NRC Form 366 (9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 8	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Inoperable Main Steam Line Tunnel Exhaust Duct Temperature Elements

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	2 6	8 4	8 4	— 0 0 6	— 0 0	0 5	2 5	8 4		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	X 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
B. L. Clark, Senior Engineer - Special Projects	AREA CODE 2 1 5 8 4 1 - 5 0 1 7

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
A	S	B T E	B 5 7 2	N					
A	S	B T E	B 5 7 2	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Abstract: 3-84-06

On April 26, 1984, at approximately 7:00 a.m., with Unit 3 at 100% power level, an inconsistency in the temperature indications (TS-5931A and B) for the main steam line tunnel exhaust duct was observed by the Shift Technical Advisor on ST 9.1-3Z, "Z Shift Surveillance Log". At 10:40 a.m., investigation revealed that temperature elements, TE-5931A and TE-5931B were pulled out of the exhaust duct. This defeated one of two instrument channels in each of two trip systems responsible for initiating a Group I isolation of the Primary Containment Isolation System. As a result, at 11:06 a.m., a controlled reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with Tech. Spec. Table 3.2.A and an Unusual Event was declared. The cause was the result of improper scaffolding installation in the area of the temperature elements. The temperature elements were reinstalled in the duct, verified as operable, and the Unusual Event was terminated at 11:14 a.m. on April 26, 1984. Likewise, the scaffolding was also removed from the area.

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Description of the Event:

On April 26, 1984, at approximately 7:00 a.m., with Unit 3 at 100% power level, the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) observed that main steam line tunnel exhaust duct temperature indications TS-5931A and TS-5931B were reading significantly lower than temperature indications TS-5931C and TS-5931D. At 10:40 a.m., investigation revealed that temperature elements, TE-5931A and TE-5931B, were pulled out of the exhaust duct. The temperature elements were declared inoperable, and at 11:06 a.m., a controlled reactor shutdown was initiated in accordance with Tech. Spec. Table 3.2.A. Consequently, an Unusual Event was declared. The temperature elements were reinstalled in the duct, verified as operable, and the Unusual Event was terminated at 11:14. a.m. on April 26, 1984.

Further investigation revealed that a discrepancy in the main steam line tunnel exhaust duct temperatures had originally been identified on April 15, 1984, by operations personnel performing ST 9.1-3Z, "Z Shift Surveillance Log", and that a Suspected Maintenance Request Form (SMRF) was initiated to recalibrate the temperature instrumentation. However, the operations personnel did not properly address the operability requirements of the system as specified in the Tech Specs and there was no follow-up on the SMRF which was never entered into the computerized maintenance tracking system and therefore, no further investigation of the discrepancy was conducted.

Consequences of the Event:

The temperature elements (resistance temperature detectors) provide input to temperature switches of the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) in a one out of two twice logic to provide a Group I isolation on high temperature in the main steam line tunnel exhaust duct which is indicative of a main steam line leak. With the "A" and "B" inputs to the PCIS logic inoperable, one of two instrument channels in each of two trip systems was inoperable resulting only in the loss of redundancy of instrument channels in each trip system. A Group I isolation would have occurred if required, since the remaining instrument channels in each trip system were verified as operable.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A) (17)

Cause of the Event:

Scaffolding was erected in the area of the main steam line tunnel exhaust duct to enable penetration inspections as part of the fire protection modifications required by Appendix R. A handrail, which was installed in order to aid perscnnel in crossing from one portion of the scaffolding to another, was connected to the Unistrut which supports TE-5931A and B. The temperature elements were pulled out of the exhaust duct as a result of the use of this handrail.

Corrective Actions:

Upon identification of the cause, the temperature elements were reinstalled in the duct and verified as operable. The Unusual Event was terminated at 11:14 a.m. on April 26, 1984. Likewise, the handrail and associated scaffolding were removed from the area.

An inspection of all scaffolding erected in the plant was conducted to avoid any similar occurrences. Classes were held to instruct those responsible for erecting scaffolding to ensure that no plant equipment or instrumentation is affected by the configuration of the scaffolding.

Operations personnel have been counseled on the extreme importance of verifying the operability status of Tech Spec instrumentation to ensure that the operability requirements specified in the Tech Specs have been met.

Previous Similar Occurrences:

2-83-27/3L; 2-77-49/3L

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May 25, 1984

Docket No. 50-278

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report

This LER deals with the inoperability of two main steam line tunnel exhaust duct temperature elements on Unit 3.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-278
Report Number:	3-84-06
Revision Number:	00
Event Date:	April 26, 1984
Report Date:	May 25, 1984
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD #1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314

This LER is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

Very truly yours,

R. H. Logue
Superintendent
Nuclear Services Section

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I, USNRC

Mr. A. R. Blough
Site Inspector

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