

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-263/84-08(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-263

License No. DPR-22

Licensee: Northern States Power Company  
414 Nicollet Mall  
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, MN

Inspection Conducted: April 8 through May 1, 1984

Inspector: *W D Shafer for*  
C. H. Brown

5-17-84  
Date

Approved By: *W D Shafer for*  
D. C. Boyd, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section 2C

5-17-84  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 8 - May 1, 1984 (Report No. 50-263/84-08(DPRP))  
Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of previous inspection findings; IE Circulars; previous enforcement actions; TMI NUREG-0737 items; onsite review committee; and long term shutdown. The inspection involved a total of 92 inspector-hours onsite by 1 NRC inspector including 26 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.  
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

- \*W. A. Shamlu, Plant Manager
- M. H. Clarity, Assistant to the Plant Manager
- \*D. E. Nevinski, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Rad. Protection
- H. M. Kendall, Plant Office Manager
- \*D. D. Antony, Superintendent of Operations
- W. E. Anderson, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
- R. L. Scheinost, Superintendent, Quality Engineering
- \*J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security and Services
- L. H. Waldinger, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- W. J. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
- W. W. Albold, Superintendent of Maintenance
- B. D. Day, Superintendent, Operations Engineering
- L. L. Nolan, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services

The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the technical and engineering staffs and reactor and auxiliary operators.

\*Denotes those licensee representatives attending the management exit interviews.

### 2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings

- a. (Closed) Noncompliance (263/78-13-01(DPRP)): The Quality Engineer did not review and approve the resolution of discrepancies identified during the receipt inspection of purchase orders. The four purchase orders (M-82127, M-79370, M-55118 and M-55248) and discrepancies were reviewed and the required actions were completed by the licensee. The action was documented. This item was discussed with the Quality Engineers.
- b. (Closed) Noncompliance (263/78-17-01(DPRP)): Electrical Circuit Breaker 52-304 was removed from service without a Work Request Authorization (WRA). The work on Breaker 52-304 performed on June 3 and June 4, 1978, was shown to have been performed per WRA 78-805 and 78-825. The work performed on May 25, 1978 on this same breaker did not have a WRA filled out. The item was discussed during the annual QA training session for plant personnel.
- c. (Closed) Open Item (263/80-07-01(DPRP)): The Operations Committee's review-controlling procedure was revised to limit polling review to items of minor significance. This appears compatible with the IE position that no polling can be performed on items that require review by the committee.

- d. (Closed) Open Item (263/80-20-01(DPRP)): The environmental conditions in the warehouse have been modified by the addition of insulation to walls and roof. The review of conditions has been discontinued.
- e. (CLOSED) Open Item (263/81-16-01(DPRP)): The requalification training on the use of installed equipment to mitigate core damage is to be completed before the Cycle 11 startup (the startup from the present outage)
- f. (Closed) Noncompliance (Violation) (263/81-16-02(DPRP)): The improperly installed equipment was removed and the equipment was installed on the correct system. The licensee has modified the work control procedures and provided a training program on the procedures.
- g. (Closed) Noncompliance (Violation) (263/81-16-03(DPRP)): Same action as 263/81-16-02 above.
- h. (Closed) Open Item (263/81-16-05(DPRP)): The licensee has modified the floor of the Radwaste building to contain a liquid spill.
- i. (Closed) Open Item (263/81-21-01(DPRP)): The core spray line safe end reducer that contained cracks in the welds was replaced. Both core spray lines (out to the first isolation valve) were replaced with 304L stainless steel.
- j. (Closed) Open Item (263/82-XX-06(EPS)): A maintenance man was burned with contaminated steam while repacking a steam line drain valve. No violations were determined to be involved in the injury. The maintenance of steam valves has had more precautions added to ensure that the lines are depressurized.

### 3. IE Circular Followup

For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular was applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.

- a. (Closed) IEC 79-25 and Supplement A: Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference. The licensee review showed that mechanical snubbers were used only on the cross around relief valves. The snubbers are 10KIP size and were excluded in the circular. The Bergen Paterson adapters are not in the parts lists for the valves and the design precludes the use of such adapters. (Design Change M75-43)

- b. (Closed) IEC 80-10: Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification of Equipment. The maintenance program is being developed at the present time as IEB 79-01 is completed. The training department will provide training as is deemed necessary where program is completed.
- c. (Closed) IEC 80-15: Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Circulation Cooldown. The reactor recirculation pumps are tripped and the reactor is scrammed per procedure if the cooling is lost for more than 60 seconds. The cooldown from this point can be performed by any one of several procedures already in place.

This circular was sent to BWR plants for information only.

- d. (Closed) IEC 81-03: Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation. The site seismic monitoring instrumentation had experienced some of the problems that were outlined in the circular. To limit future problems, the system was upgraded during the 1982 refueling outage. The preventive maintenance and calibration programs were revised.
- e. (Closed) IEC 81-08: Foundation Materials. The settlement of Class I structures and Class II structures with Class I equipment has been within acceptable limits. The recommendation was made that the current QC/QA practices continue to be utilized for future Monticello soils work projects.
- f. (Closed) IEC 81-13: Torque Switch Electrical Bypassed Circuit for Safeguard Service Motors. The licensee review indicated that the torque switch electrical bypass circuits were visually inspected and found properly installed on the valve operators requiring the circuit. One drawing needed to be corrected. The existing directives for control appear to be adequate to prevent inadvertent removal of the circuit.
- g. (Closed) IEC 81-14: Main Steam Isolation Valve Failures to Close. "Booster Operators" were incorporated in the pilot valve operation and the problems in fluctuations in pilot supply have ceased. (Design Change 78M071 - Booster Operators on AVC (Automatic Valve Corp.) four-way valves.)

#### 4. Previous Enforcement Actions

(Closed) Three Items of Noncompliance (263/83-01-XX(DPRP)): Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) Valves Found Open (Containment Valves). The CGCS valves were found open in January 1983. These valves are part of primary containment and were required to be closed when the reactor was above 212°F. The corrective actions included revision of work control procedures and training of personnel who are responsible to implement these procedures. These items were completed before the 1984 outage was commenced. The procedures appear to provide the necessary control. The inspector has no further questions at this time.

5. Status of TMI NUREG-0737 Items

The inspector reviewed the status of the licensee's actions in response to NRC requirements as clarified by NUREG-0737. The paragraph identification is the paragraph number of NUREG-0737 and the status is as follows:

(Closed) II.F.1.3 Accident Monitoring Containment High-Range Monitor. The deviations requested by NSP on transmitter and recorder qualifications, the use of existing separation scheme, and the use of existing instrument AC power system and an exception on the installed monitors calibration was found to be acceptable. The NRR to NSP letter of June 3, 1982, stated that the review of containment high-range monitors showed that the system, with stated deviations, was capable of performing under accident conditions.

6. Onsite Review Committee

The inspector attended portions of four meetings of the onsite review committee (Operations Committee) during the month of April to observe conformance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements. The review included noting adherence to the charter and administrative procedures governing the review group activities, the group's membership and qualifications, the meeting frequency and required quorum. The activities of the committee, including review of proposed technical specifications changes, noncompliance items and corrective action, proposed facility modifications and procedure changes, and biannual review of procedures, were noted to be performed as required.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Refueling Activities

The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by the technical specifications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required by technical specifications; observed the reactor building and turbine building shifts of the fuel handling operations (removal, inspection and insertion) and verified the activities were performed in accordance with the technical specifications and approved procedures; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by technical specifications; verified that good housekeeping was maintained on the refueling area; and, verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures.

The inspector witnessed portions of the work in progress for maintenance on equipment and design changes of the following:

- a. Recirculation piping replacement.
- b. Main turbine low pressure turbines replacement.
- c. Fire proofing stairwells.
- d. Fire proofing structure steel.
- e. Preventive maintenance of 4100 volt and 480 volt breakers.
- f. Preventive maintenance on field circuit breaker recirculation pump MG sets.
- g. Seismic panel support additions (switch gear rooms and control room).
- h. Installation of 13A and 13B feedwater heaters.
- i. Installation of reactor water cleanup regenerative heat exchanger.
- j. Retubing the main condensers.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 2, 1984 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.