conducted by these organizations. Similar meetings with ORNL and Sandia Labs. were held July 9, 1981. A Technical Assistance (T.A.) contract with ORNL (FIN B 0467) was established through NRR RES. RES will conduct a review of two different types of PWR designs (one 88W plant. Oconee, and one CE plant, Calvert Cliffs), and perform the activities identified in Tasks 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Task Action Plan A 47 A separate T A contract to perform the review on one BWR type design. Browns Ferry, and one PWR type design. (Westinghouse) H 8 Robinson, was established with INEL (FIN & 6477) The technical assistance contracts will perform the

- 1. Evaluate Control System Failures Leading to Steam Generator and/or Reactor Overfill
- Evaluate Control System Failures Leading to Reactor Overcooling Transients
- Evaluate (All Others) Control System Actions That Have Safety Implications
- 4. Evaluate the Effects of Loss of Power to the Control Systems

FIN NO CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED" EXPENDED** A-8477 INEL \$1 365,000 1850,000 B-0467 and ORNI **#3.660.000** \$2.061.558 B-0816

* through FY 84

** through December 1983

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

Obtain necessary operating experience information on Non-Safety Control Systems for the Nuclear Steam System (NSS) and the Balance of Plant (BOP)

Obtain necessary design information (i.e., schematics and systems descriptions) for the Non-Safety Control System designs for the NSS and the BOP designs.

Traditionally, licensees were not required to provide design or operating experience on Non-Safety Systems and therefore this information may be difficult to obtain.

Availability of the BG&E simulator for the Calvert Cliffs 1 evaluation is scheduled to begin in October 1984.


STATUS SUMMARY

The Westinghouse PWR design review at INEL was started February 1, 1963


- Draft reports on the overfill and overcooling transients for the GE review were submitted by INEL for staff review in August 1983.
- Dreft reports on the overfill and overcooling transients and other transients for the Westinghouse review were submitted by INEL for staff review in January 1984

A draft report on the overfill transient for the B&W review was submitted by ORNL in October 1963.


- A revised schedule which addresses delays experienced has been approved by the Director, NRR
- A draft report on overcooling transients for the B&W review was submitted by ORNL in April 1983.



SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS (A-47)




SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS (A-47)



NOTE: This schedule is contingent on the availability of the BGSE simulator for ORNL use, per agreement between RES and BGSE. Simulator studies are to begin in October 1994.


GE-BWR PLANT REVIEW (BROWNS FERRY)

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS (A-47) CONTINUED



WESTINGHOUSE-PWR PLANT REVIEW

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS (A-47)




HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES AND EFFECTS OF HYDROGEN BURNS ON SAFETY EQUIPMENT (A-48)

AS OF WEEK ENDING


MAY 18, 1984

KEY PERSONNEL	TASK REVIEWERS	KRYSZTOF PARCZEWSKI CEB/DE/NRR	SCHEDULED COMPLETION
TASK MANAGER	NAME BRANCH PAT WORTHINGTON CEBR/DET/RES	RICHARD CLEVELAND RSCB/DST/NRR	
TSUNG MING SU X27477	GERALD MAZETIS PSRB/DHFS/NRR	VERNON ROONEY DL/NRR	ORIGINAL 06-30-85
	CHARLES TINKLER CSB/DSI/NRR	JOHN LARKINS SAB/DAT/RES	
	*JAMES CARTER RSB/DSI/NRR	MARTEN FLEISMAN RAB/DRA/RES	CURRENT
NRR ANALYST JUDY BUTTS X24822	HUKAM GARG EQB/DE/NRR	HAROLD POLK SGEB/DE/NRR	
Task A-48 was approved as a USI by the NRC in December 1980. Postulated reactor accidents which result in a degraded or metted core can result in generation and release to the containment of large quantities of hydrogen. The hydrogen is formed from the reaction of the zirconium fuel cladding with steam at high temperatures and/or by radiolysis of water. Experience gained from the TMI-2 accident indicates that we may want to require more specific design provisions for handling larger hydrogen releases than currently required by the regulations particularly for smaller, low pressure containment designs. The scope of this USI is limited to the generic resolution of hydrogen control and equipment qualification for ice condenser and BWR containments, and is based on the licensing case review for these containments.	RES INTERFACE INFORMATION There are extensive research programs related to the hydrogen issue spensored by RES. The results of those research programs will be incorporated into licensing decisions. as appropriate.	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS TO BE DEVELOPED	POTENTIAL PROBLEMS The state of the art has substantial uncertainties. Therefore, there is a potential for new findings which may impact the current schedule. The current schedule was developed on the basis of ficensing schedules. As of this date, the ficensing schedules for Grand Gulf and Sequi yah have slipped for several months. This slippage will potentially delay the completion date of USI A 48.
	ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION TO BE DEVELOPED	FIN NO. CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED EXPENDED	STATUS SUMMARY The Task Action Plan (TAP) was approved on 12/03/82, and a detailed schedule has been developed as shown on the following pages. A Commission Paper regarding hydrogen control for Mark III and ice condenser containments was reviewed and endorsed by CRGR on June 1, 1983. The Commission Paper was forwarded to the Commission Paper was forwarded to the Commissioners on August 26, 1983, Additional information was provided on December 28, 1983 to justify the steff position on the Commission Paper.

HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES & EFFECTS OF HYDROGEN BURNS ON SAFETY EQUIPMENT (A-48)



HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES & EFFECTS OF HYDROGEN BURNS ON SAFETY EQUIPMENT (A-48)



• POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

KEY PERSONNEL TASK MANAGER ROY WOODS X24714

Roy to water

NRR ANALYST JUDY BUTTS X24822

NAME E. THROM	BRANCH RSB/NRR
C. JOHNSON	RES
L LOIS	CPB/DSI
J STROSNIDER	RES
M YASINS	REG

R. JOHNSON	GIB/DST
R. KLECKER	MTEB/DE
N. RANDALL	MTEB/DE
G. VISSING	ORB-4/DL
J. CLIFFORD	PTRB/HFS
S. ISRAEL	RRAB/DST

SCHEDULED COMPLETION

ORIGINAL

Not Determined

CURRENT

03-31-86

PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

This task was designated a USI by the NRC in December 1981

Neutron irradiation of reactor pressure vessel weld and plate materials decreases the fracture toughness of the materials. The fracture toughness sensitivity to radiation induced change is increased by presence of certain materials such as copper. Decreased fracture toughness makes it more hit by that, if a severe overcooling event occurs followed by or concurrent with high vessel pressure, and if a small crack is present on the vessels inner surface, that crack could grow to a size that might threaten vessel

Severe pressurized overcooling events are improbable since they require multiple failures and improper operator performance. However, certain precursor events have happened that could have potentially threatened vessel integrity if additional failures had occurred and/or if the vessel had been more highly irrad ated. Therefore, the possibility of vessel failure due to a severa pressurized overcarting event cannot be ruled out.

. RES INTERFACE INFORMATION

A major portion of the work is being performed under a contract with Oak Ridge National Laboratory through the Division of Risk Analysis, RES (FIN / BOSE).

Other major contributors are:

Primary System Integrity Research Program through the Division of Engineering Technology.

Code Applications Program throught are Division of Accident Evaluation, RES

ACRS INTERFACE INFORMATION

Meetings have been held and will be scheduled as necessary with the Subcommittee on Metallic Components and with the full ACRS. The latest Subcommittee meeting was held on May 17, 1984.

• TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS

Contract (8-2510) issued to PNL PNL will perform sensitivity studies using the VISA code, and investigate ressel failure modes due to PTS.

The following RES contracts are providing technical assistance to the PTS program. These are in addition to the technical assistance contracts which were initiated to specifically address the PTS issue and listed in the

1	FIN NO.	LAB	DESCRIPTION
ı	G-1647	Purdue	Mixing Calculations
1	A-4070	Creare	Mixing Experiments
ı	A-3266	ENL	T-H Calculation Comparisons
ì	A-7306	LASL	SOLA Mixing Calculations
ì	A-7315	LASL	TRAC T-H Calculations
١	A-6047	INEL	RELAP T-H Calculations
ı	B-0468	DANL	Integrated PTS Study
ı	B-0119	ORNL	HSST Experiments
į	8-8900	ENSA	Struct. Integrity
Į	8-5290	NSRDC	Spectrum Shape
ì	5-7026	USNA	Repid J-R Curve
ı	B 8942	Gundremming	
į	8-2253	PNL	Visa Davelopment
į	8-5969	HEDL	Dosimetry
ı	B 0415	ORTH	P. V. Simulation
ı	B-6224	NRS	Dosimetry
۱	B 2289	PNL	NDE
ı	8-2467	PNL	NDE
ĺ	8-2088	PNL	Accoustic

FIN NO. CONTRACTOR OBLIGATED EXPENDED

1680K FY83

LANL

B-2510

A-7272

A-3701

STATUS SUMMARY

The Task Action Plan for A48 was approved and issued on

NRC Staff PTS recommendations (SECY-82-466) were approved by the Commission in December 1982. A new rule for PTS resolution was published for public comment on February 7, 1984. The TAP has been extensively revised (Revision 1) to reflect division of the program into two parts, a short term program. "Development of a PTS Rule and a long term program that will provide "Guidance and Acceptance Criteria for the Analyses to be Required by the PTS Rule." The revised TAP describes issuance of the new rule, confirmatory studies now underway to support the new rule, and the plant specific analyses and other requirements that will be included in the new

A status report regarding flux reduction efforts was sent to the Commission on February 25, 1983 (SECY 83-79). The final report was submitted on October 28, 1963 (SECY-83-443)


Revision 1 of the TAP as described above was approved on November 22, 1983 by the Director of NRR. Revision 2. containing minor scheduled changes, was submitted to the Director of NRR for approval in March 1964

PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (A-49) SHORT TERM PROGRAM

TASK A: Review of information requested by August 21, 1981 letters to industry groups and eight selected utilities



TASK 8: Promulgation of a new PTS Rule



TASK C: Consideration of flux reduction options for lead plants*



^{*} PTS Rule also requires consideration of flux reduction option for all PWRs. This Task (C) is such consideration in the immediate future to prevent preclusion of this option for the oldest (lead) plants.

PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (A-49) LONG TERM PROGRAM

Task 1:

Development of a Revised Regulatory Guide 1.99


Draft revision of the trend curves in Reg. Guide 1.99, Revision 1, "Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials": This task is no longer considered to be necessary for completion of A-49. Its scheduled completion is a longer term item than A-49, and adequate guidance regarding this subject is contained within Task (B). A detailed schedule for this task is therefore not presented.


Task 2:

Ongoing Program to Improve Procedures and Operator Training

This program is ongoing separate from the A-49 PTS effort and is much broader than PTS, considering PTS as one of the many types of incidents for which procedures and training should be improved, on a combined/integrated basis. Generic Letter 82-33 contains a description of the overall program and schedule. The PTS effort cannot and should not be separated from the overall effort, and so a detailed PTS schedule is not presented here. The ongoing program will be completed and applied to e on plant, however, on a schedule compatible with completion of the final PTS resolution for each plant (i.e., before acceptance of plant specific analyses required by the PTS rule, Task (B) above.)

Task 3: Determination of Event Sequences to be Considered








PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (A-49) LONG TERM PROGRAM


Task 4: Transient Model Development & Verification

& Task 5: Calculation of P(t) and T(t)



Task 6: Improvements in Methods and Data for Fracture Mechanics and Calculations


& Task 7: Vessel Failure Analysis




(CONTINUED)

LONG TERM PROCESAN

LONG TERM PROGRAM (CONTINUED)











Task 9: Plant-Specific Sensitivity Studies, Benefits of Corrective Actions, and Draft Final Report for B&W Plant


Task 10: Plant-Specific Sensitivity Studies, Benefits of Corrective Actions, and Draft Final Report for CE Plant

Task 11: Plant-Specific Sensitivity Studies, Benefits of Corrective Actions, and Draft Final Report for W Plant






PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (A-49) LONG TERM PROGRAM



PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (A-49) LONG TERM PROGRAM (CONTINUED)



US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET	I. REPORT NUMBER (Assigned by CDC)
4 TITLE AND SUBTITLE (Add Volume No., if appropriate)	NUREG-0606, Vol. 6, No. 2
	2. (Leave blank)
Unresolved Safety Issues Summary (Aqua Book)	3 RECIPIENT'S ACCUSSION NO.
7 AUTHORISI	5 DATE REPORT COMPLETED
	MONTH YEAR
	May 1984
9 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	DAT REPORT ISSUED
U. S. Maclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation	M ATH YEAR
Division of Safety Technology	1984
Division of Safety Technology Washington, C. 20555	(Leave blank)
mashington, b. 20555	8. (Leave blank)
2 SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	
S SOURCE AND MAILING ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)	10 PROJECT TASK WORK UNIT NO
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission	
Office of Nuclear Reac or Regulation Division of Safety Technology	11. CONTRACT NO.
Division of Safety Technology	
Washington, D. C. 20555	
13 TYPE OF REPORT	COVERED (Inclusive dates)
Feb. 18	8. 1984 - May 18. 1984
S. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	14 (Leave nian*)
\ /	
Provide an overview of the status of the progress and p tasks addressing "Unresolved Safety Issues" is reported	plans for resolution of the generic d to Congress.
tasks addressing "Unresolved Safety assues" is reported	to Congress.
The HOENTIFURNS OPEN ENDED TERMS.	to Congress.