



## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

- R. Baker, Technical Services Superintendent
- R. Burns, Vice President, Nuclear Support-BWR
- T. Butler, Outage Coordinator
- \*V. Childs, Senior Licensing Engineer
- \*R. Converse, Superintendent of Power
- M. Curling, Training Superintendent
- W. Fernandez, Maintenance Superintendent
- \*H. Keith, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- D. Lindsey, Assistant Operations Superintendent
- R. Liseno, Operations Superintendent
- \*C. McNeill, Resident Manager
- \*E. Mulcahey, Radiological & Environmental Services Superintendent
- \*R. Patch, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- T. Teifke, Security & Safety Superintendent

The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and control, maintenance and contractor personnel.

\*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

### 2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Inspector Followup Item (333/79-SC-06): Based on observations during surveillance testing and on discussions with several licensed operators, the inspector noted that both pairs of Emergency Diesel Generators(EDG) are routinely tested at the same time. When the inspector pointed out that IE Circular No. 79-12, Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem, recommended that concurrent testing of redundant diesel engines be avoided, the licensee stated that he would revise the EDG full load surveillance test procedure to specify that only one pair of EDG's be tested at a time and that the first pair of EDG's be allowed to cool down prior to testing the second pair. This item remains open pending implementation of this procedure revision.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (333/83-01-02): The inspector reviewed Flow and Machinery drawing FM-21A, Revision 13, and the system drawing and valve lineup checklist in Operating Procedure No. 17, Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System, Revision 9, and verified that the SLC pump suction pressure gages, the isolation valves for these gages, and the pump suction vent valves were added to the drawings and the valve-lineup checklist.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (333/83-04-02): The inspector reviewed procedure PSP No. 4, Wastewater Sampling and Analysis, Revision 4, dated March 30, 1983, and verified that the licensee revised the liquid radioactive waste discharge permit so that the radwaste operator is now required to document that the discharge valve lineup was returned to normal following the canal discharge of any tank. The inspector also reviewed plant modification F1-82-40 which will add a discharge flow control valve on each laundry drain tank pump and interlock these valves such that only one can be opened at a time. The inspector noted that this modification has been approved and funded and had no further questions on this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (333/83-28-05): The inspector reviewed the results of an evaluation in which the licensee determined that, using actual valve parameters from the vendor (Wm. Powell, Co.) and the Limitorque selection procedures, the incorrect actuator installed on the Residual Heat Removal Suppression Pool Cooling Outboard Isolation Valve (10-MOV-39B) was capable of meeting the design limits of the valve. The inspector had no further questions on this item.

### 3. Licensee Event Report (LER) Review

The inspector reviewed LER's to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported. The inspector determined that reporting requirements had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by details, corrective actions appeared appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.

LER's 84-07, 84-09\*, and 84-11\* were reviewed.

\*LER's selected for onsite followup.

LER 84-09 reported that the reactor tripped from 67% power as the result of low reactor vessel water level. Details of this event are discussed in paragraph 8a. of inspection report no. 50-333/84-04.

LER 84-11 reported that both Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitors failed downscale and resulted in a turbine building ventilation system isolation. The cause of the failure was precipitation which, leaking through a closed Recirculation Motor Generator Set room roof damper during adverse weather conditions, fell on and entered the cable connectors between the detector units and the monitors. The inspector observed licensee actions during the event and noted that the licensee installed a portable continuous atmosphere monitor on the turbine building ventilation exhaust in order to reset the turbine building ventilation isolation and to allow continued operation in accordance with Technical Specification 3.2.3.b and Environmental Technical Specification 2.3.B.9. The licensee adjusted the roof damper to stop the leakage and returned both Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitors to service in approximately three hours. The licensee also plans on installing a protective shield over the roof damper to prevent recurrence of the event.

#### 4. Operational Safety Verification

##### a. Control Room Observations

Daily, the inspector verified selected plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with limiting conditions for operation of the plant Technical Specifications. Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken. The inspector observed shift turnovers biweekly to ensure proper control room and shift manning. The inspector directly observed the operations listed below to ensure adherence to approved procedures:

- Routine Power Operation.
- Issuance of RWP's and Work Request/Event/Deficiency forms.

No violations were identified.

##### b. Shift Logs and Operating Records

Selected shift logs and operating records were reviewed to obtain information on plant problems and operations, detect changes and trends in performance, detect possible conflicts with Technical Specifications or regulatory requirements, determine that records are being maintained and reviewed as required, and assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs.

No violations were identified.

##### c. Plant Tours

During the inspection period, the inspector made observations and conducted tours of the plant. During the plant tours, the inspector conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between containment and the isolation valves for leakage or leakage paths. This included verification that manual valves were shut, capped and locked when required and that motor operated valves were not mechanically blocked. The inspector also checked fire protection, housekeeping/cleanliness, radiation protection, and physical security conditions to ensure compliance with plant procedures and regulatory requirements.

No violations were identified.

##### d. Tagout Verification

The inspector verified that the following safety-related protective tagout records (PTR's) were proper by observing the positions of breakers, switches and/or valves.

- PTR 840554 on the "B" Standby Liquid Control System.
- PTR 840559 on the Containment Atmosphere Dilution System.
- PTR 840600 on the Containment Atmosphere Sampling System.

No violations were identified.

e. Emergency System Operability

The inspector verified operability of the following systems by ensuring that each accessible valve in the primary flow path was in the correct position, by confirming that power supplies and breakers were properly aligned for components that must activate upon an initiation signal, and by visual inspection of the major components for leakage and other conditions which might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements.

- Emergency Service Water System.
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.
- Standby Liquid Control System.
- 125 VDC Power System.

No violations were identified.

5. Surveillance Observations

The inspector observed portions of the surveillance procedures listed below to verify that the test instrumentation was properly calibrated, approved procedures were used, the work was performed by qualified personnel, limiting conditions for operation were met, and the system was correctly restored following testing:

- F-ST-6G, Standby Liquid Control Component Inoperable Test, Revision 4, dated January 11, 1984, performed April 12, 1984.
- F-ST-76B, Electric Fire Pump Operational Check, Revision 5, dated May 19, 1982, performed April 24, 1984.
- F-ISP-3-2, Reactor Lo-Lo/Lo-Lo/Lo-Lo Water Level (HPCI, LPCI, RHP, ADS, Core Spray) Instrument Functional Test/Calibration, Revision 13, dated October 27, 1983, performed April 24, 1984.
- F-ISP-5, Reactor High Pressure Instrument Functional Test/Calibration, Revision 6, dated November 2, 1983, performed April 30, 1984.

The inspector also witnessed all aspects of the following surveillance test to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to technical specification requirements and had been properly approved, limiting conditions for operation for removing equipment from service were met, testing was performed by qualified personnel, test results met technical specification requirements, the surveillance test documentation was reviewed, and equipment was properly restored to service following the test.

- F-ST-4E, HPCI Subsystem Logic System Functional Test, Revision 17, dated November 9, 1983, performed April 4, 1984.

No violations were identified.

#### 6. Maintenance Observations

- a. The inspector observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to determine that redundant components were operable, these activities did not violate the limiting conditions for operation, required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, approved procedures were used or the activity was within the "skills of the trade", appropriate radiological controls were properly implemented, ignition/fire prevention controls were properly implemented, and equipment was properly tested prior to returning it to service.
- b. During this inspection period, the following activities were observed:
  - WR 11/24211 on the repacking of the "B" Standby Liquid Control pump.
  - WR 27/23353 on the repair of the Containment Atmosphere Dilution System nitrogen supply to steam vaporizer isolation valve (valve 27-ACV-127B).

No violations were identified.

#### 7. Licensee Action on IE Bulletins

The inspector verified that for the IE Bulletin listed below, the licensee's written response was provided within the time period stated in the Bulletin, included the information required to be reported, included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the Bulletin and was accurate. The inspector further verified that any corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the response.

## IE Bulletin No. 79-24, Frozen Lines

Based upon an independent review of plant systems and a review of the licensee's response to the bulletin dated October 31, 1979, the inspector determined that the licensee's review of systems with lines subjected to freezing temperatures and the measures taken to prevent freeze-ups was adequate. The inspector also noted that, in response to the bulletin, the licensee indicated that the heat tracing associated with keeping the lines from freezing would be checked out annually in the fall to assure proper operation of the circuits. The inspector noted that the licensee developed preventive maintenance procedure no. EP-71.1, Revision 0, dated January 16, 1980, to perform these annual operability checks. During a record review; however, the inspector was only able to verify that the operability checks of the heat tracing circuits were performed in October 1979 and November 1982. The inspector also noted that, during both check outs, deficiencies were found which had to be corrected. Based on discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector determined that no checks of the heat tracing circuits were made during 1983. The inspector pointed out to the licensee the importance of performing these annual operability checks since the outdoor heat tracing circuits are powered from non-emergency buses, are not redundant, and do not provide any alarms in the event of failure. The licensee agreed with the inspector's concerns and stated that he would review this item and develop a method to ensure that these annual operability checks are done, possibly by including it in the preventive maintenance program. This bulletin remains open pending completion of the licensee's review and implementation of such a program.

8. Review of Periodic and Special Reports

Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports. The review included the following: inclusion of information required by the NRC; test results and/or supporting information consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; planned corrective action for resolution of problems, and reportability and validity of report information. The following periodic report was reviewed.

-- March, 1984 Operating Status Report, dated April 9, 1984.

9. Exit Interview

At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings. On May 1, 1984, the inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are described in this report.