



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-263

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT


AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 24  
License No. DPR-22

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated January 26, 1976, as supplemented by information dated July 2, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.
3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Dennis L. Ziomann, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #2  
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 15, 1976

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 24

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22

DOCKET NO. 50-263

Replace existing pages listed below of the Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. Changes on these pages are denoted by marginal line.

76  
76a (new page)  
86

2. Reactivity margin - stuck control rods.

Control rod drives which cannot be moved with control rod drive pressure shall be considered inoperable. The directional control valves for inoperable control rods shall be disarmed electrically and the rods shall be in such positions that Specification 3.3.A.1 is met. If more than six non-fully inserted rods are inoperable during power operation the reactor shall be placed in a shutdown condition. If a partially or fully withdrawn control rod drive cannot be moved with drive or scram pressure the reactor shall be brought to a shutdown condition within 48 hours unless investigation demonstrates that the cause of the failure is not due to a failed control rod drive mechanism collet housing.

#### B. Control Rod Withdrawal

1. Each control rod shall be coupled to its drive or completely inserted and the directional control valves disarmed electrically. This requirement does not apply when removing a control rod drive for inspection as long as the reactor is in the refueling mode.

2. Reactivity margin - stuck control rods.

Each partially or fully withdrawn operable control rod shall be exercised one notch at least once each week, with the exception that one rod in any two by two array need not be exercised more than one notch at least once each month. (This exception applies to cycle 5 but may be extended to subsequent cycles unless inspection of representative monthly exercised drives at end of each cycle shows abnormal piston tube or index tube degradation. Choice of monthly-exercised rods during each cycle shall be such that failure of all the monthly-tested rods to insert will not impair shutdown capability using the remaining rods). This test shall be performed at least once per 24 hours in the event power operation is continuing with two or more inoperable control rods or in the event power operation is continuing with one fully or partially withdrawn rod which cannot be moved and for which control rod drive mechanism damage has not been ruled out. The surveillance need not be completed within 24 hours if the number of inoperable rods has been reduced to less than two and if it has been demonstrated that control rod drive mechanism collet housing failure is not the cause of an immovable control rod.

B. Control Rod Withdrawal

1. The coupling integrity shall be verified for each withdrawn control rod as follows:

- (a) when the rod is fully withdrawn the first time subsequent to each refueling outage, observe that the drive does not go to the overtravel position; and

The scram times for all control rods will be determined during each refueling outage. The weekly control rod exercise test serves as a periodic check against deterioration of the control rod system and also verifies the ability of the control rod drive to scram since if a rod can be moved with drive pressure, it will scram because of higher pressure applied during scram. Allowing for monthly exercising of one rod in any two by two array is consistent with the bases for local and overall core reactivity insertion rates assumed in the transient analyses discussed above. The frequency of exercising the control rods under the conditions of two or more control rods out of service provides even further assurance of the reliability of the remaining control rods.

The occurrence of scram times within the limits, but significantly longer than the average, should be viewed as an indication of a systematic problem with control rod drives especially if the number of drives exhibiting such scram times exceeds six, the allowable number of inoperable rods.

#### D. Control Rod Accumulators

The basis for this specification was not described in the FSAR and, therefore, is presented in its entirety. Requiring no more than one inoperable accumulator in any nine-rod square array is based on a series of XY PDQ-4 quarter core calculations of a cold, clean core. The worst case in a nine-rod withdrawal sequence resulted in a  $k_{eff} < 1.0$  -- other repeating rod sequences with more rods withdrawn resulted in  $k_{eff} > 1.0$ . At reactor pressures in excess of 800 psig, even those control rods with inoperable accumulators will be able to meet required scram insertion times due to the action of reactor pressure. In addition, they may be normally inserted using the control-rod-drive hydraulic system. Procedural control will assure that control rods with inoperable accumulators will be spaced in one-in-nine array rather than grouped together.

#### E. Reactivity Anomalies

During each fuel cycle excess operating reactivity varies as fuel depletes and as any burnable poison in supplementary control is burned. The magnitude of this excess reactivity is indicated by the integrated worth of control rods inserted into the core, referred to as the control rod inventory in the core. As fuel burnup progresses, anomalous behavior in the excess reactivity may be detected by comparison of actual rod inventory at any base equilibrium core state to predicted rod inventory at that state. Rod inventory predictions can be normalized to actual initial steady state rod patterns to minimize calculational uncertainties. Experience with other operating BWR's indicates that the control rod inventory should be predictable to the equivalent of one per cent in reactivity.