



VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

P. O. BOX 157  
GOVERNOR HUNT ROAD  
VERNON, VERMONT 05354

April 1, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE: Operating License DPR-28  
Docket No. 50-271  
Reportable Occurrence No. LER 92-009

Dear Sirs:

As defined by 10 CFR 50.73, we are reporting the attached Reportable Occurrence as LER 92-009.

Very truly yours,

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

Donald A. Reid  
Plant Manager

cc: Regional Administrator  
USNRC  
Region I  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

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NRC Form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-89)  LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)	APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.
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FACILITY NAME (1) VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION	DOCKET NO. (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 1	PAGE (3) 0 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4) Failure to Maintain an Hourly Fire Watch as Required by Plant Technical Specifications Due to Inadequate Shift Turnover

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ #	REVR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES N/A			DOCKET NO. (8)
0 3	1 3	9 2	9 2	- 0 0 9	- 0 0	0 6	0 1	9 2	N/A			0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) R	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO REQ'TS OF 10 CFR §: CHECK ONE OR MORE (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)	
	20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.7-(c)	
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER:	
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)										
NAME DONALD A. REID, PLANT MANAGER								TELEPHONE NO. AREA CODE 8 0 2 2 5 7 - 7 7 1 1		

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYST	COMPONENT	MFR	REPORTABLE TO NFRDS	...	CAUSE	SYST	COMPONENT	MFR	REPORTABLE TO NFRDS	...
N/A				N/A	....	N/A				N/A	....
N/A				N/A	....	N/A				N/A	....

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)							EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MO	DAY	YR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approx. fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0914 hours on 03-13-92, with the plant shutdown for the 1992 refueling outage, the Duty Shift Engineer discovered that the hourly fire watch, established because the Turbine Loading Bay Fire Detection System (EHS-IC) was taken out of service, was not maintained as required by Technical Specification section 3.13.A.2. This event was discovered during the closeout review of a Fire Protection Control Permit.

The root cause of this event was determined to be inadequate communications during shift turnover. The hourly fire watch was not maintained following a shift change.

On 03-14-92 a memo was distributed to all fire watch personnel stressing the importance of effective communication when the fire watch duties are turned over to another approved fire watch. Additionally, future fire watch training will stress the importance of effective communication when fire watch duties are turned over.

No similar events have been reported to the commission in the last five years.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 3-12-92 at approximately 0700 hours, with the plant shutdown for the 1992 refueling outage, Fire Protection Control Permit No. 92-147 was issued to control taking the Turbine loading bay Fire Detection System (EISS=IC) out of service. The system was taken out of service to allow the use of a 30 Ton crane in the loading bay. An hourly fire watch was established per Technical Specification 3.13.A.2.

On 03-12-92 at 2000 hours, following a shift change the hourly fire watch was not maintained.

On 03-13-92 at 0914 hours, the Duty Shift Engineer discovered that the hourly watch had not been maintained and initiated an hourly fire watch.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of this event was determined to be an inadequate shift turnover. Discussions with contractor personnel involved with this event revealed that, although the day shift fire watch did communicate to the night shift fire watch that a permit existed for the Turbine Loading Bay Activity, the night shift fire watch could not recall the item being discussed.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The Turbine Loading Bay fire detection system was installed to provide protection to the common area outside the two (2) Diesel Generator Rooms due to concerns about a vehicle fire in the Turbine Loading Bay. At the time of this event the Mode Switch was in Refuel and the diesels were required to be operable. Additionally, there was a vehicle located in the loading bay during the period of time that the fire watch was not maintained.

The Diesel Generators are protected from the Turbine Loading Bay areas by three (3) hour rated fire barriers. Vermont Yankee's administrative controls require Fire Protection Control Permits to be generated and continuous fire watches to be established to breach these barriers. A review of the permits, for the time in question, revealed that these barriers were functional.

Vermont Yankee's administrative controls require Hot Work Permits to be generated and continuous fire watches to be maintained for all hot work (eg. welding and grinding) that is performed in the vicinity of the Turbine Loading Bay. A review of the permits for the time in question revealed that only one was being worked during the time that the hourly fire watch was not maintained. For this effort a continuous fire watch was in place during all hot work activities. It is likely that this fire watch would have detected a fire in the loading bay area.

A review of Vermont Yankee's Fire Watch Training Program was performed. Based upon discussions with the Training Department personnel and selected fire watches, it was determined that the responsibility to effectively communicate permit requirements during turn over of fire watch duties is generally understood. However, based on a review of the Instructor Guide

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-89)		APPROVED OMS NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.					
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION		DOCKET NO (2)		LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A) (17)

additional emphasis on turnover communications will aide in minimizing the potential for similar occurrences.

Based on the above, Vermont Yankee believes that this is an isolated event. Additionally, Vermont Yankee believes that this event did not pose a significant threat to the health and safety of the public.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate corrective actions included;

- (1) initiating the required hourly fire watch,
- (2) removing the contractor from the "Active" fire watch list,
- (3) initiating investigation into the cause of this event,
- (4) issuing a memorandum on 03-14-92 to all "Active" fire watches emphasizing the need for effective turnover communications, and
- (5) discussing the event at the 03-14-92 daily outage meeting.

#### LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- (1) The current Fire Watch Training Program will be revised to include a discussion of the Fire Watches responsibility to effectively communicate permit requirements when turning over Fire Watch duties to another qualified Fire Watch.

#### ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

No similar events have been reported to the commission in the last five years.