



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos.: 50-280/84-12 and 50-281/84-12

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
 Richmond, VA 23261

Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281

License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37

Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2

Inspection at Surry site near Williamsburg, Virginia

Inspector: R. R. Marston 5/2/84
 R. R. Marston Date Signed

Approved by: W. E. Cline 5/2/84
 W. E. Cline, Acting Section Chief Date Signed
 Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Inspection on March 26-30, 1984

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 37 inspector-hours on site in the areas of emergency preparedness.

Results

Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *J. L. Wilson, Station Manager
- R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager
- *W. R. Runner, Supervisor, Administrative Services
- *S. P. Sarver, Supervisor, Health Physics
- O. A. Vogtsberger, Supervisor, Training, Power Station Support
- *R. F. Driscoll, Manager, QA
- P. R. DeWitt, Shift Supervisor
- G. N. Marshall, Shift Supervisor
- J. J. Simpson, Shift Supervisor
- *E. M. Topping, Corporate Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- *B. R. Parkhurst, Station Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- *R. C. Bilyeau, Licensing Coordinator
- *B. A. Garber, Health Physicist
- *W. D. Grady, Station QA

NRC Resident Inspector

- D. J. Burke
- *M. J. Davis

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 30, 1984, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Emergency Detection and Classification

Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EIPs) were reviewed and determined to be consistent with each other and with those in NUREG-0654. The EALs were also determined to be consistent with the range and units of indicators in the control room.

EPIP-2.01, Notification of State and Local Governments, requires that initial notification of an emergency be made within 15 minutes. The classification EPIP appeared to be adequate and was consistent with NRC classification guidance. The inspector reviewed selected emergency operations procedures. The inspector noted these procedures referenced the EIPs where appropriate.

The inspector interviewed three Shift Supervisors concerning emergency preparedness matters. All appeared to have adequate knowledge of their responsibilities and authorities when acting as Station Emergency Manager. When presented with hypothetical accident conditions, they were also able to accurately classify an accident in a timely and accurate manner.

The inspector had no further questions in this area.

6. Protective Action Decisionmaking

The inspector reviewed the Emergency Plan and EPIP-1.05 and determined that staff and responsibility are assigned to assess the accidents and make protective action recommendations. During the interviews with the Shift Supervisors discussed in paragraph 5 of this report, it was determined that Shift Supervisors were aware of their responsibilities in this area and were able to make protective action recommendations based on core and containment status as well as radiological release information. Licensee representatives stated that all personnel eligible to be designated as Station Emergency Manager had been trained in making these recommendations in accordance with Surry's amended procedure. This procedure was amended in response to Violation 50-280, 281/84-01-01. Other commitments made by the licensee in response to the Notice of Violation were not yet complete, so this item will remain open and be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

The inspector reviewed EPIP-2.01, Notification of State and Local Governments, which now requires use of an expanded notification form for all General Emergency conditions and, therefore, protective action recommendations will be made for all General Emergencies.

Since not all commitments were complete under this violation (50-280, 281/84-01-02), it will be evaluated during a subsequent inspection.

7. Training

The inspector reviewed the training program for the station emergency organization. Lesson plans and outlines, attendance sheets, and tests and test scores were reviewed. The basic emergency training is split into seven modules, and the modules taken depend on the type of emergency assignment. Specialized fire and first aid training were also reviewed.

The records showed that fifteen helicopter ambulance personnel were trained and that training was scheduled for offsite fire and rescue personnel. A licensee representative stated that offsite fire and rescue personnel did

not attend the scheduled training established for them in 1983. The inspector stated that VEPCO needed to assure that these agencies participated in training this year and that this would be evaluated during a subsequent inspection.

Drill and exercise records were also reviewed. The records showed that the semiannual radiation monitoring drill which was missed earlier in 1983 was made up prior to the annual exercise. Other than that one instance, other drills were held as scheduled. Offsite fire and rescue units did participate in the drills.

Training of the corporate response staff which supports emergency response at the Surry Station had been evaluated during the North Anna inspection earlier this year.

The inspector had no further questions in this area.

8. Followup of Previously Open Items

a. Training Open Items

- (1) IFI 82-05-05. Include all training for the emergency response organization in the training matrix.
- (2) IFI 82-05-06. Establish essential training required by the first aid team.
- (3) IFI 82-05-07. Include name and grade for attendee, descriptive course title and lesson plan, training date, and instructor's name in documentation of emergency response training.

The emergency response training program is described in Section 8.1 of the Radiological Emergency Plan. The inspector verified that all emergency response training is included in the plan, including training required for the first aid team, and all required data is included in emergency response training documentation.

Based on the above findings the previously identified improvement items in this area (50-280, 281/82-05-05, 50-280, 281/82-05-06, and 50-280, 281/82-05-07) are closed.

b. IFI 82-05-18. Establish an alternate offsite assembly area.

The inspector determined that Section 6.1 of the Emergency Plan and EPIP-5.05 provide for an alternate offsite assembly area.

Based on the above findings the previously identified improvement item in this area (50-280, 281/82-05-18) is closed.

c. IFI 82-05-29. Provide for periodic test of electrical switches and controls at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panels.

The inspector reviewed PT-18.13, Auxiliary Panel Shutdown Test, which is performed during cold shutdown at refueling. The purpose of the procedure is to test switches and controls of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel to ensure its readiness.

Based on the above findings the previously identified improvement item in this area (50-280, 281/82-05-29) is closed.

- d. IFI 82-05-57. Revise analytic procedures to specify means of counting if the counting area has a high background.

Rather than change procedures, the licensee elected to count samples at North Anna Power Station if a high background level exists in the Surry count room. Accordingly, Sections 7.18 and 7.22 of the Emergency Plan specify that samples will be counted at North Anna Power Station if the counting cannot be done at Surry.

Based on the above findings the previously identified improvement item in this area (50-280, 281/82-05-57) is closed.

- e. IFI 50-280, 281/82-32-01. Offsite radiological monitoring procedure should provide for recording air flow data for air sampling.

EPIP-4.16, Offsite Monitoring, has been amended to make provisions for recording air sample volume.

Based on the above findings the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/82-32-01) is closed.

- f. IFI 50-280, 281/82-32-02. The procedure for handling contaminated injured persons will be reviewed to determine if additional guidance on contamination control should be included.

A licensee representative stated that EPIP-4.02, Radiation Protection Supervisor Controlling Procedure, covered the subject adequately. Step 11.b states that area contamination levels should be determined if time and dose rate levels permit.

Based on the above findings the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/82-32-02) is closed.

- g. IFI 50-280, 281/83-01-02. Change Emergency Plan to show that meteorological data can be read out on recorders in the control room and that the information can be transmitted from there to the TSC and EOF.

The inspector verified that the Plan states that met data is electronically transmitted to the control room, where it is sent to the TSC and EOF via automatic ringdown telephones or status sheets.

Based on the above findings the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/83-01-02) is closed.

- h. IFI 50-280, 281/83-01-03. The part of the Emergency Plan that discusses dose rates for key isotopes will be changed to indicate that those key isotopes are the ones listed in Table 3 of NUREG-0654.

The inspector verified that Section 6.2.6.f now references key isotopes to Table 3, NUREG-0654.

Based on the above findings the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/83-01-03) is closed.

- i. IFI 50-280, 281/83-01-04. While the implementing procedures require immediate notification of onsite personnel of an emergency condition, the Emergency Plan does not do so.

The inspector verified that Section 6.4.1.1.b of the Emergency Plan now requires that onsite personnel be immediately notified of an emergency if it is Alert classification or higher.

Based on the above findings, the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/83-01-04) is closed.

- j. IFI 50-280, 281/83-21-01. The Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) bases protective action recommendations only on the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).

The inspector determined that Section 4 of the REP now bases protective action recommendations on core and containment status as well as the EPA PAGs.

Based on the above findings the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/83-21-01) is closed.

- k. IFI 50-280, 281/83-21-02. The REP made no provisions for an annual review and coordination of EALs with State and local governments.

The REP now includes a statement that EALs are reviewed on an annual basis with State and local governments.

Based on the above finding the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/83-21-02) is closed.

- l. 50-280, 281/83-21-03. The REP and EPIPs use the terms, "Unusual Event," and "Site Emergency," rather than the correct terminology.

The inspector verified that the REP and classification and notification EPIPs have been corrected to reflect the correct terminology. It was agreed that terminology in other EPIPs would be corrected whenever correction for other reasons becomes necessary.

Based on the above findings the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/83-21-03) is closed.

- m. 50-280, 281/83-21-04. Means needed to determine containment air temperature at least up to highest EAL (280°F).

The inspector verified that a temperature indicator has been installed in the control room which indicates over a range including the highest EAL.

Based on the above findings the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/83-21-04) is closed.

- n. 50-280, 281/83-21-05. The REP or EIPs do not discuss the existence of a verification system for emergency notification messages.

The inspector verified that Section 5.4.5 of the REP now mentions the existence of a system the State and localities have to verify messages.

Based on the above findings, the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/83-21-05) is closed.

- o. IFI 50-280, 281/83-21-07. Emergency kit dosimeters had a range up to 10 Rem. The REP, Section 6.5.1 stated that doses up to 25 Rem or 75 Rem might be authorized in an emergency. The available dosimeters would be inadequate to cover these doses.

The HP Supervisor stated that dosimeters with a range of 200 Rem are now in selected emergency kits. The inspector reviewed the emergency kit inventory document and noted that 200 Rem dosimeters are available in the EOF, Control Room, and OSC Emergency Kits.

Based on the above findings, the previously identified inspector followup item in this area (50-280, 281/83-21-07) is closed.