

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-397/84-08

Docket No. 50-397

License No. CPPR-93

Licensee: Washington Public Power Supply System
P. O. Box 968
Richland, Washington 99352

Facility Name: WNP-2

Inspection at: WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington

Inspection conducted: March 19-23, 1984

Inspector: *Dennis J. Willett* 4-27-84
D. J. Willett, Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Inspector: *Jay K. Ball* 4-27-84
J. K. Ball, Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Inspector: *Daniel F. Hollenbach* 2-27-84
D. F. Hollenbach, Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Approved by: *Dennis J. Willett for* 4-27-84
R. T. Dodds, Chief Date Signed
Reactor Projects Section 1

Summary:

Inspection on March 19-23, 1984 (Report No. 50-397/84-08)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspections of Quality Assurance Programs for: tests and experiments, test and measurement equipment, maintenance activities and audits; and follow-up of TMI (NUREG-0737) items. The inspections involved a total of 28 onsite hours by three NRC inspectors.

Results: Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *J. D. Martin, WNP-2 Plant Manager
- *G. K. Afflerbach, Assistant Plant Manager
- *G. D. Bouchey, Director Support Services
- *M. M. Monopoli, Manager Operations Assurance Program
 - T. S. Houchins, Manager Audits and Surveillance
- *J. F. Peters, Plant Administrative Manager
- *G. Hansen, Senior Engineer (EFSEC)
- *D. H. Walker, Plant Quality Assurance Manager
- *J. M. Graziani, Nuclear Safety Assurance Engineer
 - W. Kelso, Engineer
 - I. Jenkins, Engineer
 - P. Power, Manager of Safety and Licensing
 - D. E. Larson, Manager Radiological Program and Instrument Calibration
 - C. D. Petitt, Instrument and Calibration Foreman
 - E. Cheyney, Instrument Foreman
 - J. W. Baker, Manager of Operations WNP-1

The inspector also talked with other licensee personnel during the inspections. These included plant staff engineers, technicians, administrative assistants, and document control personnel.

*Denotes personnel present during the exit interview on March 23, 1984.

2. Quality Assurance Program for Test and Experiments

The inspector reviewed administrative procedures PPM 1.2.4 - "Plant Procedures Approval and Revision" and PPM 1.5.1 and 1.5.5 which govern the administrative and technical review and approval process, for proposed special tests and experiments. The plant operating committee reviews all proposed tests and experiments for unreviewed safety questions (pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59) and to insure that the proposal does not violate technical specification requirements or commitments. From discussions with the reactor engineering supervisor it was determined that the only special test or experiment is 8.2.93 - "Sacrificial Shield Wall Verification". The purpose of this test is to measure the radiation field outside of the wall.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Quality Assurance Program - Test and Measurement Equipment

The inspector reviewed plant procedures regarding "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment" (PPM 1.5.4). This review included discussions with supervisors and personnel responsible for program management and implementation. This review verified that: The test and measurement equipment inventory matrix included all equipment used on safety systems, each instrument had an identified calibration frequency, calibration standard and a calibration procedure.

PPM 1.5.4: Prohibits use of equipment not in current calibration; requires that, if test equipment is found out of calibration, all equipment that the test instrument was used on be reviewed for potential miscalibration; and requires new test equipment be calibrated before being added to the inventory.

No violations or deviation were identified.

4. Quality Assurance - Maintenance

Plant procedures were reviewed to ascertain whether a QA program has been developed and implemented relating to maintenance activities and is in conformance with technical specifications, regulations and commitments. This review verified: that written procedures have been established for initiating routine and emergency maintenance; that criteria and responsibilities for review and approval of maintenance requests has been established; that criteria and responsibilities that form the basis for designating maintenance activities safety or non-safety related have been established; that criteria, provisions and responsibilities, for establishing and performing inspection of maintenance activities, has been established; and methods and responsibilities have been designated for functional testing of systems, structures and components prior to their return to service following maintenance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Quality Assurance - Audits

The long-range schedule for audits and implementation of the audit program was discussed with personnel responsible for program management. Additionally, nuclear operations standards (NOS)-1, Rev. 0, NOS-20, Rev. 2; and the Operational Quality Assurance Program description, Rev. 8 were reviewed. This examination was to verify the Corporate Nuclear Safety Review Board's (CNSRB) compliance with their responsibilities regarding audit scope and frequencies provided for in Technical Specification sections 6.5.2.1 and 6.5.2.8 respectively.

The inspector expressed the concern that while the audit organization was relied upon to review and evaluate quality affecting activities, there was no formal program to periodically evaluate the audit program. This evaluation is necessary to: assess the overall effectiveness and degree of implementation of quality assurance program policies and objectives and satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B numbers I and XVIII.

The licensee committed to perform a regularly scheduled review and assessment of the audit program by staff designated by the CNSRB.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. TMI (NUREG 0737) Activities

I.D.2 (Open) "Plant Safety Parameter Display Console" - The requirements for this item are outlined in NUREG-0696 Section 5, Safety Parameter Display System.

A review of FSAR Sections 7.5.1.2.3 and 7.7.1.1.5 describing the WNP-2 safety parameter display system (SPDS) and supporting technical data acquisition system (TDAS) indicates that the licensee is progressing in the implementation of a program which will meet the requirements of NUREG-0696. The licensee has been participating in the BWR Owner's Group development of a standard emergency response information system.

The responsible SPDS system engineer indicated that some calibration checks of inputs into SPDS have not been completed. Also, some continuity verification checks to the technical support center (TSC) and emergency operations facility (EOF) remain to be done before the system could be declared fully operational. The manager of safety and licensing stated that relief from some system operational display requirements for the TSC and EOF was being sought.

The inspector observed that currently there are no technical specification requirements which address SPDS operability. System operating procedures and operator training manuals are yet to be developed. No criteria appears to exist to evaluate SPDS operability following a seismic event. No operating procedure exists which provides guidance for resolution of unsuccessful data validation. The licensee indicated that these areas would be reviewed. This item will remain open until program completion.

Item I.C.6 (Closed) "Redundant Verification" This item has been addressed through a programmatic approach outlined in a memo (J. D. Martin from J. W. Baker September 19, 1983). The remainder of the program - the locked valve list and isolation/manifold instrument valves PPM, has been developed and implemented.

Item II E.4.1 (Open) "Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations" - The requirements for this item are: A) external recombiners for post-accident combustible gas control of containment atmosphere shall be connected to the containment through penetrations dedicated to that service only and must meet redundancy and single-failure requirements of General Design Criteria 54 and 56 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50; B) containment penetration systems for external recombiners must be sized to satisfy flow requirements of the recombiners.

The detailed design of the containment atmosphere control system piping is provided in FSAR Section 6.2.5 and by Figure 6.2-31g, Isolation Valve Arrangement for Penetrations, X-96, X-97, X-98, X-99, X-102, X-103, X-104, X-105, X-11A and X-11B and Burns and Roe Drawing No. M554, Rev. 26. Review of these documents indicate compliance with the requirement for dedicated penetrations that meet redundancy and single-failure criteria.

The inspector reviewed the preoperational test procedure PT 22.0-A ("Primary Containment Atmosphere Control System") and discussed the results and system status with the responsible system design engineer. Due to design modifications for the flow orifices between the drywell/wetwell and the recombiner units, the required design flow (65.7 SCFM per FSAR Section 6.2.5) has yet to be verified. This item therefore

will remain open until the required flow through the recombiners has been demonstrated.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 23, 1984. The scope and findings of this inspection, were discussed during the exit interview, and are summarized in paragraph 1 through 6 of this report.