

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

AREA DODE SOM STATION POST OFFICE PCX 230 S7 FRANDRIVALE LOURDANA 75775

December 10, 1991 RBG- 36,097 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washirgton, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458

Enclosed is Gulf States Utilities Company's Special Report concerning an invalid failure of the Division I diesel generator at River Bend Station. This report is being submitted pursuant to River Bend Station Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2.

Sincerely,

Manager - Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group

LAE/PDG/GAE/DCH/LWS/kvm

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011

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SPECIAL REPORT

REPORTED CONDIT. ON

At 0421 on 11/12/91, with the reactor operating at 100 percent power while performing the regular monthly Surveillance Test Procedure (STP-309-0201), "Diesoi Generator Division I Operability Test," a trip occurrad on the Division I diesel generator 1EGS*EGIA. The cause of the trip was determined to be a defective low pressure lube oil pressure switch. Since this trip is bypassed in the emergency mode, this is considered an invalid failure in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108. This Special Report is provided in accordance with the requirements of River Bend Station Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2.

INVESTIGATIC'S

At 0421 on 11/12/91 the Division I diesel generator, 1EGS*EGIA was given a normal start signal for performance of the regularly scheduled monthly surveillance test (STP-309-0201). Approximately two minutes after the start signal was given, the diesel tripped. Five annunciators were received and the cause of the trip was not immediately known. The annunciators that were received were: generator loss of field, control air pressure low, jacket water low pressure trip, turbo oil pressure low trip, and lube oil pressure low trip.

Following the trip during troubleshooting efforts, the test engineer determined that the control air pressure gauge on the shutdown logic board, which should normally read about 60 psig was actually reading about 15 psig. Due to the fact that four Group II trip annunciators were received, it was determined one of the four trips had not reset when the diesel was started.

CAUSE OF FAILURE

Engineering and maintenance personnel worked together to isolate the problem. The diesel was run in the emergency rode. While the diesel was running, tubing caps were installed one at a time to identify which device failed to reset. When a tubing cap was placed on the low pressure lube oil trip line the shutdown logic board pressure increased to 60 psig. With that discovery, it was determined that pressure switch EGO*PS2A had failed to reset.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The defective pressure switch (EGO*PS2A) was replaced with a new pressure switch. Prior to installation, the new pressure switch was calibrated in accordance with the marufacturer's recommendations. After the new instal ation was completed the monthly surveillance test procedure, (STP)-309-0201 was satisfactorily completed and a leak test of all disturbed pneumatic lines was performed.

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*Length of time Diesel Cenerator was Out-of-Service:) hours

Current Surveillance Interval:

Division I Monthly Division II Monthly Division III Weekly

Test Intervals Conform to Technical Specification:

Yes

Failures for Division I:

Valid failures in the last 20 Valid Tests
Valid failures in the last 100 Valid Tests

Failures for Division II:

Valid failures in the last 20 Valid fests
Valid failures in the last 92 Valid Tests

Failures for Division III:

Valid failures in the last 20 Valid Tests
Valid failures in the last 100 Valid Tests

Number of Valid Failures in Previous 100 Valid Tests of all Diesel Generators at River Bend Station:

* The diesel generator was available to perform its safety function throughout this event. It was placed in the emergency mode to perform troubleshooting.

** This information was current at the time of the event.