

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
HIGH TORUS WATER LEVEL INDICATION

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	0 8	8 4	8 4	0 0 6	0	0 5	0 8	8 4			0 5 0 0 0
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10) 1 1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.406(a)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.406(a)(1)(i)	80.38(a)(1)	X 80.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)	80.38(a)(2)	X 80.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(i)	80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(ii)	80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
		20.406(a)(1)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME James P. Pelletier, Plant Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 8 0 2 2 5 1 7 - 1 7 1 1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD'S	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD'S

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During normal operation, the CRO discovered torus level instruments 16-19-46A and 16-19-46B reading 1.33' (70,730 FT³) and 1.52' (72,455 FT³) respectively. Maximum torus volume permitted per Tech. Spec. Section 3.7.A.1 is 70,000 FT³ (1.25' level).

Investigation revealed that a hot slug of DI water in the instrument reference leg improperly compensated for density and caused the high level reading. This resulted because the technicians did not verify normal on-line level indication.

The instrument reference legs were refilled and torus level indication returned to normal readings of 1.07' (68,364 FT³) and 1.08' (68,455 FT³).

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PDR ADOCK 05000271
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) VERMONT YANKEE	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 4	- 0 0 6	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

On 8 May 1984 at 1600 hours, the Control Room Operator (CRO) performing routine rounds during normal operation, discovered torus level instruments 16-19-46A and 16-19-46B reading 1.33' (70,730 FT³) and 1.52' (72,455 FT³) respectively. Maximum torus volume per Tech. Spec. Section 3.7.A.1 is 70,000 FT³ (1.25'). I & C had calibrated these instruments earlier that day. The 6 hour clock was started per Tech. Spec. Table 3.2.6 note 3.

At 1615 hours, the Shift Supervisor contacted I & C to check level instruments 16-19-46A & B. The wide range torus level instrument (16-19-11B) indicated normal torus level.

At 1630 hours, I & C backfilled reference legs and the torus level indication₃ instruments returned to normal readings of 1.07' (68,364 FT³) and 1.08' (68,455 FT³).

At 1650 hours, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC that the torus level instruments had been properly backfilled and that torus level indication had returned to normal. The 6 hour clock was stopped.


The technician upon completion of the calibration, backfills the System using Demin Water. The technician then records the online level indication. In this case the technician did not ensure correct indication on the instrument upon completion of the backfill.

The erroneous indications were the result of a condition that exists in the Demin Water System. A portion of the demin piping runs through the RCIC room which develops a slug of hot water in the System. If this slug of hot water is used to refill the reference legs, it will result in indications that are higher than actual conditions.

Vermont Yankee has initiated the following corrective actions to prevent a similar event from occurring in the future:

1. The plant procedure has been revised to insure that:
 - a) The Demin Water temperature has stabilized prior to refilling the instrument reference legs.
 - b) The technician records the online indication and has the as-left setting verified. Documentation of this is also required.
 - c) Due to the evaporation of water in the reference lines, they will be backfilled weekly.
2. All personnel involved in the weekly performance of backfilling the instrument reference legs will be trained on the proper performance of this procedure.

Based on the above, there were no adverse consequences to the public health and safety. No previous similar occurrences have been reported.



VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

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VYV-84-317

June 5, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

REFERENCE: Operating License DPR-28
Docket No. 50-271
Reportable Occurrence No. LER 84-06

Dear Sirs:

As defined by 10CFR50.73, we are reporting the attached Reportable Occurrence as LER 84-06.

Very truly yours,

James P. Pelletier
Plant Manager

RDP/cjm

cc: Regional Administrator
USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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