

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): Oyster Creek	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
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TITLE (4)
Failure to test a SGTS train within required time.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																				
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)																																		
04	02	84	84	007	00	05		84			05000																																		
<table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width:15%;">OPERATING MODE (9) N</td> <td colspan="10">THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)</td> </tr> <tr> <td rowspan="5">POWER LEVEL (10) 000</td> <td>20.402(b)</td> <td>20.406(c)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(iv)</td> <td>73.71(b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.406(a)(1)(i)</td> <td>50.36(c)(1)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(v)</td> <td>73.71(c)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.406(a)(1)(ii)</td> <td>50.36(c)(2)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(vii)</td> <td rowspan="3">OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.406(a)(1)(iii)</td> <td>X 50.73(a)(2)(i)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.406(a)(1)(iv)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(ii)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20.406(a)(1)(v)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(iii)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(x)</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>												OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)										POWER LEVEL (10) 000	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Paul F. Czaya	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 609 971-4893

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 1530 hours on April 2, 1984, Diesel Generator No. 1 (DG-1) was declared inoperable as a result of a failure to fast start during that segment of the monthly surveillance. Since DG-1 is the emergency power supply for Standby Gas Treatment System No. 1 (SGTS 1), SGTS 1 must also be considered inoperable pursuant to Definition No. 1.1 'OPERABLE-OPERABILITY' in the Technical Specifications. At this time, Torus painting work was stopped and a ten (10) hour waiting period began prior to testing SGTS II. Technical Specification 3.5.B.3.b.1 requires a redundant SGTS train to be demonstrated operable within two (2) hours.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

DATE OF OCCURRENCE

April 2, 1984.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

SGTS II was not tested within the time limit required by Technical Specification 3.5.B.3.b.1 after SGTS I was declared inoperable due to its emergency power supply (DG-1) being inoperable.

This occurrence is considered to be a reportable event as defined in 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The reactor was defueled with the mode switch in REFUEL.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

The regularly scheduled surveillance of the Standby Gas Treatment System was performed on Sunday, April 1, 1984 at approximately 1720 hours, with an operability test on both SGTS I and SGTS II and a ten (10) hour run on SGTS I. The 10-hour run on SGTS I was completed at 0348 hours on April 2, 1984. At 0322 hours on April 2, 1984, a load test on DG-2 was completed in preparation for removing DG-1 from service later that morning. At 0630 hours on April 2, 1984, DG-1 was removed from service for preventive maintenance and monthly surveillance.

During the course of the day on April 2, 1984, Torus painting had begun as scheduled. Upon declaring DG-1 and SGTS I inoperable at approximately 1530 hours, Torus painting was stopped. A 10 hour wait period was required by procedure after stoppage of Torus painting prior to operating a SGTS train for testing purposes due to a potential for degradation of charcoal adsorbers. SGTS II was demonstrated operable at 0140 hours on April 3, 1984.

An operable SGTS was required during the period in question due to the requirement for maintaining secondary containment integrity stemming from the movement of an irradiated fuel assembly from a storage location to the fuel preparation machine for channeling at 1750 hours on April 2, 1984, and then back to its storage location at 2310 hours later that evening.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The apparent cause of occurrence is believed to be two-fold: 1) more restrictive Technical Specifications regarding emergency and normal power supply requirements in the SHUTDOWN or REFUEL modes, and 2) a conflicting procedural requirement established to protect the integrity of SGTS charcoal adsorbers.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT


Operability of SGTS I and II was demonstrated within twenty three (23) hours prior to declaring DG-1 and SGTS I inoperable. Inoperability of SGTS I was due solely to the inoperability of its emergency power supply (DG-1), not due to inoperability of any component in the SGTS train. Operability of SGTS II was again demonstrated within eleven (11) hours of declaring SGTS I inoperable. In addition, DG-2 was load tested prior to performing the monthly surveillance on DG-1. On the basis of the above discussion the safety significance of the event is considered minimal.

Technical Specifications (3.0.B) are more restrictive during SHUTDOWN or REFUEL than during normal operation with regard to the inoperability of the alternate or normal power supply for a system. During normal operation, the inoperability of either the alternate or normal power supply for a system does not render the system inoperable as regards satisfying applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO). In other words, this event would not be reportable if the plant was operating. Oyster Creek Technical Specifications for power supply requirements (Section 3.7) do not specifically address power supply availability requirements in the REFUEL or SHUTDOWN modes.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Once the requirement to test SGTS II was established, Torus painting was stopped and SGTS II was tested after the required ten (10) hour wait period. Technical Specifications did not require the termination of irradiated fuel handling. However, if controls had been instituted to prevent irradiated fuel handling at the time SGTS I was declared inoperable, secondary containment integrity would not have been required and, therefore, the SGTS would not have been required to be operable at all.

A change to the Technical Specifications will be investigated to ascertain if the more restrictive Technical Specifications regarding normal or emergency power supply requirements in the SHUTDOWN or REFUEL modes can be eased or clarified. The procedural requirement to wait 10 hours prior to operating a SGTS train for testing, after termination of painting activities, will be changed when a test is required to comply with an LCO. This LER will be made required reading for all Operations personnel.



GPU Nuclear Corporation
Post Office Box 388
Route 9 South
Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388
609 971-4000
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

May 18, 1984


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/84-007

This letter forwards one (1) copy of Licensee Event Report No. 50-219/84-007 in compliance with 10CFR50.73. The 30 day time limitation has been exceeded due to uncertainty regarding the reportability of the event described therein.

Very truly yours,



Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:dsm
Enclosures

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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