ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Inspection Report: 50-498/95-15
50-499/95-15

Licenses: NPF-76
NPF-80

Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas

Facility Name: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Wadsworth, Texas

Inspection Conducted: June 5-9, 1995

Inspectors: Lawrence E. Ellershaw, Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Claude E. Johnson, Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Approved: Dale A. Powers 7/1/95
Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Maintenance Branch Date
Division of Reactor Safety

Inspection Summary

Areas Inspected (Units 1 and 2): Routine, announced inspection of licensee's surveillance procedures and records, actions on previous inspection findings, and followup of licensee event reports.

Results (Units 1 and 2):

Plant Operations

- Not applicable during this inspection.

Engineering

- The engineering staff addressed concerns related to excessive degradation of boraflex material in the spent fuel pools in a prudent and conservative manner. Proper actions were taken to assure that the design basis for limiting K_{eff} to ≤ 0.95 in the spent fuel pool was being complied with (Section 4.1).

Maintenance

- The surveillance procedure enhancement program has been effective and has made a marked improvement in the overall quality of surveillance procedures (Section 2.2).

- The development of a basis document for each of the enhanced surveillance procedures was considered a strength in the licensee's program (Section 2.2).

- The instrumentation and control technicians and the control room operators performed the observed surveillance tests in an excellent manner. Communications and repeat backs were clear, and double verification was conducted during each of the observed surveillance tests (Section 2.3).

- The incorporation of surveillance test results into the body of surveillance procedures allowed elimination of separate test data sheet attachments, and was considered to be a positive result of the procedural enhancement process. From a records perspective, this provided for a single and complete data base for any given surveillance test performed, and satisfied the associated Technical Specification requirements (Section 2.4).

- Establishment of an inservice testing program bases document was a strength in the licensee's program (Section 3.2).

Plant Support

- Not applicable during this inspection.

Management Overview

- Not applicable during this inspection.

Summary of Inspection Findings:

- Inspection Followup Item 498;499/9419-02 was closed (Section 3.1).

- Inspection Followup Item 498;499/9419-05 was closed (Section 3.2).

- Inspection Followup Item 498;499/9419-04 was closed (Section 3.3).

- Violation 498/9315-02 was closed (Section 3.4).

- Licensee Event Report 498/95-002 was reviewed but not closed (Section 4.1).

Attachments:

- Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
- Attachment 2 - Documents Reviewed

DETAILS

1 PLANT STATUS

During this inspection period, both units were in Mode 1 full-power operation.

2 SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES AND RECORDS (67100)

The objective of this part of the inspection was to ascertain whether the surveillance of safety-related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with approved procedures as required by the Technical Specifications, and inservice testing programs for pumps and valves.

2.1 Background

The inspectors discussed the surveillance procedure enhancement program with a licensee representative and found that, in 1993, a multi-year action plan to revise operations and maintenance surveillance procedures was developed because the licensee and the NRC had identified numerous problems associated with surveillance test procedures. The licensee, in an initial effort, selected and revised 51 procedures based on risk associated with reactor trips or engineered safety features actuation.

The inspectors were informed that the objectives of the enhancement program were to (1) ensure that surveillance procedures were technically adequate to provide assurance that equipment will perform intended safety functions, (2) ensure that surveillance procedures complied with Technical Specifications, (3) establish a documented technical basis for future reference, (4) minimize the risk of reactor trips, (5) make procedures user friendly, and (6) reduce duplication. In 1994, during restart of Unit 1, errors were discovered in some of the 51 procedures that had undergone the enhancement process. Because of these errors, the enhancement criteria were reevaluated, the scope of the upgrade plan was increased to include all surveillance procedures, and the completion date was extended to December 1998.

2.2 Surveillance Procedure Review

The inspectors randomly selected Technical Specification surveillance tests related to the reactor coolant system, instrumentation, electrical power systems, containment, and reactivity control to verify that they were controlled by properly approved surveillance test procedures. Some procedures had been enhanced and some had not. The inspectors were informed that enhancement completion of surveillance test procedures was prioritized based on risk evaluation. The inspectors also selected inservice tests associated with centrifugal charging pumps, fire protection system valve operability, spent fuel pool cooling pumps, and residual heat removal pumps and verified that they were controlled by properly approved procedures. The reviewed inservice testing procedures had been enhanced. All of the reviewed procedures are listed in Attachment 2 to this report.

The inspectors interviewed the contract technical writers responsible for developing the enhanced procedures in order to get an insight into how they thought the enhanced surveillance procedure program was working. The technical writers informed the inspectors that, based on the feedback that they had received from personnel using the enhanced procedures, the program was working well.

The inspectors were also informed by the technical writers that a bases document was developed for each enhanced procedure. The bases document provided the basis for each step in procedures. Before revising or deleting a procedural step, a reviewer must refer back to the bases document which described the basis for the step. This information helped minimize the potential for deleting essential steps from a procedure during a revision process. The inspectors asked the technical writers if a desk top guide, or similar document, was used to develop the bases documents in order to maintain consistency. The technical writers stated that they did not use a desktop guide; however, they worked together closely to develop each bases document. The inspectors noted that each writer was able to provide comments and there was pride of ownership associated with the development of each bases document. The inspectors were also informed that each technical writer was cognizant of the basic reference documents, such as the Updated Safety Analysis Report, vendor manuals, drawings, commitments, and technical standards used to develop the bases documents. The inspectors reviewed the bases document for Procedure OPSP03-PS-0001, "Primary Sampling System Valve Operability Test," and determined that it was an excellent document for the stated purposes. There were no regulatory requirements identified for this bases document; therefore, the inspectors considered this to be a strength in the licensee's surveillance program.

The project manager of the enhancement program informed the inspectors that approximately 480 Technical Specification surveillance procedures have been reduced to 280 procedures through the enhancement process. Approximately 620 procedures remained to go through the process. The project was approximately 44 percent complete.

The inspectors determined that the reviewed enhanced surveillance procedures were clear, detailed, user friendly, and technically adequate. They contained clear prerequisites, detailed precaution statements, sufficient acceptance criteria, and clear instructions for restoring equipment to service. The technical content of the enhanced surveillance procedures was good and the format was consistent. The inspectors found the bases document for the enhanced procedure to be an excellent document for historical purposes. The inspectors determined the surveillance enhancement program was resulting in a strengthening of the licensee's surveillance program.

2.3 Observation Of Work Activities/Interviews With Site Personnel

The inspectors observed instrumentation and control technicians conduct the safety injection accumulator pressure analog channel operability test, and

partially observed a containment hydrogen analyzer operability and analog channel operability test. The technicians were knowledgeable of the equipment used and procedural requirements. The technicians maintained good communications between themselves and the control room staff during the conduct of the surveillance tests. The inspectors observed the technicians perform double verification during the above surveillances. Overall, the technicians performed the observed surveillance tests in an excellent manner.

The inspectors also observed the control room operators perform Procedure OPSP03-DG-0003, "Standby Diesel 13(23) Operability Test," Revision 2. The control room operators performed the operability test of the diesel in an excellent manner, and in accordance with the procedure. Repeat backs were clear, and double verification of each control room manipulation was conducted by the shift technical advisor and the unit supervisor.

The inspectors concluded that the instrumentation and control technicians and the control room operators performed the surveillance tests in an excellent manner. Communications and repeat backs were clear, and double verification was conducted during each of the observed surveillance tests.

2.4 Records Review

The inspectors reviewed records from recently completed surveillance tests, and also observed in-process records being completed during observation of surveillance tests. The enhanced surveillance procedures provided for documenting the test results within the body of the procedure. This procedural enhancement eliminated test data attachments, which the inspectors considered to be a positive move. From a records perspective, the enhanced procedures provided a single and complete data base for each surveillance test performed. The inspectors verified that completed tests were in conformance with Technical Specifications, procedural requirements, and had been properly reviewed by appropriate personnel. The inspectors also verified that surveillance tests were performed within the time limitations specified by the Technical Specifications.

The inspectors concluded that the reviewed surveillance records satisfied the Technical Specifications and applicable procedures.

3 FOLLOWUP - MAINTENANCE (92902)

3.1 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 50-498;499/9419-02: Licensee Identified Problems Associated With Surveillance Test Procedures During The Ongoing Enhancement Project

3.1.1 Original NRC Followup Item

Since the licensee had identified problems associated with surveillance test procedures during the ongoing procedure enhancement project, and the fact that significant importance was attached to the project, the inspectors considered this issue as an inspection followup item.

3.1.2 Licensee Action in Response to the Inspection Followup Item

The licensee committed to upgrade all surveillance procedures. This program was about 44 percent complete and scheduled for completion in December 1998.

3.1.3 Inspector Action During the Present Inspection

As stated in Section 2, the inspectors observed control room operators, and instrumentation and control technicians conduct surveillance activities using enhanced surveillance procedures. Enhanced surveillance procedures reviewed by the inspectors were user friendly. They contained clear prerequisites, detailed precautions statements, sufficient acceptance criteria, and clear instructions for returning equipment back to service. The technical content of the new enhanced surveillance procedures was good, and the format was consistent. Site personnel using the new enhanced procedures spoke highly of them. They stated that the new enhanced procedures were definitely better and user friendly. The inspectors did not get any negative feedback on the new enhanced procedures.

3.1.4 Conclusions

The inspectors concluded, after review of the enhanced surveillance procedures, observation of surveillance activities using new enhanced procedures, and interviews with personnel using these procedures, that the enhanced surveillance program was definitely having a positive effect. The licensee's surveillance enhancement program was accomplishing what it was intended to do, and was an effective program improvement.

3.2 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 50-498;499/9419-05: Development of a Bases Document for the South Texas Project Inservice Testing Program

3.2.1 Original NRC Followup Item

NRC draft NUREG-1482, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants," published November 1993, recommended that each licensee create a bases document for its inservice testing program. Bases documents typically have included a description of the methodology used for preparing the inservice testing program, the basis for including or excluding pumps or valves in the inservice testing program, and the testing applied to each component. The inspection followup item pertained to NRC review of the bases document.

3.2.2 Licensee Action in Response to the Followup Item

On August 10, 1994, the licensee identified and documented in Station Problem Report 941538 that the standby diesel generator starting air receiver inlet check valves (both units) were not being tested in accordance with ASME Section XI and Technical Specification 4.0.5 requirements. The cause of this condition was determined to be an inadequate review of the function of these check valves when the inservice testing program was initially developed.

This resulted in the establishment of certain corrective actions, including the development of an inservice testing program bases document.

3.2.3 Inspector Action During the Present Inspection

The inspectors discussed this item with the engineering program personnel responsible for the inservice testing program, and were provided a copy of the "South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 & 2, Inservice Testing Program Bases Document." The document had not received final approval, but the inspectors were informed that this was imminent. As the document was being assembled, each completed section had been routed to the designated department managers for review and comment. This process was expected to provide an expeditious final review and approval, which was the stage that the document was in during this inspection.

The inspectors reviewed the bases document and recognized that a significant effort had been expended by the responsible licensee personnel during its development. The scope of the program was defined by the identification of pumps and valves subject to testing, as well as the determination of the types of tests applicable to the program-included pumps and valves. The document also provided an overview of the current requirements applicable to the inservice test program, and established the criteria for component evaluations and types of tests. The document included: a description of the methodology for preparing the inservice testing program; a listing of each ASME Code pump and valve; the bases for inclusion or exclusion of the listed pumps and valves in the inservice testing program; and the basis for the identified testing applicable to each component.

3.2.4 Conclusions

The inspectors did not evaluate the bases document for completeness in terms of component inclusion, but only in terms of its being in accordance with the recommendations and guidance contained in the final version of NUREG-1482, published in April 1995.

The inspectors concluded that the establishment of an inservice testing program bases document was a strength, which clearly showed the results of the significant effort that went into its development. The inspectors further concluded that the bases document, although not required by the NRC, would clearly be beneficial to the licensee in ensuring inservice testing program continuity, would enable plant staff to clearly understand the reasons for inclusion or exclusion of components, and would provide a useful reference for reviews performed under 10 CFR 50.59 when changes are made to the plant.

3.3 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 50-498;499/9419-04: Incomplete Corrective Actions

3.3.1 Original NRC Followup Item

This followup item was initiated because the licensee, during a self-assessment of the Unit 2 startup, had identified additional discrepancies in the inservice testing program. At the time of the inspection, a number of corrective actions had been proposed; some had been completed, but others remained open. The most significant of the remaining actions included: submitting the Unit 1 and Unit 2 inservice test plan supplements to the NRC; ensuring that followup to NRC, correspondence requiring a response, and commitments made to the NRC, were properly tracked; and, revising the inservice test plans to ensure that future submittals of relief requests were separate from new revisions to the inservice test plans.

3.3.2 Licensee Action in Response to the Followup Item

The Unit 1 and Unit 2 inservice test plan supplements (Supplement 1 to Revision 6 - Unit 1, and Supplement 1 to Revision 4 - Unit 2) were submitted to the NRC under Letter ST-HL-AE-4788 dated June 14, 1994.

Procedure OPGP05-ZN-0006, "Preparation of Correspondence to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission," Revision 0, was issued on June 30, 1994. This procedure contained guidelines and requirements for the preparation, accuracy, and completeness of information sent to the NRC, and the proper tracking and implementation of commitments made to the NRC.

On July 5, 1994, the licensee revised Procedures OPGP03-ZE-0021 "Inservice Test Program for Valves," and OPGP03-ZE-0022, "Inservice Test Program for Pumps," to Revisions 7 and 8, respectively. The revisions incorporated steps which stated "to ensure proper attention is given to Relief Requests requiring NRC approval, they shall be submitted to the NRC separate from any new revision to the IST Plan."

3.3.3 Inspector Action During the Present Inspection

The inspectors verified that the licensee had submitted the Unit 1 and Unit 2 inservice test plan supplements to the NRC. The submittals were acknowledged by the NRC in a letter dated August 16, 1994. While the inspectors verified that the actions associated with establishing and revising the above procedures had been accomplished, verification of implementation was not possible, in that the licensee had not submitted any Relief Requests or inservice test plan revisions since the procedures were revised.

3.3.4 Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the licensee had taken the appropriate actions to eliminate any concerns associated with this inspection followup item.

3.4 (Closed) Violation 50-498/9315-02: Failure to Follow Maintenance Instructions

3.4.1 Original NRC Violation

This violation, which was identified by the licensee on April 21, 1993, pertained to the failure of maintenance personnel to follow maintenance instructions provided in Procedure OPMP05-SI-0001, "High Head Safety Injection Pump Motor Inspection," Revision 1, by adding approximately 22 quarts of oil rather than the prescribed 11 quarts to the upper bearing oil chamber of High Head Safety Injection Pump 1C.

3.4.2 Licensee Action in Response to the Violation

Station Problem Report 931387 was initiated on April 21, 1993, to document and establish corrective actions for the violation. The evaluation determined that the cause of the incident was essentially a human factors and procedural issue. Specifically involved was an unquestioning attitude on the part of a maintenance technician combined with insufficient guidance in a procedure regarding the amount of oil to be added and the correct orientation of the oil level sight glass upon reinstallation.

As a result, Procedure OPMP05-SI-0001 was revised to Revision 2, which provided specific guidance regarding the amount of oil required to fill the bearing sumps, and indicated the required amount of oil on the data sheet. In addition, if it was found necessary to remove the sight glass, the procedure required matchmarking of the oil level sight glasses to the gauge and motor to ensure proper reinstallation. Meetings and seminars, which focused on human performance and the changes to the procedure, were conducted with maintenance personnel.

3.4.3 Inspector Action During the Present Inspection

The inspectors, by review of Procedure OPMP05-SI-0001, verified that the above procedural changes had occurred. The inspectors also verified, by review of records, that the meetings and seminars had been held with the maintenance personnel.

3.4.4 Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the above actions were appropriate for correcting the problem and minimizing recurrence of similar incidents.

4 ONSITE REVIEW OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (92700)

4.1 (Open) Licensee Event Report 498/95-002: Excessive Degradation of Boraflex Neutron Poison Found in the South Texas Project Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks

The licensee submitted Licensee Event Report 498/95-002, dated February 23, 1995, which addressed boraflex degradation in several Region 1 spent fuel pool fuel storage racks in Unit 1.

Early in 1993, the licensee became aware of a boraflex degradation problem reported by Palisades Nuclear Power Station in Licensee Event Report 255/93-007. This report noted up to 90 percent disintegration or complete deterioration of boraflex material in surveillance coupons. Also in 1993, the NRC issued Information Notice 93-70, "Degradation of Boraflex Neutron Absorber Coupons," which addressed similar conditions identified at other licensee facilities. Recognizing the similarities in length of service with respect to the fuel racks at Palisades and South Texas Project (i.e., about 5 years), Station Problem Report 932582 was issued on August 30, 1993, to document the Palisades problem as one which had potential for becoming an issue at South Texas Project. This also provided a means to administratively track the issue and to perform an "Operability/Reportability Review" on the potential loss of boraflex in the spent fuel racks.

The review pointed out that Technical Specification 5.6.1.1a required that the K_{eff} of the spent fuel racks be maintained at ≤ 0.95 when flooded with unborated water. The review also noted that if the boraflex totally disappeared, the k_{eff} of the spent fuel pool would still be ≤ 0.95 since the boron concentration of the pool water at South Texas Project is maintained at a nominal 2500 ppm. Therefore, it was concluded that there was no operability concern for the spent fuel racks. It was also concluded that there was no reportability concern for the K_{eff} since the design limit of 0.95 would still be met, assuming a complete loss of boraflex. However, since there was no data to show the condition of the boraflex panels in the spent fuel racks, and a licensing commitment was made to perform boraflex surveillance after irradiated fuel had been stored in the racks for 5 years, the reactor engineering department made arrangements for a vendor to perform a boraflex surveillance inspection during 1994. In addition, operations revised Procedure OPOP02-FC-0001 (Field Change 93-1389) to require a minimum of 2500 ppm boron concentration in the spent fuel pools.

The surveillance activities, performed on Unit 1 during August and October 1994, consisted of boraflex blackness testing (a measurement of neutron attenuation) and visual inspection of the boraflex surveillance coupons. Initial results showed the existence of boraflex degradation. The South Texas Project spent fuel racks were of two designs, each being designated by a region number. Region 1 racks consisted of cells with a higher pitch (medium-high density fuel assembly storage spacing) while Region 2 racks consisted of cells with a lesser pitch (high-density fuel assembly storage spacing).

Eight storage cells in Region 2 were tested and no degradation was detected. Thirty seven cells in Region 1 were tested, and 20 cells showed indications of degradation. Included in the 20 cells, were 8 cells that had, through fuel storage, received accelerated exposure rates. Six of these cells showed evidence of substantial loss of boraflex. The two other cells had even more degradation, to the extent where the loss of boraflex was observed to extend up to 8 and 30 inches, respectively. The large lengths of boraflex loss was attributed to spent fuel pool flow erosion of the radiation-damaged plastic boraflex matrix.

These initial observations resulted in the issuance of Station Problem Report 941583 on August 16, 1994, in order to alert management to the preliminary results of the blackness testing. The Station Problem Report also addressed generic implications with respect to Unit 2, and noted that the nearly identical racks in Unit 2 were expected to experience the same degree of boraflex degradation. Therefore, all corrective actions developed for Unit 1 were applied to Unit 2, and no blackness testing or coupon surveillance was planned for Unit 2.

In conjunction with the issuance of Station Problem Report 941583, the licensee initiated Justification for Continued Operation 94-940005 on August 18, 1994. The Justification for Continued Operation provided a comprehensive discussion of the issue, and established compensatory actions in order to ensure that the criticality limit was satisfied. The actions, which were verified by the inspectors to have been implemented, involved revisions to procedures. Procedure OPOP02-FC-0001 "Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Revision 6, stated that the spent fuel pool "boron concentration SHALL be maintained greater than 2500 ppm." It also included steps for verification that boron concentration had equalized to at least 2500 ppm across mixed bed demineralizers in the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system prior to the beds being placed in service. Surveillance Procedure OPSP07-ZC-0001, "Boron Determination for Borated Systems," Revision 8, stated that whenever fuel assemblies were stored in the spent fuel pool, then the boron concentration must be sampled at least once every 7 days and must be $\geq$2500 ppm. The inspectors reviewed a document which contained all boron concentration samplings taken since December 1, 1994, for Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent fuel pools. The document showed that spent fuel pool samplings were taken at least once every seven days, and equalization across the mixed bed demineralizers were performed prior to placing the beds in service. There were no instances identified where boron concentration did not meet a minimum of 2500 ppm. In addition, Procedure OPEP02-ZM-0005, "Internal Transfer of Fuel Assemblies," Revision 4 addressed the use of the fuel transfer form, a document that authorized movement of specific fuel assemblies and locations. This document required approval of the reactor engineering supervisor and the shift supervisor prior to fuel movement. The inspectors also reviewed a computerized form used by control room personnel during the most recent Unit 1 refueling outage (1RE05), which started on March 26, 1995. This form prohibited placement of any fuel assemblies into the eight Region 1 cells that had been identified as exhibiting excessive gaps or washout of boraflex.

The justification for continued operation also established long-term corrective actions, with the basic premise being that the resolution of the issue revolved around the requirement that the limit of K_{eff} be attained using unborated water. Therefore, one proposed corrective action was aimed at obtaining credit for soluble boron in the design basis and changing the South Texas Project Technical Specifications. The other two proposed corrective actions dealt with evaluating options for adding additional poisons to the fuel racks and/or fuel assemblies stored in the racks, or replacing the boraflex with a material of similar neutron absorbing properties. The target date for completion of these actions was established as August 18, 1995.

These long-term corrective actions were further defined and incorporated into the long-term boraflex management plan, which was addressed in the licensee event report, along with the development of a dose-to-degradation correlation to aid in establishing restrictions on future cell usage in Units 1 and 2. The due date for determining the most feasible option along with implementation dates has been established as August 1, 1995.

The inspectors were made aware of a Westinghouse document, "Criticality Analysis of the South Texas Units 1 & 2 Spent Fuel Racks," which was an attachment to a letter dated May 8, 1992, from Westinghouse Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division to the licensee. The analysis performed by Westinghouse indicated that approximately 1300 ppm boron concentration would be sufficient to maintain $K_{eff} \leq 0.95$ without the presence of boraflex. Allowing a margin of 700 ppm for accident conditions (i.e., a misplaced or dropped fuel assembly), a soluble boron value of 2000 ppm would maintain the K_{eff} limit under operational conditions without taking credit for any boraflex. Since the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool was procedurally required to be maintained at a minimum of 2500 ppm, with verification at least once every seven days, and a prohibition against placing fuel assemblies in fuel rack cells identified as having excessive degradation, the licensee determined that no safety issue existed.

The inspectors were made aware, by licensee representatives, that another licensee who had experienced similar boraflex degradation was preparing to submit a proposal to NRC for a Technical Specification amendment that would allow credit for borated water in the spent fuel pool. The inspectors were informed that this was preliminary information and that no formal actions had occurred.

While this discussion only provided a status of the licensee event report, the inspectors concluded that, to date, the licensee had performed in a prudent and conservative manner, and taken the proper actions to assure that the design basis (i.e., limiting K_{eff} to ≤ 0.95) was being complied with.

ATTACHMENT 1

1 PERSONS CONTACTED

1.1 Licensee Personnel

H. Butterworth, Manager, Operations Support
D. Clark, Consulting Engineer, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing
K. Coates, Manager, Maintenance, Unit 2
W. Cottle, Group Vice President, Nuclear
H. Dannhardt, Supervisor, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing
R. Ferguson, Licensing Engineer
A. Granger, Quality Administrator
J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
R. Harris, Consulting Engineer, Support Engineering Department
S. Head, Supervisor, Licensing Compliance
D. Hoppes, Supervisor, Nuclear Fuels
B. Humble, Manager, Reliability Engineering
M. Johnson, Associate Licensing Specialist
M. Lashley, Supervisor, Section XI, Support Engineering Department
D. Leazar, Director, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis
J. Lovell, Manager, Operations
L. Martin, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing
R. Masse, Plant Manager, Unit 2
J. Noftsger, Project Manager, Operations Support
S. Query, Project Manager
S. Rosen, Manager, Industrial Relations

1.2 NRC Personnel

J. Keeton, Resident Inspector
W. Sifre, Resident Inspector

The personnel listed above attended the exit meeting. In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.

2 EXIT MEETING

An exit meeting was conducted on June 9, 1995. During this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not express a position on the inspection findings documented in this report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.

ATTACHMENT 2

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES

**OPEP03-FA-0101, "Fire Detection System Detector Operability Test," Revision 4

**OPEP03-FP-0101, "Fire Protection Systems Valve Position Verification," Revision 4

**OPSP02-CM-4105, "Containment Hydrogen Analyzer ACOT," Revision 0

**OPSP02-CM-4105A, "Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Operability Test," Revision 0

* OPSP02-SI-0950, "SI Accumulator Level ACOT," Revision 1

* OPSP02-SI-0960, "SI Accumulator Pressure ACOT," Revision 1

* OPSP03-CV-0001, "Centrifugal Charging Pump 1A(2A)" Inservice Testing," Revision 0

* OPSP03-DG-0003, "Standby Diesel 13(23) Operability Test," Revision 2

**OPSP03-EA-0002, "ESF Power Availability," Revision 2

* OPSP03-FC-0002, "Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 1A(2A) Inservice Test," Revision 3

* OPSP03-FP-0001, "Fire Protection System Valve Operability Test," Revision 1

**OPSP03-NI-0001, "Power Range NI Channel Calibration," Revision 8

* OPSP03-RH-0001, "Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A(2A) Inservice Test," Revision 0

**OPSP03-SI-0016, "Containment Integrity Checklist," Revision 1

**OPSP05-NI-0043B, "Power Range Detector N43 High Voltage Plateau Evaluation," Revision 1

* OPSP07-ZC-0001, "Boron Determination for Borated Systems," Revision 8

OTHER PROCEDURES

OPEP02-ZM-0005, "Internal Transfer of Fuel Assemblies," Revision 4

OPMP05-SI-0001, High Head Safety Injection Pump Motor Inspection," Revision 2

OPOP02-FC-0001, "Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Revision 6

* Enhanced ** Not Enhanced