JAN 1 0 1992

Docket Nos. 50-498 50-499 License Nos. NPF-76 NPF-80

Housto: Lighting & Power Company ATTN: Donald P. Hall, Group Vice President, Nuclear P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77251

Gentlemen:

This is in regard to your letter of January 8, 1992 (ST-HL-AE-3975), providing the basis for a request for a temporary waiver of compliance from the provisions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, "Essential Cooling Water," for South Texas Project (STP), Unit 1, by allowing you to increase the TS allowed outage time by up to 24 hours in order to complete repairs to the A train essential cooling water (ECW) system. As discussed with Mr. Mark Wisenburg of your staff, it was determined that the repairs to the A train ECW system were completed during the specified TS allowed outage time. Therefore, there was no need for the proposed temporary waiver of compliance.

> Sincerely, Original Signed By. A: B. BEACH

A. Bill Beach, Director Division of Reactor Projects

TEGI

cc: Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: William J. Jump, Manager Nuclear Licensing P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

RIV:C:DRP/DA ATHowell:df AdBeach 1/10/92 1/10/92

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Houston Lighting & Power Company

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City of Austin Electric Utility Department ATTN: J. C. Lanier/M. B. Lee P.O. Box 1088 Austin, Texas 78767

City Public Service Board ATTN: R. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, Texas 78296

Newman & Holtzinger, P. C. ATTN: Jack R. Newman, Esq. 1615 L Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036

Central Power and Light Company ATTN: D. E. Ward/T. M. Puckett P.O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403

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Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie 50 Bellport Lane Bellport, New York 11713

Bureau of Radiation Control State of Texas 1101 West 49th Street Austin, Texas 78756

Judge, Matagorda County Matagorda County Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street Bay City, Texas 77414

Licensing Representative houston Lighting & Power Company Suite 610 Three Metro Center Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: Rufus S. Scott, Associate General Counsel P.O. Box 61867 Houston, Texas 77208 Houston Lighting & Power Company

bcc to DMB (IE51)

bcc distrib. by RIV: R. D. Martin DRP CRS DRSS-RPEPS RIV File RSTS Operator

Resident Inspector Section Chief (DRP/D) MIS System Lisa Shea, RM/ALF R. Bachmann, OGC Project Engineer (DRP/D)

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Houston Lighting & Power Company

bcc to DMB (IE51)

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bcc distrib. by RIV: R. D. Martin DRP DRS DRSS-RPEPS RIV File RSTS Operator

Resident Inspector Section Chief (DRP/D) MIS System Lisa Shea, RM/ALF R. Bachmann, OGC Project Engineer (DRP/D) COMPANY Houston Lightin, & Power South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

> January 8, 1992 ST-HL-AE-3975 File No.: G20.02 10CFR50

U. S. Niclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

The Light

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Unit 1 Proposed Temporary Waiver of <u>Compliance to Specification 3.7.4</u>

HL&P requests a one time Temporary Waiver of Compliance to Specification 3.7.4 for the STPEGS Unit 1 Essential Cooling Water System (ECW) to allow A Train of ECW to remain out of service for up to 96 hours for the repair of a crack in the 6" flange fitting on the inlet to the Standby Diesel Generator intercooler piping upstream of the expansion bellows and a crack in the expansion bellows. The cracks are being repaired by replacing the expansion bellows and the affected flange with hard pipe and a new flange. HL&P has evaluated the effect of ECW A Train being out of service for more than 72 hours and determined that continuing plant operation for the necessary time is consistent with protecting the public health and safety. The approval of this Temporary Waiver of Compliance will preclude an unnecessary transient and associated stresses on Unit 1 components and systems during shutdown and restart evolutions.

HL&P decided to repair the cracks in a scheduled A Train outage beginning January 7, 1992. HL&P has initiated repairs of the cracks and initially expected the repairs to be completed within 65 hours. However, during the repairs it was determint that additional piping was required to be drained to prevent valve leakby f affecting the repair. This draining and subsequent refilling adds additional outage time. Therefore, the repair duration may require ECW A train trive out of service for up to 96 hours, which exceeds the allowed outage time of 72 hours in STPECS Technical Specification 3.7.4.

There is no significant safety impact relative to extending the outage time. The other two trains of ECW will be operable and can mitigate the design basis accident (DBA). Additionally since only one train of ECW is necessary for safe shutdown of the plant and mitigation of all accidents but the very unlikely DBA, there is adequate redundancy with the availability of the two other ECW trains.

Review of the STPEGS Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) shows that a one time increase in the allowed outage time from 72 hours to 96 hours will not significantly affect the calculated core damage frequency (CDF) at STPEGS. The percent increase in CDF has been conservatively est. and at 0.1%, which is well within the margin of error for the CDF and is considered insignificant.

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1126P's review of the requested extension shows that there are no significant hazards considerations:

- It does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Availability of the other two trains of ECW is adequate for accident mitigation, since unavailability of one train is already considered in STPECS accident analyses.
- 2) It does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No changes in mode of operation of ECW are proposed, or in the configuration of the system. No change to the system as evaluated in the STPEGS safety analysis is proposed.
- 3) It does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. As discussed above, the review of the STPEGS PSA shows the increased outage time for this waiver of compliance is an insignificant contribution to risk at STPEGS.

There is no potential for significant environmental consequences from extending the ECW A train outage time. There is no accident analysis impact, and the nature of the work does not involve release of radiological or non-radiological effluents or adversely affect systems associated with control of effluents.

HL&F's Plant Operation Review Committee has reviewed the proposed extension and found it to be acceptable.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. A. W. Harrison at (512) 972-7298, or me at (512) 972-7921.

W. H. Kinsey, JT.

Vice President Nuclear Generation

SDP/1f

Andrea Marca Sama