




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May 30, 1984

W3K84-1298
Q-3-A35.07.107

Mr. John T. Collins
Regional Administrator, Region IV
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012



REFERENCE: LP&L Letter W3K84-0927 dated April 24, 1984

Dear Mr. Collins:

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3
Docket No. 50-382
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 107
"Schedule 80, 1" and 2" Carbon Steel Pipe Fittings 'P3'"
Final Report

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 107, "Schedule 80, 1" and 2" Carbon Steel Pipe Fittings 'P3'".

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

T. F. Gerrets
Corporate Quality Assurance Manager

TFG:CNH:SSTG

cc: Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
(15 copies)

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Mr. John T. Collins

May 30, 1984

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cc: Director
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Washington, D.C. 20555

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FINAL REPORT OF
SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 107
"SCHEDULE 80, 1" AND 2" CARBON STEEL PIPE/FITTINGS 'P3'"

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes 1" and 2" carbon steel pipe/fittings in ASME Section III Class III installations which lack material traceability.

To the best of our knowledge, this deficiency has not been reported to the USNRC pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION

Documentation review of installation packages identified the lack of traceability for 1" carbon steel (C.S.) SCH 80 pipe and 1" and 2" carbon steel 3000# fittings on three level stations (AC system) for Chilled Water Expansion Tanks A, B, and A/B and on one level station (CC system) of the Component Cooling Surge Tank. The items identified as lacking material heat numbers in the documentation review were inspected to determine if heat numbers were present on the material. Forty-four items have been identified as having indeterminate traceability.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The piping and fittings in question connect CCW surge tank level monitoring equipment which automatically actuates makeup from the Demineralized Water System, automatically bypasses the dry cooling towers and isolates the respective CCW train on low level in the respective tank side. The piping and fittings associated with Chilled Water Expansion Tanks A, B, and A/B connect level switches which automatically control makeup water supplied from the CCW makeup pumps. Portions of the CCW System and the Essential Services Chilled Water System are required to function following a design bases accident. Therefore, if left uncorrected, the safe operation of the plant could be adversely affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Forty-one items with indeterminate traceability have been removed, scrapped, and replaced with traceable materials. During the specified rework, the three remaining items (Component Cooling Surge Tank stations) were found to have heat numbers. As supports were being removed, heat numbers were found in areas previously inaccessible for the visual inspection resulting from the documentation review.

Corrective action and the supporting documentation reviews are completed.

This is submitted as the Final Report.