MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Helping Build Mississippi
P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

June 5, 1984

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director

Dear Mr. Denton:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417
License No. NPF-13
File: 0260/L-860.0
Supplemental Information on the
Technical Specification Review
AECM-84/0299

During discussions with Mr. Don Hoffman of your staff, it was requested that Mississippi Power & Light Company (MP&L) provide supplemental information on Technical Specification Problem Sheets 100, 305 and 336. That supplemental information is attached.

Yours truly,

S H Hobbs

S. H. Hobbs
Manager of Nuclear Safety & Compliance

SHH:rg
Attachment

cc: Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a)
Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/o)
Mr. N. S. Reynolds (w/o)
Mr. G. B. Taylor (w/o)

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (w/a)
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator (w/a)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900
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Technical Specification Problem Sheet 100

Environmental Qualification Report 33-55170-QS indicates that the weak link in the ESF Switchgear area is the 750 KVA transformer. If the transformer is loaded to rated capacity with an ambient temperature of 30°C (90°F), the expected life is 54 years; at rated capacity and 40°C (104°F) ambient, the expected life is 26 years. If the transformer is run continuously at 700 KVA (6% below rated capacity) with an ambient of 40°C, the expected life will be 75 years. Although MP&L does not plan to make cooling system modifications until the first refueling outage, the affect on equipment qualification, due to occasionally operating with an ambient above 30°C, will be insignificant. Therefore, the existing Technical Specifications are believed to be adequate in this area.

Technical Specification Problem Sheet 305

The original local PMP evaluation for Grand Gulf concluded that runoff from the local PMP would not exceed the plant finished entrance floor level elevation of 133.0 feet mean sea level in the plant area.

Later evaluation, taking into account a finished plant grade in some areas in excess of the design elevation of 132.5 feet mean sea level, certain drainage swales in the main plant area which were filled in, berms and fencing for security, and security skirting on trailers parked in the main plant area, all of which could contribute to impeding runoff and inducing local PMP flood levels 5" in excess of 133.0 feet mean sea level for up to 7 hours, concluded that flooding of plant structures containing safety related equipment could result.

License Condition 2.C.(5)(b) required certain interim measures and that, prior to exceeding 5 percent power, plans for a permanent solution be submitted. Plans which require providing door seals to 6" above the predicted PMP level in the affected structures as well as modifying floor penetrations in the service water pumphouse to prevent backflow were submitted in MP&L letter AECM-82/0466 dated October 1 , 1982. Supplement 4 to the GGNS SER concluded that proposed changes are acceptable to satisfy the License Condition.

These modifications have been completed. An inspection conducted by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement on May 22 and 23, 1984 verified that the modifications were complete.*

Based on the provision of passive flood control protection features as described above, flood protection features need not be included in the Technical Specifications.

References:

1. NUREG-0831, Supplement 4, GGNS SER, Section 2.4.3 (p 2-1 thru 2-2)

*2. Report No. 50-416/84-18, 5/23/84 (to be issued)

*At the exit interview on May 23, 1984 the inspector (Mr. J. R. Harris), indicated that when a bowed door is repaired, the permanent modifications to satisfy License Condition 2.C.(5)(b) will have been completed.

Technical Specification Problem Sheet 336

Action a. of Tech Spec 3.8.1.2 includes a requirement for suspending crane operations over the spent fuel storage pool. Action a. of Tech Spec 3.8.3.2 does not contain a similar requirement. This problem sheet raises the issue of whether or not the two action statements should be consistent. It is appropriate to suspend crane operations in the 3.8.1.2 action since under these circumstances facility AC power sources (both onsite and offsite) would have reached a significant level of degradation which could result in a complete loss of safety functions of critical systems which might be needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident involving crane operations. A similar action statement for Tech Spec 3.8.3.2 is not included since only individual load centers and motor control centers would be potentially deenergized, affecting only individual components; this condition is less severe than facility onsite/offsite power source degradation and does not warrant the discontinuance of crane operations since critical system safety functions would not necessarily be affected. Action statements for individual systems affected would be followed in this case. Therefore, the existing Technical Specifications are believed to be adequate in this area.