

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	PAGE(S) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION ON HIGH STEAM LINE FLOW

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	5	08	8	4	01	5	0	06				0 5 0 0 0
0	5	08	8	4	0	0	0	06				0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) **2** THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	20.406(a)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(a)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME WILLIAM J. KELLY, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE 8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS
X	S B	I M O D	M O 2 1	NO					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 2 (Startup) a malfunction in the steam dump control system allowed several 40 percent steam dump valves to open, initiating a high steam flow coincident with Low-Low Tavq reactor trip and safety injection. All associated plant systems and components responded normally. A failed pressure control module was replaced and the Steam Dump Control System returned to service.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 4	0 1 5	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

On May 8, 1984, at 1304 PCT, with the reactor in Mode 2 (Startup) and at 2 percent power, a malfunction in the Steam Dump Control System (SB) caused some of the 40 percent steam dump valves to open (SB)(XCV), initiating a High Steam Flow coincident with Low-Low Tavg reactor trip and safety injection. All associated plant systems and components responded normally.

Investigation revealed that the Pressure Control Module (PC-507)(IMOD)(SB) randomly produced a spurious output signal which caused the steam dump valves to open. The module was replaced and the Steam Dump Control System returned to service on May 9, 1984. Subsequent troubleshooting of the module determined that a transistor (Q2) had failed. Maintenance history cards did not indicate any previous failures of this transistor.

When the steam dump valves opened, a rapid increase in steam flow caused a power mismatch between the reactor core power and the steam generator load demand, which is defined as an excessive load increase incident in the FSAR. This type of incident involving an equipment malfunction in the Steam Dump Control System is analyzed as a Condition II fault. The worst case scenario for this type of incident would be at the end of core life with the highest absolute value of moderator temperature coefficient. Under these conditions, the minimum DNBR will still be above the limit of 1.30.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

77 BEALE STREET • SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA 94106 • (415) 781-4211 • TWX 910-372-6587

JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

June 7, 1984

PGandE Letter No. : DCL-84-213

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-015-00
Reactor Trip and Safety Injection

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning a reactor trip and safety injection.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,


for J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

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