

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of
Georgia Power Company
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

} Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425
License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81
EA 91-063

DEMAND FOR INFORMATION

I

Georgia Power Company (Licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81 (Licenses), issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR 50 on March 16, 1987 and March 31, 1989, respectively. The Licenses authorize the operation of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) in accordance with conditions specified therein. The facility is located on the Licensee's site in Waynesboro, Georgia.

II

In January 1990, the NRC Region II received information alleging that VEGP Unit 1 was intentionally placed in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS). In response to this information, the NRC initiated a special investigation of licensed activities. In its investigation, which was completed on March 19, 1991, the Office of Investigations (OI) concluded that TS 3.4.1.4.2 was knowingly and intentionally violated in October 1988 by VEGP Operations Shift Supervisors with the express knowledge and, in the case of one shift crew, the concurrence of the Operations Manager.

At the time of VEGP's first refueling outage, the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 15.4.6.2.1.1, Dilution During Refueling, required that Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) discharge valves 1-1208-U4-175, 1-1208-U4-176, 1-1208-U4-177, and 1-1208-U4-183 be locked closed during refueling in order to

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prevent a boron dilution accident. Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 and VEGP Procedure 12006-C "Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown," Section D4.2.14 were instituted to prevent such an inadvertent boron dilution during Mode 5 reactor coolant loops not filled or Mode 6. The Technical Specification stated, in part, "Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) discharge valves (120B-U4-175, 120B-U4-176, 120B-U4-177 and 120B-U4-180) shall be closed and secured in position." The locking of these valves prevents the flow of unborated water from the RMWST into the RCS. At that time, boron dilution flow analyses did not exist for Mode 5 reactor coolant loops not filled or Mode 6 and, since these analyses had not been done for VEGP, the above mentioned valves were required to be closed and secured in place.

Based on the investigative findings, the NRC is concerned that an NRC-licensed VEGP manager and NRC-licensed supervisors may have intentionally disregarded Technical Specifications in an attempt to facilitate outage activities. Notwithstanding claims by the Operations Manager and the senior reactor operators that reasonable interpretation of the Technical Specifications would allow opening of the valves for a short time period, the NRC concludes that the wording of the Technical Specification is exceptionally clear and not open to any interpretation that would allow the intentional manipulation to the open position of the above-listed valves with the plant in the specified condition.

Therefore, further information is needed to determine whether the Commission can have reasonable assurance that in the future the Licensee will comply with Technical Specifications and otherwise conduct licensed activities in accordance with the Commission's requirements.

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III


Accordingly, pursuant to sections 161c, 161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f), in order for the Commission to determine whether the Licenses should be modified, suspended or revoked, or other enforcement action taken to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements, the Licensee is required to submit to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, within 30 days of the date of this Demand for Information, the following information, in writing and under oath or affirmation:

- A. An explanation for the actions taken by W. F. Kitchens with respect to his responsibilities as Operations Manager in the events associated with the opening of the RMWST discharge valves, with VEGP Unit 1 in Mode 5 reactor coolant loops not filled, that occurred in October 1985.
- B. An explanation as to why Messrs. W. F. Kitchens, J. P. Cash and J. E. Bowles should not be removed from 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 55 licensed activities because of their participation in this event.
- C. Information describing the corporate procedure related to the issuance of Technical Specification interpretations and the process used to control those interpretations.

- D. Information describing how outage planning is conducted to assure that the requirements of Technical Specifications are considered in the planning process so that they are adhered to as required during conduct of evolutions during the outage activities. In addition, the planning that went into the event at issue should be discussed.
- E. A full and complete discussion of the Licensee's practices and procedures regarding compliance with Technical Specifications and the methods to ensure that licensed operators operate the facility in a manner consistent with the Technical Specifications, including the bases for those Technical Specifications. This response is to include actions operators are expected to take and with whom they are to consult within the organization if they do not fully understand Technical Specification requirements or encounter other unusual conditions.

Copies also shall be sent to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement at the same address as above, and to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, 101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 2900, Atlanta, Georgia 30323. After reviewing the Licensee's response, the NRC will determine whether further action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



James H. Sniezek
Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations
and Research

Dated at Rockville, Maryland
this 8th day of June 1991

Georgia Power Company

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