MEMORANDUM FOR:

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

FROM:

Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch

Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING MARCH 25, 1992 - MEETING 92-03

On March 25, 1992, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events meeting (92-03) to inform senior managers from the Commission Office, SECY, ACRS, AEOD. EDO, NRR, and regional offices of selected events that occurred since our last briefing on February 26, 1992. Enclose a 1 lists the attendeds. Enclosure 2 presents the significant elements of the discussed events.

Enclosure 3 contains reactor scram statistics for the weeks ending 03/01/92, 03/08/92, 03/15/92 and 03/22/92. Inclosure 4 tabulates one significant event which was identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program.

original signed by Robert L. Dennig for Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

Enclosures: As stated

cc w/enclosures: See next page

DISTRIBUTION:

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RBenedict

DOCUMENT NAME: ORTRANS.RPT (WP/KAB)

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RDennig 03/)0/92 EAD/DOEA DFischer 03/30/92 EAB/DOEA AChaffee 03/20/92

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

RETURN TO REGULATORY CENTRAL FILES

9204060088 920330 PDR ORG NRRB TOTR-5-1 OFFERENCES EXPERIENCES T. Murley, NRR (12G18)

F. Miraglia, NRR (12G18) W. Russell, NRR (12G18)

F. Gillespie, NRR (12G18)

J. Partlow, NRR (12G18)

S. Varga, NRR (14E4)

J. Calvo, NRR (14A4)

G. Lainas, NRR (14H3)

B. Boger, NRR (14A2)

J. Zwolinski, NRR (13H24) M. Virgilio, NRR (13E4)

D. Crutchfield, NRR (11H21)

W. Travers, NRR (11819)

J. Richardson, NRR (7D26)

A. Thadani, NRR (8E2)

B. Grimes, NRR (9A2)

F. Congel, NRR (10E2)

J. Roe, NRR (10H5)

M. Pohida, NRR (10E4)

T. Martin, RI

W. Kane, RI

C. Hehl, RI

S. Ebneter, RII

L. Reyes, RII

B. Davis, RIII

E. Greenman, RIII

R.D. Martin, RIV

B. Beach, RIV

J.B. Martin, RV

R. Zimmerman, RV

P. Boehnert, ACRS (P-315)

E. Jordan, AEOD (MN-3701)

T. Novak, AEOD (MN-3701)

L. Spessard, AEOD (MN-3701)

E. Weiss, AEOD (MN-3206)

S. Rubin, AEOD (MN-4106)

M. Harper, AEOD (MN-9112)

W. Bateman, EDO (17G21)

R. Newlin, GPA (2G5)

E. Beckjord, RES (NLS-007)

A. Bates, SECY (16G15)

G. Rammling, OCM (16H3)

bcc: INPO

ATTN: J. Cowan

1100 Circle 75. Suite 1500

Atlanta, GA 30339

D. Brinkman (PDI-1)

R. Capra (PDI-1)

D. Labarge (PDII-4)

F. Hebdon (PDII-4)

W. Reckley (PDIV-2)

S. Black (PDIV-2)

ENCLOSURE 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS FULL BRIEFING (92-03)

MARCH 25, 1992

NAME	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE
A. CHAFFEE R. BENEDICT R. DE NIG	NRR	B. GRIMES	NRR
	NRR	F. HEBDON	NRR
	NRR	G. LAINAS	NRR
K. BAUMANN	NRR	D. NAUJOCK	NRR
J. CARTER	NRR	R. HERMAN	NRR
D. CARPLEANI	NRR	M. MARKLEY	NRR
	NRR	D. CARTER	NRR
T. Kos.	NRR NRR	s. VARGA J. PARTLOW	NRR NRR RII
1	NRR NRR NRR	T. KOZAK R. MUSSER K. HART	RII
R.	NRR	P. BOEHNERT	ACRS
	NRR	M. FLEISMAN	OCM/KR
B. BOGER	NRR	T. NOVAK	AEOD

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 92-03 EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH LOCATION: 10 B11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 1992, 11:00 A.M.

NINE MILE POINT, UNIT 2

LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
(AIT)

SEQUOYAH, UNITS 1 AND 2

INOPERABLE ICE CONDENSER DOORS

WOLF CREEK, UNIT 1

"NOISE" IN CONTAINMENT DURING HEATUP

LENINGRAD NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 3

LOSS OF PRESSURE IN PRESSURE CHANNEL

NINE MILE POINT, UNIT 2 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER MARCH 23, 1992

PROBLEM:

WHILE WORKING ON THE AUXILIARY BOILER RELAY CIRCUIT, OFF-SITE POWER WAS LOST FOR ABOUT 1 HR. ONE DIESEL GENERATOR PROVIDED POWER AND CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS WERE LOST.

CAUSE:

AN INADVERTENT CONTACT CLOSURE LOST LINE #5 AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SEEN BY LINE #6 FOLLOWING A MANUALLY INITIATED TRANSFER.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

OFFSITE POWER WAS LOST WITH ONLY ONE DIESEL GENERATOR AVAILABLE FOR ONSITE POWER.

DISCUSSION:

- THE REACTOR HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN SINCE MARCH 4 FOR REFUELING.
- O PART OF THE CORE HAD BEEN OFF-LOADED.
- OFFSITE POWER LINE #5 SUPPLYING DIV ! AND DIV III.
- 0 OFFSITE POWER LINE #6 SUPPLYING DIV 11.
- "A" UPS WAS ON MAINTENANCE POWER SUPPLY (FROM LINE #5); 0 BACKUP POWER WITH BATTERIES NOT AVAILABLE.
- 0 "B" UPS WAS ON NORMAL POWER (FROM LINE #6).
- MAINTENANCE BEING PERFORMED ON AUX BOILER RELAY CIRCUITRY. 0 POWER FROM LINE #5.

CONTACT: J. CARTER, NRR/DOEA

REFERENCES: 10 CFR 50.72 #23078 AND

PNO-1-92-14

AIT: YES




Figure 4.3 AC onsite power system

NINE MILE POINT, UNIT 2

SEQUOYAH, UNITS 1 AND 2 INOPERABLE ICE CONDENSER DOORS MARCH 18, 1992

PROBLEM:

ICE CONDENSER DOORS STUCK CLOSED.

CAUSE:

WATER UNDER CONCRETE FLOOR FROZE. ITS EXPANSION CAUSED FLOOR TO CRACK AND HEAVE UPWARD, PRESSING DOOR FLASHING UP AGAINST BOTTOM OF DOORS

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT AND COMPARTMENT PRESSURES MIGHT BE HIGHER THAN DESIGN BASIS IF ICE CONDENSER DOORS DO NOT OPEN.

DISCUSSION:

- O ICE CONDENSER CONCEPT:
 - ABOUT 2 MILLION POUNDS OF ICE IS STORED IN AN ANNULAR AREA INSIDE CONTAINMENT.
 - ICE IS MAINTAINED SOLID BY COLD AIR IN WALLS. ETHYLENE GLYCOL SOLUTION IN EMBEDDED PIPING COOLS THE FLOOR.
 - LOWER INLET DOORS, NORMALLY CLOSED, OPEN WHEN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 1 PSF.
 - AIR/STEAM MIXTURE PASSES UP AROUND AND THROUGH THE ICE BASKETS (COLUMNS), MELTING THE ICE AND BEING COOLED BEFORE DISCHARGE INTO UPPER CONTAINMENT.
 - CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE IS 12 PSI.

O FLOOR CONSTRUCTION

- A- 3CH CONCRETE WEAR SLAB OVER 4-INCH STEEL PLATE. GLYL LOOLING TUBES EMBEDDED ABOVE PLATE.
- STEEL PLATE OVER 1-INCH GROUT OVER FOAMED CONCRETE INSULATION OVER STRUCTURAL CONCRETE BASE.

CONTACT: R. BENEDICT, NRR/DOEA

REFERENCE: 10 CFR 50.72 #23047

AIT: NO

SIGEVENT: TBD

O PROBABLE SCENARIO

- WATER FROM DEFROSTING PROBABLY COLLECTED BETWEEN WEAR SLAB AND STEEL PLATE OR BETWEEN PLATE AND GROUT DUE TO INCOMPLETE SEALING.
- WATER EXPANDS WHEN IT FREEZES, CAUSING WEAR SLAB TO HEAVE UPWARD FROM 3/8-INCH TO 2 INCHES. NO SIGN OF FAILURE OF STRUCTURAL CONCRETE BASE.
- HEAVING OF WEAR SLAB PUSHED FLASHING AGAINST BOTTOM OF DOOR. TWENTY SEVEN OF 48 DOORS IN UNIT 2 WERE OBSTRUCTED, AND 11 IN UNIT 1.

O OTHER PLANTS:


- NO EVIDENCE OF WEAR SLAB CRACKING OR HEAVING.
- DO NOT HEAT THE GLYCOL IN THE FLOOR DURING DEFROST, SO WATER DOES NOT GET UNDER THE WEAR SLAB.

STATUS


- O BORESCOPE FOUND ICE AND VOIDS ABOVE AND BELOW STEEL PLATE.
- O UNIT 2 DOOR-OPENING FORCE WILL BE MEASURED IN AS-IS CONDITION.
 UNIT 1 DOOR-OPENING FORCE WAS NOT MEASURED PRIOR TO REMOVING
 THE JAMMED FLASHING.
- O CAL ISSUED:
 - ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS.
 - ANALYZE EFFECTS ON OTHER SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS IMPACTED BY THE MECHANISM THAT CAUSED WEAR SLAB MOVEMENT.
 - PLANS FOR SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

FOLLOWUP:


O INFORMATION NOTICE IS BEING PREPARED.




Sequoyah Ice Condenser Containment (Steel Cylinder with Concrete Shield Building)



General Arrangement of an ice Condenser





Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door

WOLF CREEK, UNIT 1 "NOISE" IN CONTAINMENT DURING HEATUP FEBRUARY 28, 1992 MARCH 16, 1992

PROBLEM:

DURING PLANT HEATUP, A LOUD NOISE WAS HEARD IN CONTAINMENT. IN ADDITION, SEISMIC MONITOR AND LOOSE PARTS MONITOR ALARMS WERE RECEIVED.

CAUSE:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) INTERMEDIATE LEG SADDLE BLOCK INTERFERENCE.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

INTERFERENCE DURING HEATUP COULD LEAD TO ADDITIONAL PIPING STRESS.

DISCUSSION:

- O ON BOTH OCCASIONS, PLANT HEATUP WAS IN PROGRESS.
- WHEN TEMPERATURE APPROACHED NORMAL OPERATING TEMPERATURE 0 (557 DEGREES F), A LOUD NOISE WAS HEARD IN CONTAINMENT.
- DURING THE EVENTS, THE SEISMIC AND LOOSE PARTS ALARMS 0 ACTUATED.
- DURING THE MARCH 16, 1992, HEATUP, THE LICENSEE TOOK NUMEROUS 0 MEASUREMENTS TO DETERMINE THE SOURCE OF THE "NOISE."
- THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE 0 "NOISE" WAS RCS INTERMEDIATE LEG SADDLE BLOCK INTERFERENCE.

REFERENCES:

CONTACT: D. GAMBERONI, NRR/DOEA PNO-IV-92-14A DATED 03/05/92, SIGEVENT: NO

AIT: NO


PNO-IV-92-14B DATED 03/17/92, AND


MORNING REPORT DATED 03/02/92


- SADDLE BLOCK SHIMS WERE MACHINED DOWN TO ELIMINATE THE 0 INTERFERENCE DURING HEATUP, BUT WERE REMOVED DURING THE HEATUP PRIOR TO REACHING 557 DEGREES F BECAUSE ADDITIONAL MACHINING WAS REQUIRED.
- ON MARCH 23, 1992, A PLANT HEATUP WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT THE 0 "NOISE."

FOLLOWUP:

- THE NRC SENT A REACTIVE INSPECTION TEAM TO THE SITE TO INVESTIGATE THE "NOISE."
- THE LICENSEE MET WITH NRC MANAGEMENT ON MANCH 24, 1992, TO 0 DISCUSS THE EVENTS AND TO PRESENT WESTINGHOUSE PIPING STRESS CALCULATIONS.
- A MANAGEMENT MEETING, OPEN TO PUBLIC OBSERVATION, WILL BE 0 HELD AT THE SITE ON MARCH 26, 1992, TO DISCUSS THE CAUSE OF THE EVENTS, THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.







LENINGRAD: UNIT 3 LOSS OF PRESSURE IN PRESSURE CHANNEL MARCH 24, 1992

PROBLEM:

ONE OF THE UNIT 3 PRESSURE TUBES APPARENTLY EXPERIENCED A SUDDEN PRESSURE LOSS.

CAUSE:

UNKNOWN.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

REPORTED RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY TO ENVIRONMENT.

BACKGROUND:


- O FOUR RBMK-1000 REACTORS ARE LOCATED APPROX 50 TO 60 MILES WEST OF ST. PETERSBURG (LENINGRAD)
- O RBMK REACTORS ARE GRAPHITE MODERATED, LIGHT WATER COOLED.
- O COOLANT IS CIRCULATED THROUGH APPROX 1600 PRESSURE TUBES.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:


- O APPROX 2:37 A.M. LOCAL TIME, INDICATIONS OF A SUDDEN PRESSURE LOSS IN ONE PRESSURE TUBE WERE SEEN.
- 0 UNIT WAS SHUTDOWN AFTER EVENT.
- REPORTED THAT JODINE AND NOBLE GASES WERE RELEASED TO 0 ENVIRONMENT.
- RUSSIAN SAFETY AUTHORITIES HAVE DISPATCHED TEAM TO SITE. 0
- × 0 REPORTED THAT EVENT HAS BEEN DOWNGRADED FROM LEVEL 3 TO LEVEL 2 ON IAEA SCALE.

CONTACT: J. RAMSEY, NRR/DOEA
REFERENCE: 10 CFR 50.72 #23087


AIT: NO SIGEVENT: NO



Location of Leningrad Atomic Power Station '




Typical RBMK-1000 Power Station Layout'.




*4.


ter; d - X.-500-05/3000 steems turbinue; S - Cons peac facetrone, 32 - Exhaust ser ster. 3 - 50/10-1 prenhasd travelli 6 overhood transfung crans. 14 - Refu tirel beard, 20 - Lecation beneath cor to pering, 2 - 125,/20-t ensisted the




Typical RBMK-1000 Reactor Core Arrangement








Fuel channel



. 24

Gas circuit system

P.



System to protect the reactor vault from excess pressure

REACTOR SCRAM SUMMARY MEEK ENDING 03/01/92

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA (1)

DATE	SITE	UNIT	POWER	SIGNAL	CAUSE	COMPLIA:	3) YTD	YTD	YTD
						CATIONS		BELOW 151	TOTAL
02/24/92	SOUTH TEXAS	2	100	Ħ	EQUIPMENT	MO	2	0	2
02/25/92	BRAIDWOOD	2	100	A	EQUIPMENT	MO	1	0	1
02/27/92	DCONEE	3	100	A	PERSONNEL	MO	2	0	2
02/27/93	CLINION	1	72	A	EQUIPMENT	ND	2	0	2
02/29/92	GINNA	- 1	97	A	EQUIPMENT	ND	2	0	2
02/29/92	BRUNSKICK	1	80	A	EQUIPMENT	MO	2	0	2
03/01/92	DAVIS BESSE	1	40		PERSONNEL	NO	1	0	1
03/01/92	LASALLE	- 1	89	A	EQUIPMENT	NO	1	. 0	1

REACTOR SCRAM SUMMARY MEEK ENDING 03/08/92

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA (1)

DATE	SITE	UNIT	POWER	SIGNAL	CAUSE	COMPLIA	3) 410	YTO	YTD
						CATIONS	APOVE 157	PELOW 151	TOTAL
03/05/92	NORTH ANNA	1	0	H	EQUIPMENT	NC	0	,	
03/05/92	RIVER BEND	1	100	A	EQUIPMENT	NO	2	0	2
03/06/92	DIABLO CANYON	1	100	4	EQUIPMENT	NO NO	1	0	1
03/06/92	VERMONT YANKEE	1	0	A	EQUIPMENT	NO	5	1	1
03/05/92	FARLEY	2	11	A	EQUIPMENT	NO	1	1	2

II. COMPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES

SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 03/01/92

SCRAM CAUSE POWER GREATER THAN 15%	NUMBER OF SCRAMS	1992 WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	1991 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1990 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1989 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1988 WEEKLY AVERAGE	
EQUIPMENT RELATED PERSONNEL RELATED (2) OTHER (4)	6 2 0	3.0 0.8 0.0	2.9 0.6 0.0	3.4 0.5 0.0	3.1 1.0 0.1	3.0 1.0 0.4	
Subtotal	8	3.8	3.5	3.9	4.2	4.4	
POWER LESS THAN 15%							
EQUIPMENT RELATED PERSONNEL RELATED (2) OTHER (4)	0 0	0.1 0.0 0.0	0.3 0.2 0.5	0.4	0.3 0.3 0.0	0.6 0.4 0.2	
Subtotal	0	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.2	
TOTAL	8	3.9	4.0	4.4	4.8	5.6	

MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS

TYPE	NO. OF SCRAMS	1992 WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	1991 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1990 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1989 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1988 WEEKLY AVERAGE
MANUAL SCRAMS AUTOMATIC SCRAMS	1 7	0.8	0.7	1.2	0.9	1.1

II. COMPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES

SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 03/08/92

SCRAM CAUSE POWER GREATER THAN 15%	NUMBER OF SCRAMS	1992 WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	1991 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1990 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1989 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1988 WEEKLY AVERAGE
EQUIPMENT RELATED PERSONNEL RELATED (2) OTHER (4)	2 0 0	2.9 0.7 0.0	2.9 0.6 0.0	3.4 0.5 0.0	3.1 1.0 0.1	3.0 1.0 0.4
Subtotal	2	3.6	3.5	3.9	4.2	4.4
POWER LESS THAN 15%						
EQUIPMENT RELATED PERSONNEL RELATED (2) OTHER (4)	0 0	0.4	0.3 0.2 0.5	0.4 0.1 0.0	0.3 0.3 0.0	0.6 0.4 0.2
Subtotal	3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.2
TOTAL	5	4.0	4.0	4.4	4.8	5.6

MANUAL VS AUTO CRAMS

TYPE	NO. OF SCRAMS	1992 WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	1991 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1990 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1989 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1988 WEEKLY AVERAGE
MANUAL SCRAMS AUTOMATIC SCRAMS	1 4	0.8	0.7	1.2	0.9	1.1

* FACTOR SCRAM SUMMARY WEEK ENDINE 03/15/92

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA (1)

DATE	2718	UNIT POWER	SIGNAL	CAUSE	COMPLIA			TOTAL
03/12/92	VOSTLE HADDAM NECK HADDAM NECK SOUTH TETAS BRAIDWOOD	1 5 1 6 1 100	*	PERSONNEL PERSONNEL EQUIPMENY PERSONNEL PERSONNEL	NO NO NO NO	1 9 0 1 2	0 1 2 0 0	-1 20 00 00 00

REET ENDING 03/22/97

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA (1)

\$475	EITE	UNIT PON	ER SIGNA.	CAUSE	COMPLIA			177 JAIOT
23/16/92 03/18/92 03/21/92	BUSC THANNA		00 M 62 A	EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT	NO NO NO	1 1	0 0	1

III. COMPARTSON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES

SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 03/15/92

SCRAM CAUSE	NUMBER	1992 WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	1991 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1990 WEEKLY AVERAGE	WEEKLY	WEEKLY
POWER GREATER THAN 15%						
EQUIPMENT RELATED PERSONNEL RELATED (2) OTHER (4)	0 3 0	2.6 0.9 0.0	2.9 0.6 0.0	3.4 0.5 0.0	3.1 1.0 0.1	3.0 1.0 0.4
Subtotel	3	3.5	3.5	3.9	4.2	4.4
POWER LESS THAN 15% EQUIPMENT RELATED PERSONNEL RELATED (2) OTHER (4) 0.2 Subtotal	1 1 0	0.5 0.1 0.0	0.3	0.4 0.1 0.5	0.3	0.6
TOTAL	5	4.1	4.0	4.4	4.8	5.6
. TOTAL		***	***	***	***	3.0
	MANUAL	VS AUTO		1990	1989	1988
TYPE	NO. OF SCRAMS	WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	WEEKLY	WEEKLY	WEEKLY	WEEKLY

3.3

MANUAL SCRAMS AUTOMATIC SCRAMS

0.8 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.9 4.5

II. COMPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES

SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 03/22/92

SCRAM CAUSE	NUMBER OF SCRAMS	1992 WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	1991 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1790 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1989 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1988 WEEKLY AVERAGE	
POWER GREATER THAN 1	58						
EQUIPMENT RELATED PERSONNEL RELATED (2) OTHER (4)	3 0 0	2.6 0.9 0.0	2.9 0.6 U.0	3.4 0.5 0.0	3.1 1.0 0.1	3.0 1.0 0.4	
Subtotal	3	3.5	3.5	3.9	4.2	4.4	
POWER LESS THAN 15%							
EQUIPMENT RELATED	0	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.6	
PERSONNEL RELATED (2)	0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.4	
OTHER (4) 0.2	0	0.0		0.5	0.0	0.0	
Subtotal	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.2	
TOTAL	3	4.0	4.0	4.4	4.8	5.6	

MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS

TYPE	NO. OF SCRAMS	1992 WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	1991 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1990 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1989 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1988 WEEKLY AVERAGE
MANUAL SCRAMS AUTOMATIC SCRAMS	2	0.9	0.7	1.2	0.9	1.1

NOTES

- 1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE 111 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.
- 2. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.
- 3. COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
- 4. "OTHER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE.

OEAB SCRAM DATA

Manual	and	Automatic	Scrams	for	1987		435
Manual	and	Automatic	Scrams	for	1990		226
						(YTD 03/22/92)	

OPERATING REACTOR PLANTS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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No Sort Specified GRENTY Event Type 51G & Event Date <= 99/07/91 & Event Date <= 99/07/91

EFR 92-005

BENEDICT R.

91-16

BRIEFING PRESENTER

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26/22/50