



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 20071, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37375

J. L. Wilson
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

March 27, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:


In the Matter of) Docket No. 50-328
Tennessee Valley Authority)

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 -
SPECIAL REPORT 92-03

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier being nonfunctional for a period greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with Action Statement (a) of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.12.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-8422.

Sincerely,


J. L. Wilson

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Page 2

March 27, 1992

cc (Enclosure):

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Enclosure

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT SPECIAL REPORT 92-03

Description of Event

On February 27, 1992, with Units 1 and 2 operating in Mode 1, it was determined that fire barrier penetration 4A-2T821 was nonfunctional for a period of greater than seven days. The penetration is on Elevation 759 of the auxiliary building, serving the Unit 2 control rod drive mechanism control panel room. On February 20, 1992, at 0945 Eastern standard time (EST), a fire barrier breach was issued to allow installation of a conduit through the fire barrier. The operability of the fire detectors on one side of the fire barrier was verified and an hourly, fire watch patrol was established as required by Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.12, Action Statement (a). The roving fire watch remained in effect until the fire barrier breach was restored to a functional status. The fire barrier breach was returned to operable status on February 27, 1992, at 1705 EST.

Cause of Event

The cause of the fire barrier breach not being returned to functional status within the seven-day timeframe was because of personnel failing to follow procedures. The individual involved misunderstood the requirement that the breach must be closed within seven, 24-hour periods. The individual believed he had until the end of the seventh day to restore the breach to functional status.

Corrective Action

The fire barrier was restored, a visual inspection was performed, and the penetration was returned to functional status on February 27, 1992. The individual involved was counseled on the event and informed of the requirements of the procedure. Also, this event was discussed with other appropriate Modifications personnel.