

#### UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

May 17, 1984

Docket No.: 50-416

LICENSEE: Mississippi Power & Light

FACILITY: Grand Gulf Unit

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF APRIL 5, 1984, MEETING WITH MISSISSIPPI POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY REGARDING GRAND GULF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVIEW

The meeting was held in the Bethesda, MD offices of NRC to review the MP&L program for resolving technical specification problems for the Grand Gulf facility. Enclosure 1 is a list of attendees.

The NRC staff handed out the results of the ICSB re-review of Grand Gulf Technical Specifications (GGTS) as revised through Amendment 12 (Enclosure 2). This ICSB handout is part of the NRC, Division of Systems Integration (DSI) re-review of the TS completed in March of this year. The other part of the DSI re-review was provided to MP&L as a handout in the April 4, 1984 morning meeting. The NRC staff also handed out the results of the INEL Laboratory (EG&G) Audit Report dated March 27, 1984. This report gives results of the EG&G audit of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 Technical Specification (Enclosure 3).

The NRR staff requested the licensee to provide, prior to the meeting on April 11, 1984, a description of how NRR, EG&G and Region II comments and recommendations resulting from reviews of GGTS have been considered in the MP&L TS review program. MP&L representatives agreed to list technical specification problem sheet numbers for NRR, EG&G, and Region II comments. The list would include:

- The CHEB November 7, 1983 memorandum on fire protection technical specifications (Handout in the March 22, 1984 meeting).
- The February 9, 1984 memorandum from R. C. Lewis (Region II) to D. G. Eisenhut (DL) on results of the second proof and review of GGTS. (Handout in the March 14, 1984 meeting).
- 3. Region II Inspection Report 50-416/84-06, dated March 13, 1984 (Handout in the March 14, 1984 meeting).
- Division of Systems Integration, NRR comments on GGTS (Handout in the April 4, 1984 meeting).
- Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch comments on GGTS (Enclosure 2).

8405290393 840517 PDR ADOCK 05000416 PDR PDR

DESIGNATED ORIGINAL Certified By D. Marlen 6. EG&G Idaho, Inc. Audit of GGTS (Enclosure 3).

In addition, MP&L was requested and agreed to provide prior to the April 11 meeting:

- (a) An identification of those specifications which were applicable solely to operational conditions 1 (above 5% power) or 5 (refueling).
- (b) An identification of those technical specification problems for which the anticipated resolution was to change the FSAR rather than change the TS.
- (c) New problem sheets resulting from the generic instrumentation review (TSPS No. 034).

h.L. Kintur

-

L. L. Kintner, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

3

. 1

- 1. List of Attendees
- 2. Results of ICSB re-review
- of GGTS (Comments and Recomm.) 3. Audit of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
- Technical Specifications March 27, 1984
- cc: See Next Page

-2-

GRAND GULF

.

\*

Mr. J. P. McGaughy Vice President Nuclear Production Mississippi Power & Light Company P.O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205

cc: Robert B. McGehee, Esquire Wise, Carter, Child, Steen and Caraway P.O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205

> Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell and Reynolds 1200 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20036

-

Mr. Ralph T. Lally Manager of Quality Middle South Energy, Inc. 225 Baronne Street P.O. Box 61000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161

Mr. Larry Dale Mississippi Power & Light Company P.O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205

Mr. R. W. Jackson, Project Engineer Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Bechtel Power Corporation Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760

Mr. Alan G. Wagner Senior Resident Inspector Route 2, Box 399 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Enclosure 1

Attendees at the April 5, 1984 meeting between NRC staff and MP&L Representatives

.2

L. L. Kintner	NRC/NRR/DL/	LB-1
Caudle Julian	NRC/Region	III
D. Hoffman	NRC/NRR/DL/	SSPB
John Richardson	MP&L/TERA C	orp.
Wayne Russell	MP&L	
Jerry C. Roberts	. MP&L	
H. M. Brooks	MP&L	
J. H. Starling	MP&L	

Comments and Recommendations on Grand Gulf Technica! Specifications, as amended through Amendment 12 by Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, DSI, NRR, NRC, March 1984.

## ICSB COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDED CHANGES FOR THE GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

- 1. By memorandum dated December 30, 1982, from R. Mattson to D. Eisenhut the ICSB proposed technical specification changes to address the operability of the remote shutdown systems required under the provisions of GDC 19. These changes impose limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements on transfer switches, control circuits and both channels of monitoring instruments for the remote shutdown system. It was recommended in the December 30, 1982, memorandum that these changes be implemented immediately on OL reviews. Therefore, Section 3/4.3.7.4 of the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications should be modified to include these recommendations.
- 2. By memorandum dated October 12, 1983, from R. Mattson to D. Eisenhut the ICSB proposed technical specification changes to address the operability of the post accident monitoring instrumentation required under the provisions of NUREG-0737 Supplement #1. These changes update the Standard Technical Specifications to reflect the Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 graded approach to operability requirements depending on the importance to safety of the measurement of a specific variable. It was recommended in the October 12, 1983, memorandum that these changes be implemented immediately or OL reviews. Therefore, Sections 3/4.3.7.5 and 6.8.3 of the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications should be modified to include these recommendations.

Current surveillance requirements for the reactor protection system (i.e., reactor trip, engineered safety Teatures actuation and supporting features) and the reactor core isolation cooling system specify testing of the final actuation logic (i.e., the <u>AND</u> function of the one-out-of-two taken twice logic: A or C <u>AND</u> B or D) at refueling outage intervals. This actuation circuitry (including the circuits associated with supporting features) should be tested more frequently (e.g., semi-annually) commensurate with the importance of the safety functions performed by these systems.

By letter dated October 13, 1983 from A. Schwencer (NRC) to J. P. McGaughey (MP&L) the NRC staff requested additional information regarding the frequency of testing actuation circuitry. By letter dated February 17, 1984 from G. F. Dale (MP&L) to H. Denton (NRC) the licensee proposed to provide additional information on test intervals by March 2, 1984.

The completion of the ICSB's review of the technical specifications is pending receipt and review of this information.

4. The ICSB has identified deficiencies in the method used to establish the protection system trip setpoints and allowable values contained in the technical specifications for recent BWR OLs. The licensee is currently participating in a BWR Owners Group study on instrument setpoints and will be providing a setpoint methodology position state-

- 2 -

3.

1.3.5

ment. At this time we have identified one deficiency in the setpoint methodology used for Grand Gulf involving the treatment of trip unit drift. The numerical difference between the technical specification's trip setpoints and allowable values, should be that quantity of the instrument uncertainty allotted for the trip unit drift and calibration accuracy. The numerical difference between the trip setpoints and allowable values for Grand Gulf include both trip unit drift and sensor drift. "This insufficient drift allowance at the allowable value could permit continued operation with instrument channels that would not actuate safety systems to terminate transients or mitigate accidents within the bounds specified in the FSAR analyses. Therefore, the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specification's trip setpoints and allowable values should be revised to include an allowance for only the drift associated with that portion of the instrument channel tested at 31 day intervals (i.e., trip unit) and an allowance for trip unit calibration inaccuracy between the trip setpoint and the allowable value. Additional changes to the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications may be required following our review of the licensee's methodology position statement.

-

5. By letter dated October 11, 1983 from J. McGaughy (MP&L) to H. Denton (NRC) the licensee proposed changes to the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications that address the <u>RCIC</u> actuation instrumentation. We have reviewed the proposed changes and found them acceptable. A discussion on the proposed changes is contained in the ICSB input to Supplement No. 5 of the SER. The Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications should be revised accordingly.

2.2 : + 3/4.3:1 6. By letter dated October 14, 1983 from L. Dale (MP&L) to H. Denton the licensee committed to propose revisions to the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications. The proposed changes will require more frequent calibrations of components in the containment isolation actuation instrumentation. We have reviewed the proposal and found it acceptable. A discussion on the proposal is contained in the ICSB input to Supplement No. 5 of the SER. The Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications should be revised accordingly.

7. The Bases Section for Specification 3/4.3.1 entitled "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation" includes the following statement: "The system meets the intent of IEEE 279 for nuclear power plant protection systems". We recommend that this statement be deleted. A detailed discussion on the conformance of the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 design to the NRC's regulatory requirements is contained in the SER.

8. Technical Specification 3/4.3.8 entitled "Plant Systems Actuation Instrumentation" includes the requirements applicable to the containment spray system. By letter dated September 12, 1983, from L. Dale to H. Denton the licensee identified a potential problem with regard to the minimum operable channels requirements of the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications that address this system. It appears that the requirements

- 4 -

+.3.2

address only one-half of the instruments provided. The licensee has stated that the worst case single failure would be limited to the disabling of the initiation of one spray loop when operating with one-half of the instruments provided. The system has been designed such that any single failure within the actuation instrumentation will not prevent actuation at the systems level when all of the actuation instruments provided are operable. Therefore, to enhance plant safety we recommend that the minimum channels operable requirement for the drywell pressure high, containment pressure high and reactor vessel low actuation signals be revised from the present one per trip system to two per trip system and that an appropriate action statement be developed to address operation with one or more channels per trip system inoperable.

9. Specification 3/4.3.1 entitled "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation" and Specification 3/4.9.1 entitled "Reactor Mode Switch" address the operability requirements and surveillance requirements for the reactor mode switch. The requirements address only those circuits associated with the shutdown and refuel position. The mode switch is provided to select the protective functions appropriate for each mode of reactor operation shutdown, refueling, startup and power operations. In addition to the protective functions of reactor trip (six trip inputs) and primary containment isolation (one trip input) the mode switch enables/bypasses

- 5 -

control rod blocks, operation of the suppression pool makeup system, refueling interlocks and monitoring functions which are provided to control operations within prescribed bounds. Therefore, we recommend that the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications include limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements that include consideration of the other safety-related functions accomplished by the mode switch.

10. Specification 3/4.7.1 entitled "Service Water Systems" addresses the surveillance requirements for the standby service water (SSW) system. These requirements include a periodic demonstration of the operability of the circuits that automatically reposition valves servicing safety-related equipment. The SSW system (including the SSW pumps, SSW cooling tower fans and automatic system valves) is initiated automatically upon occurrence of a LOCA or startup of any of the ESF systems it serves. In addition, the SSW system is initiated automatically on a loss of offsite power through the associated load sequencing circuits. Currently the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications address only those circuits associated with the SSW system's valves. To ensure the operability of the automatic actuation of the SSW system pumps and cooling tower fans we recommend that Specification 4.7.1.1 be revised to include periodic testing of the actuation circuitry for these components.

- 6 -

- 11. Specification 3/4.6.3 entitled "Suppression Pool" addresses the operability requirements and surveillance requirements for the suppression pool. This specification does not address the suppression pool make-up system. The suppression pool makeup system provides water from the upper containment pool to the suppression pool by gravity flow after a LOCA and is classified as an ESF system at Grand Gulf. The system isautomatically initiated 30 minutes after a LOCA is detected or on a low-low suppression pool level following a LOCA. The suppression pool makeup system consists of two independent and redundant subsystems. The actuation logic for each subsystem is a one-out-of-two arrangement of level sensors. We recommend that appropriate Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements be developed to address this ESF system.
  - 12. Specification 3/4.7.3 entitled "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System" addresses the operability of the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC). The design of the RCIC system includes protective features to automatically shut down the turbine by tripping the trip and throttle valve closed if any of the following conditions are detected: turbine overspeed, high turbine exhaust pressure, RCIC isolation signal from logic A or B, or low pump suction pressure. To ensure the reliability of these features, the availability of RCIC system and to enhance plant

- 7 -

safety these features should be included in the operability and surveillance requirements.

13. The high pressure/low pressure system interlocks prevent overpressurization of the low pressure systems that connect ' the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Specification 3/4.4.3.2 entitled "Reactor Coolant. System Leakage" address the operability of the isolation valves with respect to leak-tight integrity and the instrumentation provided to monitor valve leakage, however, this specification does not address the valve interlocks. The following valves are interlocked to prevent valve opening until pressure permissives are satisfied: E12-F009, E12-F008, E12-F053, E12-F023, E12-F087, and E38-F001. To ensure the reliability of these features and to enhance plant safety we recommend that appropriate limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements be included in the Grand Gulf-Unit 1 Technical Specifications.

3/4.3.1 TINTO 3/4.3.6

14. By letter dated September 12, 1983 from A. Schwencer (NRC) to J. Mc Gaughey (MP&L) the NRC staff requested additional information to resolve concerns regarding the minimum number of operable instrument channel requirements contained in the Grand Gulf Technical Specifications, and additional information regarding the licensee's interpretation of the definition of the terms "trip functions", "channel" and "trip systems" contained in the Grand Gulf technical specifications. By letter dated September 12, 1983 from L. F. Dale (MP&L) to H. Denton (NRC) the licensee committed to provide the requested information by February 15, 1984. By letter dated February 15, 1984 from L. F. Dale to H. Denton the applicant formally requested an extension of this due date until March 16, 1984.

The completion of the ICSB's review of the technical specifications is pending receipt and review of this information.

-

··· ·· What

Audit of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Technical Specifications March 27, 1984, by EG&G Idaho, INc. (Consultant to NRC)

-



P.O. BOX 1625, IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83415

March 27, 1984

Mr. F. L. Sims, Director Reactor Research and Technology Division Idaho Operations Office - DOE Idaho Falls, ID 83401

TRANSMITTAL OF GRAND GULF, UNIT 1, REPORT A6816 - LPL-106-84

Ref: J. M. Fehringer, H. C. Rockhold and T. L. Cook, <u>Audit of Nuclear</u> <u>Plant Technical Specifications Grand Gulf Nuclear Station</u>, Unit 1, Docket No. 50-416, EGG-EA-6542, March 1984

Dear Mr. Sims:

Enclosed is the referenced final report. This report determined that there are inconsistencies between three Technical Specification Sections, the Final Safety Analysis Report, and the Safety Evaluation Report for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1. This report issued under FIN A6816 completes Node 106-D1 on the FY1984 NRC Support Milestone Chart.

Very truly yours,

70 Thite for

L. P. Leach, Manager Reactor Evaluation Programs

JMF: jh

Enclosure: As Stated

- cc: J. N. Donohew, NRC/DL (5)
  - G. C. Meyer, NRC/DL
  - J. O. Zane, EG&G Idaho (w/o Enc.)

EGG-EA-6542

March 1984

-

AUDIT OF NUCLEAR PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-416

J. M. Fehringer H. C. Rockhold T. L. Cook

Prepared for the U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. A6816

# DISCLAIMER

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

EGG-EA-6542

## GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 AUDIT OF NUCLEAR PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Docket No. 50-416 TAC No. 54185

Published March 1984

J. M. Fehringer H. C. Rockhold T. L. Cock

EG&G Idaho, Inc. Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415

Responsible NRC Individual and Division: G. C. Meyer/Division of Licensing

Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. A6816

### ABSTRACT

This report documents the review of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1, Technical Specifications (T/S) to determine if selected sections of the T/S are consistent with the Grand Gulf Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as amended, and the Grand Gulf Safety Evaluation Report (SER) as supplemented. Inconsistencies are listed in this report but no further evaluation was conducted to determine if the inconsistency was an indication of an error in any of the subject documents.

### FOREWARD

-

This report is supplied as part of the "Audit of Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications" being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing, by EG&G Idaho, Inc., NRC Licensing Support Section.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under authorization B&R 20 19 10 11 1 FIN No. A6816.

# CONTENTS

. .

1.	INTRODUCTION	1
2.	REVIEW CRITERIA	1
3.	DISCUSSION	3
4.	CONCLUSIONS	7
5.	REFERENCES	7

# TABLE

I.	Grand Gulf-1 Technical	Specification/FSAR/SER	
	Consistency Summary		4

### AUDIT OF NUCLEAR PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1, (Grand Gulf-1) is a boiling water reactor (BWR) plant. It has been selected for an audit to determine if the Grand Gulf-1 Technical Specifications  $(T/S)^1$  are consistent with the Grand Gulf-1 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)<sup>2</sup> as amended and the Grand Gulf-1 Safety Evaluation Report (SER)<sup>3</sup> as supplemented. The specific sections of the T/S selected for audit and summary results are listed in Table I. Inconsistencies between these sections of the T/S and the FSAR and SER were identified but no further evaluation was conducted to determine if the inconsistencies were indications of error in any of the subject documents.

### 2. REVIEW CRITERIA

The T/S Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and Action Statements for each technical specification listed in Table I (Section 3) were compared to the FSAR and SER to determine if the T/S are consistent with the FSAR and SER. Emphasis was on the T/S Operational Mode 1, power operation, with exceptions noted in this report. Setpoints and lists of valves. instruments, overcurrent protective devices and electrical buses in the T/S were checked against tables in the FSAR and SER.

The SER was reviewed to ensure that requirements in the SER were addressed in the T/S.

The T/S bases and surveillance requirements were not reviewed in this audit of the T/S.

An explanation of each inconsistency between the T/S and the FSAR and SER is included in this report.

1

### 3. DISCUSSION

The following inconsistencies were identified:

1. T/S Section 3/4.3.2 (Isolation Actuation Instrumentation)

 T/S, Amendment 9, Table 3.3.2-1 (Isolation Actuation Instrumentation), Item 5.m, includes "Drywell Pressure-High "concurrent with" RCIC Steam Supply Pressure-Low", as a signal which causes Valve Group 4 and Valve Group 9 to close isolating Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC).

However, Chapter 5.4.6, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, (pages 5.4-15 and 5.4-16) of the FSAR does not identify "Drywell Pressure-High" concurrent with "RCIC Steam Supply Pressure-Low" as an RCIC isolation signal. -

b. Item 5.h of T/S Table 3.3.2-1 (Isolation Actuation Instrumentation) identifies a "Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature Timer". The function of the timer is to delay RCIC isolation for 30 minutes (to allow the operator time to establish an alternate means of Reactor Vessel Level Control).

A timer is identified in the Figure 7.6-17 (Leak Detection System) of the FSAR as Instrument E-31R617. However, the FSAR does not identify the function of this timer. Without an FSAR discussion, the timer identified in Figure 7.6-17 cannot be verified as the timer in Table 3.3.2-1 Item 5.h. of T/S.

2

.c. Item 2.b of T/S Table 3.3.2-2 (Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints) identifies the "Main Steam Line Flow-High" setpoint as ≤ 169 psid. A 169 psid signal corresponds to 140% steam flow. The FSAR identifies 140% steam flow as the required "Main Steam Line Flow-High" setpoint.

However, Table 7.3-10 (Containment and Reactor Vessel Control System Instrumentation Specifications) of the FSAR identifies the setpoint as  $\leq$  133.5 psid.

-

d. Item 2.b of T/S Table 3.3.2-2 (Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints) requires an instrument with an indicating range of -50/0/250 psid in order to indicate the ≤169 psid trip setpoint.

However, Table 7.3-10 (Containment and Reactor Vessel Control System Instrumentation Specifications) of the FSAR identifies an instrument with an indicating range of -15/0/150 psid.

2. T/S Section 3/4.6.4 (Containment and Drywell Isolation Valves)

Sections 3.6.4-1.1.b through 3.6.4-1.4.b of T/S Table 3.6.4-1 (Containment and Drywell Isolation Valves)<sup>a</sup> lists valves that are not identified as required in the FSAR Table 6.2-44 (Containment Isolation Valves).

 T/S Section 3/4.6.6.2 (Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers/Valves)

The completeness of T/S Table 3.6.6.2-1, (Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers/Valves) cannot be verified by FSAR Table 7.6-12.

a. Some of the valves are listed in FSAR Tables 7.6-12 (Auxiliary Building Isolation System Actuated Equipment List), 6.2-48 (Primary Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Instrumentation), and Table 6.2-49 (Reactor Containment Penetration and Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Rate Test List).

 Auxiliary Building Isolation System Actuated Equipment List), because the specific Isolation Dampers are not listed in FSAR Table 7.6-12. The Isolation Valves are listed.

Table I contains a summary of the Grand Gulf Unit 2 T/S sections reviewed; consistencies and inconsistencies with the FSAR and/or the SER are shown.

TABLE I. GRAND GULF-1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION/FSAR/SER CONSISTENCY SUMMARY

SECTION		CONSISTENT/INCONSISTENT
3/4.3 IN	STRUMENTATION	
3/4.3.2	ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION	Inconsistent
3/4.3.3	EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION	Consistent
3/4.5 EM	ERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS	
3/4.5.1	ECCS - OPERATING	Consistent .
3/4.5.3	SUPPRESSION CHAMBER	Consistent
3/4.6 00	NTAINMENT SYSTEMS	
3/4.6.1	PRIMARY CONTAINMENT	Consistent.
	Primary Containment Integrity	Consistent
	Primary Containment Leakage	Consistent
	Primary Containment Air Locks	Consistent
	MSIV Leakage Control System	Consistent
	Feedwater Leakage Control System	Consistent
	Primary Containment Structural Integrity	Consistent
	Primary Containment Internal Pressure	Consistent
	Primary Containment Purge System	Consistent

TABLE I.	(Continued)	
SECTION		CONSISTENT/INCONSISTENT
3/4.6.2	DRYWELL	
	Drywell Integrity	Consistent
	Drywell Bypass Leakage	Consistent
	Drywell Air Locks	Consistent
	Drywell Structural Integrity	Consistent
	Orywell Internal Pressure	Consistent
3/4.6.3	DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS	
	Suppression Chamber	Consistent
	Primary Containment Spray	Consistent
	Suppression Pool Cooling	Consistent
	Drywell-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure	Consistent
3/4.6.4	CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES	Inconsistent
3/4.6.5	SECONDARY CONTAINMENT	
	Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers/Valves	Inconsistent
	Standby Gas Treatment System	Consistent
3/4.6.7	ATMOSPHERE CONTROL	
	Containment and Drywell Hydrogen Recombiner Systems	Consistent
	Drywell Purge System	Consistent
3/4.8 EL	ECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS	
3/4.8.1	A.C. SOURCES	Consistent
	A.C. Sources-Operating	Consistent

TABLE I.	(Continued)	
SECTION		CONSISTENT/INCONSISTENT
3/4.8.2 3/4.8.3	ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS	
	A.C. Distribution - Operating	Consistent
	D.C. Distribution - Operating	Consistent
3/4.8.4	Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices	Consistent

## 4. CONCLUSION

As shown in Table I, 32 technical specification sections were compared with information in the FSAR and SER for Grand Gulf, Unit 1. Inconsistencies were identified in three sections of the technical specifications shown in Table I. This review did not determine the significance of the inconsistency or which of the documents was in error.

### 5. REFERENCES

1. Grand Gulf Technical Specifications Rev. June 1982

2. Grand Gulf FSAR up to Amendment No. 57

3. Grand Gulf SER up to Amendment No. 4

6