

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2  
DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 1 OF 0 2  
PAGE (3): 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4): Unscheduled Lockout of the High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator (HPCS-DG)

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	5	1	0	8	4	8	4	0	5
0	5	1	0	8	4	8	4	0	5
0	4	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	1
0	5	1	0	8	4	8	4	0	5
0	5	1	0	8	4	8	4	0	5

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11):

OPERATING MODE (9): 1	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10): 1 9	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(a)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.72(b)(2)(iii)
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):  
NAME: I.D. Kassakatis, Plant Compliance Engineer  
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 510 931 771-1 25101 1  
AREA CODE: Ext. 2201

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
A				N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):  
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO   
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15):

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 5/10/84, while performing preventive maintenance on a HPCS-DG Pressure Switch, a Technician miscounted the contacts on an interlock relay and installed a jumper which caused a lockout of the HPCS-DG. The actuation of the HPCS-DG Lockout Relay was annunciated in the Control Room and an Operator was dispatched to the HPCS-DG Room. Discussion with the Technician revealed the misplaced jumper and it was removed. The Operator reset the lockout and verified the HPCS-DG had been returned to Standby status.

The sequence of events described above took approximately 20 minutes.

To try and prevent this in the future a note was added to the Pressure Switch Calibration Sheet designating the proper contacts to be jumpered and cautioning that a Lockout can occur if the wrong contacts are jumpered.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7 8 4	0 4 0	0 0 0	2 OF 0 2	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

- (a) Power Level - 18%
- (b) Plant Mode - 1
- (c) During the Plant Ascension Test Program

Event

On 5/10/84 preventive maintenance to verify calibration was being accomplished on DCW-PS-27. At approximately 1020 the Control Room received "Diesel Engine Trip" and "HPCS System Out of Service" annunciators. An Operator was dispatched to the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Diesel Room and found that the HPCS Diesel Lockout Relay had been actuated. The Technician working on DCW-PS-27 had already made the determination that the Lockout had been actuated when he jumpered the wrong contacts on Relay TD-5. In order to perform the calibration check of DCW-PS-27 the Low Jacket Water Pressure Annunciator Circuit, which is completed via TD-5, had to be jumpered. The Technician had made a mistake and jumpered contacts (1 & 5) which completed the Low Lube Oil Pressure Interlock and in turn actuated the Diesel Lockout Relay.

Immediate Corrective Action

After the Technician removed his jumper, the Operator reset the Engine Lockout and verified the engine had been returned to the Standby mode. The Technician completed the preventive maintenance by jumpering the proper contacts (2 & 6) to prove the Low Jacket Water Pressure Circuit functional.

The sequence of events described above took approximately 20 minutes.

Safety Significance

Although the Diesel was locked out for approximately 20 minutes, the HPCS System remained in Standby because the normal power supply was unaffected. Also the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), in conjunction with LPCI/LPCS, serves as a backup to the HPCS System and remained in Standby throughout the event. The assessment was made that this event posed no danger to Plant personnel or to the public.

Further Corrective Action

The Data Sheet used to facilitate calibration of DCW-PS-27 was revised and a note added to insure contacts 2 & 6 are used when verifying circuit function.

## Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397  
May 31, 1984

Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-040

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-040 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of Technical Specification Section 6.9.1.7 and discusses the item of noncompliance, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1020 hours on May 10, 1984.

Very truly yours,

  
J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)  
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:  
Licensee Event Report No. 84-040

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, Administrator  
Region V, Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Walnut Creek, California 94596  
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector (901A)  
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