CONTROL BLOCK	NRC FORM 366 (12-61)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT	APPROVED BY OMB 3150-0011 EXPIRES 4-30-52
CONT	CONTROL BLOCK:	1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQU	JIRED INFORMATION)
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROGRADE CONSCIUNCES (®) EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROGRADE CONSCIUNCES (®) During normal operations, 2-CV-407 main steam supply valve to the PD steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps failed	7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15	0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 LICENSE NUMBER 25 25 LICENSE	1 1 4 1 5 S
During normal operations, 2-CV-407 main steam supply valve to the 33 Steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps failed Deen causing 12 AFW pump to start. To repair the valve, the auto initiate capa- 15 bility for the steam driven AFW pumps was defeated (T.S. 3.7.1.2). 16 The AFW system was returned to a normal line-up 14 hours after 17 being declared inoperable. The motor driven pump remained operable 18 throughout the event. Similar events: 83-035. 19 CHHO X		0 0 3 1 8 7 0 8 1 5 8 3 8 0 ET NUMBER 55 EVENT DATE 74	5 3 0 8 4 9
21 AFW pump to start. To repair the valve, the auto initiate capa— 3 bility for the steam driven AFW pumps was defeated (T.S. 3.7.1.2). 6 The AFW system was returned to a normal line-up 14 hours after 7 being declared inoperable. The motor driven pump remained operable 8 1 being declared inoperable. The motor driven pump remained operable 8 1		consequences (0) ns, 2-CV-4071 main steam supply valve to	to the
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			750

LER NO.: 83-39/3L
Docket No.: 50-318
License No.: DPR 69
Event Date: 08-15-83
Report Date: 05-30-84
Attachment

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT'D)

On August 15, 1983, 2-CV-4071 (steam supply from number 22 Steam Generator to number 21 Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump) failed open causing number 21 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to automatically start. (Number 22 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was in standby.)

The diaphragm was replaced and the valve stroked satisfactorily. Number 21 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was aligned for automatic initiation at 1750 on August 15, 1983, terminating the event.

Upon further investigation it was revealed that the diaphragm plate nut on 2-CV-4071 was loose when disassembled and when the new diaphragm was installed it was torqued to an unknown value. The subject nut should be torqued to 400 ft./lb. per Fisher Controls.

During the shutdown of both reactors in May 1984 all valves with type 657NS actuators were disassembled, inspected, and reassembled with all nuts being torqued to their correct values under the supervision of the vendor's technical representative.

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

P.O. BOX 1475

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENT
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
LUSBY, MARYLAND 20657

May 31, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Docket No. 50-318 License No. DPR 69

Dear Sirs:

The attached revision to LER 83-39/3L is being forwarded to you for your information.

Should you have any questions regarding this report, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

L. B. Russell

Plant Superintendent

LBR:WIL:srm

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley

Director, Office of Management Information

and Program Control

Messrs: A. E. Lundvall, Jr.

J. A. Tiernan