



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
CITY OF ALACHUA
CITY OF BUSPIELL
CITY OF GAINESVILLE
CITY OF KISSIMMEE
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CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND UTILITIES COMMISSION, CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH
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ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION AND CITY OF ORLANDO
SEBRING UTILITIES COMMISSION
SEMINOLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
CITY OF TALLAHASSEE

DOCKET NO. 50-302

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 68
License No. DPR-72

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al. (the licensees) dated January 30, 1984 (as supplemented on March 20, 1984), complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 68, are hereby incorporated in the license. Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George W. Rivenbark, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 25, 1984

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 68

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72

DOCKET NO. 50-302

Replace the following pages of the appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Pages

3/4 4-6

3/4 4-10a (new page)

B 3/4 4-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

PRESSURIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A steam bubble,
- b. A water level between 40 and 290 inches, and
- c. At least 126 kW of pressurizer heaters.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the control rod drive trip breakers open within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4.1 The pressurizer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying pressurizer level to be within limits at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.4.2 The emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by manually transferring power from the normal to the emergency power supply and energizing the heaters.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

STEAM GENERATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.5 Each steam generator shall be OPERABLE with a maximum water level as specified on Figure 3.4-5 and a minimum water level of 18 inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.*

ACTION:

- a. With one or more steam generators inoperable due to steam generator tube imperfections, restore the inoperable generator(s) to OPERABLE status prior to increasing T_{avg} above 200°F.
- b. With one or more steam generators inoperable due to the water level being outside the limits, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.


SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.4.5.0 Each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.
- 4.4.5.1 Steam Generator Sample Selection and Inspection - Each steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE during shutdown by selecting and inspecting at least the minimum number of steam generators specified in Table 4.4-1.
- 4.4.5.2 Steam Generator Tube Sample Selection and Inspection - The steam generator tube minimum sample size, inspection result classification, and the corresponding action required shall be as specified in Table 4.4-2. The inservice inspection of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the frequencies specified in Specification 4.4.5.3 and the inspected tubes shall be verified acceptable per the acceptance criteria of Specification 4.4.5.4. The tubes selected for each inservice inspection shall include at least 3% of the total number of tubes in all steam generators; the tubes selected for these inspections shall be selected on a random basis except:
- a. Where experience in similar plants with similar water chemistry indicates critical areas to be inspected, then at least 50% of the tubes inspected shall be from these critical areas.

*As noted on Figure 3.4-5, maximum water level restrictions are not applicable in MODE 4.

FIGURE 3.4-5

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL*



*Not applicable to Mode 4 operation.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

system and the secondary coolant system (primary-to-secondary leakage = 1 GPM). Cracks having a primary-to-secondary leakage less than this limit during operation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating plants have demonstrated that primary-to-secondary leakage of 1 GPM can be detected by monitoring the secondary coolant. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown and an unscheduled inspection, during which the leaking tubes will be located and plugged.

Operational experience has shown that tube defects can be the result of unique operating conditions and/or physical arrangements in specific limited areas of the steam generators (for example, tubes adjacent to the open inspection lane or tubes whose 15th tube support plate hole is not broached but drilled). A full inspection of all of the tubes in such specific limited areas will provide complete assurance that degraded or defective tubes in these areas are detected. Because no credit is taken for these distinctive tubes in the constitution of the first sample or its results, the requirements for the first sample are unchanged. This requirement is essentially equivalent to and meets the intent of the requirements set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.83, "Inservice Inspection of Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Tubes", Rev. 1, July 1975, and does not reduce the margin of safety provided by those requirements.

Wastage-type defects are unlikely with proper chemistry treatment of the secondary coolant. However, even if a defect should develop in service, it will be found during scheduled inservice steam generator tube examinations. Plugging will be required for all tubes with imperfections exceeding the plugging limit of 40% of the tube nominal wall thickness. Steam generator tube inspections of operating plants have demonstrated the capability to reliably detect degradation that has penetrated 20% of the original tube wall thickness.

Whenever the results of any steam generator tubing inservice inspection fall into Category C-3, these results will be promptly reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.1 prior to resumption of plant operation. Such cases will be considered by the Commission on a case-by-case basis and may result in a requirement for analysis, laboratory examinations, tests, additional eddy-current inspection, and revision of the Technical Specifications, if necessary.

The steam generator water level limits are consistent with the initial condition assumptions in the FSAR. The maximum steam generator level, as a function of steam superheat, is sufficient to assure a mass inventory of less than or equal to 62,600 lbm in the event of a main stream line rupture.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.6.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. (These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.)

3/4.4.6.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

Industry experience has shown that, while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE portion of this can be reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 GPM. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary. Therefore, the presence of any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE requires the unit to be promptly placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

The 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitation provides allowance for a limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the leakage detection systems.

The CONTROLLED LEAKAGE limit of 10 GPM restricts operation with a total RCS leakage to all RC pump seals in excess of 10 GPM.

The total steam generator tube leakage limit of 1 GPM for all steam generators ensures that the dosage contribution from tube leakage will be limited to a small fraction of Part 100 limits in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 1 GPM limit is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents.