



Commonwealth Edison

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May 30, 1984

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt - Region III
Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Subject: LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2
Supplemental Response to Inspection
Report Nos. 50-373/84-05 & 50-374/84-05
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

References (a): C. E. Norelius letter to Cordell Reed
dated April 18, 1984.

(b): D. L. Farrar letter to J. G. Keppler
dated May 18, 1984.

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter and its attachments supplement the response to the inspection report transmitted by Reference (a). The Commonwealth Edison Company response to the Notice of Violation was provided in Reference (b).

During a subsequent telephone conversation with Mr. S. Stasek of your staff, I was informed that the response was incomplete. This supplement contains the additional information requested. The time available to submit this supplement was the subject of a telecon with Mr. N. Chrissotimos on May 24, 1984.

If you have any further questions on this matter, please direct them to this office.

Very truly yours,

Jos Marshall

for D. L. Farrar
Director of Nuclear Licensing

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cc: NRC Resident Inspector - LSCS

Attachment

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ATTACHMENT

Commonwealth Edison Company
LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2
Response to Additional Items of Concern

Item 1

Items (B and C) in paragraph 4.F.1 of Reference (a) describe two concerns associated with miswiring of the CRD Directional Control Valve solenoids. Station management did not expect these solenoid amphenol connectors to become interchanged between different CRD HCU's, based on specific actions that had been taken to prevent such an occurrence. The solenoid cables had been previously tie wrapped in a manner such that a cable could only reach its corresponding solenoid. Additionally, adjacent CRD's are not usually removed from or returned to service at the same time.

In this case several CRD's were being removed for maintenance, and each one had an array of surrounding CRD's O.O.S. Also, some of the tie wraps had been removed or broken in the course of maintenance and operation, which allowed several cables to hang with more than normal slack. The combination of these two factors contributed significantly to the crossing of the solenoid connector leads.

The station has conducted training for all licensed operators on this event. Equipment Attendants will be trained on this event during OJT session 84-5 module 4, which starts on June 25, 1984. The Shift Supervisors have also been advised of the station's policy concerning en-masse clearing of large outages. This practice has been discontinued. Training on both of these topics will be provided to all new Equipment Attendants. Color coding of the CRD Directional Control Valve solenoids and cables will be completed as soon as acceptable materials are available.

ATTACHMENT

LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2
Response to Additional Items of Concern

Item 2

Missing the CRITICAL DATE on this Tech Spec surveillances was due in part to a misunderstanding of CRITICAL DATES and how they are calculated.

When a CRITICAL DATE and DUE DATE were specified to be the same day some people thought the computer program to be in error. The Surveillance Coordinators of the respective departments have been reinstructed on this program.

Also some people tended to look at only the DUE DATES and did not check CRITICAL DATES until the DUE DATE was past. A letter to Department Heads and users of the surveillance schedule from the Procedure Manager dated April 24, 1984 re-emphasized the importance of meeting the DUE DATES, and checking CRITICAL DATES at the same time. It also restated the purpose of the schedule; to serve as a tool for planning work loads so that manpower and equipment problems are not a cause for missed surveillances.