

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 [F | L | C | R | P | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0] [3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1] [4] [8]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

CONT
01 [L] [6] [0] [5] [0] [-] [0] [3] [0] [2] [7] [0] [8] [0] [6] [8] [0] [8] [0] [6] [0] [1] [8] [4] [6]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 [At 0700, while performing SP-340, ECCS Pump Operability, DHV-110, "A" decay]
03 [heat pump discharge throttle valve, would not control flow in automatic. This]
04 [created an event contrary to T.S. 3.5.2. DHV-110 did respond in manual]
05 [control; decay heat loop "B" provided redundancy. There was no effect upon]
06 [the general public health or safety. This was the sixth occurrence for]
07 [DHV-110 and the thirteenth event reported under this Specification.]

09 [S] [F] [11] [E] [12] [E] [13] [I] [N] [S] [T] [R] [U] [14] [C] [15] [Z] [16]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [8] [0] [21] [0] [5] [8] [24] [0] [3] [28] [X] [30] [1] [33]
18 ACTION TAKEN [X] [34] [Z] [20] [Z] [27] [0] [0] [0] [0] [Y] [23] [N] [24] [A] [25] [C] [6] [8] [0] [26]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 [The cause is attributed to air in the controller sensing line. Operability]
11 [was restored by venting the sensing line. The sensing lines for DHV-110 and]
12 [DHV-111 will be vented monthly until permanent corrective action is implement-]
13 [ed. An engineering evaluation has determined the following additional correc-]
14 [tive actions to be implemented: (1) replace existing flow switches with elec-]

15 [G] [28] [0] [0] [0] [29] [N/A] [30] [B] [31] [Operator Observation] [32]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

16 [Z] [33] [Z] [34] [N/A] [35] [N/A] [36]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

17 [0] [0] [0] [37] [Z] [38] [N/A] [39]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

18 [0] [0] [0] [40] [N/A] [41] [8406050381 840604]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

19 [Z] [42] [PDR ADDCK 05000302] [43] [S] [PDR] [44]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

20 [N] [44] [N/A] [45] [NRC USE ONLY]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO. : 50-302/80-058/03X-1

FACILITY : Crystal River Unit 3

REPORT DATE : June 1, 1984

OCCURRENCE DATE: August 6, 1980

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Failure of DHV-110 to control flow in automatic mode contrary to Technical Specification 3.5.2.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 3, HOT STANDBY (0%)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0700 during performance of SP-340, ECCS Pump Operability, it was discovered that DHV-110, "A" decay heat pump discharge throttle valve, would not control flow in automatic. DHV-110 did respond in manual control; maintenance actions were initiated.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

The cause is attributed to air in the sensing line of the controller.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

There was no effect upon the general public health or safety. Redundancy was maintained by the "B" decay heat loop.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The sensing lines were vented and a functional check was completed. An engineering evaluation of the control system for DHV-110 and DHV-111 determined the following additional corrective action to be implemented:

1. Replace existing flow switches with electronic controls.
2. Change out helical gears in the valve actuators.

FAILURE DATA:

This was the sixth occurrence reported for DHV-110 and the thirteenth event reported under this Specification.