

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
 Zone II and III Cross-connected.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	4	2	8	4	8	4	0	2	4	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	3	8	7	SSES - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 8
0	4	2	8	4	4	0	0	5	2	2	8	4	0	5	0	0	0				0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1

POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(iv)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER
 L.A. Kuczynski - Nuclear Plant Specialist-III AREA CODE
7 1 7 5 1 4 2 1 - 1 3 7 1 5 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS
A	VIA	BIHDI	B 1 1 3 1 0	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

The station's Reactor Building ventilation zones were inadvertently cross-connected contrary to the provisions of Technical Specification 3.6.5.1. The condition was rectified within 25 minutes of discovery. Procedural changes have been implemented to prevent recurrence of this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 8 4 - 0 2 4 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 255A's) (17)

The station's secondary containment is divided into three ventilation zones. Zones I and II surround respective Unit I and Unit 2 containments below the common refueling floor. Zone III includes Unit 1 and Unit 2 secondary containments above the common Refueling Floor. Since Unit 1 was in Operational Condition 1 during the time of the event, Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 requires that secondary containment integrity be maintained. Per Tech. Spec. 3.6.5.1 for Unit 1, secondary containment consists of Zone I, Zone II and Zone III or Zone I and Zone III when Zone II isolated from Zone I and Zone III. Unit 2 -as in Operational Condition 5 during the event and, per Unit 2 Tech. Specs., its secondary containment integrity was not required.

On April 20, 1984, in preparation for setting the Unit 2 drywell head, primary containment ventilation ducting to the area that would be under the head was installed and the four ventilation hatches which permit air return to the lower areas of the drywell were opened. The work was performed in accordance with work authorizing documents prepared and reviewed by operations and maintenance personnel (licensed and non-licensed utility personnel) per approved station procedure. At 0500 on April 22, 1984, licensed Operations personnel determined that, since the Unit 2 primary containment personnel access airlock interlocks were defeated (i.e., both airlock doors were open), Zone II was not isolated from Zone III because of the flowpath from Unit 2 secondary containment through the airlock and out the vent hatches to the Refuel Floor. Since Zone II was not isolated from Zone I and Zone III, the station was in a configuration contrary to that required by Unit 1 Tech. Specs. (There is no annunciation associated with the vent hatches). Within 25 minutes, the Unit 2 airlock was closed, thus restoring isolation between Zone II and Zone III.

The Unit 2 airlock doors were open to permit ease of personnel access to primary containment during the final stages of construction close-out. A thorough search of work documents disclosed only one other instance when the Unit 2 vent hatches and airlock were open simultaneously. However, during that time, Unit 1 was shut down for the Unit 1-Unit 2 Tie-in Outage and secondary containment integrity was not required on either Unit 1 or Unit 2.

The four 24-inch diameter vent hatches open directly to the drywell air space with no connecting ductwork. The hatches provide a return pathway for ventilation of the area underneath the drywell head and are open during normal operation. With the exception of four short-duration trips of Zone II and Zone III fans, normal ventilation equipment for all three zones operated properly throughout this event, maintaining 1/2 inch vacuum throughout secondary containment. The fan trips were caused by circumstances not associated with this event.

Procedural changes have been implemented to highlight the conditions under which the possibility exists of cross-connecting ventilation zones. These changes alert both operations and maintenance personnel to the cross-connecting hazard during reactor head insulation installation and removal, and during installation and removal of the drywell head. Additionally, this event will be added to the Supervisor of Operations Weekly Meeting for review with all Operation's shift personnel.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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May 22, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 84-024-00
ER 100450 FILE 841-23
PLA-2213

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 84-024-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) in that, Unit 1 operation continued beyond the time limit specified in Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 with Reactor Building ventilation Zone I cross-connected to Zones II and III.

H.W. Keiser
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

LAK/pjg

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