

G.

8-11-82
Barbara

ENTV

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

In the Matter of
CPCo. Midland Plant
Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-329OL
50-330OL

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING BOARD
OPERATORS LICENSE CONTENTIONS OF INTERVENOR STAMIRIS

8/11/82

- 1. NRC's economic cost benefit analysis of the DES is faulty and misleading
- 3 because it;
 - a. ignores construction costs, outstanding to the public
 - b. underestimates decommissioning costs
 - c. overestimates lifespan of Unit I *material question not settled*
 - d. overestimates electrical growth rate in Michigan (using CPC 3.2% rate instead of Attorney General's 1-1 1/2% rate)

- 2. CPC/NRC internal reporting systems intended to allow plant workers to raise concerns or criticisms about inadequate workmanship or practices are ineffective because they have resulted in job losses due to QA/QC reporting. (Midland Daily News articles dated 7-20-82, 6-28-82, and Howard affidavit, 7-30-82) *More-*

over, paragraph 4 of the Bechtel Secrecy Agreement (attached) does not allow plant workers to provide information freely to the NRC, further frustrating these reporting systems.

- 3. Extensive deficiencies in the procurement system for proper qualification of equipment has resulted in unresolved safety deficiencies concerning :
 - a. bolting (RPV 79-10, LAQT 80-09, pipe whip restraints 8-11-81 MCARR)
 - b. HVAC components (GAP Howard allegations)
 - c. electrical components (82-01, 82-03)

and these EQ procurement deficiencies are unresolved (SER 3.11) despite their 1978 (55e 78-10) identification.

Consolidated with Sinclair admitted

Stamp: 8/11/82

Stamiris Contention 6 8-11-82

- 4. Welding conditions, practices, and qualification deficiencies have resulted in unsafe weld conditions and lack of assurance about inaccessible welds, as seen in:
 - a. class 1 and 2 piping (SER p 5-14)
 - b. low alloy steel welding (SER 5-10, 5-11)
 - c. corrosion damage to piping due to electro-chemical attack because of improper grounding during welding (FES p 9-39, No. 7, Midland Daily News, 7-20-82)
- 5. Despite extensive deficiencies and reliability questions associated with the DGB onsite power supply due to soil settlement problems, the offsite/onsite blackout power failure accident is not a postulated design basis event for safe shutdown and this represents a serious unconsidered threat to public health and safety. (The AFW system--see contentiou 15-- and a turbine driven pump are not designed for and cannot be relied upon to provide sufficient cooling water from the non-category I condensate tanks to perform this essential safety function. (SER p C-16, 17)

Underlined portion accepted, refer to PREHEARING CONFERENCE ORDER for correct wording

6. The NRC risk assessment concerning potential release of radioactivity to underlying groundwater (DES p 5-58) is unconservative because it depends too heavily on the natural safeguard of the "essentially impervious" clay layer, whose properties have not been clearly established to provide the assumed barrier (Kane OM-OL testimony p 4292), and it does not consider potential effects of permanent dewatering on the ground-water relationships. Therefore, public health and safety is jeopardized by these inadequacies.

- 7. Reactor containment integrity is compromised by the combined effects of:
 - a. RVP Support Modification (79-10)
 - b. lack of adequate shear reinforcement (81-05) which is uncorrectable
 - c. inadequate loading combinations (SER p 3-21)
 - d. failure to postulate containment pipe break effects (SER 3.6.2)
 - e. NSSS Seismic/LOCA deficiencies (80-07)
 and the interrelated effect of these unresolved safety issues is not addressed by the NRC in the SER.

Respectfully submitted,

ECISTAM

Barbara Stamiris
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Stamiris Contention 8 8-11-82

accepted

3. The ACRS has recommended an assessment of Midland's design adequacy and construction quality in their 6/18/82 report (SER Supplement 1, Appendix G) in order to assure that this audit be thorough and objective, it must be performed by an independent third party of a competing contracting firm. Such a requirement was imposed by the ASLB in the Houston Power and Light, 50-498 and 50-499 OL proceeding, 4/30/82. And, due to the pattern of design deficiencies (4/20/82 SALP, p 16) such an independent audit is necessary to assure the design integrity of this plant. However, the NRC has not required (SER Supplement 1, p 19-2(1)), and CPC has not committed (7/9/82 Tedesco to Cook letter) to such an independent audit.

Respectfully submitted,

Barbara Stamiris
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MIDLAND INTERROGATORY RESPONSE ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Contention</u>	<u>Questions</u>	<u>Reviewer</u>
Sinclair 3	1,3,4,6,7 2 5	J. Mitchell A. Thadani F. Manning
Sinclair 5	1-11	C. Billups
Sinclair 7	1-5	H. Walker
Stamiris 1b and 1c	1-9,11 10,12-18,21-24 19,20	S. Feld B. Elliott R. Johnson
Stamiris 2	1-11	Region III
Stamiris 6	1 2	J. Kane R. Gonzales
Stamiris 8	1-9	Region III

Bob - no prep yet - we
do not have to respond
until investigation
is complete.
WS