

A-104

GPC EXH *II-104*

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USNRC

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Transcript of audiotape No. 32,
transcribed by Danette L. Holbrook, Certified Court
Reporter and Notary Public.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Docket No. 50-424/425-OLA-3 EXHIBIT NO. *GPC II-104*
In the matter of Georgia Power Co. et al., Vogtle Units 1 & 2
 Staff Applicant Intervenor Other
 Identified Received Rejected Reporter *KHW*
Date *7/11/95* Witness *Mosbaugh*

9508110245 950711
PDR ADOCK 05000424
T PDR

[SIDE B, APPROXIMATELY 1/4 THROUGH TAPE]

1 [LINES 1 through 17 DELETED]

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18 MOSBAUGH: No. I think as Mike says
19 that, you know, the engineering group is the one
20 that has worked the troubleshooting, worked with the
21 team, and worked with Rick Kendall, you know; and
22 their focus of the team has been the diesel. You
23 know, the two big impacts of the emergency that we
24 got ourselves into is the failure of the diesel to
25 perform and the failure of the plant to carry out

1 the emergency plan. Those are the two big things
2 that really went wrong and made this the magnitude
3 event that it is. NRC has yet to really dig in real
4 hard in the emergency plan area. They spent most of
5 their time digging into the diesel area, and they're
6 slowly -- they're certainly not satisfied yet, 'cause
7 they're continuing to ask for information; but
8 slowly we are resolving issues with the diesel and
9 satisfying them, and I think at some point here, you
10 know, they will be satisfied on the diesel issues
11 sufficiently to release the hold; and that's
12 particularly significant because in those two areas,
13 the emergency plan and the diesel, they not only
14 have a hold on Unit 1 which they have in the
15 confirmatory action letter; but if those areas went
16 sour or went sour sufficiently, they have the
17 potential for shutting down Unit 2. Because both of
18 those issues are generic. And so this thing could
19 have expanded. It hasn't; and, you know, it could
20 have gotten a whole lot worse because it could have
21 ended up being a Unit 2 impact as well; and I think
22 it's a tribute to everybody that was on the [GPC] team
23 with the diesel troubleshooting and all those that
24 supported that team and everybody that's helped the
25 corrective actions in the other areas. There were

1 numerous other areas like some of the things with
2 the met tower and the -- ERF -- and, you
3 know, PERMS and ENN and, you know, there's a lot of
4 different things where I think we've explained to
5 the [NRC] team's satisfaction the behavior of the plant,
6 you know; the team comes in and if you can't really
7 explain the behavior of the plant, you know, it was
8 unexpected but, you know, if you can explain the
9 behavior of the plant and if you have an explanation
10 and it seems reasonable, you know, they're
11 satisfied, you know. If they come in and you really
12 can't demonstrate that you understand where it was
13 fired from and why it was designed that way, they
14 start getting in to your design and configuration
15 control areas and say, "my God, they don't even know
16 what they got down there;" and so forth; and then,
17 you know, they start turning that into to generic
18 issues. And, you know, we've effectively stopped
19 that from happening by having the information,
20 having the expertise and providing it to the team
21 promptly, you know. There are some inadequacies,
22 you know. All these events reveal some of those,
23 you know; we learned a lot, the design of the
24 diesel, trips that we really probably don't all need
25 in there in a UV type run, you know, and functioning

1 of some of the push buttons and knowledge of the
2 first out annunciation and the diesel annunciator
3 panels and so forth, you know. There's been a lot of
4 things that have been recognized, you know, by all
5 groups, Engineering, Operations, and so forth.
6 Where an event like this reveals how good your
7 knowledge is of the plant. And I think we're
8 learning a great deal, you know, from this. I think
9 we have a great deal more to learn and do in the
10 emergency plan area. . . .

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