

Callaway Plant

DCD

December 5, 1952

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, CC 20555

ULNRC-2526

Gentlemen:

DOCKET NUMBER 50-483

CAJLAWAY FLANT UNIT 1

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-30
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 91-006-00

A REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A FAILURE OF A

GATING/SEQUENCING CARD IN THE INVERTER
FOR A 120 VOLT AC INSTRUMENT BUS

The enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) concerning a reactor trip due to a failure of a gating/sequencing card in the inverter for a 120 volt AC instrument bus.

J. D. Blosser

Manager, Callaway Plant

JDB/TPS/MAH/171

Enclosure

cc: Distribution attached

1(1

6 10

'cc. distribution for ULNRC-2526

Mr. A. Bert Davis
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regior. III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Fllyn, IL 60137

Manager, Electric Department Missouri Public Service Commission P.O. Box 360 Jefferson City, MO 65102

Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC Senior Resident Inspector

Mr. J. P Hall (2 copies) U.S. Nuc_ear Regulatory Commission OWFN - Mail Stop 13E21 Washington, D.C. 20555

Supervisor Licensing Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. P. C. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839

Mr. R. L. Hague Chief, Project Section 3C U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Lion III Last Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED DIMENO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/10/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN FER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTE REGARDING BUILDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND EUPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (FS30). U.E. NUCLEAR REQUESTION Y WASHINGTON DO 20055 AND TO THE FAFERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 31500108). DEFICE

		4		المراجع						DEMENT AND BL			N. D.C 205	03
FACILITY									10	OCKET NUMBER	(2)	-	FAC	18 191
and the second second		ay Pl	ant	Unit 1						0 15 10 10	10141	8 [3]	1 OF	0 6
YIYLE IA	A R	Velt		ip Due To Instrument		e Of A Gat	ing/	Sequen	cing Card	In The	Invert	er I	or A	
EVE	ENT DATE	(6)	-	LER NUMBER (Account to have a second	BEPORT DATE	(3)		OTHER	ACILITIES INVO	LVED (#)			
MONTH	DAY	Y £ 6.00	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	解析で発売SSV からが移る。数	MONTH DAY	YEAR		FACILITY NAM	11.5	DOCKETA	OMBER	(8)	
											0 5	010	0	1 1
1 1	0 5	9 1	9 1	006	00	1 2 0 5 5	1				0 5	0 1 0	0	
	RATING		THIS R	SPORT IS BURNITTE	D PURSUANT 1	O THE REQUIREMEN	NYS OF 10	OFR 5 10	mack one or more o	f the followings (1	(1)			
MI	DDE (8)	- 1	21	402(6)		20.406(e)		.X.	80 73(4:(2)(x)		73.7	1.660		
POWE			Second .	2.406(a)(1.11)	and the same	60.36(((1))			80 73(4)(2)(4)		75.7	1907		
(18)	-	0.10	demant.	0.606 (a (15 (1))	- Lancia	50.36(c)(2)		mar a	50.73(x)(2)(v))				That WA	
			the same of	AMERICANUS.		\$0.73(x1)2(1)		-	- 100 アネルコスコミッパナル		3664	V		
			000.44	D.408(a)(1)(re)	parent.	86 T3(a1(2)(ii)		-	50 73 kilživini (B					
-	-	and the later of t	21	7.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(e1(21(ii))			90.73(e)(2)(e)	CHICAGO CO	L		- marine de la companya de la compa	-
NAME					and the same of the	CENSES CONTACT	CH THIS	LER (12)		-	TELEPHON	V 51 110	energy of	
										AREA CODE	1	E WUNG		
R. I	Af	folte	r. S	uperintend	ent. Sys	tems Engin	cerin	12		3,1 14	6 . 7.	6.0	A. 2	4 . 0
	-	and the same			al and the local districts in	EACH COMPONENT	-		D IN THIS REPORT		1111	-		
		-		MANUFAC	REZORTABLE					*				
CAUSE	BYSTEM	COMP	JABAT	TURER	TO NERDS		CAULE	SYSTEM	COMMONENT	TURER	TO NA			
Х	ElI	EIC	BD	W ₁ 3 ₁ 5 ₁ 1	Y					111				
									111	111				
		AND DESCRIPTION OF THE	-	BUPPLEME	NTAL REPORT	EXPLOTED (14)				EXPECT		MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 species i.e. approximately tifteen single-specie typewritten lines) (16)

YES IT VAL COMPLETE EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE:

On 11/5/91, at 1031 CST, a reactor trip occurred due to the failure of a gating/sequencing card in the inverter (NN12) supplying a 120 volt AC safety-related instrument bus (NN02). The NN02 bus was de-energized. This failed a controlling feedwater channel resulting in a high water level in the 'A' steam generator which caused a Turbine Trip signal. The reactor trip occurred on a Unit Trip/Turbine Trip signal. A Feedwater Isolation and an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation were generated by design. The plant was in Mode 1 - Power Operations at 100 percent reactor power. The reactor coolant system temperature was 588 degrees F and the pressure was 2237 psig. The licensed operators recovered from the trip and the Engineered Safety Feature actuations via plant procedures. The NN02 bus was energized from backup power via the Sola transformer at 1109. The failed inverter card was replaced and the inverter lined up to NN02 at 0242 on 11/6/91.

The plant was returned to Mode 1 - Power Operations at 2018 on 11/6/91. Corrective actions include: an analysis of the card failure; a determination if additional preventive maintenance for this card is necessary; procedures will be developed with NN bus load information for operator use; and operator training on this type of event will be developed and performed.

APPROVED DMB ND 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 800 MRS. FORWARD COMMENTS RESARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (FEBUL 15 NOCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20665 AND TO THE PARENWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603

TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)								LER NUMBER (6)								FAGE (B)		
									Y	LAR		88 Q	MER	I	REV B	DN EE		T		-
Callaway Plant Unit 1	0	6	0	0	0	14	18	13	9	1	nine	0	016	_	01	0	01	2 OF	0	¥4

TEXT Iff more appose is required, use additional NRC Form 3654's/ (17).

BADIS FOR REPORTABILITY

Qm 11/5/91, at 1031 CST, a reactor trip occurred upon a turbine trip after the loss of control power to an instrument bus. This event is reportable per 10CFR5G.73(a)(2)(iv) to report the Reactor Protection System (1) and Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) (2) actuations (i.e. Feedwater Isolation and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation).

PLANT CONDITIONS AT TIME OF EVENT:

Mode 1 - Power Operations 100 percent reactor power
Reactor Coolant System (RCS): Temperature (average) - 588 degrees F;
Pressure - 2237 psig

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On 11/5/91, at 0645 CST, utility engineers were notified by the licensed operators of abnormal noise in the 120 volt AC safety-related instrument inverter (NN12) (3). Electricians and engineers began investigating the noise in the NN12 cabinet. At 1029, the NN12 inverter failed and de-energized its supplied bus NN02 (4). This resulted in trip signals being sent for one channel in each of the four steam generators. The multiple failed channels included the controlling channels (5) for the 'A' and 'D' steam generator feedwater control systems. This caused the feedwater demand signals in both steam generators to increase feedwater flow, thus raising their water levels.

In the Control Room, numerous alarms and annunciators (6) were received when NN12 failed. Some of these alarms and failed indications gave the licensed operators conflicting information, such as low steam generator level alarms and indications while two steam generator real feedwater flows and levels were increasing. The licensed operators knew that NN02 had de-energized, but could not immediately determine the effects on the plant. They concentrated on stabilizing steam generator 'D' level since its level was rising faster than the others and its narrow range level recorder had pegged. The operators selected to the operable controlling channel for 'D' steam generator, but did not change the controlling channel for 'A' steam generator since its level change was slower. The level rise in 'D' steam generator was reversed, but now more feedwater was made available to the 'A' steam generator and its level quickly reached the high level trip setpoint. At 1031, two minutes after NN02 was de-energized, the reactor tripped as the result of a Unit Trip/Turbine Trip signal. The high 'A' steam generator level had caused the Turbine Trip. A Feedwater Isolation and an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation were generated by design with the reactor trip.

NES FORM 366A

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

SULATORY COMMISSION APPROLED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4:30-92

TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BUPDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F630) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20565 AND TO THE FAFERWORK REQUICTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)									LE	R NUMBER	PAGE (3)					
								Y	LAR		NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER				
Callaway Plant Unit 1	0 6	0	10	0	14	18	13	9	11	1000	0 0 6	-	0 10	0 3	OF	0	14

TEXT (If more space is required, use estateane NAC Form MEA's) (17)

The licensed operators recovered from the trip and the Engineered Safety Feature actuations via plant procedures. The NNO2 bus was energized from backup power via the Sola transformer at 1109. The failed inverter card was replaced and the inverter lined up to NNO2 at 0242 on 11/6/91. The plant was returned to Mode 1 - Power Operations at 2018 at 11/6/91.

ROOT CAUSE:

The NN12 inverter gating/sequencing card failed (C). This resulted in a rising water level in both the 'A' and 'D' steam generators since the controlling level channels selected caused the feedwater regulating valves to go full open. The high level trip setpoint was reached in 'A' steam generator before the operators could select away from the failed channel and stabilize its level rise.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:

- The cause of the gating/sequencing card failure has not been determined. There is no indication that the NN12 cabinet investigation by the electricians and engineers contributed to the card failure.
- 2. At the time of this event, a review was being performed to determine what components would be affected by a loss of NNO2. This was preparation for an outage on this bus that had been scheduled for the following week. The gathering of this information had been on-going for several weeks and was not completed. Consequently, this information was not yet available to the operators. Although the operators selected to the correct controlling channel for one steam generator, they did not immediately know the extent of the instrumentation failures due to the de-energized NNO2 bus.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

- A degraded gating/sequencing card in a similar inverter (NN14) had been replaced during planned maintenance on 10/25/91. Both cards will be sent to the vendor for testing to determine failure cause. When the results of this testing are completed, the following additional evaluations will be performed as applicable.
 - a. An evaluation will be performed to determine if additional preventive maintenance is necessary.
 - b. An evaluation will be performed to determine whether this type of card or components on it should be replaced with a different model.

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST SOO HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-830). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 2006S, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 2007.

LICEN	SEE	EVE	NT	REP	ORT	(LER
TE	XT	CON	TIN	UAT	ION	

PACILITY NAME (1)	DOOKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (E)	PAGE (3)		
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL MEVICON NUMBER			
Callaway Plant Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 8 3	911 - 01016 - 010	014 010 14		

TEXT IS more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's/ (17)

- 2. The project to identify components affected by loss of NNO2 has been completed. Similar research will be performed on the remaining two buses, NNO1 and NNO3. When this research is completed, the following actions will be taken:
 - a. Procedures will be developed to make this information readily available to the operators.
 - b. Classroom and simulator training will be developed and performed on scenarios similar to this event.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The plant safety systems performed as required. There was no detrimental effect on plant equipment as a result of the actuations. There was no threat to the health and safety of the public.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

None

FOOTNOTES:

The system and component codes below are from the IEEE Standards 805-1983 and 803A-1983, respectively.

- 1. System JC
- 2. System JE
- 3. System EI, Component INVT
- 4. System . EE, Component . BU
- 5. System JB, Component TC
- 6. System IB
- 7. System EI, Component XFMR
- 8. System EI, Component ECBD
 - Westinghouse model no. 3443072G01